Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule (RIN 0694-AK43, 91 FR 1684, signed 13 January 2026, effective 15 January 2026) revising the EAR license-review policy for exports of certain advanced-computing integrated circuits to end-users in China and Macau from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review. Eligibility is limited to commodities controlled under ECCN 3A090.a and 3A090.b with a Total Processing Performance (TPP) below 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth below 6,500 GB/s — the band that covers NVIDIA H200 and AMD MI325X-equivalents and below. To qualify, exporters must certify (i) sufficiency of US supply such that the export will not delay domestic orders or divert foundry capacity, (ii) that aggregate TPP of advanced-node ICs exported to China or Macau will not exceed 50% of domestic shipments, (iii) compliance with end-use and end-user prohibitions, and (iv) prior performance review by a qualified independent third-party testing lab headquartered in the United States. The rule is the first material rollback of the October 2022 / October 2023 / December 2024 advanced-computing export-control architecture and operationalises the Trump-administration policy of trading H200-class chip access against Chinese cooperation on critical minerals, fentanyl precursors and Taiwan-strait restraint.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.

On 20 November 2025 the White House and US Department of Commerce / Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorised Abu Dhabi AI holding company G42 to import advanced computing chips — equivalent to approximately 35,000 Nvidia GB300 Blackwell processors — under the UAE-pioneered Regulated Technology Environment (RTE) compliance framework. The RTE is an Emirati-designed technology governance and audit architecture, developed by G42 and approved under BIS guidelines, with binding UAE-side controls to prevent onward diversion to foreign adversary nations. The authorisation accelerates the Stargate UAE project — a 1 GW AI compute cluster being built by G42 for OpenAI in partnership with Oracle, Cisco, NVIDIA, and SoftBank Group — and represents the first concluded major country-level advanced-compute authorisation following the May 2025 rescission of the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.

MOFCOM Announcement No. 68 of 2025 (商务部公告2025年第68号), issued on 26 October 2025, sets the application requirements and procedures for state-owned trading enterprises (STEs) authorised to export tungsten, antimony and silver during the 2026-2027 cycle. The notice formalises a quota review and joint-approval gate operated through the Key Export Supervision Catalog under MOFCOM's foreign-trade STE authority — distinct from the Export Control Law dual-use regime used in Announcement No. 10 of February 2025. Silver is added for the first time to the STE-managed list, framed by MOFCOM as defence of strategic supply for defence, electronics and photovoltaics. Approved-exporter lists were published in a follow-on review-results notice; the new regime applies to export shipments dated 1 January 2026 onwards.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003, adopted by the European Commission on 8 September 2025, published in the Official Journal on 14 November 2025 and entering into force on 15 November 2025, amends Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 to implement the 2024 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. The most extensive EU semiconductor-equipment additions since the 2021 framework took effect: ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography, EUV pellicles/masks/reticles, SEM, and etching equipment, plus tighter controls on quantum computers, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, additive-manufacturing, and cryogenic/superconducting components. The regulation is the EU-side update layer of the Western dual-use export control architecture, structurally aligned with the US BIS advanced- computing/SME packages and the Netherlands DUV-licensing regime.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations to remove three foreign-owned semiconductor fabs operating in China — Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) Ltd, Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd, and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd — from the Validated End-User (VEU) Authorizations list (15 CFR Part 748). BIS framed the VEU program as a "loophole" that previously allowed these fabs to receive most US-origin chipmaking equipment, software and technology license-free, a privilege no US-owned fab in China ever had. After the effective date, every restricted shipment to these fabs will require an individual export license, reviewed case-by-case under the existing 2022/2023 advanced- computing controls. The rule is published as Federal Register document 2025-16735 (90 FR 42321), Docket BIS-2025-0555, RIN 0694-AK32.

Malaysia's Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, acting through the Strategic Trade Controller, issued Directive No. 1/2025 on 14 July 2025 invoking Section 12 of the Strategic Trade Act 2010 to declare high-performance US-origin AI chips (GPUs, TPUs, neural processors, AI accelerators meeting the Annex I total-processing-performance and performance-density thresholds) as "unlisted controlled items". With effect from 14 July 2025, any export, transshipment, or transit of those chips through Malaysian territory requires a Strategic Trade Permit, a 30-day prior notification, an export-control classification from the manufacturer, and a re-export licence from the originating country. The directive is the formal Malaysian response to US scrutiny over alleged Nvidia AI-chip flows to China via Malaysian freight forwarders and data-centre operators, and it remains binding even after the US relaxes its own export rules.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) amended the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) export-control Entity List on 10 June 2025 (announced 15 June 2025) under Article 13 of the Trade Act, adding 601 new entities — including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) plus 599 additional entities domiciled in China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. Taiwanese exporters (TSMC, UMC, ASE, KYEC and downstream suppliers) must obtain pre-export government licences for direct or third-party shipments of any SHTC-listed item to the listed entities; the action expands Taiwan's total entity-list population to ~10,844 entities. Two follow-on amendments tightened the regime further: a +279-entity expansion on 18 September 2025 and an 18-item commodity-list expansion on 18 November 2025 covering advanced 3D printers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electron microscopes and quantum-computing hardware.

On 13 May 2025, two days before the AI Diffusion Rule's primary 15 May 2025 compliance date, the Trump administration's BIS announced it would rescind the Biden-era Framework for AI Diffusion (90 FR 4544) and simultaneously issued three guidance documents that re-routed US AI export policy through existing EAR authorities. The package comprises (1) GP10 guidance asserting that all ECCN 3A090 ICs designed by PRC-headquartered firms are presumptively EAR-violative, with Huawei Ascend 910B/910C/910D processors named explicitly — making US- and non-US-person use, transfer, financing, or servicing of those chips anywhere in the world a presumptive General Prohibition 10 violation; (2) a policy statement warning industry that supplying US advanced computing ICs for training or inference of Chinese AI models risks EAR enforcement; and (3) industry guidance on diversion-prevention diligence. BIS stated a formal Federal Register rescission and replacement rule would follow.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) overhauled the catch-all export-control framework under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) — the first comprehensive review of Japan's catch-all controls in 12 years (since 2013). Cabinet decisions were taken on 25 March 2025 and 4 April 2025 with METI's consolidated announcement on 9 April 2025; the amended Cabinet Order entered into force on 9 October 2025. The reform (i) splits catch-all-controlled items into "core items" (high dual-use risk, including certain semiconductors and machine tools) and a general catch-all tier, (ii) adds a new end-user requirement alongside the existing end-use requirement and extends both from UN-arms-embargo countries only to "general countries" (everywhere outside Group A), materially expanding the perimeter of items requiring METI export licences for general-country end-users including China, and (iii) introduces an "informed" condition for exports to Group A countries — once METI notifies an exporter of a defined risk pattern, a Group A export becomes licence-required, addressing transit-export-circumvention to Russia. Structurally distinct from the 23-category equipment-specific 2023 amendment (2023-03-31-japan-meti-semi-equipment-export-controls); this is the underlying horizontal catch-all reform and brings Japan's framework closer to US BIS EAR catch-all controls.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to add 12 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (11) and Taiwan (1) via Final Rule 2025-05427 (90 FR 14046), companion to the larger 70-entity rule (2025-05426) published the same day. Targets fall in three clusters: (i) Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence and Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology — added for acquiring US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, specifically developing large AI models and advanced computing chips for defense; (ii) the Inspur group — Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong), Inspur (HK) Electronics, Inspur Software, and Inspur Taiwan — added as subsidiaries contributing to supercomputers for military end use; and (iii) Henan Dingxin, Nettrix Information Industry, Suma Technology, and Suma-USI Electronics — added for involvement in the development of Chinese exascale supercomputers. License requirements are for all items subject to the EAR; review policy is presumption of denial for the AI cluster and policy of denial for the supercomputer clusters.

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

BIS published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2025-00711, 90 FR 4544-publication slot; companion to the AI Diffusion Framework signed three days earlier) revising the EAR to add explicit due-diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits captured by ECCN 3A090. The rule (i) creates an Authorized IC Designer / Approved IC Packager regime so that foundries and OSATs can identify trustworthy customers via lists maintained by BIS, (ii) imposes new front-end-fabricator reporting requirements for any 3A090.a IC produced for an authorized IC designer to give the US government supply-chain visibility, and (iii) adjusts the scope of covered advanced-computing items. Effective 16 January 2025; compliance required from 31 January 2025; comment period extended to 14 March 2025. The rule was immediately followed by the 16 January Entity List additions (Sophgo et al.) targeting circumvention paths and was technically amended on 14 February 2025 to narrow the RS license requirement to ECCN 3A090.a only.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued its largest single export-control package targeting China's semiconductor industry on 2 December 2024, with three layered measures (final rules published in the Federal Register 5 December 2024). First, controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) above set performance thresholds — blocking the memory architecture that is foundational to AI training. Second, additions of 24 semiconductor manufacturing equipment item types to the Commerce Control List, covering deposition, etch, ion- implant, advanced packaging, and metrology categories. Third, Entity List designations for 140+ entities, the bulk Chinese semiconductor companies + equipment makers + investment vehicles, including major Chinese fab tooling firms. The package triggered MOFCOM's same-day-following retaliation (filed: 2024-12-03-china-mofcom-ge-ga-sb-export-ban-us).

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

On 6 September 2024 the Dutch government announced an expansion of its national export-control measure on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, bringing two additional ASML DUV immersion lithography systems — TWINSCAN NXT:1970i and NXT:1980i — under a Dutch national authorisation requirement for shipments to destinations outside the EU. The measure took effect on 7 September 2024 via a ministerial regulation published in Staatscourant 2024 no. 29008. Until this point those two older system variants were controlled extraterritorially through the US Foreign Direct Product Rule; the change transfers licensing authority from BIS to the Dutch government and aligns the Dutch national list more tightly with the perimeter set by the June-2023 measure on NXT:2000i+. ASML characterised the update as a "technical change" with no expected impact on its 2024 financials or longer-term outlook.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).

On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule on 17 October 2023 that substantially expanded the advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls first imposed in October 2022. The rule closed the performance-threshold workaround that NVIDIA had used to ship China-specific A800/H800 GPUs, replacing it with a "performance density" metric and adding a new "Notified Advanced Computing" licence category. It expanded controls on chipmaking equipment (additional ECCNs covering deposition, etch, metrology), pulled 21 additional countries (mostly Middle East / Central Asia) into a regional licensing scheme to prevent transshipment, and added 13 Chinese entities to the Entity List including AI-chip designers.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced an export licensing regime covering eight gallium-related items (including gallium metal, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride wafers and ingots) and six germanium- related items (including germanium metal, germanium oxide, germanium tetrachloride). Effective 1 August 2023, exporters must obtain a dual-use-item licence from MOFCOM citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The measure was framed as protecting national security and interests, though the timing immediately followed the Dutch ASML DUV controls and US chip-equipment escalations.

The Dutch government announced on 30 June 2023 a new national export-licensing requirement covering specific advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, most prominently ASML's TWINSCAN NXT:2000i and subsequent DUV immersion lithography systems used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND production. Effective from 1 September 2023 via the national Strategic Goods Decree, the rule completes the trilateral US-Japan-Netherlands chip-equipment perimeter initiated by the January 2023 trilateral agreement. Although nominally country-neutral, the BIS Foreign Direct Product Rule means licences for shipments to "countries of concern" — read: China — face a presumption of denial. Subsequent guidance in 2024 expanded coverage to additional TWINSCAN NXT:1970Ci and 1980Di system variants.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced on 31 March 2023 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act adding 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to the export-licensing list. The measure, effective from 23 July 2023, is the Japanese counterpart to the US October 2022 BIS rule (filed: 2022-10-07-us-bis-advanced-ai-chip-controls-china) and the Dutch DUV controls. Items covered span lithography (mostly ArF and KrF), deposition (CVD, ALD, sputtering), etch, and cleaning + advanced inspection — broadly the toolset used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND. The controls are formally non-discriminatory but in practice capture exports to China; non-China destinations get general licences.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

BIS published an interim final rule on January 18, 2023 (88 FR 2821, FR Doc 2023-00888) extending to Macau the same advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls originally imposed on China by the October 7, 2022 rule. The extension closes a diversion loophole created by Macau's status as a Special Administrative Region of China, applying equivalent license requirements for advanced computing ICs, equipment used in ≤14 nm logic and advanced NAND/DRAM fabrication, and supercomputer end-use restrictions. The rule also includes entity list modifications and took effect one day before Federal Register publication (January 17, 2023).

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 36 entities — 35 in China, 1 in Japan — to the Entity List under a presumption of denial for all EAR-controlled items, effective December 16, 2022. The most consequential additions are Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC, simultaneously removed from the Unverified List), eight Cambricon AI-chip subsidiaries, and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), China's sole domestic lithography producer. Three existing entries were revised: CETC 13 and two affiliates gained a Footnote 3 Russian-military-end-user designation, bringing them under the Russia/Belarus Foreign Direct Product rule with a blanket denial policy.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security imposed broad new controls on the export of advanced computing chips, chipmaking equipment, and US-person services supporting Chinese semiconductor fabrication. The October 7 2022 rule blocked supply of GPUs above set performance thresholds (initially 600 GB/s interconnect / 4800 TOPS) to China and added end-use restrictions on manufacturing tools used in advanced (≤14/16 nm logic, ≤18 nm DRAM, ≤128-layer NAND) facilities, with a foreign direct product rule extending coverage globally.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 31 Chinese entities — including Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC), China's largest NAND flash manufacturer — to the Unverified List (UVL), suspending license exceptions and requiring end-user statements for all EAR-controlled items destined to these parties. BIS simultaneously removed nine Chinese entities previously on the UVL after successfully completing end-use checks. The rule also established a new 60-day UVL-to-Entity-List escalation clock and clarified that sustained host-government obstruction of end-use checks constitutes independent grounds for Entity List designation — a structural enforcement change aimed at closing China's pattern of blocking BIS post-shipment verification visits.

Effective 24 February 2022 — the date of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (87 FR 12226, FR Doc 2022-04300) adding sweeping new export license requirements under a new § 746.8 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule requires a licence for any item in CCL Categories 3–9 (electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation/avionics, marine, aerospace, propulsion) exported, reexported, or transferred to Russia, with a review policy of denial. Two new Russia-specific Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules extend US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured goods: the Russia FDP Rule (§ 734.9(f)) covers all foreign-made items using US technology/equipment destined for Russia, and the Russia-MEU FDP Rule (§ 734.9(g)) covers items destined to 47 designated military-end-user (MEU) entities with no licence exceptions available. All three restrictions carry a presumption of denial, making this the most sweeping peacetime expansion of the EAR since its modern codification.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese supercomputing entities to the Entity List, imposing a license requirement covering all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with a presumption of denial. The entities were designated for procuring and building supercomputers used by China's military actors, supporting China's military modernization, and aiding the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hypersonic weapons programs. This was the Biden administration's first Entity List action targeting China's supercomputing sector.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove Hong Kong as a separate, preferentially treated destination, effective December 23, 2020. Hong Kong is reclassified from Computer Tier 1 to Tier 3 and now subject to the same licence requirements, licence exceptions, and end-use restrictions that apply to mainland China. The rule implements Section 3 of Executive Order 13936 (July 14, 2020, "Hong Kong Normalization"), itself a response to China's imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong on June 30, 2020.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 77 entities (under 78 entries) to the Entity List via a December 22, 2020 final rule (FR Doc 2020-28031). The headline designation is Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) — China's largest contract chipmaker — for activities related to military-civil fusion (MCF), with a presumption of denial applied to all items uniquely required to produce chips at advanced nodes of 10 nanometers or below. The batch also covers entities that supported PRC militarisation of artificial islands in the South China Sea and entities implicated in human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang.

The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress on 17 October 2020 (Presidential Order No. 58) and entered into force on 1 December 2020. Comprising 5 chapters and 49 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework governing China's export-control regime over dual-use items, military items, nuclear items, and other goods, technologies, services, and data whose export could affect national security or China's non-proliferation obligations. The law introduces comprehensive licensing requirements, end-user and end-use certification, deemed-export and re-export controls with extraterritorial reach, a Controlled Entities List (CEL) with matching-entity restrictions, and substantial criminal and administrative penalties — and it is the parent statutory authority under which every China export-control implementing instrument in the IPTM register operates.