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Décret n° 2024/05251/PM, signed on 19 November 2024 by the Cameroonian Prime Minister, establishes the legal framework governing the possession, marketing, export, import, and transit of mineral substances in Cameroon. The decree operationalises the trade-flow control architecture introduced by the headline Loi n°2023/014 portant Code Minier (December 2023), giving effect to SONAMINES's statutory monopoly over the purchase and commercialisation of strategic minerals including gold, diamonds, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. It is one of eight implementing decrees signed 18–19 November 2024 that together constitute the full operational legal framework under the 2023 Code Minier.

On 14 November 2024 in Port Moresby, the Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) signed a five-year Memorandum of Understanding (2025–2030) with the Nanjing Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources of the China Geological Survey (CGS), renewing a geoscience cooperation framework first established in a 2012 MoU. The agreement covers joint geochemical mapping, soil and rock sampling, remote-sensing surveys across PNG mineral provinces, and a capacity-building programme placing PNG geoscientists at Chinese universities for postgraduate degrees. At a time when the US, Australia and Japan are competing for upstream critical-minerals influence across the Pacific under the Quad and Lobito Corridor architectures, the MoU directs PNG's geological-survey knowledge production into Chinese state-affiliated channels, potentially biasing downstream mineral-rights allocation toward CGS-aligned exploration entities.

Tanzania's Parliament passed the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 (Bill No. 15 of 2024, published in the Special Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No. 34 Vol. 105 on 5 November 2024), which amends eight statutes including the Mining Act, Cap. 123. The mining-related provisions: (i) empower the Minister for Minerals, on recommendation from the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST), to declare specific minerals as "critical" (essential to national economic, geopolitical, technology, or industrial use with limited or threatened supply) or "strategic" (mineral resources with diplomatic or defence importance) — the first Tanzanian statutory authority to do so; (ii) raise the minimum capital investment for a Mining Licence from USD 100,000 to USD 5,000,000 (a 50× hike pricing out junior explorers); (iii) authorise gemstone export following government-organised mineral auctions or international gem fairs while reaffirming the general beneficiation-in-Tanzania requirement on raw minerals and concentrates; (iv) require GST verification of mineral data on samples exported by mineral right holders; and (v) impose penalties for inaccurate or false mineral-data submissions. The Act establishes the gateway statutory authority for any future Tanzania critical- mineral export-control or stockpiling regime.

The European Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2754 on 29 October 2024 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of new battery electric vehicles (BEVs) originating in China, effective the day after publication. Following a 13-month investigation initiated by Commissioner Dombrovskis in October 2023, the rates layered on top of the existing 10% MFN duty are: BYD 17.0%, Geely 18.8%, SAIC 35.3%, Tesla 7.8% (individually-investigated), 17.0% for sampled cooperating producers, 20.7% for non-sampled cooperating producers, 35.3% for non-cooperating producers. Duties are payable for five years from entry into force unless reviewed earlier. The measure followed a member-state vote with Germany voting against and France/Italy in favour.

On 8 October 2024 Botswana's National Assembly assented to the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 2024, the most significant rewrite of the country's mining statute (Cap. 66:01, 1999) in over two decades. The Act commenced on 1 October 2025 via Statutory Instrument 120 of 2025 and introduces five structurally significant provisions: a mandatory 24% citizen/local-investor equity participation in new mining concessions (if the state elects not to take the stake itself), a broadened "controlling interest" definition capturing indirect offshore transactions, enhanced ministerial licence-transfer approval requirements, strengthened environmental rehabilitation obligations, and an in-country beneficiation push. The measure closes the offshore-transaction loophole that previously allowed indirect change-of-control via Mauritius/BVI/Singapore SPVs to bypass ministerial approval, and operationalises Botswana's resource-nationalism turn alongside the companion February 2025 De Beers / Debswana commercial renegotiation.

The Cook Islands government promulgated the Seabed Minerals (Minerals Harvesting and Other Mining) Regulations 2024 (Serial 2024/11), entering into force 1 October 2024, as the first statutory framework enabling commercial-scale polymetallic-nodule harvesting in the Cook Islands' 1.96 million km² EEZ — one of the world's largest documented manganese-nodule provinces estimated at ~6.7 billion metric tonnes. The Regulations were issued by the SBMA under the Seabed Minerals Act 2009 and establish the licensing pathway, environmental-assessment standards, royalty-and-benefit-sharing framework, production-licence application criteria, and operator financial-assurance requirements for the commercial harvesting tier. The government has stated that only exploration activities are currently permitted and that harvesting licences will not be granted until a science-based environmental decision has been made; the Regulations nonetheless create the legal architecture that would activate commercial extraction, structurally peer to Norway's June 2024 Arctic seabed-mining opening and ahead of the stalled ISA Mining Code negotiations.

Zambia's Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development, under Minister Hon. Paul C. Kabuswe, launched the National Critical Minerals Strategy 2024-2028 on 27 August 2024 following Cabinet approval, alongside the National Three Million Tonnes Copper Production Strategy by 2031. The strategy designates copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium, manganese, graphite, tin, uranium and rare earth elements as Zambia's strategic critical minerals and is built on four pillars: geological knowledge and resource management; value addition and local processing; government participation through a special-purpose vehicle taking up to 30% equity in new strategic projects; and regulatory and institutional reform. It is the first standalone Zambian industrial-policy framework for critical-minerals beneficiation and the first ZM action in the IPTM register.

On 2 August 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned Lei nº 14.948/2024 (with partial veto, Mensagem nº 741) at a ceremony in the Pecém Industrial-Port Complex in Ceará, following Senate and Chamber approval of PL 2308/2023; the law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 August 2024. The statute establishes Brazil's first comprehensive legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen: it (i) creates the National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy (PNH2BC) under the National Energy Policy umbrella, (ii) sets a statutory definition of "low-carbon hydrogen" as fuel/industrial input with lifecycle GHG intensity ≤ 7 kg CO₂e/kg H₂, (iii) institutes the Brazilian Hydrogen Certification System (SBCH2) for origin and emissions accreditation, (iv) creates the Special Incentive Regime for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production (Rehidro), suspending PIS/Pasep and Cofins for five years on capital-goods, raw-materials and services purchases by qualified producers, and (v) authorises the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Hidrogênio de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (PHBC) — a tax-credit envelope capped at BRL 18.3 bn between 2028 and 2032 (subsequently regulated by Lei nº 14.990/2024 sanctioned 30 September 2024). ANP gains regulatory authority over hydrogen transportation, storage and import/export licensing, while the law amends Leis nºs 9.427/1996 (ANEEL) and 9.478/1997 (Petroleum Law) to integrate hydrogen into the energy-policy and electricity-regulation framework. Industry reporting at sanction cited >USD 30 bn in announced project pipeline, concentrated in Northeast renewable-rich states (Ceará, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte) leveraging Pecém, Suape and Açu as hydrogen-derivative export terminals.

Decree 0977, signed 2 August 2024 by the Petro administration, regulates Article 231 of the National Development Plan (Law 2294/2023) by adding Chapter 12 to Title V, Part 2, Book 2 of Decreto 1073 de 2015, the consolidated mining-and-energy regulation. The decree creates a new state-managed territorial category — Distritos Mineros Especiales para la Diversificación Productiva — split into two tracks: "Distritos Mineros para la Vida y la Paz" (zones of high informal-mining presence, formalisation focus) and "Distritos Mineros para la Transición Energética Justa" (decarbonisation and productive-reconversion focus, principally coal phase-out zones). The decree restructures where, how, and under what licensing terms large-scale mining is permitted in Colombia, the world's #1 thermal coal exporter to Europe and a major LatAm producer of gold, copper and nickel.

Italy's Decreto-Legge 25 giugno 2024 n. 84, converted with amendments into Legge 8 agosto 2024 n. 115 (Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 189 of 13 August 2024, in force 14 August 2024), is Italy's national implementing instrument for Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 (the EU Critical Raw Materials Act). It establishes a MIMIT-led national governance framework for strategic CRM projects spanning extraction, transformation, and recycling; creates a mandatory National Register of strategic companies and value chains with annual reporting on strategic-material import/export flows; divides permitting competence between MASE (extraction/recycling, max 18/10 months) and MIMIT (transformation, max 10 months); and designates INVITALIA and CDP as financing windows for Italian strategic-CRM projects seeking EU Strategic Project status under CRMA Article 6.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 - the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) - was published in the Official Journal on 22 June 2024 and entered into force on 12 July 2024 (twenty days after OJ publication). It sets a binding target that at least 40% of the EU's annual deployment needs for net-zero technologies be manufactured within the EU by 2030. It establishes a streamlined permitting regime for Net-Zero Strategic Projects (NZSP) capped at 18 months for construction permits (9 months for smaller projects), creates Net-Zero Regulatory Sandboxes, and requires public procurers and auction designers to include resilience and sustainability criteria that effectively favour non-China-sourced equipment. The Act is the manufacturing-capacity complement to the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA, Reg 2024/1252, filed separately) and was explicitly designed to close the EU's competitive gap with US IRA manufacturing incentives.

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade promulgated Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan (Permendag) No. 10 of 2024 on 30 May 2024, amending Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export. The regulation set 31 December 2024 as the final cutoff for copper-concentrate and anode-sludge exports — extending the original 1 June 2024 ban deadline by seven months — and enforced a full prohibition starting 1 January 2025. The measure is paired with ESDM Regulation No. 6 of 2024 covering the upstream mining-product side, completing the legal architecture of Indonesia's copper "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) mandate. The ban forces all domestically mined copper concentrate to be smelted and refined inside Indonesia. Two operators are directly affected: PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), majority-owned by state holding MIND ID with Freeport-McMoRan as minority partner, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua and the new Manyar/Gresik smelter in JIIPE; and PT Amman Mineral Nusa Tenggara (subsidiary of PT Amman Mineral Internasional, IDX:AMMN), which operates the Batu Hijau mine in Sumbawa with a smelter under commissioning. A fire at Freeport's Gresik smelter in October 2024 disrupted ramp-up and forced the government to grant a discretionary export-permit extension into 2025 for PTFI, signalling that the ban — while now legally in force — is being enforced flexibly during smelter commissioning rather than as a hard stop. Permendag 10/2024 is the copper-sector equivalent of the 2020 nickel- ore export ban (ESDM 11/2019) and the planned bauxite-ore ban (effective June 2023). Together these three measures complete Indonesia's resource-nationalism package across its three highest-value mineral exports: nickel, bauxite, and copper. Combined domestic smelter capex commitments tied to the copper rule (Freeport Manyar + Amman Sumbawa) total ~USD 6 billion. Indonesia's Finance Ministry estimated forgone export revenue of ~Rp 10 trillion (~USD 640 million per year) from the copper-concentrate ban alone, which the government is treating as an acceptable downstream-policy cost. Severity is set at 4: the action is binding, durable, and reshapes a globally relevant supply chain (Indonesia is ~5% of global mined copper, rising), but discretionary export extensions during smelter commissioning soften near-term enforcement and limit the immediate market shock relative to the harder 2020 nickel rule.

On 15 May 2024 the NEDA Board, chaired by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., approved a modification of Executive Order No. 12 s.2023 to expand the zero-tariff MFN regime on electric vehicles. The expansion broadens the scope from purely battery-electric four-wheeled passenger cars to hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), e-motorcycles, e-bicycles, e-tricycles, e-quadricycles, nickel-metal-hydride accumulator batteries, and PHEV/BEV jeepneys and buses, with the zero MFN duty extended through 2028 (versus the five-year horizon to 2028 under the original EO 12 of 13 January 2023). The measure is a trade-flow preference designed to accelerate domestic EV adoption and attract assembly investment under the Comprehensive Roadmap for the Electric Vehicle Industry (CREVI); it favours Chinese, Korean, and Japanese EV exporters that dominate the addressable supply.

Australia's Future Made in Australia package, announced in the 2024-25 Federal Budget on 14 May 2024, commits A$22.7bn over 10 years to position Australia as a preferred supplier in the global clean-energy and critical-minerals supply chain. The two flagship production tax incentives are: (1) the Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive (10% of eligible processing and refining costs for 31 critical minerals) and (2) the Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive (A$2 per kg of eligible renewable or low-emissions hydrogen, 2027-2040). A National Interest Framework administered by DISR determines which investments qualify. The framework act established a Future Made in Australia Coordinator and consolidated existing industrial-support vehicles (NAIF, EFA) under a single policy lens.

The Biden administration announced on 14 May 2024 a package of Section 301 tariff increases on Chinese imports following the four-year statutory review of the original 2018-2019 tariffs. The hikes target sectors central to the US-China industrial-policy contest: BEVs went from 25% to 100%, lithium- ion EV batteries 7.5% → 25% (with non-EV battery cells rising in 2026), battery parts 7.5% → 25%, natural graphite + magnets 0% → 25% (phased to 2026), semiconductors 25% → 50% (phased to 2025), solar cells 25% → 50%, steel + aluminum products in selected categories 0-7.5% → 25%, ship-to-shore cranes 0% → 25%, certain medical products 0-7.5% → 50%. USTR issued the final determination on 13 September 2024 with most items effective 27 September 2024.

Act No. 9 of 2025, given Royal Assent on 14 February 2025, enacts the two production tax credits announced in the May 2024 Future Made in Australia package. Schedule 1 creates the Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive (HPTI): A$2/kg refundable tax offset for eligible renewable hydrogen produced with emissions intensity below 0.6 kgCO2e/kg H2. Schedule 2 creates the Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive (CMPTI): a refundable 10% tax offset on eligible processing and refining expenditure for the 31 minerals on Australia's Critical Minerals List. Both offsets apply to production occurring between 1 July 2027 and 30 June 2040, capped at 10 years per project, administered by the ATO via new Divisions 419 (CMPTI) and 421 (HPTI) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.

Mongolia's State Great Khural adopted the Sovereign Wealth Fund Law and accompanying Minerals Law amendments on 19 April 2024 (effective 10 May 2024). The package caps any private holder plus affiliates at ≤34% of issued shares of a company holding a strategic-deposit licence, and requires transfer of a state share (up to 34%) for designated strategic deposits. Up to 16 deposits are potentially affected. A February 2025 cabinet decision rebranded the SOE "Mongolrostsvetmet" as "Erdenes Critical Minerals" with an expanded rare-earth mandate, consolidating critical-minerals exploration and processing under Erdenes Mongol LLC.

OFAC issued two determinations under Executive Orders 14068 and 14071 banning the import into the United States of Russian-origin aluminum, copper, and nickel produced on or after April 13, 2024, and separately prohibiting the provision of warranting/deliverable services for these metals on global exchanges (LME, CME) and their use to settle over-the-counter derivative contracts. Metal produced before the effective date is grandfathered. The action was coordinated with the United Kingdom, which imposed parallel exchange-listing prohibitions the same day, following G7 statements on reducing Russia's metals revenue.

The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252) entered into force on 23 May 2024 after publication in the EU Official Journal on 3 May 2024. The Act sets binding 2030 benchmarks for the Union: ≥10% of annual consumption from domestic extraction, ≥40% from domestic processing, ≥25% from domestic recycling, and a strict ≤65% concentration limit from any single third country for each strategic raw material. It establishes a list of 17 strategic raw materials and 34 critical raw materials, creates a "Strategic Project" fast-track permitting regime (≤27 months for extraction, ≤15 months for recycling), and mandates joint purchasing and supply-risk stress tests for large EU manufacturers.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

Portugal's Council of Ministers adopted Resolution n.º 49/2024 on 26 March 2024, establishing the Sistema de Incentivos ao Investimento em Setores Estratégicos (Strategic Sectors Investment Incentive System) — a dedicated state-aid window anchored to the EU Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF, Commission Communication C(2023)1711) and routed through Portugal's Regime Contratual de Investimento (RCI, Decree-Law 191/2014). The scheme covers green-transition equipment manufacturing (batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, heat pumps, electrolysers, CCUS) and upstream critical raw materials (lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, copper, rare earths, graphite, anode/cathode precursor chemistries), offering cumulative grant equivalents up to 35% of eligible investment for large enterprises and 45–55% for SMEs, Cohesion-Region operations, or strategic-priority categories. A hard 31 December 2025 approval-decision sunset tied to TCTF expiry drove a Q3–Q4 2025 project-decision rush. The scheme served as the primary domestic state-aid instrument underpinning Portugal's four EU CRMA-designated strategic projects (Savannah Barroso lithium, Lusorecursos Aguas Frias lithium, Lifthium Estarreja LiCO3/LiOH refinery, Bondalti Estarreja lithium-derivatives integration).

President Paul Biya signed Loi n°2023/014 on 19 December 2023, replacing the 2016 mining code (Loi n°2016/017) and significantly enlarging state control over Cameroon's mineral sector. The law vests SONAMINES (Société Nationale des Mines) with an exclusive statutory monopoly over the purchase and commercialisation of gold and diamonds nationwide, mandates a 10% non-dilutable free-carry equity stake for the state in all mining enterprises, and introduces a production-sharing mechanism (1–5% of finished product for precious substances; 2–15% of raw ore for others) layered on top of revised ad valorem royalties (5% for precious metals, 3% for base metals, 10% for radioactive substances). The code provides the legal framework for SONAMINES-led reindustrialisation of large iron-ore and bauxite projects, including Mbalam-Nabeba and Minim-Martap.

On 19 December 2023, the Thai Cabinet endorsed the second phase of the national electric-vehicle support programme ("EV 3.5") covering 2024-2027, following its approval by the National Electric Vehicle Policy Committee. The Excise Department published the implementing Notification on 28 December 2023; the regime entered into force on 1 January 2024. EV 3.5 combines (i) per-vehicle purchase subsidies of THB 50,000-100,000 for battery-electric passenger cars and pick-ups, (ii) a reduction in excise duty on BEV passenger cars priced ≤ THB 7 million from 8% to 2%, and (iii) up to 40% import-duty relief on Completely Built-Up (CBU) BEV passenger cars priced ≤ THB 2 million during 2024-2025. Participating OEMs must offset CBU imports with domestic Thai production at a 1:2 ratio by end-2026 and 1:3 by end-2027, or face clawback of the granted incentives. The package is the operational successor to EV 3.0 (2022-2023) and was designed to lock in the wave of Chinese-OEM gigafactory and assembly investment that EV 3.0 attracted (BYD Rayong, MG/SAIC, GAC AION, Great Wall Motor, NETA, Changan, Chery). By the August 2025 EV-Board meeting Thailand had logged > THB 137 billion in approved EV-supply-chain investment under the combined EV 3.0 + EV 3.5 envelope. EV 3.5 is the central instrument in Thailand's "EV Hub of ASEAN" industrial strategy and the principal regional competitor to Indonesia's nickel-anchored EV-cluster bid and Vietnam's Decree 182 investment-support fund.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/1364) amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to prohibit UK persons from acquiring, importing, supplying or delivering listed Russian-origin metals and metal articles, delivering the Prime Minister's commitment to ban Russian copper, nickel and aluminium. Per law-firm summaries the list (a new Schedule 3BA) also covers lead, zinc, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, tantalum, magnesium, cobalt, antimony, manganese and further metals, and most provisions took effect on 15 December 2023 with a grace period for cargoes consigned before that date.

Colombia's National Mining Agency (ANM) issued Resolution 1006 of November 30, 2023, formally designating 17 mineral groups as "strategic" for the country under the authority of Law 1753/2015 Article 20. The designated list — Cu, Ni, Zn, platinum group elements, Fe, Mn, metallurgical coal, phosphates, Mg, Al, Au, emeralds, construction materials, silica sands, limestone, gypsum, and Cr — enables ANM to declare Strategic Mining Reserve Areas (AME) and organise special licensing rounds under preferential procedures. The resolution reframes Colombia's mineral priorities around energy transition, food security, reindustrialisation, and public infrastructure rather than the prior coal/precious-metals export emphasis.

Burundi's Assemblée Nationale promulgated Loi n°1/19 of 4 August 2023, amending the 2013 Mining Code (Loi n°1/21 of 15 October 2013). The law introduces mandatory 16% no-cost state equity participation in all large-mine joint ventures — rising by 5% at each permit renewal — caps individual operators to two permits per mineral substance, and imposes a 0.5% of turnover municipal development levy. Implementing decrees and orders followed: Décret n°100/224 of 23 November 2023 (artisanal/small-scale licensing), and Joint Ministerial Order n°760/540/1443 of 11 December 2023 (fiscal regime). Burundi holds East Africa's second-largest coltan reserves and significant cassiterite, gold, REE, nickel, and phosphate deposits, making this reform structurally significant for regional critical-mineral supply chains.

Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 establishes a comprehensive EU statutory framework for all battery categories (portable, SLI, LMT, EV, industrial), imposing supply-chain due-diligence obligations for cobalt, lithium, nickel, and natural graphite; mandatory recycled-content thresholds; carbon-footprint declarations; a digital battery passport; and ambitious collection and recycling-efficiency targets, with rolling application dates running from February 2024 through August 2036. It repeals Battery Directive 2006/66/EC and applies to every economic operator placing batteries on the EU market, binding every EV, consumer-electronics, and stationary-storage supply chain that relies on DRC cobalt, Australian/Chilean lithium, Indonesian/Philippine nickel, and Chinese/Mozambican graphite.

Loi n° 2023-007 portant refonte du Code Minier replaces the 2005-021 framework as the comprehensive legal foundation for Madagascar's mining sector. The headline fiscal change raises the ad-valorem mining royalty from 2% to 5%, decomposed as a 2% mining rebate (ristourne minière) earmarked for local communities and a 3% mining royalty (redevance minière) accruing to the State; a 30% reduction applies where extracted products are processed domestically, embedding a value-add incentive into the royalty schedule. The law also introduces a dedicated environmental, health and safety chapter, modernises customs/fiscal/foreign- exchange provisions, tightens permit-issuance procedures and strengthens oversight of small-scale mining. It is the first IPTM entry for Madagascar — a Tier-2 critical-minerals jurisdiction with material cobalt (Ambatovy), graphite (Molo / Green Giant), ilmenite/zircon (QMM Fort-Dauphin) and emerging REE / vanadium / nickel pipelines.

Norway's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (NFD) published the national mineral strategy on 21 June 2023, establishing a comprehensive framework to develop domestic critical-mineral resources sustainably while anchoring Norway's role in EU and allied supply chains. The strategy introduces a "hurtigspor" (fast-track) permitting procedure for projects of strategic significance, coordinates the Norwegian Geological Survey (NGU) and Directorate of Mineral Management around critical-raw-material mapping, and signals consideration of a state investment vehicle to secure Norwegian equity stakes in domestic mineral projects. Key mineral resources targeted include the Fen Complex rare-earth deposit (the largest validated EU REE resource), the Engebø rutile/garnet project (Nordic Mining), and the primary aluminium cluster (Hydro).

Poland enacted the Act of 16 June 2023 amending the Geological and Mining Law (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 2029), which introduced the foundational "strategic deposit" (złoże strategiczne) concept into Polish law. The amendment empowers the Minister of Climate and Environment to designate, by administrative decision, any deposit of hydrocarbons, hard coal, lignite, metal ores, radioactive ores, native sulphur, rock salt, rare-earth elements, or noble gases as a strategic deposit on grounds of economic significance or national security. A designated strategic-deposit decision may direct the relevant municipality to prohibit permanent surface development or any land use that would exclude future extraction, effectively granting central government override authority over municipal spatial planning (uchwała studium / miejscowy plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego). A 2-year mandatory ex-officio review window was established, requiring the Minister to initiate proceedings for all mineral deposits documented before the amendment's effective date of 28 October 2023.

France's first dedicated critical-minerals industrial-finance instrument: a €500m state contribution to a critical metals and rare materials investment fund, jointly announced by the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Ecological Transition on 11 May 2023, targeting €2bn total fundraising including private capital. Managed by InfraVia Capital Partners with Caisse des Dépôts as state operator, the fund invests as minority partner across extraction, processing and recycling — in France, Europe and globally — prioritising off-take agreements for French and European industry. The fund operationalises the Stratégie Nationale Métaux Critiques framework (Varin Report delivered 10 January 2022) alongside the OFREMI critical-minerals observatory at BRGM and the inter-ministerial delegate for strategic-metals supply security.

Statutory Instrument 57 of 2023, the Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1), was issued by Zimbabwe's Minister of Mines and Mining Development (Hon. Winston Chitando) in April 2023 to amend the foundational SI 5 of 2023 ban on raw base-mineral ore exports. The amendment imposes lithium-specific permit conditions: exporters must either own an Approved Processing Plant (APP) or contractually commit to building one within two years of receiving an export permit, unbeneficiated lithium permits may only be granted to Zimbabwean citizens or wholly-Zimbabwean-owned entities, and any such permit further requires the President's concurrence. The order also requires that beneficiated lithium export prices not fall below the floor set by the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), and stipulates penalties of up to level 9 fines or twice the value of the mineral involved, plus up to two years' imprisonment, for non-compliance. SI 57 sits between the December 2022 lithium-bearing-ore ban (SI 213/2022) and the February 2026 ministerial directive that suspended all raw-mineral and lithium-concentrate exports outright — it is the foundational statutory architecture that the 2026 reset later operated on top of.

Switzerland's Federal Council amended the Ordinance on measures related to the situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72) to align with the EU's ninth sanctions package, effective 6pm on 25 January 2023. The amendment bans new Swiss investment, equity provision, and participation (including joint ventures) in Russian mining-sector entities, with a carve-out for critical raw materials (aluminium/bauxite, chromium, cobalt, copper, iron ore, mineral fertilisers, molybdenum, nickel, palladium, rhodium, scandium, titanium, vanadium). It also extends export bans on aerospace goods to aircraft and drone engines, adds new controls on dual-use and military/security-enhancement goods, bans product testing/advertising/market-research services to Russia, and designates roughly 200 additional individuals and entities, including the Russian Regional Development Bank, to frozen-asset lists.

Statutory Instrument 5 of 2023, gazetted by Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, banned the export of unbeneficiated ("raw" / unprocessed) base mineral ores from Zimbabwe, widening the December 2022 lithium-only export ban (SI 213 of 2022) into a horizontal ban covering the entire base-minerals category — including lithium, chrome, copper, nickel and coal — while excluding precious metals, precious stones, oil and natural gas. Exporters need a written ministerial permit, granted only where compelling reasons show the ore cannot be beneficiated inside Zimbabwe, or for small assay samples. Non-compliance carries a level-9 fine or twice the mineral's value (whichever is greater), up to two years' imprisonment, or both. SI 5 was itself amended three months later by SI 57 of 2023, which layered lithium-specific citizenship and beneficiation-plant conditions onto this base order.

On 4 January 2023 the Union Cabinet of India, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the National Green Hydrogen Mission with an initial financial outlay of ₹19,744 crore (≈USD 2.3 bn) covering FY2023-24 through FY2029-30. The bulk of the outlay — ₹17,490 crore — funds the Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT) programme for electrolyser-manufacturing incentives and green-hydrogen production incentives. ₹1,466 crore is allocated to pilot projects (steel, mobility, shipping, ports, decentralised hydrogen), ₹400 crore to R&D, and ₹388 crore to other Mission components (skilling, regulatory framework, certification). The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is the lead implementing agency. Headline targets by 2030: at least 5 MMT/year of domestic green-hydrogen production capacity, with ≈125 GW of associated additional renewable- energy capacity, mobilisation of >₹8 lakh crore (≈USD 100 bn) of total investment, creation of >600,000 jobs, and avoidance of ≈50 MMT/year of CO₂ emissions. The Mission is positioned as the supply-chain underpinning for India's hard-to-abate decarbonisation (refining, fertilisers, steel) and as the basis for a green-hydrogen export industry leveraging India's low-cost solar resource. MNRE notified the SIGHT scheme guidelines on 28 June 2023, splitting the programme into Component I (Electrolyser Manufacturing Incentive, ₹4,440 crore) and Component II (Green Hydrogen Production Incentive, ₹13,050 crore for Mode-1; subsequent Mode-2A and Mode-2B tranches added for sector-specific tenders). Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) is the implementing agency for both components and runs the competitive reverse-auction tenders.

Indonesia banned the export of raw bauxite ore (including washed bauxite) effective 10 June 2023, extending the "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) doctrine that previously prohibited nickel-ore exports (effective 1 January 2020) to the country's second-largest mineral export. The ban is implemented through the existing Mining Law framework (UU 3/2020 amending UU 4/2009) and operationalised via Ministry of Trade Regulation Permendag 18/2022 on Provisions for Mining-Product Exports. President Joko Widodo formally announced the bauxite-export-ban schedule on 21 December 2022, citing forecast revenue uplift from IDR 21 trillion to IDR 62 trillion (~USD 1.35bn → ~USD 3.9bn) once domestic alumina/ aluminium refining ramps.

Natural Resources Canada published Canada's Critical Minerals Strategy on 8 December 2022, committing $3.8 billion CAD over eight years (drawn from Budget 2022 and the Fall Economic Statement 2022) to develop Canada's position across the critical-minerals value chain. The strategy designates 31 priority minerals, sets six strategic pillars (data and geoscience, investment and trade, indigenous participation, workforce development, regulatory environment, and sustainability), and explicitly positions Canada as the preferred FTA-partner supplier for the US Inflation Reduction Act's domestic-content requirements under CUSMA/USMCA.

The Inflation Reduction Act (Public Law 117-169), signed by President Biden on 16 August 2022, contains the largest single package of clean-energy and clean-manufacturing subsidies in US history — Congressional Budget Office scored the energy and climate provisions at $369B over 10 years, with subsequent Treasury / academic estimates reaching $800B-$1.2T as uptake exceeded baseline. Core mechanisms include the Section 30D Clean Vehicle credit ($7,500 per qualifying EV), the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (per-unit credits for domestically-produced battery cells, modules, electrodes, and critical-mineral processing), the Section 48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit, and the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Credit. Critically, the law contains Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) provisions barring credit eligibility for vehicles or components linked to entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.

On 29 June 2022 the Government of Fiji formally joined the Alliance of Countries for a Deep Sea Mining Moratorium at the United Nations Ocean Conference in Lisbon, Portugal. Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama committed Fiji to a precautionary moratorium on commercial seabed mining pending finalisation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) mining code and comprehensive scientific assessment of environmental impacts. Fiji confirmed it would not operationalise its International Seabed Minerals Management Act 2013 ahead of the ISA regulatory framework. The moratorium stance has been consistently reaffirmed under the subsequent Rabuka administration (2024, 2025), and at the ISA Pacific SIDS Regional Workshop in Suva in May 2026 Minister Filimoni Vosarogo confirmed Fiji remains aligned with the ISA process and will not activate domestic seabed-minerals licensing.

The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority (SBMA) granted five-year exploration licences on 14 February 2022 (formal ceremony 23 February 2022) to three operators — Cook Islands Cobalt (CIC) Limited, Moana Minerals Limited (a subsidiary of Ocean Minerals LLC), and CIIC Seabed Resources Limited — under the Seabed Minerals Act 2019, marking the first commercial seabed-mineral exploration rights awarded in any Pacific island EEZ. The licences cover polymetallic nodule deposits across the Cook Islands' ~1.96 million km² exclusive economic zone, estimated at approximately 6.7 billion wet tonnes rich in cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese at 4,500–5,300 m depth on the abyssal plain. Initial five-year terms run to February 2027; in November 2025 the SBMA confirmed all three licences will be extended a further five years to at least 2032, pending renewal applications evaluated by the independent Licensing Panel.

Government Resolution No. 172 of 30 April 2021 approved the State Program for the Development of the Geological Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2030, directing the Main Directorate of Geology (GST.TJ) to expand exploration and reserve quantification across the Pamir, Tian Shan, and Kuraminsky belts covering 28 priority critical and strategic minerals. The programme targets a US$2.6 billion investment envelope across 76 sectoral projects in the 2025–2028 implementation tranche, with an explicit mandate to develop domestic processing and refining capacity for lithium, tungsten, nickel, and antimony. Tajikistan holds an estimated 50% of Asian antimony reserves and the Rasht Valley niobium-tantalum belt (major discoveries confirmed by the Tajik Geological Survey in July 2025), making this programme the foundational state instrument for all subsequent TJ critical-minerals FDI inflows and bilateral minerals diplomacy.

The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), a multilateral development bank owned by the eight Nordic and Baltic member states, signed an 8-year EUR 100 million loan with Swedish mining and smelting group Boliden Mineral AB. The loan finances an expansion of the Kevitsa copper-nickel-PGM mine in Finnish Lapland (raising ore throughput from 7.8 to 9.5 million tonnes/year) and a new leaching plant at the Rönnskär copper smelter in northern Sweden that converts smelter residues into saleable lead and copper/zinc sulphate.

Indonesia accelerated the implementation of its raw nickel ore export ban, originally scheduled for 2022, to take effect on 1 January 2020. Announced 30 August 2019 by Minister Ignasius Jonan via ESDM Regulation No. 11/2019, the ban prohibits the export of nickel ore with grades below 1.7% Ni (effectively all Indonesian saprolite and limonite ore that previously flowed to Chinese stainless-steel and ferronickel mills) and forces ore to be processed domestically into intermediate products (nickel pig iron, ferronickel, mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulfate). The policy is part of the long-running "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) strategy and was the trigger for the >$30B wave of Chinese-led nickel- processing investment in Sulawesi (Morowali, Weda Bay) that has since made Indonesia the dominant global nickel producer.

Tanzania's Parliament enacted Act No. 5 of 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, as part of a landmark resource-nationalism legislative trio (alongside Act No. 6 on unconscionable contract renegotiation and Written Laws Miscellaneous Amendments No. 7), signed into law by President John Magufuli on 4 July 2017. The Act vests all of Tanzania's natural wealth and resources — minerals, oil and natural gas, fisheries, wildlife, forestry, water, and related sub-surface assets — as the permanent and inalienable property of the People of the United Republic, held in trust by the President on their behalf. Key operative provisions prohibit international commercial arbitration of natural-resource disputes (mandating adjudication within Tanzanian courts under Tanzanian law), empower Parliament to review and require renegotiation of any natural-resource arrangement containing "unconscionable terms," impose an in-country banking rule on earnings from natural wealth extraction, and authorise statutory override of contractual stabilisation clauses embedded in pre-2017 mining development agreements. The Act is the foundational parent statute underpinning all subsequent Tanzanian mining-sector reform, including the 2024 Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act critical/strategic minerals classification and the 2025 Finance Act mining amendments.

Loi n° 2014-138, adopted by the Assemblée nationale and promulgated by President Alassane Ouattara on 24 March 2014, is the foundational mining-rights statute governing all mineral prospecting, research, and exploitation in Côte d'Ivoire. Its 197 articles across 16 titles repeal the prior Loi n° 95-553 (1995 Code Minier) and establish the modern permit regime, a 10% state free-carry in all industrial mining projects via SODEMI, and the royalty + ad valorem fiscal architecture that underpins every subsequent mining-convention and fiscal-law amendment. As West Africa's second-largest gold producer (approx. 45 t/yr) with growing bauxite and manganese exploration, CI's mining-code architecture is a material determinant of supply-chain access for Western and Chinese industrial consumers of these commodities.

In May 2011 Jinchuan Group, one of China's largest nickel and copper producers (Gansu Province, state-owned), agreed to acquire South African mining company Metorex Limited for ZAR 9.1 billion (approximately USD 1.36 billion), besting a competing bid from Vale. Metorex's principal asset was a 77% stake in Kinsenda Copper Company (DRC), operator of the Kinsenda underground copper mine in Katanga Province — at the time one of the world's highest-grade active underground copper mines, with ore grades of approximately 5.5% copper. The acquisition gave Jinchuan effective control of Kinsenda, adding high-grade DRC copper production to its existing Chinese and African operations. It was one of the first Chinese state-enterprise acquisitions of a JSE-listed mining company and established a template for Chinese SOE outbidding of Western and emerging-market competitors for African copper assets. The deal was financed by state-directed credit from China Development Bank and represents one of approximately 14 high-value mining transactions (each >$100M) in which Chinese policy-bank lending was deployed to secure copper and cobalt assets in the DRC-Zambia copper belt in the 2010-2015 period.

The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4501–4568) is the foundational US statute governing wartime and emergency industrial mobilization. Signed by President Truman on 8 September 1950 during the Korean War, the Act empowers the President to compel industrial priority-rated ordering (Title I / DPAS), authorize direct investment in domestic production capacity for critical industries (Title III), and conduct investment security review (Title VII, precursor to CFIUS). Reauthorized approximately 50 times, most recently extended through September 2025 by Pub. L. 115-263 (2018) and further extended under NDAA FY2026; it has been invoked by every Administration since 1950 and has accelerated dramatically since 2020 to target critical-minerals processing, semiconductor manufacturing, battery supply chains, biopharmaceuticals, and energy infrastructure.