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China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 26 of 2026 on June 24, 2026, establishing a formal reporting and handling system for violations of export controls on strategic minerals and dual-use items, effective July 1, 2026. The mechanism opens two reporting channels — a dedicated hotline (010-12369) and an online portal (aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn) — through which any organisation or individual may report suspected violations including unauthorised exports, circumvention via third-country re-routing, illegal technology transfers, and provision of services to sanctioned exporters. Anonymous reports are accepted; real-name reporters may qualify for monetary rewards; voluntary self-disclosure is treated as a mitigating factor in penalty determination. Service providers including freight forwarders and financial institutions face mandatory reporting obligations when they discover suspected violations in the course of business.

The UK Department for Business and Trade launched a £50M critical minerals programme at Teesside's Wilton Centre on 22 June 2026, announced by Industry Minister Chris McDonald. The programme has three pillars: a £25M Critical Minerals Accelerator funding collaborative extraction, processing and recycling projects; a £20M Magnet Hub establishing a national facility for rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing and skills training; and a £5M Demand Aggregation Platform pooling UK industrial demand to unlock supply partnerships. The programme operationalises the UK Critical Minerals Strategy 'Vision 2035' (November 2025) and marks the first UK capital commitment to domestic critical minerals processing at scale.

At the 52nd G7 Summit in Évian-les-Bains (June 15–17, 2026, under France's G7 Presidency), the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a dedicated leaders' declaration committing to secure supply chains for critical minerals by diversifying sourcing, reducing excessive dependencies on any single foreign supplier, and coordinating investment and market-development tools across G7 members. The declaration references the Partnership On Wide Energy and Resources Resilience Asia (POWERR Asia) as a named allied cooperation vehicle, and calls for stronger G7 coordination on emergency supply-chain response and private-capital mobilisation for critical mineral projects outside of concentrated supplier states. This is the first standalone G7 leaders' declaration specifically dedicated to critical minerals supply-chain security, moving beyond language embedded in broader summit communiqués.

Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development gazetted a formal Mineral Classification and Declaration on 22 May 2026, signed by Minister Dr Polite Kambamura, classifying 14 minerals as "critical" (nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, REE, chrome, PGMs, manganese, antimony, uranium, ruthenium, tungsten, niobium — plus metallurgical coal as "special critical") and 10 as "strategic" (limestone, potash, phosphorus, iron ore, pyrites, oil, gas, coal, gold, diamonds). The declaration mandates minimum state shareholding through designated Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in all critical-mineral exploitation operations and prohibits export of listed minerals in raw or unbeneficiated form without a ministerially-approved conditional transitional plan specifying a local beneficiation timeline.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 839 on 20 May 2026, promulgating the "Regulations for the Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law of the People's Republic of China" (8 chapters, 79 articles), effective 15 June 2026. The Regulations are the primary implementing instrument for the revised Mineral Resources Law and establish a unified governance architecture across the entire mineral value chain — exploration, production, processing, stockpiling, and emergency supply mobilisation — with inter-agency coordination spanning MNR, NDRC, MIIT, the State Grain and Material Reserves Administration, NEA, and the State Administration of Mine Safety. The Regulations introduce a three-layer strategic reserve system (physical stockpiles, production-capacity reserves, and in-ground strategic areas), grant the state authority to directly organise mining and distribution during supply emergencies (Article 59), and explicitly authorise countermeasures against nations that restrict China's access to mineral supply chains (Article 76).

The Government of Sierra Leone officially launched the National Strategy for Critical Minerals 2026-2031 on 20 May 2026 at Sierra Leone Mining Week (Freetown International Conference Centre), with Vice President Dr Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh delivering the keynote address alongside Minister of Mines Julius Daniel Mattai. The strategy commits to attracting USD 2.5 billion in exploration and mining investment, establishing 3-5 domestic mineral-processing plants, and achieving USD 1.5 billion in annual value-added mineral exports by 2031 -- up from a current raw-mineral export base of approximately USD 1.3 billion. Scope covers lithium, graphite, bauxite, cobalt, coltan, rutile, diamonds, iron ore, and rare-earth elements, and frames the national minerals agenda under the theme "Responsible Mining, Value Multiplication and Shared Prosperity."

On 14 May 2026, following an on-site inspection of mining operations in Mpanda Municipality and Nsimbo District Council in Tanzania's Katavi Region, Minister for Minerals Hon. Anthony Mavunde ordered the immediate suspension of all mining activities along the Mtisi River after inspectors found severe environmental degradation, absence of environmental management plans and NEMC permits, and foreign nationals operating machinery directly — in violation of the Mining Act Cap. 123 (R.E. 2019), which restricts foreign parties under Technical Support Agreements (TSAs) to advisory and technical-support roles only. Mavunde simultaneously directed all Resident Mining Offices nationwide to conduct a review of every TSA between local small-scale miners and foreign investors to verify legal compliance and ensure that agreements genuinely benefit Tanzanian citizens. Three large exploration licences recently revoked (linked to the 15 April 2026 mass-revocation) are to be reallocated to small-scale miners in Katavi Region under the Mining for a Brighter Tomorrow (MBT) framework.

Brazil enacted Lei 15.506 of 16 September 2026 (in force on publication, Art. 51), establishing the Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PNMCE) — Brazil's first standalone critical-minerals sovereignty framework — and the Conselho Nacional para Industrialização de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (CIMCE). The law originated as Bill PL 2780/2024, approved by the Chamber of Deputies on May 6-7, 2026 (one day before the Lula-Trump White House meeting) and then by the Senate. It authorises the Union to create the Fundo Garantidor da Atividade Mineral (FGAM) with up to R$2bn (Art. 9) to guarantee critical-mineral projects, and a tax credit of up to 20% of spend on critical-mineral processing, transformation and urban mining. The Chamber-approved text (CMCE committee with prior-approval rights over takeovers and foreign participation, FGAM up to R$5bn, 0.3% gross-revenue R&D levy) was amended before enactment; see the 2026-09-16 amendment.

Mozambique's National Mining Institute (INAMI) presented a draft revision of the country's mining law for public consultation, with parliamentary debate scheduled for 7 May 2026. The bill mandates that the state hold a minimum 15% equity stake in all mining projects (raisable on a project-by-project basis), reserves "strategic minerals" exclusively for the state mining company Empresa Nacional de Minas (ENM), prohibits the export of unprocessed minerals (forcing in-country processing), caps concessions at 25 years, and channels 10% of mining revenues to a local development fund for the province, district, and community where operations occur. Implementation is not expected before 2027 to allow development of secondary regulations and ENM institutional build-out. This is the flagship economic-policy instrument of President Daniel Chapo's January 2025 mining and oil/gas restructuring agenda.

The European Commission and the US announced on 24 April 2026 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. The framework deepens cooperation on supply-chain security across the strategic raw-materials list shared between the two jurisdictions — joint financing, recycling, mutual recognition of strategic- project status under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and US IRA §30D / §45X frameworks (filed: 2022-08-16-us-inflation-reduction-act). The agreement is positioned as a joint response to non-market practices in third-country supply chains for the named materials.

On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.

On 15 April 2026 Tanzania's Minister for Minerals Hon. Anthony Mavunde announced at a press conference in Dodoma the revocation of 40 idle mineral exploration licences covering 188,163 hectares, following a ministerial assessment that found widespread licence-holder breaches: hoarding of blocks without development activity, non-payment of statutory fees and royalty obligations, failure to meet local-content requirements under GN 563/2025, and neglect of corporate social responsibility obligations to host communities. Revoked areas are to be reallocated under the "Mining for a Brighter Tomorrow" (MBT) framework with explicit preference for small-scale miners, women, youth, and persons with disabilities. A companion default-notice batch issued on 10 April 2026 covered 43 additional licences (40 exploration + 3 medium-scale mining) with 30-day rectification windows before further revocations proceed.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

Brazil's Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX) opened a formal antidumping investigation via Circular nº 18 (12 March 2026) into imports of machined graphite electrodes (NCM 8545.11.00, diameter ≥ 350 mm) from China and India, following a petition by GrafTech Brasil Participações Ltda (subsidiary of NYSE-listed GrafTech International / EAF). DECOM's preliminary assessment found indicative dumping margins of 54.9% for Chinese-origin and 57.3% for Indian-origin electrodes. The investigation covers assembled and unassembled electrodes used in electric-arc-furnace steelmaking, ferroalloy smelting, and metal-oxide reduction. A definitive antidumping duty of up to five years may result if DECOM confirms material injury and issues a positive final determination.

At the PDAC Convention 2026 in Toronto, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced the Critical Minerals Sovereign Fund (CMSF), a CAD 2 billion vehicle to be operated by Natural Resources Canada that will deploy equity investments, debt, and offtake agreements into Canadian critical-minerals projects and companies. Initial focus covers six of Canada's 34 critical minerals — copper, nickel, lithium, graphite, cobalt, and rare earth elements — with capital expected to begin flowing in spring 2026. The CMSF is part of a broader CAD 3.6 bn PDAC-day announcement package that NRCan estimates will unlock CAD 12.1 bn in mining-project capital across 30+ partnerships, and is structurally modelled on Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve.

On 26 February 2026 USTR published a Federal Register notice (90 FR 9686, docket USTR-2026-0034) inviting public comment on the design of a plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals and accompanying policy actions to strengthen critical-mineral supply-chain resilience. The notice signals that the agreement under consideration would include "a commitment by all parties to implement minimum prices or other price mechanisms, with appropriate border measures" — a coordinated price-floor/border-adjustment regime across like-minded partners to incentivise ex-China mining, processing, and refining investment. Comments were due 19 March 2026.

France's third Programmation Pluriannuelle de l'Énergie (PPE3), adopted by Décret n° 2026-76 of 12 February 2026 and published in the Journal Officiel on 13 February 2026, sets the framework for public energy policy in metropolitan continental France from 2026 to 2035. The decree codifies a 60% decarbonised-energy-consumption target by 2030 (from 42% in 2023), a 34% electrification share (585 TWh), and a reduction of fossil fuels to 40% of final energy consumption by 2030 (from 58% in 2023). It also formalises the EPR2 new-build programme (6 + 8 optional reactors) within the long-range generation-mix architecture, pairs with the Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone (SNBC3) for a net-zero-2050 trajectory, and includes an annex on clean-mobility development (SDMP).

On 4 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard announced a U.S.-Mexico Action Plan on Critical Minerals — a first-of-its-kind 60-day bilateral work programme to develop coordinated trade policies and supply-chain mechanisms for critical minerals. The Action Plan tasks both governments with identifying a priority mineral list, exploring border-adjusted price floors as a candidate trade instrument, and consulting on how price floors could be incorporated into a binding plurilateral agreement on trade in critical minerals. It is framed as a confidence- building measure ahead of the USMCA Joint Review (statutory deadline 1 July 2026) and as the Mexico-side template that parallels concurrent USTR engagements with the EU and Japan.

On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.

On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.

On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman tabled India's Union Budget 2026-27, with Customs Notification No. 02/2026-Customs (dated 1 Feb 2026, effective 2 Feb 2026) implementing the customs-duty package. The notification zero-rates basic customs duty (BCD) on (i) capital goods imported for domestic processing of critical minerals — crushing, beneficiation, refining, chemical-processing, separation/purification, and metallurgical/alloy-making equipment; (ii) capital goods for lithium-ion cell manufacturing for battery energy storage systems (BESS), extending the 2024-25 EV-cell exemption to stationary storage; and (iii) twelve additional critical minerals plus cobalt powder and lithium-ion battery scrap, on top of the 25 critical minerals already exempted in the FY2024-25 budget. In parallel, critical minerals (including monazite / rare-earth concentrate) are migrated from the customs-exemption notification mechanism into the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act at Nil BCD, effective 1 May 2026 — a tariffisation step that locks the rate into primary legislation rather than annually renewable notification. The Budget also commits to dedicated critical-mineral / rare-earth-magnet processing corridors in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Structurally this is the fiscal/tariff layer underneath the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM, Jan 2025) and the National Manufacturing Mission (Feb 2025): NCMM funds capex and overseas asset acquisition (₹34,300 cr), this Budget removes the import-duty drag on the equipment needed to actually run domestic processing lines. It complements the REPM scheme (Nov 2025) for sintered rare-earth magnets and Semicon Mission 2.0 (Feb 2026) on the demand side for refined critical minerals.

The Cabinet Secretary for Mining, Blue Economy and Maritime Affairs promulgated the Mining (Mineral Royalty Sharing) Regulations, 2026 (Legal Notice No. 3 of 2026) under section 183 of the Mining Act 2016 (No. 12 of 2016), published on 29 January 2026 in the Kenya Law database. The regulations establish the intergovernmental and community architecture for distributing mineral royalties collected under the parent Act: 70% to the national Consolidated Fund, 20% to the relevant County Revenue Fund Account(s), and 10% to a dedicated Community Mineral Royalties Account held in trust for host communities. This is the executive's procedural cure following the September 2025 High Court ruling that voided the 2024 Royalty Collection and Management Regulations (LN 106/2024) for inadequate public participation; LN 3/2026 focuses solely on distribution architecture and is therefore structurally distinct from the collection mechanics of its predecessor.

The Council of Ministers, chaired by President Andry Rajoelina at its 27–29 January 2026 session, approved the lifting of Madagascar's 16-year moratorium on the issuance of new mining permits. The suspension — originally imposed by Decree No. 2011-074 of 8 February 2011 following the 2009 constitutional crisis — had effectively frozen upstream mine development despite the 2023 Mining Code overhaul (Loi n° 2023-007). Gold permits remain explicitly excluded pending resolution of substantial discrepancies between officially declared production (~13 kg) and artisanal-mining scale. The decision unlocks approximately 1,650 pending permit applications held by the Bureau Central des Mines de Madagascar (BCMM) cadastre, with at least ten large-scale projects in graphite, nickel, cobalt, rare-earths, and iron-ore sectors expected to advance within three months.

The Minister of Minerals published Government Notice No. 692 of 2025 on 19 December 2025, amending the Mining (Corporate Social Responsibility) Regulations 2023 (GN 409/2023) made under section 105 of the Mining Act, Cap. 123. Key operative changes include restructuring the CSR Expert Committee, imposing statutory 14-day timelines for plan revision and ministerial submission, enhancing licensee financial-reporting obligations, and granting explicit corrective-action authority against underperforming contractors. All Tanzanian mining licensees — including Barrick (North Mara, Bulyanhulu), AngloGold Ashanti (Geita), and Petra Diamonds (Williamson) — are subject to the tightened compliance framework.

On 16 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the Communication on a Battery Booster Strategy (later published in the Official Journal as C/2026/682), part of the EU Automotive Package presented alongside the CO2 emission-standards review, the Automotive Omnibus simplification, and the Corporate Vehicle Decarbonisation initiative. The Battery Booster envelopes EUR 1.8bn of EU-budget support for the European battery value chain: EUR 1.5bn from the Innovation Fund as interest-free loans for European battery cell producers ramping to giga-scale output (delivered through a dedicated Battery Booster Facility, with the implementing Commission Decision in stakeholder consultation through 15 March 2026), plus EUR 300m for critical raw materials projects in Europe. The strategy is the first standalone EU industrial-finance instrument targeted exclusively at battery cell manufacturing, and is paired with RESourceEU (3 Dec 2025) and the Industrial Accelerator Act proposal (4 Mar 2026) to stitch together upstream CRM, midstream cell production and downstream automotive demand.

The Government of Ontario launched the Critical Minerals Processing Fund (CMPF), a CAD 500 million (~USD 364 million) provincial financial-support program to accelerate processing and refining capacity for critical minerals mined in the province, administered through Invest Ontario. The fund targets nickel, graphite, copper, cobalt and lithium, with a geographic emphasis on the Ring of Fire region northeast of Thunder Bay, and is intended to keep Ontario-mined minerals processed domestically rather than exported raw. It complements a separate CAD 3.1 billion package of loans, guarantees, grants and scholarships supporting Indigenous participation in the province's critical-minerals supply chain, and was first flagged in Ontario's 2025 Budget.

The Department for Business and Trade, with DSIT, published "Vision 2035: Critical Minerals Strategy" on 22 November 2025 — the UK's first dedicated critical-minerals strategy under the Starmer government, superseding the withdrawn 2022 strategy. DBT commits up to GBP 50 million for new critical mineral projects on top of GBP 165 million in existing support, with the National Wealth Fund providing equity backing (Cornish Lithium GBP 24m in 2023 plus a further GBP 31m commitment in 2025; Cornish Metals GBP 28.6m in 2025; South Crofty Tin GBP 26.8m). Sets 2035 targets of 10% of UK industrial demand from domestic production (extraction + processing + refining), 20% from recycling, and a hard floor of 50,000 tonnes lithium carbonate equivalent produced domestically. Strategy is consciously midstream-and-recycling-tilted rather than upstream-extraction race; pillars are (i) optimise domestic production, (ii) resilient global supply networks via partnerships with US, EU, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan (plus Kazakhstan rhenium/vanadium and continued China engagement), (iii) circular economy / recycling, (iv) responsible supply chains.

The US Department of Energy's Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, via the National Energy Technology Laboratory, announced USD 355 million in federal funding across two notices of funding opportunity (NOFOs) on 14 November 2025: up to USD 275 million for pilot-scale facilities recovering critical minerals from coal-based feedstocks and industrial/mining byproducts at existing US industrial sites, and up to USD 80 million for the "Mine of the Future — Proving Ground Initiative," field-scale test sites for next-generation mining technologies (novel extraction, in-situ methods, beneficiation) plus mining-workforce training. Applications were due 15 December 2025.

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) issued Announcement No. 72 (2025) on November 9, 2025, suspending Article 2 of Announcement No. 46 (2024) — the provision that had imposed a categorical export ban on gallium, germanium, antimony, superhard materials, and graphite dual-use items destined for the United States. The suspension is valid until November 27, 2026, reverting these exports to China's standard dual-use licensing framework for that period. Article 1 of Announcement No. 46 — prohibiting re-exports to US military end-users regardless of routing — remains fully in force. The measure followed bilateral US-China trade consultations and signals a conditional de-escalation window within China's established critical-minerals counter-strike posture.

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) issued Announcement No. 70 (2025) on November 7, 2025, suspending for one year the package of rare-earth export-control measures announced on October 9, 2025 (Announcements Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62). The suspended measures include the licensing regime on medium- and heavy-rare-earth elements, rare-earth processing equipment and technologies, lithium-battery and synthetic-graphite anode materials, superhard materials, and — most significantly — the extraterritorial "0.1% content" rule of Announcement No. 61 that asserted licence jurisdiction over foreign-made products containing Chinese-origin controlled rare earths. The gazette text fixes the window explicitly: "自即日起至2026年11月10日" (from the date of issue until November 10, 2026). This is the rare-earth leg of the post-Busan US-China truce; the dual-use leg (gallium, germanium, antimony, graphite) was suspended two days later by the separate Announcement No. 72 (2025), which runs to November 27, 2026. The two instruments create a two-step expiry cliff in November 2026.

On 6 November 2025, the US Department of the Interior (DOI) and the US Geological Survey (USGS) released the final 2025 List of Critical Minerals under the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. § 1606), expanding the designation from 50 to 60 minerals. The final list adds 10 newly designated commodities — boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver, and uranium — based on updated supply-chain disruption modelling, public comment, and interagency recommendations. The list constitutes the foundational statutory anchor for downstream US critical-minerals policy instruments including DPA Title III awards, DOE LPO Title 17 loan eligibility, IRA Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit eligibility, Section 30D FEOC determinations, BIS export-control predicate assessments, Section 232 trade-investigation predicates, and CFIUS critical-technology triggers under 31 CFR § 800.215.

Canada's Budget 2025 (released 4 November 2025) creates the First and Last Mile Fund (FLMF), allocating $371.8 million over four years starting in 2026-27 to Natural Resources Canada to address transport and utility bottlenecks connecting near-term critical-minerals production sites to deep-water ports and downstream processing facilities. The fund absorbs the existing Critical Minerals Infrastructure Fund and leverages its envelope to provide up to $1.5 billion in total support through 2029-30. The FLMF is structurally distinct from the CMSF (equity/debt vehicle), the CMETC (exploration tax credit), and the Clean Tech ITC (manufacturing tax credit) — it is the infrastructure-grant instrument completing Canada's critical-minerals programme architecture.

On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.

Natural Resources Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Tim Hodgson, announced on 31 October 2025 conditional approval of up to CAD 14,062,500 (USD ~10.0M) in non-repayable federal funding for Focus Graphite Inc. under NRCan's Global Partnerships Initiative, part of the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan's first tranche of 26 investments and partnerships. Focus Graphite executed the funding agreement on 8 December 2025. The grant covers approximately 73.6% of eligible project costs for a commercial-scale electrothermal fluidized-bed purification demonstration plant converting Quebec natural flake graphite (from the Lac Knife and Lac Tétépisca deposits) into ultra-high-purity battery-anode and advanced materials, with Focus Graphite contributing the remaining CAD 4.79M cash plus CAD 250K in-kind. Eligible expenditures run 14 October 2025 to 31 March 2028.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order effective 21 October 2025 prohibiting the export of all raw, unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi, covering uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, rutile, gold, copper, diamonds, heavy mineral sands, and all other minerals. Minerals that have been processed, refined, or value-added in Malawi are exempt. The order aligns with an announced National Mining Corporation to oversee mineral production and processing, and introduces fines and sanctions under Malawi law for violations.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs (GAC) jointly issued Announcement No. 58 of 2025 on 9 October 2025, adding high-energy-density lithium-ion batteries (cells and packs, >=300 Wh/kg), artificial graphite anode materials, related production equipment, and key manufacturing technologies to the dual-use export control list under licence requirement. The controls were scheduled to take effect 8 November 2025 but were suspended the day before via Announcement No. 70 (2025), which deferred entry-into-force until 10 November 2026 in the context of the US-China Busan economic-trade arrangement. Controls remain legislatively adopted and will become operative unless the suspension is renewed or withdrawn.

On 8 October 2025 South Africa's Public Investment Corporation (PIC) — the state-owned asset manager that invests the Government Employees Pension Fund and other public-sector funds — announced it has set aside ZAR 1.35 billion (~USD 78.7 million) to fund early-stage mining projects, from post-scoping through bankable-feasibility-study stage. Capital is deployed indirectly via private equity, venture capital, specialist mining funds and joint ventures, in tickets of ZAR 100-400 million per project. At least 50% of funded projects must be in South Africa, with the remainder earmarked for copper/cobalt in Zambia and the DRC, rare earths in Malawi, and graphite in Tanzania and Madagascar. The fund explicitly targets minerals aligned with South Africa's Just Energy Transition (JET) and carries BEE Level 2 / Historically Disadvantaged Individuals preference criteria for South African applicants.

Brazil's Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) and the Serviço Geológico do Brasil (SGB) released the final report of the Plano Decenal de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais (PlanGEO 2026-2035) on 24 September 2025. The plan defines 145 priority research areas selected through public consultation for ten years of focused geological mapping and mineral-resources research, prioritising ten commodities — rare earths, lithium, copper, nickel, manganese, graphite, tin, gold, phosphate, and potassium — covering the battery / magnets demand spectrum plus food-security inputs. The plan is enabled by Portaria Normativa nº 72/GM/MME of 13 March 2024 and operates on a 2026-2035 horizon, with a SGB/MME budget-and-staffing scenario proposing up to a 50% increase in execution team and a 100% expansion in annual financial investment.

The European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1890 on 18 September 2025, imposing a definitive five-year anti-dumping duty on imports of threaded tube or pipe cast fittings of malleable cast iron and spheroidal graphite cast iron (CN code ex 7307 19 10) originating in China and Thailand, following an expiry review under Article 11(2) of the Basic AD Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. Dumping margins are 65% for China and 70% for Thailand; for China, normal value was constructed under Article 2(6a) using Thailand as a representative country due to significant market distortions. The measure extends and renews the original anti-dumping duty in force since 2013, confirming continued risk of injury recurrence to EU producers of plumbing and HVAC fittings.

Tanzania's Minister for Minerals issued the Mining (Local Content) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025 via Government Notice No. 563 of 2025, published on 12 September 2025 and in force on the same day with no grace period. The amendment overhauls the Mining (Local Content) Regulations, 2018 (GN No. 3 of 2018) and introduces a new Regulation 13A empowering the Tanzania Mining Commission to publish — in the Gazette, on its website, and in nationwide media — a list of "reserved" goods and services that may be supplied only by an Indigenous Tanzanian Company (ITC) that is 100% Tanzanian-owned (no joint venture permitted in those reserved categories). For non-reserved categories, non- indigenous suppliers must form a JV with an ITC operating in the same line of business in which the ITC holds at least 20% equity, with the JV agreement subject to prior Mining Commission approval. Sole-sourced contracts above ~USD 10,000 must be notified to the Commission, and Local Content Plans must now include Banking Services and Procurement sub-plans, channelling mining-related financial transactions through Tanzanian-registered banks.

The MoEFCC Impact Assessment Division issued an Office Memorandum on 8 September 2025 categorically exempting all mining projects involving atomic minerals (uranium, thorium and the 12 minerals under the Atomic Energy Act 1962), the 30 critical minerals notified by the Ministry of Mines on 28 June 2023, and separately designated strategic minerals from the mandatory public-consultation stage (para 7(i)) of the EIA Notification 2006, invoking the existing national-defence and strategic-considerations clause. Exempted projects will instead undergo comprehensive appraisal by the relevant Sectoral Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC/EAC) at the central level regardless of project size, bypassing the standard Category-A/B thresholding architecture. The measure was issued in response to formal requests from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), and directly accelerates the approval pipeline for the National Critical Mineral Mission (Rs 34,300 crore, 2025-2031).

Parliament of India passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2025 (Act No. 28 of 2025) — Lok Sabha on 12 August 2025, Rajya Sabha on 19 August 2025, Presidential assent on 21 August 2025, in force 1 September 2025 — amending the parent MMDR Act, 1957. The Act removes the prior 50% cap on captive-mine production eligible for open sale (allowing captive-block holders unrestricted third-party sale after meeting end-use requirements), widens the National Mineral Exploration Trust into the National Mineral Exploration and Development Trust (NMEDT) with mandate extended to mine development, offshore areas, and overseas acquisition operations, raises the NMEDT royalty contribution from 2% to 3%, waives the auction premium for the 24 critical and strategic minerals listed in Part D of the First Schedule (including lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, REE, PGM, beryllium, and antimony), and establishes a statutory authority to register and regulate Mineral Exchanges as electronic commodity-trading platforms for minerals and metals.

On 19 August 2025 the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) opened applications for the Battery Breakthrough Initiative (BBI), an AUD 500 million capital-grant and production-incentive program to build domestic battery manufacturing capability across the value chain, from active materials to finished cells and packs. The program was first announced in the May 2024 Federal Budget as a pillar of the Future Made in Australia agenda and the National Battery Strategy, and is designed to strengthen supply-chain resilience by leveraging Australia's position as the world's largest lithium producer and a major nickel/cobalt/graphite supplier. Funding was subsequently cut to AUD 142.32 million in the 2026 Federal Budget (see amendments).

H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.