Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 23 of 2026 on June 22, 2026, adding 10 US entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to these entities and bars any global party from transferring China-origin dual-use goods to them; ongoing transactions are suspended pending MOFCOM approval. The 10 entities include the two largest non-Chinese rare earth producers — MP Materials Corp. (Mountain Pass, CA) and USA Rare Earth Inc. (Round Top, TX) — as well as eight US defence firms (Aveox, Red Cat Holdings, Teal Drones, IMSAR, Jaia Robotics, Ball Aerospace, Oshkosh Defense, L3Harris Maritime). MOFCOM explicitly framed the action as retaliation for the US DoD's June 8, 2026 update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies list, which added ~80 Chinese parent firms and 188 affiliates.

On 8 May 2026 the US Department of Commerce and South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) signed the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative (KUSPI) MOU, establishing a standing bilateral platform covering commercial shipbuilding cooperation, workforce development, industrial modernisation, and maritime manufacturing investment. The agreement creates the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center in Washington D.C. (expected operational later in 2026) as the permanent coordination mechanism for technical exchanges, shipyard productivity improvement projects, FDI into the US maritime industrial base, and joint workforce training. KUSPI operationalises the $150 bn Korean investment sub-pledge to US shipbuilding — itself a tranche of the broader $350 bn / $20 bn-annual-cap commitment under the December 2025 US-Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — and structurally positions the US-ROK allied axis as the coordinated civilian shipbuilding counterweight to China's dominant global shipyard share.

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Germany's Federal Economic Affairs Ministry (Bundesregierung) and BAFA issued Allgemeine Genehmigung Nr. 48 (AGG 48) on 20 March 2026, a time-limited general export licence simplifying the export of specified air-defence and maritime-defence equipment to Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine, in force until 15 September 2026. Exporters may register retrospectively up to 30 days after first shipment, replacing individual-licence applications for in-scope items and materially compressing per-shipment administrative lead times. The measure is framed as part of Germany's reinforced commitment to supplying defence equipment to allies countering regional threats and Russian aggression.

On 12 March 2026 Senegal's Primature held a press conference releasing mid-term findings of the National Commission for the Re-evaluation and Renegotiation of Petroleum, Gas, and Mining Contracts, created in August 2024 under Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko's reform programme. The Commission identified a 1,075.9 billion FCFA shortfall in the mining sector — concentrated in unpaid taxes/royalties and unauthorised tax exemptions at ICS (Industries Chimiques du Sénégal) — and announced the termination of four offshore oil-exploration blocks (Djifer Offshore, Kayar Offshore, Saint-Louis Offshore, Rufisque Offshore). Renegotiation of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project, operated by BP with Kosmos Energy and Woodside as partners on the Senegal-Mauritania maritime border, is under active examination; the Primature projects 900 bn FCFA in incremental fiscal revenue 2026-2040 from the contract revision programme. This is Senegal's first major instance of retroactive resource-contract review under the Sonko-Faye government and establishes the legal-political baseline for subsequent contract renegotiations across the 27 mining contracts and remaining hydrocarbon licences under Commission review.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act for Korea-US Strategic Investment Management (한미 전략적 투자 관리를 위한 특별법) on 12 March 2026 by a bipartisan vote of 226-8-8, authorising a sovereign-backed US$350bn (~KRW 517tn) investment commitment to the United States over an annual US$20bn cap. The act creates the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation (한미전략투자공사), a new state-run entity with KRW 2tn (~US$1.36bn) government-financed paid-in capital, as the institutional vehicle to execute the bilateral investment MOU. Article 3 Clause 3 permits investment decisions to proceed despite insufficient commercial viability when national-security or supply-chain-stability grounds exist, subject to prior consent of the relevant National Assembly Standing Committee, operationalising the December 2025 Korea-US Strategic Trade and Investment Deal investment-pledge tranche.

NIB, the multilateral development bank owned by the eight Nordic and Baltic member states, signed a EUR 11.4 million 10-year loan with Metrosert AS, Estonia's national testing, calibration and certification body, to finance a new Drone Technology Unit within Metrosert's Applied Research Centre in Tallinn. The unit will house nine laboratories to develop, validate and industrialise unmanned aerial, ground and maritime systems, with most planned activity explicitly defence-related, covering unmanned aviation, communications, navigation, flight physics and hardware security. NIB financing at preferential development-bank rates functions as a below-market state-backed subsidy to a strategic dual-use research facility; the unit is targeted to be fully operational by summer 2027 as part of a EUR 42.9 million total Applied Research Centre build-out.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

The Cabinet Secretary for Mining, Blue Economy and Maritime Affairs promulgated the Mining (Mineral Royalty Sharing) Regulations, 2026 (Legal Notice No. 3 of 2026) under section 183 of the Mining Act 2016 (No. 12 of 2016), published on 29 January 2026 in the Kenya Law database. The regulations establish the intergovernmental and community architecture for distributing mineral royalties collected under the parent Act: 70% to the national Consolidated Fund, 20% to the relevant County Revenue Fund Account(s), and 10% to a dedicated Community Mineral Royalties Account held in trust for host communities. This is the executive's procedural cure following the September 2025 High Court ruling that voided the 2024 Royalty Collection and Management Regulations (LN 106/2024) for inadequate public participation; LN 3/2026 focuses solely on distribution architecture and is therefore structurally distinct from the collection mechanics of its predecessor.

On 29 January 2026 Switzerland's Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF) amended Annex 28 of the Ordinance on Measures Relating to the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), lowering the price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil from USD 47.6 to USD 44.1 per barrel, effective 1 February 2026. The amendment prohibits Swiss-domiciled operators from providing financial and transport (maritime, insurance, brokering) services related to Russian crude oil priced above the new cap. Switzerland is not an EU member but autonomously aligns its Ukraine Ordinance with EU sanctions packages; this cut mirrors the EU's Implementing Regulation 2026/124 and the UK OFSI general licence amendment adopted two weeks earlier under the same six-monthly dynamic-adjustment formula.

On January 23, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight vessel-owning/management firms — based in the UAE, India, Oman, the Seychelles, and the Marshall Islands — and identified nine of their tankers as blocked property, for transporting hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian crude oil, LPG, naphtha and high-sulfur fuel oil to buyers across East Asia, South Asia and East Africa. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum/petrochemical sector) as part of the maximum-pressure campaign under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, and OFAC concurrently issued General License T authorizing limited safety, environmental and cargo-offloading transactions involving the newly blocked vessels.

On 16 January 2026 the Saudi Council of Ministers, via Cabinet Decision No. 468/1447 (issued 30 December 2025 / 9 Rajab 1447H), published in the Umm Al-Qura Official Gazette four sets of implementing regulations governing the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), Ras Al-Khair, Jazan, and Cloud Computing & IT Special Economic Zones. The regulations entered into force on 16 April 2026 (90 days after gazette publication) and operationalise the SEZ framework first launched by ECZA in April 2023. Each zone has its own standalone framework but they share a common headline tax package: 5% corporate income tax for up to 20 years, zero VAT on intra-SEZ and SEZ-import flows, customs-duty suspension on qualifying imports, withholding-tax exemption on dividends and approved cross-border payments, and exemption from key provisions of the Saudi Companies Law, Commercial Register Law, and Trade Names Law. KAEC focuses on advanced manufacturing, automotive, consumer goods, ICT and pharmaceuticals; Ras Al-Khair targets shipbuilding, offshore rigs and MRO; Jazan covers food processing, metals conversion and logistics for Africa-bound trade; the Cloud Computing SEZ is a virtual zone (data centres can sit anywhere in KSA, headquarters must be in Riyadh) for cloud and AI-compute workloads. The package is the operational implementation layer for the 2024 Investment Law and a core Vision 2030 FDI-attraction instrument.

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

India's Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways notified operational guidelines on 26 December 2025 for two paired shipbuilding subsidy schemes with a combined outlay of ₹44,700 crore (~USD 5.4bn). SBFAS (₹24,736 crore corpus) provides 15–25% per-vessel financial assistance tiered by vessel category, with milestone-linked disbursement and a 40% scrap-value credit for vessels broken at Indian yards. SbDS (₹19,989 crore outlay) funds greenfield shipbuilding clusters, brownfield-yard modernisation, and establishment of an India Ship Technology Centre. Both schemes are valid to 31 March 2036 with an in-principle extension to 2047, with applicability for shipbuilding contracts signed from 24 September 2025. On 7 January 2026 the guidelines were amended to include chemical tankers under SBFAS Category-1.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Cabinet Office jointly published the Shipbuilding Revival Roadmap (造船業再生ロードマップ) on 26 December 2025, redefining shipbuilding as a "national strategic industry" within an All-Japan shipping-and-shipbuilding framework. The Roadmap targets doubling domestic shipbuilding capacity from ~9 million GT to 18 million GT by 2035 (re-capturing roughly 20% global market share) backed by a ¥1 trillion (~USD 6.4 bn) public-private investment commitment over three staged phases (2026-28 automation, 2029-31 facility expansion, 2032-34 dock-operation support), mandates consolidation of domestic shipbuilders into 1-3 groups by 2028, and is funded in its first three years by a ¥120 bn FY2025 supplementary budget enacted in December 2025.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit and outbound-investment finance institution, signed a loan agreement on 2025-12-22 providing JPY 135 billion (approx. USD 865 million) to Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. (MOL), co-financed alongside private financial institutions for a total facility of JPY 250 billion. The loan finances part of the funds MOL used to acquire LBC Tank Terminals Group Holding Netherlands Coöperatief U.A., a chemical tank-terminal operator with core operations in Europe and the US; the acquisition itself completed in June 2025.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit and outbound-investment finance institution, signed a loan agreement on 2025-12-22 providing approximately USD 189 million toward a syndicated facility for UnicornMark Discovery Pte. Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle incorporated by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL) to own Singapore's first floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU). Co-lenders are MUFG Bank, DBS Bank, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, and Standard Chartered (Singapore). The vessel will be chartered to Singapore LNG Corporation, the state-owned LNG terminal operator, under a leasing/operation/maintenance arrangement.

The Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 on 18 December 2025, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, to add 41 vessels to Annex XLII of the Russia sanctions regime. Of these, 36 vessels are designated for transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products while engaging in irregular and high-risk shipping practices characteristic of the "shadow fleet," 5 vessels are designated for transporting stolen Ukrainian grain and cultural property, and 1 vessel (GT HONOR) is designated for facilitating violation or circumvention of EU sanctions. Listed vessels are banned from access to EU member-state ports and locks and from a broad range of maritime-transport-related services, effective 19 December 2025. The measure is an incremental listing update between the 19th (Regulation 2025/2033, October 2025) and 20th (Regulation 2026/506, April 2026) numbered sanctions packages, rather than a new package itself.

On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.

On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.

Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.

Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) announced the K-Shipbuilding Strategy for Next-Generation Market Dominance on 15 November 2025 at the emergency economy ministerial meeting and exports-and-investment promotion meeting. The strategy deploys KRW 710 billion (~USD 534 million) by 2028 across three policy directions: (1) technology super-gap via autonomous self-navigating vessels, zero-emission ships (LNG/ammonia/hydrogen tri-fuel), and AI-driven design and smart shipbuilding; (2) manufacturing upgrade through smart shipyard investment, robotics distribution, and improved foreign-manpower visa pathways; and (3) legal infrastructure including a new dedicated "Promotion of Industrialization and Technological Innovation of the Next-Generation Shipbuilding Industry" Act. Korea's overarching target is to capture ≥80% of the next-generation shipbuilding market, explicitly in competition with China's state-subsidised fleet expansion.

New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

China's Ministry of Transport (Water Transport Bureau, document 交办水〔2025〕59号), acting under the PRC International Maritime Transport Regulations, issued a measure on 10 October 2025 imposing escalating special port service fees on U.S.-linked vessels calling at Chinese ports from 14 October 2025. Fees apply at the first Chinese port of call per voyage to (i) U.S.-owned, (ii) U.S.-operated, (iii) ≥25% U.S.-equity, (iv) U.S.-flagged, or (v) U.S.-built vessels, charged per net ton on a stepped schedule (¥400/NT from 14 Oct 2025, ¥640/NT from 17 Apr 2026, ¥880/NT from 17 Apr 2027, ¥1,120/NT from 17 Apr 2028) and capped at five voyages per vessel per year. The measure is the first MOT-issued trade-remedy instrument in the IPTM register and the direct, named-target mirror response to USTR's 17 April 2025 Section 301 maritime Notice of Action. Both regimes were mutually suspended for one year from 10 November 2025 through 9 November 2026 following the 30 October 2025 Trump-Xi Busan meeting.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by PM Narendra Modi, approved a ₹25,000 crore ($3bn) Maritime Development Fund (MDF) on 24 September 2025 as part of the broader ₹69,725 crore shipbuilding and maritime package. The MDF comprises a ₹20,000 crore Maritime Investment Fund (MIF) — a blended-finance Category-I Alternative Investment Fund with the Government of India contributing up to 49% of capital at concessional rates and the remaining 51% raised from ports and private/commercial investors — and a ₹5,000 crore Interest Incentivization Fund (IIF) that subsidises loan interest costs for shipyards and shipowners to lower the effective cost of debt. The fund is designed to run through FY 2026-36 and is projected to catalyse up to ₹1.5 lakh crore (~$18bn) in maritime-sector investment by 2030, covering shipbuilding, ship repair, ports, inland waterways, coastal shipping and tonnage-capacity expansion.

On 19 September 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office designated two Georgian nationals — Otar Partskhaladze and Levan Vasadze — and two companies, UK-based Aeza International Ltd and Russia-based HeliCo Group LLC, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, citing their roles in supporting Russian disinformation and Georgia's Kremlin-aligned political network. In the same package OFSI proscribed two oil tankers, Bavly and Karakuz, for allegedly delivering Russian-origin crude to the port of Batumi, Georgia, barring both vessels from UK ports and the UK Ship Register. Designated individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and director-disqualification sanctions.

Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.

New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

On 2 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra'i, a dual Iraqi/St Kitts-and-Nevis citizen, along with his UAE-based shipping manager Babylon and five Marshall Islands-registered shell companies (Tryfo Navigation, Keely Shiptrade, Odiar Management, Panarea Marine, Topsail Shipholding) that hold registered ownership of nine Liberia-flagged tankers (ADENA, LILIANA, CAMILLA, DELFINA, BIANCA, ROBERTA, ALEXANDRA, BELLAGIO, PAOLA). The network blends Iranian crude with Iraqi oil via ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian Gulf and at Iraqi ports, then markets the blend as solely Iraqi-origin to evade US sanctions, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian regime and al-Samarra'i. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902 and blocks all US property and interests of the designated individual, entities and vessels.

Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to certify, from 21 August 2025, that vessels calling at Turkish ports have no Israeli ownership or agency ties and carry no military or hazardous cargo destined for Israel; Israeli-flagged or Israeli-linked ships were barred from Turkish ports outright, and Turkish-flagged vessels were barred from calling at Israeli ports. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed and formalised the measures — alongside a parallel closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government/military flights — in an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on 29 August 2025, stating Türkiye had "completely cut off trade with Israel." The measure operationalises and tightens enforcement of Türkiye's broader Israel trade suspension (in place since May 2024) by closing the maritime transshipment channel that had allowed indirect trade to continue.

On 22 July 2025 the Government of Quebec, via Investissement Québec, announced a CAD 145 million (~USD 106 million) capital injection into Groupe Océan, a Quebec-based shipbuilding, harbour-towing and dredging firm. The package comprises CAD 75 million in preferred shares from the Quebec government plus CAD 34 million from the Fund for the Growth of Quebec Businesses and CAD 36 million from Investissement Québec's own equity funds. The stated purpose is to expand Groupe Océan's shipyards (Quebec City and L'Isle-aux-Coudres), preserve its head office and ~1,120 jobs in Quebec, and position the firm to win work under Canada's federal National Shipbuilding Strategy.

Guinea's Council of Ministers activated a longstanding right in the Mining Code on 14 July 2025, mandating that at least 50% of all bauxite export volumes be shipped on Guinean-flag vessels. To operationalise the mandate, the government simultaneously created Guinéenne des Transports Maritimes (GUITRAM), a 100% state-owned maritime company designated as the exclusive Guinean-flag carrier for the mandated share. A complementary Guinea Bauxite Index (GBX) was launched simultaneously to establish a state-managed reference price for export pricing. The measures redirect freight revenues — estimated at $15–25 per tonne — from existing (predominantly Chinese-controlled) shipping operators toward the Guinean state, applied to approximately 130 Mt/year of exports that constitute roughly 60% of global seaborne bauxite supply.

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan's state export-credit and outbound-investment finance institution, signed a loan agreement on 2025-06-27 providing USD 252 million toward a syndicated facility for White Eagle Energy Limited, a Cyprus-registered special-purpose vehicle wholly owned by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL). Co-lenders are Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank. The facility finances White Eagle's acquisition of a newly built floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) — Poland's first — which will be chartered to Operator Gazociągów Przesyłowych GAZ-SYSTEM S.A., Poland's state-owned gas transmission operator, under a leasing/operation/maintenance arrangement.

On 25 June 2025 the Government of Ontario announced the CAD 15 million (~USD 11 million) Ontario Shipbuilding Grant Program (OSGP), part of a wider CAD 215 million package to support the province's shipbuilding and marine sector. OSGP offers non-repayable grants covering up to 50% of eligible project costs for skills training, infrastructure improvements, and machinery/equipment purchases at Ontario shipyards. The stated purpose is to expand provincial shipbuilding capacity in support of Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy and to bolster Ontario manufacturers facing US tariffs and economic uncertainty; applications opened in late July 2025 via Transfer Payment Ontario, with a first intake running July-September 2025.

New Zealand's Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 3) 2025, made under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022, came into force on 19 June 2025 designating seven entities and ten individuals -- including North Korean, Iranian and Belarusian actors supporting Russia's war effort and Russian actors involved in drone and weaponry production. The same instrument created a new "restricted ship" category under Regulation 8 and sanctioned 27 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet under it, and expanded the Regulation 12 legal-services exception. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on New Zealand persons supplying services to them.

The European Commission on 20 May 2025 published the results of the second EU Hydrogen Bank auction (IF24), selecting 15 renewable hydrogen production projects across five European Economic Area countries to share approximately €992 million in Innovation Fund grants. Winning projects span transport, chemicals, methanol, and ammonia end-uses; three projects were selected under a dedicated maritime-fuels lot. Spain, Lithuania, and Austria committed over €700 million in additional national co-funding via the Auctions-as-a-Service mechanism, bringing total public support above €1.69 billion and marking the first large-scale EEA co-funded hydrogen auction.

The European Commission approved, under EU State aid rules (Case SA.111368), Italy's reintroduction of tax and social-security relief for shipping companies that register vessels in the Italian International Register ("Registro Internazionale"). The scheme, worth an estimated EUR 5.4 billion, runs for a ten-year period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2033 and grants qualifying operators — including cruise-ship shipboard concessionaires — corporate income-tax reductions, withholding-tax credits, and exemptions from seafarer social-security and welfare contributions. The stated aim is to encourage ship registration under EU/EEA flags, strengthen the competitiveness of the Italian-flagged fleet, and raise compliance with EU social, environmental and safety standards; undertakings in financial difficulty are excluded.