Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Executive Order 14413, signed 22 June 2026, directs a national quantum-computing industrial-policy push: the QC-ADDS effort to deliver large-scale quantum computers to Department of Energy facilities for application development and discovery science, a National Center for Quantum Computing Assessment, an expanded Quantum Information Science and Technology Counterintelligence Protection Team, and a network of National QIST Workforce Development Institutes. It sets staged deadlines (30/60/90/120/180 days) for agency policy alignment, sensor-project identification, QC-ADDS technical specifications, and workforce/supply-chain plans, plus a September 2028 target for next-generation quantum-sensor deployment. Section 9 directs harmonisation of research-security and export-control policy with allies to prevent "countries of concern" from acquiring critical quantum technologies, but the order does not itself impose any new export-control rule. No dollar figures are specified.
At the Japan–UK bilateral summit in London on June 14, 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Prime Minister Keir Starmer issued the "Japan–UK Leaders' Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation," committing to deepen collaboration on critical minerals supply-chain diversification (mining, refining, processing, recycling, stockpiling), a focused battery-materials and recycling dialogue, and semiconductor technology cooperation through the Japan–UK Frontier Technology Partnership. The two leaders expressed grave concerns over economic coercion and arbitrary export restrictions on critical minerals and other materials that could affect global supply chains. The declaration preceded and informed the G7 Évian critical-minerals alliance announced three days later on June 17, 2026.
On 3 June 2026 the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) — COM(2026) 502 — as part of the European Technological Sovereignty Package. The CADA proposes to triple EU data-centre capacity over five to seven years, introduces a single EU-wide sovereignty assessment framework for cloud and AI services, and establishes common EU-level procurement mechanisms for public administrations prioritising EU-based cloud and AI infrastructure. As a Commission proposal the CADA now enters co-decision (European Parliament + Council) and is not yet law; it is structurally distinct from the co-adopted Chips Act 2.0, addressing cloud infrastructure and AI compute capacity rather than semiconductor supply chains.
On 3 June 2026 the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to amend and substantially expand the EU Chips Act (Regulation (EU) 2023/1781), as part of the European Technological Sovereignty Package. The proposal raises the mobilisation target from €43bn to €120bn, introduces new demand-side "Demand Accelerators" to aggregate public procurement, expands "Grand Challenges" to cover AI-optimised chips, caps permitting at 12 months, and widens the Strategic Partnerships on Semiconductors framework. As a Commission legislative proposal it now enters co-decision (European Parliament + Council) before becoming law; the 2023 regulation remains in force during this process.
On 23 May 2026 President Javier Milei, Economy Minister Luis Caputo, and Chief of Staff Manuel Adorni announced the "Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones en Nuevas Industrias" (Super RIGI), and on 26 May 2026 submitted the bill (Mensaje 181/2026, expediente 0005-PE-2026) to the Cámara de Diputados — pending Congressional approval as of filing. The regime applies a US$1 billion minimum investment threshold (with ≥20% committed in the first two years), a 15% corporate income tax rate (vs 25% under the base 2024 RIGI), accelerated depreciation of 60%/20%/20% over three years, immediate export-duty exemption (vs year 3 under RIGI), import-tariff exemption, and 30-year regulatory stability across tax, customs, social security, and FX matters. A progressive FX-liberalisation schedule allows 20% / 40% / 100% free disposal of export-generated foreign currency in years 1 / 2 / 3+. Target sectors are industries that "do not currently exist or are in experimental/pilot phase in Argentina," including semiconductors, AI data centres, advanced biotech, 100% electric vehicles, lithium value chain (downstream processing, cathode, battery), green hydrogen, solar panels, wind turbines, onshore LNG, SMR nuclear, aerospace, uranium value chain, potassium and phosphorus fertilisers, and new petrochemicals.
The Decreto para la Autorización Inmediata de Inversiones, published in Mexico's Diario Oficial de la Federación on 4 May 2026, creates a streamlined investment-authorization mechanism under President Sheinbaum's Plan México strategy. The decree establishes an Investment Committee — composed of the Secretariats of Economía, Hacienda, SEMARNAT, SCT, Energía, and Bienestar — mandated to issue authorization certificates within 30 business days for qualifying projects, replacing the historic 6–18-month multi-agency backlog. Eligibility covers three tiers: projects in designated Polos de Desarrollo Económico para el Bienestar (Welfare Development Poles), investments of MXN 2 billion (≈USD 100M) or more, and projects in strategic sectors (semiconductors, EV batteries, critical minerals, automotive supply chain, medical devices, biotech, aerospace). This is the procedural- acceleration arm of Plan México, structurally distinct from the January 2025 Plan México tax-incentive decree (the fiscal arm), and operationalises the February 2026 Plan México expansion announced by Sheinbaum.
Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs established the Quantum Industry Technology Promotion Office (QITPO) on April 27, 2026, as the government's primary vehicle to develop Taiwan's role in the global quantum supply chain beyond its established "Silicon Island" semiconductor position. QITPO is mandated across three axes: supporting Taiwanese manufacturers' technical capabilities in early-stage quantum development ("Quantum Taiwan" initiative); creating a cross-sector exchange platform between industry, academia, and research institutions; and attracting global quantum companies to establish R&D centres in Taiwan. Eighteen Taiwanese companies participated in the launch event.
The UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) launched the Sovereign AI Fund on 16 April 2026, a £500 million state-anchored equity vehicle chaired by James Wise (Balderton Capital) and designed to operate at venture-capital speed. The Fund makes direct equity investments in UK-headquartered AI startups and bundles allocations of UK AI Research Resource (AIRR) supercomputer capacity alongside investment tickets; an initial cohort of six startups received up to one million GPU hours each and Callosum received the first equity ticket. The Fund is the principal operational implementation of the AI Opportunities Action Plan (CP 1241, January 2025) compute-and-capability pillar and has a dedicated government portal at sovereignai.gov.uk.
On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.
On 9 April 2026 the Government of India, exercising powers under section 4(1) of the Special Economic Zones Act 2005, gazetted a 66.166-hectare sector-specific Special Economic Zone at Dholera Special Investment Region, Gujarat for Tata Semiconductor Manufacturing Pvt. Ltd, exclusively for electronic hardware, software and IT/ITES. The notification is the statutory site- enabling instrument for India's first commercial-scale wafer-fab plant — a ~INR 91,000 crore (~USD 11bn) Tata Electronics / PSMC (Powerchip, Taiwan) joint project announced under India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 1.0 in February 2024 — and follows the Letter of Approval issued on 17 March 2026. The same notification designates the SEZ as an Inland Container Depot under the Customs Act 1962 with effect from 9 April 2026, enabling on-site customs clearance for fab inputs.
The Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration published a Federal Register notice on 10 April 2026 (91 FR 18412, doc 2026-06952) opening the inaugural Call for Proposals for the American AI Exports Program established under Executive Order 14320. Proposals are accepted from 1 April 2026 through 5:00 pm EDT on 30 June 2026 from US industry-led "pre-set" consortia offering full-stack American AI export packages — AI-optimised hardware, data pipelines, AI models and systems, security and cybersecurity measures, and sector-specific applications — for presentation by the US government to foreign public- and private-sector buyers. Designated consortia receive priority US-government advocacy, priority consideration for export-control licence engagement, interagency coordination, and federal-financing referrals (EXIM, DFC), with a 14-business-day completeness review and 60-calendar-day designation decision once a proposal is deemed complete.
On 31 March 2026 the Government of Vietnam issued Decree 96/2026/ND-CP, the principal implementing decree for the Law on Investment 2025 (Law 143/2025/QH15). It takes effect on its signing date and replaces Decree 31/2021/ND-CP, Decree 19/2025/ND-CP and Decree 239/2025/ND-CP — the first comprehensive overhaul of Vietnam's general FDI-licensing framework since 2021. The decree operationalises the new Special Investment Procedure (a registration-and-commitment fast-track in industrial parks, export-processing zones, hi-tech parks, concentrated digital- technology zones, free-trade zones, international financial centres and economic-zone functional areas) and details the list of 16 specially-incentivised sectors covering semiconductor and chip manufacturing, AI, big data, digital technology and high-tech R&D. It also rewrites foreign-investor market-access conditions, document procedures and dispute / grievance mechanisms.
The Philippine Semiconductor and Electronics Industry (PSEI) Roadmap 2026–2030 was presented at the 4th SEIAC meeting at Malacañang on 23 March 2026 by BOI Executive Director Ma. Corazon Halili-Dichosa and formally rolled out by DTI in April 2026. The Roadmap targets $110 billion in annual exports by 2030 ($70B semiconductors + $40B electronics, approximately doubling the current ~$50B baseline) via value-chain ascent from assembly-test-packaging through IC design toward front-end wafer fabrication, supported by 128,000-worker upskilling over five years and up to three national laboratories in fabrication, R&D, and talent development.
South Korea's 13th National Strategic Technology Special Committee (chaired by MSIT) adopted the 2026 Annual Implementation Plan for the First Basic Plan for National Strategic Technology Development (2024–2028), committing KRW 8.6 trillion in 2026 R&D investment — a ~30% YoY increase from KRW 6.5 trillion in 2025 — across 19 NEXT strategic-technology fields encompassing AI, semiconductors, quantum, displays, and secondary batteries, coordinated across 23 ministries. The plan is supplemented by KRW 46.6 trillion in policy finance delivered through Korea Development Bank (KDB), Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF), and Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), providing the horizontal funding-coordination architecture that operationalises all sector-specific Korean strategic-technology legislative instruments.
South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act for Korea-US Strategic Investment Management (한미 전략적 투자 관리를 위한 특별법) on 12 March 2026 by a bipartisan vote of 226-8-8, authorising a sovereign-backed US$350bn (~KRW 517tn) investment commitment to the United States over an annual US$20bn cap. The act creates the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation (한미전략투자공사), a new state-run entity with KRW 2tn (~US$1.36bn) government-financed paid-in capital, as the institutional vehicle to execute the bilateral investment MOU. Article 3 Clause 3 permits investment decisions to proceed despite insufficient commercial viability when national-security or supply-chain-stability grounds exist, subject to prior consent of the relevant National Assembly Standing Committee, operationalising the December 2025 Korea-US Strategic Trade and Investment Deal investment-pledge tranche.
Gujarat Chief Minister Bhupendra Patel launched the Gujarat Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Policy 2026–2031 on 1 March 2026 at the SemiConnect 2026 Conference in Gandhinagar, establishing a five-year ₹1,000 crore Swadeshi Anusandhan Fund (Indigenous Innovation Fund) for domestic R&D across strategic sectors including AI, semiconductors, quantum technologies, biotechnology, green energy, and defence. The policy targets state STI expenditure of 1% of GSDP by 2030, creation of 1 lakh skilled research professionals, 1,000+ IP filings annually, and builds three Gujarat Rajya Research and Innovation Cluster (GRRIC) corridors to anchor the state's growing semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14387 on 18 February 2026, invoking Section 101 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure an adequate domestic supply of elemental phosphorus and glyphosate-based herbicides. The order delegates DPA §101 priority-allocation and contract- direction authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, authorises USDA to direct the production and distribution of these inputs for national-defense purposes, and grants legal immunity to domestic producers acting in compliance with USDA directives. The EO is the first DPA invocation specifically targeting the phosphorus supply chain, reflecting the concentration of global white/yellow phosphorus production in China (~75% share) and the existence of only a single operating US producer.
On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.
On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman tabled India's Union Budget 2026-27, with Customs Notification No. 02/2026-Customs (dated 1 Feb 2026, effective 2 Feb 2026) implementing the customs-duty package. The notification zero-rates basic customs duty (BCD) on (i) capital goods imported for domestic processing of critical minerals — crushing, beneficiation, refining, chemical-processing, separation/purification, and metallurgical/alloy-making equipment; (ii) capital goods for lithium-ion cell manufacturing for battery energy storage systems (BESS), extending the 2024-25 EV-cell exemption to stationary storage; and (iii) twelve additional critical minerals plus cobalt powder and lithium-ion battery scrap, on top of the 25 critical minerals already exempted in the FY2024-25 budget. In parallel, critical minerals (including monazite / rare-earth concentrate) are migrated from the customs-exemption notification mechanism into the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act at Nil BCD, effective 1 May 2026 — a tariffisation step that locks the rate into primary legislation rather than annually renewable notification. The Budget also commits to dedicated critical-mineral / rare-earth-magnet processing corridors in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Structurally this is the fiscal/tariff layer underneath the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM, Jan 2025) and the National Manufacturing Mission (Feb 2025): NCMM funds capex and overseas asset acquisition (₹34,300 cr), this Budget removes the import-duty drag on the equipment needed to actually run domestic processing lines. It complements the REPM scheme (Nov 2025) for sintered rare-earth magnets and Semicon Mission 2.0 (Feb 2026) on the demand side for refined critical minerals.
On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, presenting the Union Budget 2026-27, announced the launch of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 — the second-phase national semiconductor industrial-policy framework succeeding ISM 1.0 (2021, INR 76,000 crore). The Budget makes an initial INR 1,000 crore provision for ISM 2.0 in FY 2026-27 and raises the Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) outlay from INR 22,919 crore to INR 40,000 crore. ISM 2.0's distinct architecture centres on four strategic priorities not in ISM 1.0: (i) indigenous semiconductor equipment, chemicals, gases and materials production, (ii) full-stack Indian semiconductor IP design, (iii) industry-led R&D and skills/training centres, and (iv) domestic and global supply-chain integration. Total mission outlay reported as approximately INR 1-1.2 lakh crore (~USD 12-14bn) is being finalised; Cabinet clearance and the formal scheme launch are expected by mid-2026.
On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.
South Korea's National Assembly passed the "Special Act on Strengthening and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Semiconductor Industry" (반도체산업 경쟁력 강화 및 지원에 관한 특별법) on 29 January 2026 by 199 votes in favour out of 206 members present, after roughly 18 months of inter-party deadlock. The act establishes (i) a Presidential Commission for Enhancing Semiconductor Competitiveness as the central inter-ministerial coordination body, (ii) a statutory five-year master plan with annual implementation plans, (iii) a dedicated semiconductor industry special account ("반도체산업 특별회계") to ring-fence funding for fabs, materials, parts and equipment, and packaging across the full memory + system-LSI + design + manufacturing supply chain, and (iv) authority to designate semiconductor clusters outside the greater Seoul area with relocation incentives. Promulgation by the Cabinet is expected shortly after passage; effectiveness contingent on enforcement-ordinance finalisation, expected Q3 2026. The KRW 2tn anchor envelope of the special account does not begin disbursing until 2027 because companion amendments to the National Finance Act were not enacted in time.
The Rajasthan State Cabinet, chaired by Chief Minister Bhajan Lal Sharma, approved the Rajasthan Aerospace & Defence Policy 2026 on 21 January 2026 in the same session that cleared the Rajasthan Semiconductor Policy 2026. The policy positions Rajasthan as a manufacturing and MRO hub for aircraft, helicopters, drones, missiles, avionics, satellite buses, armoured vehicles, radars, defence electronics, and precision engineering, targeting OEMs, system integrators, MSMEs, and startups under the Make in India / Atmanirbhar Bharat defence-industrial pivot. Projects are tiered (large / mega / ultra-mega) with differentiated incentive menus including capital grants, tax reimbursements, and turnover-linked incentives aligned with national DPEPP and iDEX frameworks.
The Government of Rajasthan approved its first dedicated semiconductor industrial policy on 21 January 2026, offering a layered incentive stack on top of India's national Semiconductor Mission (ISM). The policy covers fab, ATMP, OSAT, compound semiconductors (SiC, GaN), display fabs, sensors, power electronics, PCBs, and fabless design, with investment-classification tiering (large / mega / ultra-mega categories). Key incentives include a 60% top-up on any ISM capital subsidy received, a 5% interest subsidy on term loans, 100% electricity duty exemption for seven years, 75% stamp duty and land conversion charges exemption, and SGST reimbursements. The official policy document was publicly released on 24 March 2026 via the Rising Rajasthan portal.
India's Ministry of Mines on 19 January 2026 notified the country's first national Tailings Policy, establishing a standardised framework for the systematic exploration, sampling and economic evaluation of critical and strategic minerals from secondary sources — tailings, mine dumps, slag, anode slimes, red mud and fly ash — at existing mines. The policy designates the Geological Survey of India (GSI), Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) and Atomic Minerals Directorate (AMD) as the implementing agencies, and mandates inter-ministry coordination across the Ministries of Coal, Mines, Petroleum and Atomic Energy because critical-mineral host materials cut across sectoral jurisdictions. It supplements the National Critical Mineral Mission (2025-01-29) by adding a secondary-source recovery track aimed at lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements found as companion minerals in legacy mining waste, with the explicit objective of reducing import dependency.
On 16 January 2026 the Yunnan Provincial People's Government issued Yunzhengfa [2026] No. 2, a package of 34 policy measures (effective through 2030) to support high-quality development of the Central Yunnan New Area (滇中新区), a national-level new area centred on Kunming. The measures span industrial upgrading, innovation, opening-up and fiscal/land support: transformation of traditional petrochemical and metallurgy industries into "hundred-billion-yuan" clusters, development of semiconductor materials/equipment, new-energy battery materials and non-ferrous/rare-precious-metals manufacturing using Yunnan's mineral and plateau-agriculture resources, and cultivation of low-altitude economy, biomanufacturing and new-materials industries. It also seeks to establish a South/Southeast Asia aircraft-delivery centre and one-stop aviation-maintenance base in the new area.
On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.
On 7 January 2026 the National Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry Policy Committee (the "Semiconductor Board"), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Ekniti Nitithanprapas, endorsed the Draft National Strategy for the Development of the Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry, prepared by the Board of Investment (BOI) with Roland Berger after a public hearing in October 2025. The 25-year roadmap (2026-2050) targets more than THB 2.5 trillion (~USD 79.6 billion) in investment, training of more than 230,000 highly-skilled engineers, and construction of a complete upstream-to- downstream semiconductor ecosystem with phased milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050. The strategy prioritises five product groups where Thailand has competitive potential — Power chips, Sensors, Photonics, Analog and Discrete chips — and explicitly aims to move the country beyond OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) into IC design and upstream wafer fabrication ("Made-in-Thailand chips"). Implementation runs through a five-pillar BOI support mechanism: long-term low-interest financing and grants, human-capital development, technology upgrade of the Microelectronics Technology Centre (TMEC), specialised industrial clusters with guaranteed renewable-energy and water security, and streamlined regulatory approvals including a new BOI "FastPass" fast-track facility (16 pilot projects worth THB 170 billion already processed).
The Government of Maharashtra, Industries Department, notified the Maharashtra Industry, Investment, and Services Policy-2025 on 31 December 2025, valid for five years and superseding the prior Maharashtra Industrial Policy 2019. The umbrella state-level instrument supports Maharashtra's "trillion-dollar economy by 2030" and "Developed Maharashtra 2047" vision with targets of ₹70.5 lakh crore (~USD 850 bn) cumulative investment, 50 lakh (5 million) jobs across manufacturing and services, and expansion of industry's share of Gross State Value Added to 30%. It is Maharashtra's first-ever combined industry + services + investment-promotion framework (prior policies were industry-only), establishes the unified "Invest Maharashtra" platform and revamped MAITRI 2.0 portal (125+ services, AI investor support, blockchain document verification), and empowers a Cabinet Sub-Committee under the Chief Minister to sanction bespoke customised-package incentives for Mega and Ultra-Mega Projects above the ₹500 crore threshold.
Decree 353/2025/NĐ-CP is the principal implementing instrument of Vietnam's Law on Digital Technology Industry (Law No. 71/2025/QH15), effective 1 January 2026 — the same date as the parent statute. The decree's five chapters and 36 articles operationalise three pillars: (i) a comprehensive State-support and preferential-incentive framework for products, services, and infrastructure across the semiconductor, AI, cloud, fintech, and e-commerce sectors; (ii) a high-quality-human-resources development framework covering training funds, scholarship schemes, and foreign-expert visa fast-tracks; and (iii) Vietnam's first statutory innovation sandbox, allowing organisations to deploy new digital products and business models under time- and scope-limited regulatory carve-outs where current law has not kept pace with practice.
On 24 December 2025 the Minister of Science and Technology signed Decision No. 4386/QĐ-BKHCN defining the functions, tasks, and organisational structure of the Vietnam National Multi-Project Wafer Coordination Centre (VNMPW/CC). The Centre sits under MOST's Authority of Information Technology Industry and acts as a coordinating hub between domestic chip-design firms, research institutes, and domestic / foreign fabrication and packaging partners. It provides shared EDA software access, IP libraries, technical design verification, performance measurement, training programmes, and pilot-production (MPW shuttle) support — the first concrete institutional node operationalising Vietnam's 2024 semiconductor strategy (Decision 1018/QĐ-TTg).
The European Investment Bank and STMicroelectronics signed a EUR 500 million financing agreement, the first tranche of a EUR 1 billion credit line approved by the EIB, to support semiconductor research, development and high-volume manufacturing investments at ST's Catania and Agrate sites in Italy and its Crolles site in France. About 60% of the facility is earmarked for high-volume manufacturing capacity and 40% for R&D. It is the ninth financing agreement between EIB and STMicroelectronics since 1994, bringing cumulative EIB financing to the company to roughly EUR 4.2 billion, and is explicitly framed by the EIB around European semiconductor competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted the Law on Investment 2025 (Law No. 143/2025/QH15) at its 10th session on 11 December 2025, effective 1 March 2026. The law replaces the 2020 Law on Investment (Law 61/2020/QH14) as the umbrella FDI framework. Article 19 lets foreign investors establish enterprises in Vietnam without a prior investment project, unlocking holding-company / regional-headquarters structures. A fast-track Special Investment Procedure (SIP) covers industrial parks, export-processing zones, hi-tech parks, concentrated digital-technology zones, free-trade zones, international financial centres and economic-zone functional areas, targeting semiconductor, data-centre and 5G/digital-infrastructure capex. Appendix IV abolishes 38 conditional business sectors and adjusts 20 others (from 1 July 2026 only 199 conditional sectors remain). Operationalised by Decree 96/2026/ND-CP (issued and effective 31 March 2026) and Decree 103/2026/ND-CP for outbound investment.
On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.
Singapore's National Research Foundation (NRF), under the Prime Minister's Office, launched the five-year Research, Innovation and Enterprise 2030 Plan on 5 December 2025, allocating S$37 billion (approximately 1% of GDP) for 2026-2030. The plan succeeds RIE2025 (S$25 billion) and introduces two named RIE Flagships and two RIE Grand Challenges; the first Flagship is in semiconductors and is explicitly aimed at making Singapore a strategically important R&D and manufacturing node in the global semiconductor supply chain. The budget envelope is split 24% foundational research, 20% innovation and enterprise, 17% infrastructure / new programmes ("white space"), 10% talent development.
Canada's Budget 2025 (released 4 November 2025) expands the Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit (CMETC) to cover 12 additional minerals: bismuth, cesium, chromium, fluorspar, germanium, indium, manganese, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, tin, and tungsten. The 30% flow-through share enhanced rate (double the standard 15% Mineral Exploration Tax Credit) is maintained and applies to agreements entered after November 4, 2025 and before March 31, 2027. This is the first scope expansion since CMETC's creation in 2022, bringing the total eligible mineral count to approximately 27 and aligning the credit with Canada's 2024 Critical Minerals List update.
On 31 October 2025, Japan Investment Corporation (JIC) and its subsidiary JIC Capital, Ltd. (JICC) announced the establishment of two new private-equity limited partnerships — JIC PEF2 (JPY600 billion) and JIC PEFJ2 (JPY200 billion), collectively "JIC PE2" and totalling approximately JPY800 billion (~USD 5.36 billion) — launching 1 November 2025. The funds provide state-backed risk capital for large-scale industry restructuring, growth investment, and business-restructuring deals in capital-intensive sectors (mobility, semiconductors, chemicals, materials, healthcare) where JIC judges private PE capital in Japan to be insufficient. PEF2 is the main investment vehicle (10-year term, 5-year investment period); PEFJ2 co-invests alongside PEF2 in large-scale projects.
On 26 October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, on the margins of the ASEAN Summit, President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signed two complementary instruments structuring the US-Malaysia economic relationship: (i) a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation to Diversify Global Critical Minerals Supply Chains and Promote Investments, establishing quarterly working-level meetings on bilateral exploration, extraction, processing, refining, manufacturing, and recycling, plus shared commitments on streamlined permitting and protection from non-market policies; and (ii) a legally-binding Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) covering goods (chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, metals, vehicles, dairy, horticulture, poultry, pork, rice, fuel ethanol), digital trade, services, and investment. Under the ART, the United States maintains a 19% reciprocal tariff on Malaysian imports (with carve-outs for products receiving 0% under EO 14346) while Malaysia commits to refrain from banning or quota-restricting exports of critical minerals or rare earths to the US, ensure no restrictions on rare-earth magnet sales to US firms, and grant extended operating licenses to US partners. The ART enters into force 60 days after exchange of notifications of completed domestic procedures.
South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources (MOTIR) announced the 2026–2030 Basic Plan for Strengthening the Materials, Parts & Equipment (MPE / 소부장) Industry on 24 October 2025, succeeding the 2020–2025 MPE Basic Plan born from the 2019 Japan export shock. The new five-year plan targets three pillars — innovation, market, and ecosystem — to cut import dependence on 100+ strategic materials, components, and equipment items underpinning Korea's semiconductor, display, battery, and advanced-manufacturing sectors. Key instruments include ten additional MPE Specialized Clusters, 15 "Super Eul" world- leading technology projects, five AI New Materials projects, and KRW 35 billion in joint R&D funding; full annual appropriations flow through the government budget cycle.
On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.
On 15 October 2025 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the Microelectronics Strategy of the Federal Government, jointly presented by the Federal Ministry for Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE). The strategy is the first comprehensive cabinet-adopted German microelectronics policy framework in over a decade and operationalises Germany's contribution to the European Chips Act envelope. It is organised around three pillars — Research, Skilled Labour and Production — and creates a "Chips Office" to coordinate stakeholder interaction and implementation. It establishes a competence centre for chip design and a flagship "supercomputer in the car" project, and is framed as a key implementation instrument under the High-Tech Agenda Germany (HTAD) and as Germany's contribution to the September 29 2025 Semicon Declaration signed by all 27 EU member states calling for a revised EU Chips Act II.
On 26 September 2025, Japan's Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato announced the establishment of the Japan Strategic Investment Facility, a JBIC-administered financing vehicle operationalising the USD 550bn investment pledge from the July 2025 US-Japan tariff and investment agreement. The facility launched 1 October 2025 and runs through March 2029, supporting the overseas expansion of Japanese companies across nine economic-security sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, steel, shipbuilding, critical minerals, aviation, energy, automobiles, and AI/quantum technology. Funding draws on three sources — dollar-denominated JBIC bonds, yen-denominated Japanese government loans to JBIC, and a "supplemental" transfer from Japan's USD 1.324tn foreign-currency reserves — with private-sector loans and NEXI-backed loan guarantees supplementing JBIC's own financing.
On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.
The Yogi Adityanath cabinet approved the Uttar Pradesh Electronics Component Manufacturing Policy 2025 (UP ECMP-2025) on 3 September 2025, designating an effective date retroactive to 1 April 2025 for a six-year policy horizon (sunset 31 March 2031). Administered by UPLC and Invest UP, the policy targets INR 5,000 crore in new investment by layering state-level incentives on top of the central MeitY Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS), covering eleven priority component categories including displays, camera modules, multilayer PCBs, magnetics, lithium-ion cells, capacitors, resistors, semiconductor packaging substrates, sensors, connectors, and oscillators. UP is the fourth major Indian state (after Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh) to publish a dedicated ECMS-stacking instrument, completing the Big-Four-state cluster for ECMS-anchored greenfield investment.
South Korea's National Assembly passed an amendment to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act on 2025-08-27 (428th session, 3rd plenary sitting, 164-1 with 164 votes in favour of 165 cast), raising KDB's statutory capital ceiling from KRW 30 trillion to KRW 45 trillion and creating a new "Advanced Strategic Industry Fund" inside KDB. The fund is capitalised at KRW 50 trillion or more over five years via low-rate government-guaranteed bonds and is earmarked for the ten officially designated advanced strategic industries (AI, semiconductors, bio/vaccines, defense, robotics, hydrogen, secondary batteries, displays, future mobility) via cheap loans and equity investment. KDB intends to use the fund as seed capital for a wider "National Growth Fund" that blends in private and pension capital to reach KRW 100 trillion+ in total strategic-industry financing over five years.
Banque des Territoires, acting on behalf of the French State under the France 2030 programme, launched a EUR 500 million fund-of-funds called "Global Tech Coté" on 7 August 2025. The vehicle takes minority stakes (EUR 15 million minimum, capped at 10% of a target fund's subscribed capital) in privately-managed investment funds that in turn back publicly-listed French technology companies with strong growth potential, aiming to build up domestic asset-management capacity alongside the state's stated goal of channelling capital into equities. The selection window for management companies runs until 31 December 2026 or until the EUR 500 million envelope is exhausted, whichever comes first.
The Henan Provincial People's Government issued Yuzheng [2025] No. 18 (豫政〔2025〕18号), "Several Policy Measures to Support Enterprises in Reducing Costs and Increasing Efficiency" (河南省支持企业降本增效若干政策 措施), on 2025-08-04, effective on issuance. The package is a horizontal, cross-sector cost-reduction bundle spanning ten cost categories: R&D subsidies of up to 30% of investment (capped at RMB 5-20 million per project depending on program), equipment-renewal loan interest subsidies and technical-transformation grants (15-20% of investment, capped at RMB 5-10 million), labor-cost relief (unemployment-insurance rate held at 1%, workers'-comp rate cut 20%, unemployment-insurance stabilization rebates of 30-60% through end-2025), financing-cost relief (RMB 160 billion 2025 lending target to tech enterprises, up to RMB 4 million in start-up guarantee loans), logistics-cost relief (toll exemptions for hydrogen trucks and 30% toll discounts for electric trucks through 2025-12-31, RMB 10,000-140,000 scrap-and-renew subsidies for aging trucks), and import/export-cost relief (tariff and quick-approval facilitation for integrated-circuit and advanced-equipment imports, up to 70% subsidy on overseas certification costs).
H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.
On 14 June 2025 Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted Law No. 71/2025/QH15 on the Digital Technology Industry (DTI Law) at its 9th session. The Law enters into force on 1 January 2026 (with certain provisions phased) and is the world's first standalone primary statute dedicated to the digital technology industry, covering digital-tech production and services, semiconductor manufacturing, artificial-intelligence systems, digital assets (legally recognised as property under the Civil Code), and Concentrated Digital Technology Zones. It codifies sector-specific incentives — multi-year corporate income tax reductions, R&D-cost deductions, preferential public procurement, five-year personal income tax exemption for high-quality digital professionals, five-year visa and work-permit exemptions for foreign experts, and 50% subsidy for SME advanced-technology acquisition — and sets headline targets of 150,000 digital-tech enterprises and USD 74bn digital-economy contribution by 2030/2035 (with USD 43bn / USD 74bn variants in different government summaries).
The Shandong Provincial Department of Finance issued Lu Cai Ban Fa [2025] No. 8 (鲁财办发〔2025〕8号), "Several Fiscal Policies to Further Support the High-Quality Development of the Private Economy" (进一步 支持民营经济高质量发展若干财政政策), on 2025-06-09 (published 2025-06-11), effective on issuance through 2027. The package bundles 50 numbered measures across ten categories — technology innovation, digital/smart transformation, industrial upgrading, services, foreign trade, talent attraction, financing channels, government-procurement fairness, overdue-payment relief, and policy-delivery efficiency — targeted at private enterprises operating in Shandong.