Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 17 May 2026, Treasurer Jim Chalmers signed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers (Disposal of Interests in Northern Minerals Limited) Orders (No. 1) 2026 (F2026N00326), directing six China-linked foreign investors to divest a combined 1,678,895,780 shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) within 14 days of the Orders commencing on 18 June 2026. The six named investors are: Real International Resources Limited (619.1m shares), Qogir Trading and Service Co. Limited (523.5m), Vastness Investment Group Limited (271.3m), Chuanyou Cong (130.1m), Hong Kong Ying Tak Limited (95.3m), and Zhongxiong Lin (39.7m), together representing approximately 17.6% of NTU's total shares. NTU owns the Browns Range Heavy Rare Earths Project in Western Australia, one of the few ex-China commercial-scale dysprosium and terbium deposits. These orders are the second tranche of Treasurer-forced divestment of Chinese shareholders in NTU, distinct from the AUD 14 million Federal Court penalty imposed on Indian Ocean International Shipping in January 2026 for non-compliance with the June 2024 disposal orders.

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 113 on April 13, 2026, promulgating the 13th Regular Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL) — the first FINL update in four years, superseding the 12th FINL under EO 175 (2022). The order retains the constitutionally mandated 40% foreign equity ceiling on exploration, development, and utilisation of natural resources (including large-scale mining), and reserves small-scale mining 100% for Filipino nationals. It codifies liberalisations from RA 11659 (Public Service Act), RA 11595 (Retail Trade Liberalisation Act), and RA 11647 (Foreign Investments Act amendments), formally reclassifying telecommunications, airlines, domestic shipping, and railways as sectors open to up to 100% foreign ownership.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14382, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Iran," on 6 February 2026 (effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 7 February 2026; published in the Federal Register on 11 February 2026 as FR doc 2026-02813, 91 FR 6493-6496). Invoking IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 and 3 U.S.C. § 301, the order declared a country-specific national emergency with respect to Iran and established a secondary-tariff-authority framework: an additional ad valorem duty (the EO offers "for example, 25 percent" as illustration but sets no binding rate) is authorised on imports of articles produced by any foreign country determined to directly or indirectly purchase, import, or otherwise acquire any goods or services from Iran. Determinations are made by the Secretary of Commerce, with rate recommendations from the Secretary of State in consultation with Treasury, DHS and USTR; the President retains final authority. EO 14382 was structurally modelled on EO 14245 (Venezuelan oil importing countries, 24 March 2025) and EO 14380 (Cuba, 29 January 2026), and was on the list of nine IEEPA-based tariff EOs whose tariff component was vacated by the SCOTUS 6-3 ruling in *Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump* (20 February 2026). The companion EO 14389 of 20 February 2026 ("Ending Certain Tariff Actions") extinguished the tariff authority for entries on or after 12:00 a.m. ET on 24 February 2026; the underlying Iran national- emergency declaration was preserved. No third-country determination or specific rate was operationalised under EO 14382 prior to vacatur.

On 30 January 2026, Justice Perram of the Federal Court of Australia ordered Indian Ocean International Shipping and Service Company Ltd and its sole director Ms Jing Tian to pay a combined AUD 14 million civil penalty (Indian Ocean AUD 10 million; Ms Tian AUD 4 million) for contravening a June 2024 Treasurer disposal order under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth). The disposal order had directed Indian Ocean to divest its 613.5 million shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) — operator of the Browns Range heavy-rare-earth dysprosium and terbium project in Western Australia — by September 2024 on national security grounds. Instead, Indian Ocean transferred its NTU shares to Ms Tian in August 2024, who briefly returned then re-received them before Ms Tian transferred all 100 of her Indian Ocean shares to Ms Ning Lyu and resigned as director. The court ruled these transfers constituted a breach of the disposal order. This is the first civil-penalty action brought by an Australian Treasurer under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act since its introduction in 1975, and the first FIRB enforcement penalty outside the residential real estate sector.

On 29 January 2026 Switzerland's Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF) amended Annex 28 of the Ordinance on Measures Relating to the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), lowering the price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil from USD 47.6 to USD 44.1 per barrel, effective 1 February 2026. The amendment prohibits Swiss-domiciled operators from providing financial and transport (maritime, insurance, brokering) services related to Russian crude oil priced above the new cap. Switzerland is not an EU member but autonomously aligns its Ukraine Ordinance with EU sanctions packages; this cut mirrors the EU's Implementing Regulation 2026/124 and the UK OFSI general licence amendment adopted two weeks earlier under the same six-monthly dynamic-adjustment formula.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14380, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba," on 29 January 2026 (effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 30 January 2026; published in the Federal Register on 3 February 2026 as FR doc 2026-02250, 91 FR 5085-5089). Invoking IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act, the order declared a country-specific national emergency with respect to Cuba, citing Havana's intelligence and defense alignment with Russia, the PRC, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah — including the Russian signals-intelligence facility hosted on the island. The operative measure was a secondary-tariff-authority framework: the EO authorises additional ad valorem duties on goods imported from any country determined to be selling or otherwise providing oil to the Government of Cuba, whether directly or indirectly. No specific rate was set in the EO itself — rate-setting was delegated to the Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with State, Treasury, DHS and USTR). The EO was structurally analogous to EO 14245 (Venezuelan oil importing countries, 24 March 2025) and was on the list of nine IEEPA-based tariff EOs whose tariff component was vacated by the SCOTUS 6-3 ruling in *Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump* (20 February 2026); the underlying Cuba national-emergency declaration was preserved by the 20 February 2026 "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" EO, but the tariff authority was extinguished before any third-country determination or rate was operationalised.

On January 23, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight vessel-owning/management firms — based in the UAE, India, Oman, the Seychelles, and the Marshall Islands — and identified nine of their tankers as blocked property, for transporting hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian crude oil, LPG, naphtha and high-sulfur fuel oil to buyers across East Asia, South Asia and East Africa. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum/petrochemical sector) as part of the maximum-pressure campaign under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, and OFAC concurrently issued General License T authorizing limited safety, environmental and cargo-offloading transactions involving the newly blocked vessels.

On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.

On 14 January 2026 the European Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/124, amending Annex XXVIII to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, lowering the price cap on seaborne Russian crude oil (CN code 2709 00) from USD 47.6 to USD 44.1 per barrel, effective 1 February 2026. This is the first application of the automatic dynamic-adjustment mechanism introduced by the 18th sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, July 2025), which re-indexes the cap every six months to 15% below the 22-week trailing average Urals market price. Contracts concluded before 31 January 2026 with cargo offloaded by 16 April 2026 remain subject to the prior USD 47.60/bbl cap. The UK aligned with an equivalent reduction the same day.

On 15 January 2026 the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), acting under regulation 64 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, amended the 'Oil Price Cap' General Licence (INT/2024/4423849) to lower the price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil from USD 47.60 to USD 44.10 per barrel, effective 23:01 on 31 January 2026. Contracts signed at the prior USD 47.60 cap before that time are subject to a wind-down period, remaining valid provided the oil is offloaded at the port of destination by 22:59 on 16 April 2026. The cut applies the six-monthly dynamic-adjustment formula (15% below the 22-week trailing average Urals price) and was announced in lockstep with the EU's equivalent Implementing Regulation 2026/124.

On 12 January 2026 Switzerland's Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF) amended Annexes 8, 14, 15b and 33 of the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine, with effect from 23:00 on 13 January 2026. The amendment adds 5 natural persons, 4 organisations (one Vietnam-based, three based in the UAE and Russia), and 41 vessels to the asset-freeze and port-access-prohibition annexes, and makes technical corrections to 7 existing entries. The measure is a routine incremental listing update continuing Switzerland's autonomous alignment with the EU's Russia sanctions regime, following the first EU 19th-package tranche adopted 12 December 2025 ([switzerland-19th-eu-sanctions-package-december-listings](2025-12-12-switzerland-19th-eu-sanctions-package-december-listings.md)) and preceding the substantive package completion of 25 February 2026 ([switzerland-19th-eu-sanctions-package-russia-belarus](2026-02-25-switzerland-19th-eu-sanctions-package-russia-belarus.md)).

India's Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways notified operational guidelines on 26 December 2025 for two paired shipbuilding subsidy schemes with a combined outlay of ₹44,700 crore (~USD 5.4bn). SBFAS (₹24,736 crore corpus) provides 15–25% per-vessel financial assistance tiered by vessel category, with milestone-linked disbursement and a 40% scrap-value credit for vessels broken at Indian yards. SbDS (₹19,989 crore outlay) funds greenfield shipbuilding clusters, brownfield-yard modernisation, and establishment of an India Ship Technology Centre. Both schemes are valid to 31 March 2036 with an in-principle extension to 2047, with applicability for shipbuilding contracts signed from 24 September 2025. On 7 January 2026 the guidelines were amended to include chemical tankers under SBFAS Category-1.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Cabinet Office jointly published the Shipbuilding Revival Roadmap (造船業再生ロードマップ) on 26 December 2025, redefining shipbuilding as a "national strategic industry" within an All-Japan shipping-and-shipbuilding framework. The Roadmap targets doubling domestic shipbuilding capacity from ~9 million GT to 18 million GT by 2035 (re-capturing roughly 20% global market share) backed by a ¥1 trillion (~USD 6.4 bn) public-private investment commitment over three staged phases (2026-28 automation, 2029-31 facility expansion, 2032-34 dock-operation support), mandates consolidation of domestic shipbuilders into 1-3 groups by 2028, and is funded in its first three years by a ¥120 bn FY2025 supplementary budget enacted in December 2025.

The Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 on 18 December 2025, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, to add 41 vessels to Annex XLII of the Russia sanctions regime. Of these, 36 vessels are designated for transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products while engaging in irregular and high-risk shipping practices characteristic of the "shadow fleet," 5 vessels are designated for transporting stolen Ukrainian grain and cultural property, and 1 vessel (GT HONOR) is designated for facilitating violation or circumvention of EU sanctions. Listed vessels are banned from access to EU member-state ports and locks and from a broad range of maritime-transport-related services, effective 19 December 2025. The measure is an incremental listing update between the 19th (Regulation 2025/2033, October 2025) and 20th (Regulation 2026/506, April 2026) numbered sanctions packages, rather than a new package itself.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.

On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.

On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.

On 11 December 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six shipping companies — registered in the Marshall Islands (4), British Virgin Islands (1), and the United Kingdom (1) — and their six crude-oil tankers as blocked property under Executive Order 13850 for operating in Venezuela's oil sector. The vessels (WHITE CRANE, KIARA M, MONIQUE, LATTAFA, H. CONSTANCE, and TAMIA) had loaded Venezuelan crude in September/October 2025 and allegedly used AIS spoofing and other deceptive shipping practices to evade detection. The same action separately designated four individuals — including two nephews of Cilia Flores (Nicolas Maduro's wife) under the counter-narcotics authority EO 14059, a former PDVSA official under EO 13692, and a Panamanian facilitator under EO 13850 — but the shipping-company/tanker designations are the action's primary trade-control component.

Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.

On 10 November 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce and four other departments issued Announcement No. 73 of 2025, adjusting the "Catalogue of Precursor Chemicals for Export to Specific Countries (Regions)" and adding the United States, Canada and Mexico to the "Specific Countries (Regions) Directory" under the Interim Provisions on the Management of Exports of Precursor Chemicals to Specific Countries (Regions). Exporters must now apply for a license before shipping 13 newly listed categories of precursor chemicals (used in illicit fentanyl and other synthetic-drug manufacture) to these three countries; exports of the same chemicals to other destinations remain unrestricted. The measure took effect the same day it was announced.

New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

China's Ministry of Transport (Water Transport Bureau, document 交办水〔2025〕59号), acting under the PRC International Maritime Transport Regulations, issued a measure on 10 October 2025 imposing escalating special port service fees on U.S.-linked vessels calling at Chinese ports from 14 October 2025. Fees apply at the first Chinese port of call per voyage to (i) U.S.-owned, (ii) U.S.-operated, (iii) ≥25% U.S.-equity, (iv) U.S.-flagged, or (v) U.S.-built vessels, charged per net ton on a stepped schedule (¥400/NT from 14 Oct 2025, ¥640/NT from 17 Apr 2026, ¥880/NT from 17 Apr 2027, ¥1,120/NT from 17 Apr 2028) and capped at five voyages per vessel per year. The measure is the first MOT-issued trade-remedy instrument in the IPTM register and the direct, named-target mirror response to USTR's 17 April 2025 Section 301 maritime Notice of Action. Both regimes were mutually suspended for one year from 10 November 2025 through 9 November 2026 following the 30 October 2025 Trump-Xi Busan meeting.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

Russia's government imposed a temporary ban on exports of diesel fuel, marine (bunker) fuel and other gas oils (EAEU HS codes 2710 19 421 0 - 2710 19 429 0), including volumes purchased on exchange trading, effective 1 October 2025. The measure was framed as a domestic fuel-market stabilisation tool and initially exempted direct refinery producers from the ban. Russia is one of the world's largest diesel/gasoil exporters, so a full-coverage export halt on these grades has global gasoil-market significance, not just a regional effect. The ban has since been extended and tightened four times through mid-2026 (see amendments).

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by PM Narendra Modi, approved a ₹25,000 crore ($3bn) Maritime Development Fund (MDF) on 24 September 2025 as part of the broader ₹69,725 crore shipbuilding and maritime package. The MDF comprises a ₹20,000 crore Maritime Investment Fund (MIF) — a blended-finance Category-I Alternative Investment Fund with the Government of India contributing up to 49% of capital at concessional rates and the remaining 51% raised from ports and private/commercial investors — and a ₹5,000 crore Interest Incentivization Fund (IIF) that subsidises loan interest costs for shipyards and shipowners to lower the effective cost of debt. The fund is designed to run through FY 2026-36 and is projected to catalyse up to ₹1.5 lakh crore (~$18bn) in maritime-sector investment by 2030, covering shipbuilding, ship repair, ports, inland waterways, coastal shipping and tonnage-capacity expansion.

Decreto 685/2025, signed by President Javier Milei with Chief of Cabinet Guillermo Francos and Economy Minister Luis Caputo, cuts Argentina's Derecho de Exportación (DEX) rate to 0% on 145 meat and live-animal products (98 six-digit NCM codes) — bovine, poultry, porcine, caprine, and ovine — from the previously applicable 5% rate. Published in the Boletín Oficial on 23 September 2025 and effective 24 September, the measure runs through 31 October 2025. Exporters must liquidate at least 90% of foreign-exchange proceeds within three business days of shipping- permit authorization or lose the 0% rate retroactively. Government and press estimates put the anticipated foreign-exchange liquidation impact at USD 800M-1.2B over the window, against an estimated USD 150-200M fiscal cost in foregone export-duty revenue.

Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.

Japan lowered its price cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, effective for contracts concluded on or after 12 September 2025, aligning with the EU's July 2025 cut under its 18th sanctions package. The measure bars Japanese entities from importing, or providing shipping, insurance, financing or other services for, Russian crude priced above the new cap. In the same package Japan added 47 Russian entities and 9 individuals, 6 Crimea/Donbas-linked persons and entities, and 3 third-country entities to its asset-freeze list (transactions now require Ministry of Finance approval), and imposed export prohibitions on 2 Russian entities and 9 entities in third countries. Japan's own Russian crude imports are minimal (~0.1% of total crude imports, Jan-Jul 2025), so the measure is primarily a coalition-alignment and shipping/insurance-chokepoint action rather than a material change to Japan's own energy sourcing.

New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.

On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.

On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.

On 3 September 2025, OFAC announced a civil penalty settlement with Fracht FWO Inc. — a Houston, Texas-based freight forwarder and US subsidiary of Switzerland-headquartered Fracht AG — under which the company agreed to pay USD 1,610,775 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple OFAC sanctions programs. The violations arose from Fracht FWO's brokering of cargo shipments involving EMTRASUR, a wholly owned subsidiary of OFAC-designated Venezuelan state airline CONVIASA, on a Mexico-to-Argentina route on which Iranian crew members were subsequently discovered. Fracht self-initiated a voluntary disclosure to OFAC after learning of the Iranian crew involvement, triggering mitigating credit, and undertook extensive remedial compliance measures. The settlement resolves apparent violations of the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR), Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (WMDPSR), Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR).

On 2 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra'i, a dual Iraqi/St Kitts-and-Nevis citizen, along with his UAE-based shipping manager Babylon and five Marshall Islands-registered shell companies (Tryfo Navigation, Keely Shiptrade, Odiar Management, Panarea Marine, Topsail Shipholding) that hold registered ownership of nine Liberia-flagged tankers (ADENA, LILIANA, CAMILLA, DELFINA, BIANCA, ROBERTA, ALEXANDRA, BELLAGIO, PAOLA). The network blends Iranian crude with Iraqi oil via ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian Gulf and at Iraqi ports, then markets the blend as solely Iraqi-origin to evade US sanctions, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian regime and al-Samarra'i. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902 and blocks all US property and interests of the designated individual, entities and vessels.

Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to certify, from 21 August 2025, that vessels calling at Turkish ports have no Israeli ownership or agency ties and carry no military or hazardous cargo destined for Israel; Israeli-flagged or Israeli-linked ships were barred from Turkish ports outright, and Turkish-flagged vessels were barred from calling at Israeli ports. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed and formalised the measures — alongside a parallel closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government/military flights — in an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on 29 August 2025, stating Türkiye had "completely cut off trade with Israel." The measure operationalises and tightens enforcement of Türkiye's broader Israel trade suspension (in place since May 2024) by closing the maritime transshipment channel that had allowed indirect trade to continue.

On 12 August 2025 the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF) amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 497, adopting — within its own delegated competence and ahead of the full Federal Council decision — an interim tranche of measures aligning Switzerland with the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025). The amendment lowers the Russian-crude price cap and updates the associated Annex 28 price-threshold table, extends export prohibitions on transport services, adds port-access restrictions covering 105 additional shadow-fleet vessels, and widens controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments for Russian financial institutions. It also extends asset-freeze listings to entities in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, Azerbaijan, India and the UAE implicated in circumvention. The measure took effect 12 August 2025. The Federal Council closed out the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the 18th package on 29 October 2025 (see responds_to).