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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: aerospace. Ownership re-checked 2026-09-30 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
Figeac Aero (Euronext: FGA) is a French Tier-1/Tier-2 aerospace subcontractor specialising in complex structural metallic components and engine casings. The company machines and forms light alloys (aluminium), titanium, and nickel superalloys (Inconel) for Airbus (A320/A350/A380), Boeing (737/777/787), and engine programs including CFM56, LEAP, and TP400. Figeac Aero's own FY2024/25 results announcement puts full-year revenue at €432.
3 m (+8.1% organic); the company's 14 manufacturing sites span 8 countries. Customer-concentration figures (Airbus Atlantic 26%, Safran 22%, Airbus direct 14% — roughly two-thirds of revenue) come from a Figeac Aero investor disclosure but could not be pinned to this specific fiscal year within this pass; treat as directionally current rather than an exact FY2024/25 figure.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Figeac Aero produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Silicon — primary hardening element in aerospace aluminium alloys (e.g.
Vanadium — standard alloying element in Ti-6Al-4V, the dominant titanium alloy used in Figeac's structural titanium parts (floor grids, pylons, landing gear fittings). China and Russia together supply ~70% of primary vanadium; EU's own titanium sponge capacity is negligible.
Titanium — machined into structural titanium parts (floor grids, pylons, landing gear fittings) as a direct purchased input alongside aluminium and nickel superalloys. Supply risk: China ~75% of global titanium metal production and largely not aerospace-qualified; Russia (VSMPO-AVISMA) historically supplied a significant share of aerospace-grade…
Nickel (via Inconel superalloy) — engine casings up to 2 m diameter for CFM56, LEAP, and TP400; Inconel is ~50-70% nickel. Indonesia/Philippines supply ~60% of mined nickel; high-purity alloy-grade supply is tighter than battery-grade and far less substitutable in hot-section applications.
Niobium — matrix-stiffening element in Inconel (niobium-bearing grades such as Inconel 625/718 are standard for aerospace casings). Brazil's CBMM controls ~90% of global ferroniobium supply — single-country concentration risk comparable to rare earths.
Aluminium — primary structural material; fuselage frames, large casings, de-icing panels, and surface-treatment work across A320/A350/737 programs. Global refining is alumina-dependent and highly concentrated (China ~60% of primary Al); EU import-dependency remains high post-Russia sanctions.
Chromium — essential alloying element in both Inconel and corrosion- resistant steel variants used across Figeac's product range. Kazakhstan and South Africa together account for ~60% of global chromite ore; EU has no meaningful domestic source.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches titaniumnickelniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 104d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Titanium — machined into structural titanium parts (floor grids, pylons, landing gear fittings) as a direct purchased input alongside aluminium and nickel superalloys. Supply risk: China ~75% of global titanium metal production and largely not aerospace-qualified; Russia (VSMPO-AVISMA) historically supplied a significant share of aerospace-grade…
Nickel (via Inconel superalloy) — engine casings up to 2 m diameter for CFM56, LEAP, and TP400; Inconel is ~50-70% nickel. Indonesia/Philippines supply ~60% of mined nickel; high-purity alloy-grade supply is tighter than battery-grade and far less substitutable in hot-section applications.
Niobium — matrix-stiffening element in Inconel (niobium-bearing grades such as Inconel 625/718 are standard for aerospace casings). Brazil's CBMM controls ~90% of global ferroniobium supply — single-country concentration risk comparable to rare earths.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches niobiumaluminium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 56d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Niobium — matrix-stiffening element in Inconel (niobium-bearing grades such as Inconel 625/718 are standard for aerospace casings). Brazil's CBMM controls ~90% of global ferroniobium supply — single-country concentration risk comparable to rare earths.
Aluminium — primary structural material; fuselage frames, large casings, de-icing panels, and surface-treatment work across A320/A350/737 programs. Global refining is alumina-dependent and highly concentrated (China ~60% of primary Al); EU import-dependency remains high post-Russia sanctions.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
niobium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇧🇷 BR 93% · 🇨🇦 CA 5.4% · 🇨🇩 CD 0.9% · 🇷🇺 RU 0.3% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
aluminium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇬🇳 GN 35% · 🇦🇺 AU 23% · 🇨🇳 CN 21% · 🇧🇷 BR 7.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
JP · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches nickelchromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 101d pending
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel Strip and Nippon Kinzoku) into nickel-added cold-rolled stainless steel coil, sheet and strip originating in the People's Republic of China and the separate customs territory of Taiwan (Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu); Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa indicated provisional duties of ~45% on Chinese product and ~21% on Taiwanese product, expected to take effect as soon as July 2026. On 19 Jun 2026 METI/MOF EXTENDED the investigation period by four months to 21 Nov 2026 (final determination pending). IPTM relevance: (1) a RARE Japan-issuer trade remedy — JP has ZERO trade-remedy actions on the register and seldom uses AD, so a Japanese AD wall is a notable issuer + instrument-bloc gap; (2) China/Taiwan-target on nickel-added stainless steel, a nickel+chromium chokepoint-adjacent material; re-prices a China/TW->Japan stainless flow into a major downstream manufacturing base; (3) parallels the active 2025-26 Asian steel-AD wave the register is now capturing (Thailand DFT aluminium-extrusions, Indonesia KADI HRC, Malaysia MITI galvanised steel).
source ↗Nickel (via Inconel superalloy) — engine casings up to 2 m diameter for CFM56, LEAP, and TP400; Inconel is ~50-70% nickel. Indonesia/Philippines supply ~60% of mined nickel; high-purity alloy-grade supply is tighter than battery-grade and far less substitutable in hot-section applications.
Chromium — essential alloying element in both Inconel and corrosion- resistant steel variants used across Figeac's product range. Kazakhstan and South Africa together account for ~60% of global chromite ore; EU has no meaningful domestic source.
A duty raises the cost of the origins the measure names into Japan's market — a cost line on affected flows, not lost availability. Origins outside the measure's named targets are the route around it; the text above names the targets where its source does.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches niobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 111d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Niobium — matrix-stiffening element in Inconel (niobium-bearing grades such as Inconel 625/718 are standard for aerospace casings). Brazil's CBMM controls ~90% of global ferroniobium supply — single-country concentration risk comparable to rare earths.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 93% of world niobium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: niobium supply outside BR is 🇨🇦 CA 80%, 🇨🇩 CD 13%, 🇷🇺 RU 4.0% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicontitaniumnickelniobium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Silicon — primary hardening element in aerospace aluminium alloys (e.g.
Titanium — machined into structural titanium parts (floor grids, pylons, landing gear fittings) as a direct purchased input alongside aluminium and nickel superalloys. Supply risk: China ~75% of global titanium metal production and largely not aerospace-qualified; Russia (VSMPO-AVISMA) historically supplied a significant share of aerospace-grade…
Nickel (via Inconel superalloy) — engine casings up to 2 m diameter for CFM56, LEAP, and TP400; Inconel is ~50-70% nickel. Indonesia/Philippines supply ~60% of mined nickel; high-purity alloy-grade supply is tighter than battery-grade and far less substitutable in hot-section applications.
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2.
On 6 August 2026, at a ceremony at the Petit Palais of the Presidency chaired by Djiba Diakité (Minister Chief of Staff, chair of the Simandou 2040 Strategic Committee), Guinea's wholly state-owned N…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
Guinea = world's #2 bauxite producer (183 Mt exported in 2025, ~45% of China's bauxite imports); Mines Minister Bouna Sylla confirmed in March 2026 that export volume curbs will be applied by early A…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
Council's general approach expands the Commission's proposed downstream scope further (more products than Commission proposed); mandates annual Commission review for future scope additions; adds anti…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before en…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Gold mining royalties rise from 3-5% to 9-12% sliding-scale (price-indexed); mining lease maximum cut 30→15 years with renewals limited to 2×10-year additional terms; Development Agreements and Inves…
~25% reduction in Guinea's annual bauxite shipments to China (150 Mt target vs.
Extends the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism from the existing Regulation (EU) 2023/956 sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) to approximately 180 downstream produc…
On 18 March 2026 Guinea's Minister of Mines Bouna Sylla told Reuters that Guinea — the world's top bauxite exporter (~40% of global seaborne supply, 2025 exports ~183 Mt, +25% y/y) — would reduce exp…
Guinea — the world's largest bauxite exporter (~single-largest feed to China's alumina/aluminium chain) — is preparing a sector-wide measure to CAP/reduce bauxite exports to stabilise falling prices…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit —…
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — conc…
The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
On 7 September 2026 Guinea's state-owned Nimba Mining Company and Glencore signed a five-year pre-financing agreement, announced by the government and Glencore on 10 September 2026, worth over USD 30…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…
Supersedes 2022 bauxite reference price arrêté; establishes real-time FOB benchmark for all Guinea bauxite exports (~182 Mt/yr, world's largest supplier); estimated >$1bn/yr additional government rev…
Guinea's CNRD junta gives Societe Minière de Boke (SMB, China-linked, ~50% of Guinea's bauxite output) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG, joint venture: Halco Mining/Alcoa/Rio Tinto/Dadco) 10…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
GN ≈ 60% global seaborne bauxite; a ~150 Mt/yr cap (vs 183 Mt 2025) tightens the alumina→aluminium chain — direct hit to EU aluminium-vertical names
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
On 16 November 2025 Brazil's national development bank BNDES signed a BRL 221 million (~USD 41.
5 of 78 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (aerospace) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+34 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+2 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.