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Rosatom is Russia's state nuclear conglomerate, consolidating the entire civilian nuclear fuel cycle (via its Atomenergoprom/TVEL fuel-company subsidiaries) — uranium mining, enrichment, fuel fabrication — plus nuclear reactor construction (domestic and export, e.g.
Group exposure score is 70 including 5 tracked subsidiary — standalone is 72.
Named counterparties identified by open-source research and written only where a primary source states the relationship — never inferred from sector or co-mention. 3 customer-side. This is a partial view: it covers the relationships we could evidence, not the company's full supply base.
via TENEX — Centrus 10-K: 'The TENEX Supply Contract extends through 2028'; Centrus purchases SWU contained in LEU from TENEX. Subject to RSA import quotas; the 2024 Import Ban Act bans Russian LEU imports (effective 2024-08-11) through 2040, but DOE issued Centrus a waiver (2025-08-04) to import LEU from TENEX for deliveries already committed to its US customers in 2026 and 2027 — waivers available only up to 2028-01-01.
via TENEX — TENEX and EDF signed a contract (St Petersburg Int'l Economic Forum, 2018-05-25; reported value ~$1bn/~€600M) for TENEX to convert and re-enrich EDF's reprocessed uranium recovered from spent fuel at French reactors, implemented 2022-2032. Trade press reports the arrangement has continued despite Western sanctions on Russia; not company-disclosed by either party directly.
via TENEX subsidiary Internexco GmbH — Rosatom: 'Internexco GmbH, a subsidiary of TENEX (part of Rosatom), signed a contract with the Brazilian state-run company Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) to fully supply the Angra NPP with enriched uranium in 2023-2027.' Origin RU: Rosatom's enrichment plants are all in Russia (WNA enrichment table, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment); Interfax (https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/110074/, 2025-02-27) reports on a follow-on ~$40m INB contract that Brazilian uranium is expected to be processed at Russian enterprises. Destination BR: Angra NPP / INB Resende fuel plant. Internexco is a Rosatom trading entity, not the physical origin.
Scope. Absence of a counterparty here is not evidence that none exists — most commercial sourcing is confidential and never becomes public. Rows without a share figure mean no share was disclosed, not that the relationship is small.
2 other tracked dossiers name this company as a counterparty in its own sourced disclosure — this platform never wrote these rows on this company's own page, they are read here inverted from the dossier that disclosed them. This is a partial view: 990 additional named-counterparty rows across the corpus could not be matched to a tracked dossier by name at all (mostly non-Latin legal names), so the true count is higher than what renders here.
via TENEX — Centrus 10-K: 'The TENEX Supply Contract extends through 2028.' Centrus purchases SWU contained in LEU received from TENEX and delivers natural UF6 to TENEX for the LEU's uranium component. Subject to RSA import quotas; the 2024 Import Ban Act bans Russian LEU imports (effective 2024-08-11) through 2040, but DOE issued Centrus a waiver (2025-08-04) to import LEU from TENEX for deliveries already committed to its US customers in 2026 and 2027 — waivers available only up to 2028-01-01.
via TENEX — TENEX and EDF signed a contract (2018-05-25; reported value ~$1bn/~€600M) for TENEX to convert and re-enrich EDF's reprocessed uranium recovered from spent fuel at French reactors, implemented 2022-2032. Trade press reports the arrangement has continued despite Western sanctions on Russia; not company-disclosed by either party directly.
Scope. This section is inverted evidence: each linked dossier wrote the original row about itself, describing its own relationship to this company. It is never a claim this company itself disclosed. Absence here is not evidence of no relationship — most of the corpus has no named-counterparty block at all yet.
This company sits on the supply side for 1 of its 10 materials — a restriction on those is a tailwind, not a headwind.
Dossier discloses a dysprosium, terbium or samarium material exposure directly — A61 §1(2) names Dy/Tb-containing NdFeB and SmCo magnets by element.
A61's suspension (Announcement 70) lapses 10 Nov 2026 — on the plain text, controls revive automatically. The US DoD CN/RU/IR/KP sourcing bar follows 1 Jan 2027. See the underlying extraterritorial export-control action. We supply the provenance file; we never compute your ratio for you.
As a buyer, policy pressure across its consumed materials is rising.
Descriptive trend in official policy actions on this company’s materials — a policy-pressure trend, not a price or trading signal. No forward probability is implied. Direction is measured on actions we have discovered, and discovery lags events: where the recent window is too thin to support a calm reading, the row says coverage-limited instead of easing.
No actions in the register have named or swept this company in the last 24 months.