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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 18 September 2026 the President signed a proclamation extending Proclamation 10973 (originally issued 19 September 2025), which conditions issuance/entry on new H-1B specialty-occupation petitions on a $100,000 payment by the sponsoring employer, for a further 12 months through 21 September 2027 (exceptions remain at DHS Secretary discretion for national-interest cases). Alongside it the President signed a companion executive order, "Enhancing Program Integrity and Interagency Coordination in the Administration of the H-1B Nonimmigrant Visa Program," directing DHS, State and Labor to coordinate review of H-1B petitions and consult Commerce, Education and SBA on employment data, with heightened scrutiny for employers with recent or planned US-worker layoffs. The accompanying fact sheet cites a 92% drop in H-1B registrations by the largest IT-outsourcing firms (24,946 to 2,055) and a ~97% decrease in consular H-1B processing requests since the original 2025 proclamation. ## Severity basis Quant anchor from the primary source: $100,000 flat fee per covered H-1B petition, extended for a further 12-month term (through 2027-09-21); a measured 92% reduction in H-1B registrations by the largest IT-outsourcing filers (24,946 → 2,055) and a ~97% drop in consular H-1B processing requests attributed to the fee regime since its 2025 introduction. Severity 4/5: a binding, renewed cost barrier with a demonstrated order-of-magnitude effect on offshore-staffing-dependent filers, not a one-off or symbolic measure.
Presidential decree signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum and published in the evening edition of the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 23 April 2026, in force 24 April 2026. The decree amends the Tariff of the Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación (LIGIE/TIGIE) and the Decreto que establece diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial (PROSEC), imposing MFN import duties at 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 30% or 35% ad valorem on 185 tariff fractions covering chemical products, cosmetics, paper and cardboard, textiles, steel, graphic arts, aluminum manufactures, auto parts, electrical material, bicycles, musical instruments, furniture, wind turbines, and trailers. Goods originating in countries with which Mexico has a free-trade agreement remain eligible for preferential treatment, so practical incidence falls on China and other non-FTA suppliers (Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan, UAE, South Africa). Paired PROSEC modifications add tariff fractions to Article 5 sections I, II.b and XIX (electrical, electronic, automotive and auto-parts industries) at exempt (EX) rates.
The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative antidumping duty (AD) determinations on April 23, 2026 (Federal Register publication April 28, 2026), finding that crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos are being sold in the US at less than fair value. Preliminary dumping margins are 123.04% for India, 35.17% for Indonesia, and 22.46% for Laos, with Commerce ordering US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting AD cash deposits at those rates (107.77% adjusted cash-deposit rate for India; 22.06% for Laos). This runs parallel to, and stacks on top of, the CVD case on the same merchandise and countries (see responds_to), meaning combined AD+CVD cash-deposit burdens on subject imports now exceed 100% for all three origins. Final AD determinations are due July 13, 2026 (India, Indonesia) and September 9, 2026 (Laos).
On 13 April 2026 the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement, in trilogue with the Commission, on the new EU steel safeguard regulation that will replace the existing WTO-safeguard-based measure (Regulation (EU) 2019/159, last tightened by Implementing Regulation 2025/612) expiring on 30 June 2026. The agreement adopts the core architecture of the Commission's October 2025 proposal (procedure 2025/0726(COD)): an overall duty-free tariff-rate quota of approximately 18.3 million tonnes per year — a roughly 47% reduction versus the 2024 safeguard quotas — covering 30 product categories, with the out-of-quota customs duty raised from 25% to 50%. The deal also introduces a mandatory "country of melt and pour" declaratory requirement on steel imports and obliges the Commission to assess, within two years, whether the country of melt-and-pour should become the basis for country-specific TRQ allocations (closing transhipment loopholes that have allowed Chinese-melted steel to enter via third-country processors). The co-legislators added a reinforced and time-bound review mechanism: a first Commission review of product scope within six months of entry into force, with subsequent biennial scope reviews thereafter. Statutorily, this is a NEW instrument — a regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, not an implementing act under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards / Regulation (EU) 2015/478 — so it is filed as a new action with a `responds_to` link to the predecessor regime. Formal adoption by Council and EP plenary is expected in May 2026 ahead of the 1 July 2026 application date.
On 2 April 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ("Adjusting Imports of Pharmaceuticals and Pharmaceutical Ingredients into the United States") imposing a 100% ad valorem tariff on imports of patented pharmaceutical products listed in the FDA Orange Book and Purple Book, together with the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials used to make them. The base rate takes effect at 12:01 a.m. EDT on 31 July 2026 for the 17 manufacturers identified in Annex III, and on 29 September 2026 for all other companies. The proclamation adopts findings of the Section 232 investigation initiated by the Department of Commerce on 14 April 2025 into pharmaceuticals and APIs as a national- security supply-chain risk. The instrument is structured around a multi-tier rate ladder rather than a flat tariff: concessionary 15% rates for EU/Japan/South Korea/Switzerland/Liechtenstein under reciprocal-deal tracks, 10% for the UK with a pathway to 0% under the pending UK pharmaceutical agreement, a "+20%" surcharge for companies operating under a Commerce-approved onshoring plan (until 2 April 2030), and a 0% pathway for companies that combine an approved onshoring plan with an MFN-pricing agreement with HHS (until 20 January 2029). Generics, biosimilars and their ingredients, orphan drugs, nuclear medicines, plasma-derived therapies, fertility treatments, and cell/gene therapies are carved out.
India's Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna (BHAVYA) on 18 March 2026 with a ₹33,660 crore (~USD 4.0bn) outlay over six years (FY 2026-27 to FY 2031-32) to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks of 100-1,000 acres each across all states and Union Territories. Financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per acre supports core infrastructure (internal roads, underground utilities, drainage, common treatment, ICT), value-added infrastructure (ready-built sheds, built-to-suit units, testing labs, warehousing), and social infrastructure (worker housing). The scheme is sector-agnostic and is implemented by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (NICDC) under DPIIT, with states forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and committing to single-window clearances. The first phase will deliver 50 parks.
The UK Finance Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026, establishes the primary statutory framework for the United Kingdom Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (UK CBAM), granting HM Revenue & Customs the assessment, collection, and enforcement powers needed to apply a carbon-content levy on imports of aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, and iron & steel from 1 January 2027. Two tranches of draft secondary legislation (the CBAM Regulations 2026 covering administration, rate calculation/carbon-price relief, emissions and verification, and transitory provisions) were published for technical consultation on 10 February 2026 (closing 24 March 2026) and again in Spring 2026 (closing 21 May 2026). The mechanism imposes a UK ETS-linked benchmark price on the embedded carbon of in-scope imports, with a credit for verified third-country carbon prices already paid, and — unlike the EU CBAM — has no transitional reporting phase and a narrower initial sectoral scope (no electricity).
Presidential Decreto 0264, signed on 16 March 2026 by President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego with Minister of Commerce Diana Marcela Morales Rojas and Minister of Finance Germán Ávila Plazas, sets a 35% MFN import duty on 14 steel and metal-mechanical subpartidas (bars, profiles, tubes, wire products, barbed wire) covering HS chapters 72-73 imported from countries with which Colombia has no free-trade agreement — primarily China, Russia, Turkey, and India. The measure is valid for one year from its entry into force (15 days after Diario Oficial publication on 16 March 2026), after which the Comité de Asuntos Aduaneros, Arancelario y de Comercio Exterior must review its impact. It partially amends Decreto 1881 de 2021 and operationalises the Política Nacional de Reindustrialización (CONPES 4129), the Petro administration's flagship programme to reduce Colombia's hydrocarbon dependence by building new domestic manufacturing capacity.
On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.
The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on February 26, 2026, finding that producers and exporters of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos received countervailable government subsidies. Preliminary subsidy rates are 125.87% for India; 85.99%–143.30% by individual Indonesian producer (104.38% all-others rate); and a uniform 80.67% for Laos. Commerce ordered US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits at these rates on subject imports pending a parallel antidumping investigation and final determinations later in 2026. The case originated from a petition filed in August 2025 by US crystalline silicon PV manufacturers.
President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).
On 6 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Modi announced a framework for an Interim Trade Agreement that resets the bilateral tariff posture installed in 2025. Two operative instruments: (i) an executive order signed 6 February eliminating, effective 7 February 2026, the additional 25% IEEPA "Russian-oil" duty on Indian imports imposed by EO 14329 (27 August 2025), conditional on India's commitment to cease buying Russian crude and to expand defence cooperation; and (ii) reduction of the EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff rate on India from 25% to 18% on listed product categories (textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, plastics and rubber, organic chemicals, home décor, artisanal products, certain machinery), to take effect on finalisation of the Interim Agreement. India commits to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products (DDGs, red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine, spirits) and to purchase >USD 500bn of US energy, ICT, coal, aircraft and aircraft parts, and precious-metals products over five years. The framework also commits the parties to negotiating "robust, ambitious, and mutually beneficial digital trade rules" and to addressing non-tariff barriers in medical devices, ICT import licensing, and food/agricultural standards. US tariff reductions on Indian generic pharmaceuticals, gems, diamonds, aircraft parts, and certain automotive components are flagged as contingent on completion of the full Interim Agreement.
On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, presenting the Union Budget 2026-27, announced the launch of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 — the second-phase national semiconductor industrial-policy framework succeeding ISM 1.0 (2021, INR 76,000 crore). The Budget makes an initial INR 1,000 crore provision for ISM 2.0 in FY 2026-27 and raises the Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) outlay from INR 22,919 crore to INR 40,000 crore. ISM 2.0's distinct architecture centres on four strategic priorities not in ISM 1.0: (i) indigenous semiconductor equipment, chemicals, gases and materials production, (ii) full-stack Indian semiconductor IP design, (iii) industry-led R&D and skills/training centres, and (iv) domestic and global supply-chain integration. Total mission outlay reported as approximately INR 1-1.2 lakh crore (~USD 12-14bn) is being finalised; Cabinet clearance and the formal scheme launch are expected by mid-2026.
On 27 January 2026 the European Union and India announced the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement at the EU-India summit hosted at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, attended by PM Narendra Modi, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa. The deal — described by both leaders as the "mother of all deals" — covers ~25% of world GDP and ~2 billion people. The EU eliminates duties on 91% of tariff lines (covering 99.3% of bilateral trade by value); India eliminates duties on 86% of lines (covering 96.6% by value). Headline cuts include Indian tariffs on EU wines (150% → 75% at entry into force, falling to 20%), olive oil (45% → 0% over five years) and processed agri-food (up to 50% eliminated); EU tariffs are reduced/eliminated on Indian textiles, leather/footwear, gems and jewelry, marine products, tea, coffee, spices and certain agricultural and steel products. The agreement still requires Council adoption, European Parliament consent and approval by India's Union Council of Ministers; entry into force is expected in early 2027. Companion instruments concluded at the same summit include an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership and a Mobility and Migration Agreement.
Decree reforming various tariff fractions of the General Import and Export Duties Tariff (TIGIE), published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 29 December 2025 and in force 1 January 2026. The reform, approved by Congress as a statutory amendment to the LIGIE (Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Dec 2025) and signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum, raises MFN import duties to between 5% and 50% ad valorem on 1,463 tariff lines covering more than 20 chapters of the TIGIE, spanning automotive, auto parts, textiles, apparel, footwear, steel, aluminum, plastics, paper, leather, furniture, glass, toys, appliances and cosmetics. The increases apply only to goods originating in countries without a free trade agreement with Mexico — principally China, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, the UAE, and South Africa. The decree formalises at statutory level the September 2024 Sheinbaum executive order placing a 50% duty on finished passenger vehicles from non-FTA states and is framed by the Secretaría de Economía and SHCP as the operational tariff instrument of Plan México (2025-01-21).
On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.
On 26 November 2025 Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a package of measures to protect Canada's steel and softwood lumber industries, effective 26 December 2025. For steel, Canada tightened the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) available to countries without a Canada free trade agreement from 50% to 20% of 2024 import levels, and cut the TRQ for FTA partners outside CUSMA (i.e. not the US/Mexico) from 100% to 75% of 2024 levels; imports above quota face a 50% surtax. A new 25% tariff on the full value of listed steel-derivative products (doors, windows, fasteners, structural components and related goods) applies to all countries, covering an estimated CAD 10 billion+ of derivative imports. For softwood lumber, Canada added CAD 500 million to the BDC Softwood Lumber Guarantee Program (bringing it to CAD 1.2 billion) and earmarked a further CAD 500 million under the Large Enterprise Tariff Loan facility for lumber-sector liquidity support.
On 26 November 2025 the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved a Rs 7,280 crore (~USD 800 million) scheme to establish 6,000 MTPA of integrated sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnet (REPM) manufacturing capacity in India. The Ministry of Heavy Industries will allocate capacity to five beneficiaries (up to 1,200 MTPA each) via global competitive bidding. The package combines a Rs 6,450 crore sales-linked incentive (PLI-style, paid on REPM sales over 5 years) with a Rs 750 crore capital subsidy for facility build-out. The scheme runs 7 years from award (2-year gestation + 5-year disbursement) and covers the full value chain from rare-earth oxides through metals, alloys, to finished sintered Nd-Fe-B and SmCo magnets.
India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) notified the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 via Gazette notification G.S.R. 846(E) on 13 November 2025, operationalising the 2023 DPDP Act. The Rules introduce a "negative list" cross-border personal-data transfer regime under Rule 14, verifiable parental consent, breach-notification windows, and tiered penalties up to INR 250 crore. Implementation is phased: Data Protection Board provisions in force on notification, Consent Manager rules from 13 Nov 2026, and core data-fiduciary / cross-border-transfer obligations from 13 May 2027.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.
On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.
India's Ministry of Defence signed a contract worth over Rs 62,370 crore (excluding taxes, ~USD 7.5 billion) with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on 25 September 2025 for 97 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A — 68 single-seat fighters and 29 twin-seat trainers — for the Indian Air Force. The acquisition falls under the "Buy (India-IDDM)" (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) category of the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 and carries an indigenous-content requirement of over 64%, incorporating 67 additional indigenous items compared with the prior January 2021 LCA Mk1A contract. Deliveries begin 2027-28 and run over six years, supported by a vendor base of roughly 105 Indian component manufacturers.
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.
India and the UK signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) on 24 July 2025 in Chequers, with Prime Ministers Modi and Starmer presiding. The agreement grants duty-free access on 99% of Indian exports to the UK (textiles, apparel, footwear, auto components, engineering goods and chemicals), and reduces Indian tariffs on UK goods covering ~90% of tariff lines: Scotch whisky duties drop from 150% to 75% on day one and taper to 40% over ten years; high-end UK car tariffs fall from ~110% to 10% under a quota; UK MFN access on a wide industrial-goods envelope. A Double Contribution Convention exempts Indian secondees from UK National Insurance for three years. Bilateral trade currently ~£42 bn / USD 56 bn per year, with the parties targeting doubling by 2030. UK ratification under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRaG) ran from January 2026, with the 21-sitting-day scrutiny period concluding 5 March 2026. Entry into force was delayed from the originally targeted May 2026 date and is now confirmed for July 15, 2026 following a UK Prime Minister announcement at the G7 Évian summit sidelines on June 17, 2026. The confirmed EIF covers 64% of UK exports (£1.9bn) duty-free immediately, with an additional £25.5bn/year in projected additional bilateral trade.
On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.
India's Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) on 3 July 2025 for 10 capital acquisition proposals worth approximately ₹1.05 lakh crore (~USD 12.3 billion), routed exclusively through the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category, which mandates that the platform be designed, developed and manufactured indigenously by an Indian vendor. The cleared items span Armoured Recovery Vehicles, an Electronic Warfare System, an Integrated Common Inventory Management System for the Tri-Services, Surface-to-Air Missiles, Moored Mines, Mine Counter Measure Vessels, a Super Rapid Gun Mount and Submersible Autonomous Vessels. AoN is the formal first-stage approval that authorises the Ministry to proceed to RFP and vendor selection; it is not itself a signed contract.
On 1 July 2025 India's Union Cabinet approved the Research Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme, a six-year, ₹1,00,000 crore (≈USD 11.68 bn) fund to catalyse private-sector investment in research, development and innovation, with ₹20,000 crore allocated for FY2025-26. The scheme finances transformative RDI projects (TRL 4 and above) in strategic and sunrise sectors — deep tech, AI, biotechnology, quantum computing, robotics, space, energy transition and the digital economy — through long-tenor, low-or-nil-interest loans and equity, up to 50% of assessed project cost. Grants and short-term loans are explicitly excluded. Funds flow through a Special Purpose Fund under ANRF (first-level) to second-level fund managers — Alternate Investment Funds, Development Finance Institutions, NBFCs, and focused research bodies including the Technology Development Board (TDB) and BIRAC — which began issuing project calls in February 2026.
Gujarat Chief Minister Bhupendra Patel announced the Gujarat Electronics Component Manufacturing Policy 2025 (GECMP-2025) on 22 June 2025, making Gujarat the first Indian state with a dedicated sectoral stack-on-top instrument to the central Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) notified by MeitY on 28 March 2025. Under GECMP-2025, any project approved by MeitY under ECMS and physically located in Gujarat is eligible for a state-matched fiscal incentive equal to the central incentive (PLI / capex subsidy) disbursed under ECMS, released by the state within 30 days of the central tranche. The policy targets INR 35,000 cr in new investment and covers multi-layer / HDI printed circuit boards, lithium-ion cells, SMD passive components, display modules, camera modules, sub-assemblies and the capital machinery required for their production. A separate R&D track provides up to INR 12.5 cr per Gujarat-based recognised institution to establish Centres of Excellence, Finishing Schools or Applied Research Laboratories. Initial applications closed 31 July 2025.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 on 2 April 2025 declaring a national emergency over US trade deficits and imposing a baseline 10% ad-valorem tariff on imports from nearly all trading partners effective 5 April, with higher country-specific "reciprocal" rates effective 9 April. The rate schedule was constructed from a formula tied to bilateral goods-trade deficits and ranged from 10% (UK, Singapore, Brazil, Australia, others) through 20% (EU), 24% (Japan), 25% (Korea), 32% (Taiwan, Indonesia, Switzerland), 34% (China, later raised to 84% then 125% during the April escalation), 46% (Vietnam), 49% (Cambodia). Multiple subsequent EOs paused the country-specific rates for 90 days for non-China destinations on 9 April while keeping the 10% baseline, pending bilateral negotiations.
President Trump signed two Presidential Proclamations on 11 February 2025 reinstating a universal 25% ad-valorem tariff on all steel-mill products and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25% on all imports into the United States, effective 12 March 2025. The proclamations revoked every bilateral exclusion and quota arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration with the EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, and others under the 2021-2022 "alternative measures" frameworks, returning all trading partners to the baseline Section 232 rate without product-level or country-level carve-outs.
On 1 February 2025, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Manufacturing Mission (NMM) in the Union Budget 2025-26 as a horizontal umbrella framework extending the 2014 "Make in India" architecture across small, medium and large industries. The mission rests on five focal areas: (i) ease and cost of doing business; (ii) a future-ready workforce for in-demand jobs; (iii) a vibrant and dynamic MSME sector; (iv) availability of technology; and (v) quality manufacturing. It will deliver policy support, execution roadmaps, and a governance/monitoring framework binding central ministries with states. NMM specifically commits to building a clean-tech manufacturing ecosystem with explicit coverage of solar PV cells, EV batteries, motors and controllers, electrolysers, wind turbines, very-high-voltage transmission equipment, and grid-scale batteries — i.e., the full hardware stack for India's Panchamrit (500 GW non-fossil by 2030), FAME-III EV ramp, and National Green Hydrogen Mission. NMM is the first horizontal Indian manufacturing-mission instrument in the IPTM register; existing IND entries are sector-specific PLIs (electronics, batteries, steel, semiconductors) and the National Critical Mineral Mission. Operational rollout flows through subsequent Cabinet-level scheme approvals (e.g. Biopharma SHAKTI ₹10,000 cr, Chemical Parks ₹600 cr in BE 2026-27); the mission itself does not carry a single headline outlay because it is the framework rather than an instrument.
On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).
Uttar Pradesh notified its first dedicated state-level Semiconductor Policy on 12 February 2024 (cabinet-cleared 30 January 2024), making it the fourth Indian state with a sectoral semiconductor incentive regime after Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Gujarat. The policy stacks a 50% additional state capital subsidy on top of the central India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 50% subsidy — yielding an effective ~75% capex coverage for qualifying fab, display-fab, compound-semiconductor, ATMP/OSAT, and sensor units approved by ISM. It adds a 75% land rebate on the first 200 acres for ATMP/OSAT (30% on additional land), a 5% interest subsidy (capped at ₹1 cr/year for 7 years) on investments up to ₹200 cr, 100% stamp-duty and registration-fee exemption, and a 10-year electricity-duty exemption. Within months of notification the state attracted ₹40,038 cr in investment proposals (Tarq Semiconductor, Kaynes Semicon, Aditech, Vamasundari) with ~32,000 projected jobs, prompting the cabinet to later approve mega-project incentives for investments ≥ ₹3,000 cr.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, issued Notification No. 20/2023 on 20 July 2023 amending the export policy of non-basmati white rice (semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed; HS 1006 30 90) from "Free" to "Prohibited" with immediate effect. The stated objective was to stabilise domestic prices and ensure adequate availability after uneven monsoon onset and rising retail rice inflation. Limited carve-outs applied for cargo already loaded prior to the notification and for government-to-government supplies authorised on food-security grounds. The blanket ban was lifted by DGFT Notification 31/2024 on 28 September 2024, replaced first by a USD 490/tonne minimum export price (MEP) and then by free export after the MEP was withdrawn in late October 2024.
On 4 January 2023 the Union Cabinet of India, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the National Green Hydrogen Mission with an initial financial outlay of ₹19,744 crore (≈USD 2.3 bn) covering FY2023-24 through FY2029-30. The bulk of the outlay — ₹17,490 crore — funds the Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT) programme for electrolyser-manufacturing incentives and green-hydrogen production incentives. ₹1,466 crore is allocated to pilot projects (steel, mobility, shipping, ports, decentralised hydrogen), ₹400 crore to R&D, and ₹388 crore to other Mission components (skilling, regulatory framework, certification). The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is the lead implementing agency. Headline targets by 2030: at least 5 MMT/year of domestic green-hydrogen production capacity, with ≈125 GW of associated additional renewable- energy capacity, mobilisation of >₹8 lakh crore (≈USD 100 bn) of total investment, creation of >600,000 jobs, and avoidance of ≈50 MMT/year of CO₂ emissions. The Mission is positioned as the supply-chain underpinning for India's hard-to-abate decarbonisation (refining, fertilisers, steel) and as the basis for a green-hydrogen export industry leveraging India's low-cost solar resource. MNRE notified the SIGHT scheme guidelines on 28 June 2023, splitting the programme into Component I (Electrolyser Manufacturing Incentive, ₹4,440 crore) and Component II (Green Hydrogen Production Incentive, ₹13,050 crore for Mode-1; subsequent Mode-2A and Mode-2B tranches added for sector-specific tenders). Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) is the implementing agency for both components and runs the competitive reverse-auction tenders.
The Union Cabinet approved the Semicon India Programme on 15 December 2021, establishing the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) as the nodal agency. The programme offers fiscal support of up to 50% of project cost for silicon semiconductor fabs, compound semiconductor facilities, display fabs, ATMP/OSAT units, and chip design. Total outlay: Rs 76,000 crore (approximately $10.2bn at 2021 exchange rates). By February 2024, the Cabinet had approved three major semiconductor units under ISM: Tata Electronics with PSMC (semiconductor fab, Dholera, Rs 91,526 crore), Tata Electronics OSAT (Morigaon, Assam, Rs 27,120 crore), and CG Power OSAT (Rs 7,584 crore), totalling over Rs 1.26 lakh crore in committed investment from private applicants.
The Union Cabinet on 12 May 2021 approved the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme "National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) Battery Storage" with a Rs 18,100 crore (~USD 2.4 bn) outlay over five years to build 50 GWh of ACC and 5 GWh of "Niche" ACC manufacturing capacity in India. Selected bidders receive PLI cash incentives over five years on sale of cells made in India, gated on minimum 25% domestic value addition rising to 60% by year five and chemistry-agnostic eligibility (Li-ion, Na-ion, solid-state, flow, lead-acid). The MHI awarded the first 50 GWh tranche on 24 March 2022 (Hyundai Global Motors 20 GWh, Ola Electric 20 GWh, Reliance New Energy Solar 5 GWh, Rajesh Exports 5 GWh) under a QCBS global tender; the Hyundai Global Motors award was withdrawn after Hyundai Motor Company disowned the bidder in August 2022, triggering a re-tender of the orphaned capacity that completed in 2025.
The Department of Pharmaceuticals notified the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for Promotion of Domestic Manufacturing of Critical Key Starting Materials (KSMs), Drug Intermediates (DIs) and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) on 21 July 2020 via Gazette Notification, with an outlay of Rs 6,940 crore (~USD 920m) over FY 2020-21 to FY 2027-28. The scheme covers 41 identified critical bulk-drug products across four target segments — fermentation-based (Key Fermentation; Niche Fermentation) and chemical synthesis-based (Key Chemical Synthesis; Niche Chemical Synthesis) — paying 20% incentive on incremental sales for fermentation-based products (years 1-4) tapering to 15% (year 5) and 5% (year 6), and a flat 20% over 5 years for chemically-synthesised products. The stated objective is to reduce India's ~70% bulk-drug import dependence on China by establishing greenfield domestic manufacturing capacity with at least 90% domestic value addition for fermentation products and 70% for chemical-synthesis products.
The Union Cabinet approved the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for Large Scale Electronics Manufacturing on 21 March 2020, with the scheme notified in the Gazette of India on 1 April 2020. Total outlay: Rs 40,995 crore (~$5.5bn) over five years. The scheme extends incentives of 4% to 6% on incremental sales (over FY 2019-20 base year) to eligible companies manufacturing mobile phones (invoice value >= Rs 15,000) and specified electronic components including ATMP units. Approved beneficiaries include Samsung, Foxconn, Wistron, Pegatron, and Indian firms Dixon, Lava, and Bhagwati (Micromax).
Act No. 22 of 1992 is the foundational statute of India's modern foreign trade policy regime, receiving Presidential assent on 7 August 1992 with substantive provisions deemed in force retroactively from 19 June 1992. It replaced the restrictive Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947 — India's colonial-era command-economy trade framework — marking the 1991-92 economic liberalisation break and transitioning the state from direct import/export control to a facilitation-and-regulation model. The Act establishes the office of the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) as the principal administrative authority and empowers the Central Government to formulate, notify, and amend the Foreign Trade Policy; every DGFT export-import notification, SCOMET strategic-goods export control list update, port restriction, quantitative restriction, and agricultural export quota/ban operates as a delegation from this parent statute.