Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) amended the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) export-control Entity List on 10 June 2025 (announced 15 June 2025) under Article 13 of the Trade Act, adding 601 new entities — including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) plus 599 additional entities domiciled in China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. Taiwanese exporters (TSMC, UMC, ASE, KYEC and downstream suppliers) must obtain pre-export government licences for direct or third-party shipments of any SHTC-listed item to the listed entities; the action expands Taiwan's total entity-list population to ~10,844 entities. Two follow-on amendments tightened the regime further: a +279-entity expansion on 18 September 2025 and an 18-item commodity-list expansion on 18 November 2025 covering advanced 3D printers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electron microscopes and quantum-computing hardware.

Canada made SOR/2025-143, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-06-13. The regulations add 14 new items (743-756) to Part 2 of Schedule 1, designating Russian quantum-technology institutions and firms — including the Moscow State University Quantum Technology Centre, the National University of Science and Technology's Centre for Quantum Communications, QRate, and Rusnano — triggering a dealings ban and asset freeze. The same instrument adds a new import prohibition on coal products (Schedule 5.01) and a new export prohibition on jet fuel and additives (Schedule 5.02) and on chemical/ biological-weapons-related items (Schedule 10.1), and extends the existing metals import ban (Schedule 11) to further product lines — all coming into force 60 days after registration (~2025-08-12), with a 120-day grace period for pre-existing contracts.

Shenzhen (Guangdong Province) established the Shenzhen Semiconductor and Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (深圳市半导体与集成电路 产业投资基金, "Saimi Industrial Private Fund" / 赛米产业私募基金) with a total scale of CNY 5 billion. The fund completed business registration around 13 May 2025 following establishment on 29 April 2025, and was formally unveiled at a public ceremony on 16 October 2025. It is co-managed by Futian Hongshi (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shenzhen Capital Group, 深创投) and Zhongzhi Investment Capital (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shenzhen Major Industry Investment Group, 深重投), and operates under Shenzhen's "20+8" strategic-industry fund framework. It targets general/specialised computing chips, new-architecture storage, optoelectronic/sensor chips, and critical manufacturing equipment, components, materials, and advanced packaging/testing.

On 13 May 2025, two days before the AI Diffusion Rule's primary 15 May 2025 compliance date, the Trump administration's BIS announced it would rescind the Biden-era Framework for AI Diffusion (90 FR 4544) and simultaneously issued three guidance documents that re-routed US AI export policy through existing EAR authorities. The package comprises (1) GP10 guidance asserting that all ECCN 3A090 ICs designed by PRC-headquartered firms are presumptively EAR-violative, with Huawei Ascend 910B/910C/910D processors named explicitly — making US- and non-US-person use, transfer, financing, or servicing of those chips anywhere in the world a presumptive General Prohibition 10 violation; (2) a policy statement warning industry that supplying US advanced computing ICs for training or inference of Chinese AI models risks EAR enforcement; and (3) industry guidance on diversion-prevention diligence. BIS stated a formal Federal Register rescission and replacement rule would follow.

On 30 April 2025 the General Office of the Guangdong Provincial People's Government issued Yue Fu Ban [2025] No. 11, "Several Measures of Guangdong Province to Further Stimulate Market Entity Vitality and Accelerate the Construction of a Modern Industrial System," effective immediately through 31 December 2027. The package subsidizes bank-loan interest for manufacturing and high-tech enterprises at up to 35% of the loan rate, capped at RMB 2 billion in total annual subsidy volume and RMB 20 million per enterprise per year, alongside an expansion of government-backed financing-guarantee coverage to over RMB 10 billion annually. It also funds foreign-invested R&D centers (up to RMB 1 million, or RMB 5 million for multinational global R&D centers) and offers headquarters-relocation bonuses of up to RMB 8 million, with priority given to semiconductors, AI, robotics, biotechnology, quantum technology, commercial aerospace, and new-energy vehicles.

On 9 April 2025 the European Commission adopted Communication COM(2025)165, the AI Continent Action Plan, setting out a five-pillar strategy to make the EU a global AI leader. The pillars are (1) computing infrastructure, (2) data for AI, (3) strategic AI innovation and adoption, (4) AI skills and talent, and (5) regulatory simplification. Headline commitments include mobilising approximately €200bn of public+private investment via the InvestAI initiative announced at the AI Action Summit in Paris (11 February 2025), deploying 13 AI Factories (HPC-anchored shared compute facilities) plus regional antennas, building 5 AI Gigafactories powered by >100,000 advanced AI processors with €20bn earmarked from InvestAI, launching the Apply AI Strategy and Data Union Strategy, and proposing a Cloud and AI Development Act with a public consultation closing 4 June 2025. The one-year progress report (9 April 2026) confirmed 19 AI Factories deployed across EU supercomputers with 13 Antennas providing regional access, and €1bn in Apply AI funding calls earmarked.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to add 12 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (11) and Taiwan (1) via Final Rule 2025-05427 (90 FR 14046), companion to the larger 70-entity rule (2025-05426) published the same day. Targets fall in three clusters: (i) Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence and Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology — added for acquiring US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, specifically developing large AI models and advanced computing chips for defense; (ii) the Inspur group — Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong), Inspur (HK) Electronics, Inspur Software, and Inspur Taiwan — added as subsidiaries contributing to supercomputers for military end use; and (iii) Henan Dingxin, Nettrix Information Industry, Suma Technology, and Suma-USI Electronics — added for involvement in the development of Chinese exascale supercomputers. License requirements are for all items subject to the EAR; review policy is presumption of denial for the AI cluster and policy of denial for the supercomputer clusters.

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

Indonesia's Ministry of Communications and Digital Affairs (Kemkomdigi) promulgated Permenkomdigi No. 5/2025 on 25 March 2025 as the implementing regulation under Government Regulation PP 71/2019 governing Public-Scope Electronic System Operators (PSE Lingkup Publik), defined as operators running electronic systems for government institutions or critical public services. The regulation mandates registration, data classification by risk level (low/medium/ high/strategic) with corresponding domestic storage and processing requirements, content- moderation governance, and access-blocking mechanisms for prohibited electronic information. All public-scope PSEs must achieve compliance by 25 March 2026, with non-compliant operators subject to progressive administrative sanctions under Articles 100-series ranging from written warnings to access disconnection (pemutusan akses) and removal from official registries.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

On 19 February 2025 Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted Resolution 193/2025/QH15 at its 9th Extraordinary Session, establishing 12 pilot policy categories that operationalise the Politburo's December 2024 Resolution 57-NQ/TW without requiring full-statute enactment. The resolution's most structurally novel element is an R&D risk-acceptance framework — the first in Southeast Asia — that exempts organisations and individuals from civil liability for damage caused to the State in the course of state-funded R&D activities conducted in compliance with prescribed procedures, directly addressing Vietnam's long-standing chilling effect on state-sector innovation. Additional pilots cover expedited procurement for sci-tech and digital-transformation projects, special tax and immigration incentives for high-skilled AI/semiconductor/ quantum R&D personnel, accelerated permitting pathways for priority-sector R&D investments, a start-up grant and venture framework, and an open-data regime for state-held datasets. Implementing Decree 88/2025/ND-CP was issued shortly after adoption; the resolution provides the legal-framework architecture that complements the financial-instrument side (Decree 182/2024/ND-CP, VND 30 trillion Investment Support Fund) and the sectoral-law cluster enacted in late 2025.

BIS published a correcting amendment to its January 16, 2025 interim final rule "Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits" (FR Doc 2025-00711). The correction revises the license-requirement table for ECCN 3A090 by changing the first row, first column from "RS applies to the entire entry, except 3A090.a" to "RS applies to 3A090.a", aligning the Regional Stability control scope with BIS's intended policy in the Advanced Computing Chip rules. Effective February 11, 2025; comments due March 14, 2025. Docket BIS-2024-0055; RIN 0694-AJ98.

South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) committed in its 2025 Work Plan to establish a National AI Computing Center via public-private partnership (PPP), with an anchor envelope of KRW 2 trillion rising to KRW 4 trillion through 2030. In July 2025 MSIT executed the first major tranche: KRW 1.46 trillion (approx. USD 1.1 billion) to procure approximately 13,000 high-performance GPUs (NVIDIA B200 and H200) distributed across three domestic cloud operators — Naver Cloud, NHN Cloud, and Kakao. This is Korea's first PPP-structured sovereign-AI compute procurement instrument, structurally distinct from the AI Basic Act (horizontal regulatory framework) and the Semiconductor Special Act (fab investment incentives), as it directly addresses the compute- infrastructure supply constraint for AI model training and national AI research.

BIS published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2025-00711, 90 FR 4544-publication slot; companion to the AI Diffusion Framework signed three days earlier) revising the EAR to add explicit due-diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits captured by ECCN 3A090. The rule (i) creates an Authorized IC Designer / Approved IC Packager regime so that foundries and OSATs can identify trustworthy customers via lists maintained by BIS, (ii) imposes new front-end-fabricator reporting requirements for any 3A090.a IC produced for an authorized IC designer to give the US government supply-chain visibility, and (iii) adjusts the scope of covered advanced-computing items. Effective 16 January 2025; compliance required from 31 January 2025; comment period extended to 14 March 2025. The rule was immediately followed by the 16 January Entity List additions (Sophgo et al.) targeting circumvention paths and was technically amended on 14 February 2025 to narrow the RS license requirement to ECCN 3A090.a only.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 16 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (14) and Singapore (2). The additions concentrate on the Sophgo Technologies cluster and a set of affiliated PRC fabless / system houses (Suanze, Suanxin, Suanhu, Suanli, Suanneng, Sophon, Quliang, Shunhua) plus two Singapore entities (Sophgo Technologies Pte. Ltd., PowerAir Pte. Ltd.) acting as offshore extensions of the same group. BIS cites involvement in "supporting or directly contributing to the development of advanced computing integrated circuits" that further PRC advanced-weapons, WMD, and high-tech surveillance programs. License requirement covers all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy. The rule was effective on publication, January 16, 2025.

The UK government published the AI Opportunities Action Plan (CP 1241) on 13 January 2025, authored by Matt Clifford CBE (Chair, ARIA), and simultaneously accepted all 50 recommendations via the government response (CP 1242). The plan establishes binding cross-government commitments including a 20× expansion of UK sovereign AI compute capacity by 2030, designation of AI Growth Zones (Culham, Oxfordshire named first), a National Data Library, and energy-grid prioritisation for AI datacentres. It positions AI compute as critical national infrastructure and represents the most comprehensive national AI industrial-policy roadmap published in the UK to date.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (89 FR 80064; FR doc 2024-22587) amending the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 748.15) to expand the Validated End User (VEU) program with a new "Data Center VEU Authorization" pathway. The rule lets BIS pre-authorize specified data-center operators in third countries to receive advanced computing integrated circuits (ECCNs 3A090, 4A090 and related) and related technology without individual export licenses, conditional on vetted security plans, end-use monitoring, and reporting. Country Group D:5 destinations — China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba and 17 other arms-embargoed states — are categorically excluded. Eligible destinations include Egypt, Laos, Moldova, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the UAE — extending the US chip-equipment perimeter into a managed trusted-data-center channel for Gulf, MENA, and Central Asian AI build-out.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule amending 31 CFR § 560.540 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) to incorporate, with amendments, General License (GL) D-2 — originally issued on OFAC's website on September 23, 2022 — which authorizes the export, reexport, and provision of certain services, software, and hardware incident to communications over the internet to persons in Iran. The codification preserves the GL D-2 expansion (cloud-based services; third-country importation of hardware/software previously exported to Iran; ex-Iran installation, repair and replacement services; case-by-case licensing for internet-freedom activities) and updates the § 560.540 List of Services, Software, and Hardware Incident to Communications. Effective June 17, 2024, the List is amended to exclude laptops, tablets, and personal computing devices with an Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) exceeding 1 Weighted TeraFLOP (WT) — narrowing the consumer-electronics authorization to lower-performance devices and aligning the carve-out with broader BIS-style compute thresholds. The rule does not relax primary ITSR prohibitions; it codifies a humanitarian / internet-freedom exception while inserting a narrow high-performance-compute carve-out.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The Indiana Economic Development Corporation approved up to USD 18.3 million in EDGE (Economic Development for a Growing Economy) payroll-based tax credits for Amazon Data Services Inc., tied to Amazon Web Services' USD 11 billion data center campus at the Indiana Enterprise Center in New Carlisle, St. Joseph County. The credit was one component of a larger state incentive package announced by Governor Eric Holcomb on 2024-04-25, which also included up to USD 55 million in Hoosier Business Investment tax credits, up to USD 20 million in redevelopment tax credits, up to USD 5 million in training grants, a USD 7 million road-infrastructure contribution, and a 50-year state sales-tax exemption on data center equipment. IEDC records cite an incentive-agreement effective date of 2023-09-01. The project committed to creating at least 1,000 new jobs.

The Indiana Economic Development Corporation approved up to USD 55 million in Hoosier Business Investment (HBI) tax credits for Amazon Data Services Inc., tied to Amazon Web Services' USD 11 billion data center campus at the Indiana Enterprise Center in New Carlisle, St. Joseph County. This is the largest single instrument in the five-part state incentive package Governor Eric Holcomb announced on 2024-04-25, which also included up to USD 18.3 million in EDGE payroll tax credits, up to USD 20 million in redevelopment tax credits, up to USD 5 million in training grants, a USD 7 million road-infrastructure contribution, and a 50-year state sales-tax exemption on data center equipment. IEDC describes all incentives as performance-based, claimable only once the underlying investment and job-creation commitments are verified. IEDC records cite an incentive-agreement effective date of 2023-09-01.

The Indiana Economic Development Corporation approved up to USD 20 million in redevelopment tax credits for Amazon Data Services Inc., tied to Amazon Web Services' USD 11 billion data center campus at the Indiana Enterprise Center in New Carlisle, St. Joseph County. This is the third of five distinct incentive instruments in the state package Governor Eric Holcomb announced on 2024-04-25, alongside up to USD 18.3 million in EDGE payroll tax credits, up to USD 55 million in Hoosier Business Investment tax credits, up to USD 5 million in training grants, a USD 7 million road-infrastructure contribution, and a 50-year state sales-tax exemption on data center equipment. IEDC records cite an incentive-agreement effective date of 2023-09-01.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

On April 4, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (89 FR 23876) providing corrections, clarifications, and targeted revisions to the October 2023 advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment rules. The most substantive change splits the former License Exception NAC (Notified Advanced Computing) into two separate exceptions: NAC (retaining the 25-day prior notification requirement) and a new ACA (Advanced Computing Authorized) exception that permits certain shipments without advance notification. The rule also adds ECCN 4A090.b covering computers and assemblies containing advanced ICs, restores national-security controls to several ECCNs, and addresses various technical drafting errors from the October 2023 rules.

The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) issued the Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows (《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》) on 22 March 2024, effective immediately. The rules substantially raise the thresholds at which CAC security assessment, Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC), or Personal Information Protection Certification are required for outbound data transfers, and create categorical exemptions for contract performance, HR management, intra-group transfers below a volume threshold, and transit data processed in China with no domestic personal information introduced. A Free Trade Zone pilot mechanism allows designated FTZs (Shanghai Lingang, Tianjin, Beijing) to publish their own negative lists defining which data categories still require prior approval, easing conditions for multinationals with operations in those zones.

Ministerial order signed by the French Minister of Economy on 2 February 2024 and published in JORF n°0034 of 10 February 2024 establishing France's first national export-control list under Article 9 of EU Regulation 2021/821 on dual-use goods. The arrêté requires prior authorisation for exports to non-EU third countries of (i) quantum computers and their enabling technologies (qubit devices, control systems, measurement equipment) and (ii) equipment for the design, development, production, test and inspection of advanced electronic components, plus associated software and technology. The annex was substantively replaced by the Arrêté du 27 mars 2025 (explicit technical thresholds including ≥34-qubit systems with C-NOT error ≤10⁻⁴, HBM 6000+ processing performance, cryogenic cooling, dry-etch and EUV-mask tooling, and Si-28/Si-30/Ge isotopically-controlled materials) and is repealed by the Arrêté du 10 mars 2026 with entry into force 11 May 2026.

On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule on 17 October 2023 that substantially expanded the advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls first imposed in October 2022. The rule closed the performance-threshold workaround that NVIDIA had used to ship China-specific A800/H800 GPUs, replacing it with a "performance density" metric and adding a new "Notified Advanced Computing" licence category. It expanded controls on chipmaking equipment (additional ECCNs covering deposition, etch, metrology), pulled 21 additional countries (mostly Middle East / Central Asia) into a regional licensing scheme to prevent transshipment, and added 13 Chinese entities to the Entity List including AI-chip designers.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security revised the Validated End-User (VEU) authorizations for Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. (Xi'an NAND fab) and SK Hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. (Wuxi DRAM fab) on 17 October 2023, expanding each from its previous restricted eligible-items list to cover "all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations." Both authorizations exclude EUV equipment and related components: Samsung China is barred from EUV items for NAND production; SK Hynix is barred from EUV items for DRAM production. The revision was published simultaneously with the broader October 2023 advanced- computing chip controls (FR Doc 2023-22560), giving the two South Korean memory fabs a calibrated safe harbour under the newly tightened regime.

BIS amended §§ 734.15 and 734.19 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to clarify that a "release of software" for purposes of the transfer-of-access-information provision includes both source code and object code. A cross-reference was also added from § 734.15 to § 734.19. The practical effect is that providing a decryption key, password, or other access credential to a foreign person to unlock controlled software requires an export licence to the same degree as exporting the software itself would.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

MOTIE finalised the 31st amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items on 24 April 2023, effective 28 April 2023, adding 741 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list. The added items span industrial machinery, petroleum and gas refining equipment, steel, chemicals, automotive goods and quantum computers judged to have high military-diversion potential. MOTIE stated the amendment brings Korea's export-control coverage of Russia/Belarus closer to that of the US, EU and Japan, incorporating 2022 international export-control-regime agreements and reflecting the US's 2nd-6th Russia sanctions rounds and a substantial part of the EU's measures.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 16 ECCNs across computing, electronics, lasers, sensors, and aerospace domains. The most operationally significant change raised the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) threshold for digital computers under ECCN 4A003.b from 29 to 70 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), reducing the licensing burden for high-performance computing exports to Wassenaar partner countries while preserving controls to non-partners. Corresponding revisions to License Exception APP (15 CFR Part 740) and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) align the broader EAR framework with the updated multilateral thresholds.

BIS published an interim final rule on January 18, 2023 (88 FR 2821, FR Doc 2023-00888) extending to Macau the same advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls originally imposed on China by the October 7, 2022 rule. The extension closes a diversion loophole created by Macau's status as a Special Administrative Region of China, applying equivalent license requirements for advanced computing ICs, equipment used in ≤14 nm logic and advanced NAND/DRAM fabrication, and supercomputer end-use restrictions. The rule also includes entity list modifications and took effect one day before Federal Register publication (January 17, 2023).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security imposed broad new controls on the export of advanced computing chips, chipmaking equipment, and US-person services supporting Chinese semiconductor fabrication. The October 7 2022 rule blocked supply of GPUs above set performance thresholds (initially 600 GB/s interconnect / 4800 TOPS) to China and added end-use restrictions on manufacturing tools used in advanced (≤14/16 nm logic, ≤18 nm DRAM, ≤128-layer NAND) facilities, with a foreign direct product rule extending coverage globally.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 31 Chinese entities — including Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd. (YMTC), China's largest NAND flash manufacturer — to the Unverified List (UVL), suspending license exceptions and requiring end-user statements for all EAR-controlled items destined to these parties. BIS simultaneously removed nine Chinese entities previously on the UVL after successfully completing end-use checks. The rule also established a new 60-day UVL-to-Entity-List escalation clock and clarified that sustained host-government obstruction of end-use checks constitutes independent grounds for Entity List designation — a structural enforcement change aimed at closing China's pattern of blocking BIS post-shipment verification visits.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 15 September 2022, adding new export-control categories covering quantum computing equipment and related technology (new licensing requirements under a near-total policy of denial), discrete chemicals and biologics including fentanyl precursors and CBW-related production equipment (new Supplement No. 6 to Part 746), and 57 EAR99 industrial items added to the industry-sector sanctions list (Supplement No. 4). Six entities were concurrently designated as Russian Military End Users (MEU), and MEU/MIEU licensing restrictions were extended worldwide (previously limited to six countries). The rule also extended the Foreign Direct Product Rule to additional categories of foreign-made items.

Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act, DMA) was published in OJ L 265 on 12 October 2022, entered into force on 1 November 2022, and applied for the most part from 2 May 2023. The DMA establishes an ex-ante competition framework imposing binding obligations and prohibitions on designated "gatekeepers" operating Core Platform Services (CPS) in the EU — covering search engines, social-networking services, video-sharing platforms, number-independent interpersonal communications, operating systems, web browsers, virtual assistants, cloud computing, online intermediation services, and online advertising. The European Commission designated six gatekeepers on 6 September 2023 (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, Microsoft); full compliance with all obligations was required by 7 March 2024. Subsequent designations added Booking.com (May 2024) and Apple iPadOS (April 2024). The DMA functions as the EU's structural anchor for ex-ante digital competition regulation, closing the enforcement gap left by ex-post competition law (Articles 101–102 TFEU) where market-tipping dynamics make remedies ineffective after the fact.

The UK laid the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (UKSI 2022/748), in force 5 July 2022, extending the Belarus sanctions regime to mirror measures already imposed on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The regulations ban export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes, and of critical-industry goods and technology including quantum-computing components, microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft/aircraft parts. They widen existing import bans to cover a greater range of petroleum/mineral products and prohibit import of arms, iron and steel products originating in or consigned from Belarus, and extend financial sanctions barring Belarusian companies from issuing debt or securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks, and barring UK persons from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance.

BIS published a technical correction to the Entity List (15 CFR Part 744, Supplement No. 4) fixing three errors in the February 14, 2022 final rule (87 FR 8180; FR Doc. 2022-03029) that added and revised Huawei entities. Two entries — Huawei Cloud Brazil (São Paulo) and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (China, with 22+ affiliated addresses) — incorrectly cited §736.2(b)(3)(vi) as the Foreign Direct Product rule trigger instead of the correct §734.9(e) (the Huawei-specific FDP rule); a third error was a typographical fix to the footnote reference ("except for" → "EXCEPT\2\ for"). No new restrictions were created; the substantive export control status of all listed Huawei entities is unchanged, but exporters relying on the CFR text now have the correct regulatory citation for license requirement determinations.

Effective 24 February 2022 — the date of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (87 FR 12226, FR Doc 2022-04300) adding sweeping new export license requirements under a new § 746.8 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule requires a licence for any item in CCL Categories 3–9 (electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation/avionics, marine, aerospace, propulsion) exported, reexported, or transferred to Russia, with a review policy of denial. Two new Russia-specific Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules extend US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured goods: the Russia FDP Rule (§ 734.9(f)) covers all foreign-made items using US technology/equipment destined for Russia, and the Russia-MEU FDP Rule (§ 734.9(g)) covers items destined to 47 designated military-end-user (MEU) entities with no licence exceptions available. All three restrictions carry a presumption of denial, making this the most sweeping peacetime expansion of the EAR since its modern codification.

The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2021 (Act No. 43 of 2021), assented 30 December 2021 and in force from 1 January 2022, re-introduces the deductibility of Mineral Royalty Tax (MRT) paid under the Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015 when computing a mining company's taxable income for corporate income tax purposes. The Act removes mineral royalty from the list of non-deductible expenditures in section 44 of the Income Tax Act, reversing a non-deductibility rule that had applied since a 2015-era amendment and that mining companies and industry stakeholders had argued produced double taxation of the same revenue stream. Deductibility is conditional on the royalty having actually been paid for the charge year.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.

The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.