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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
The US Department of Defense published a final rule (DFARS Case 2020-D007) in the Federal Register on 25 August 2022, effective the same day, amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to implement section 849 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act. The rule prohibits DoD's acquisition of tantalum metals and alloys melted or produced in North Korea, China, Russia or Iran, and of any end item manufactured in one of those countries that contains such tantalum.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese entities — under seven entries — to the Entity List, effective August 24, 2022, for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization efforts. The entities span China's state-owned aerospace, space-technology, electronics, and control-systems research institutes. All seven entries carry a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
The Inflation Reduction Act (Public Law 117-169), signed by President Biden on 16 August 2022, contains the largest single package of clean-energy and clean-manufacturing subsidies in US history — Congressional Budget Office scored the energy and climate provisions at $369B over 10 years, with subsequent Treasury / academic estimates reaching $800B-$1.2T as uptake exceeded baseline. Core mechanisms include the Section 30D Clean Vehicle credit ($7,500 per qualifying EV), the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (per-unit credits for domestically-produced battery cells, modules, electrodes, and critical-mineral processing), the Section 48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit, and the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Credit. Critically, the law contains Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) provisions barring credit eligibility for vehicles or components linked to entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement four emerging and foundational technology decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, pursuant to ECRA Section 1758. The rule adds new export controls on ultra-wide bandgap semiconductor substrates (gallium oxide Ga₂O₃ and diamond), ECAD software for Gate-All- Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) integrated circuit development, and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology for advanced gas turbine engines. Controls require a licence for items destined to countries listed in the NS:1 and AT:1 columns of the Commerce Country Chart; ECAD software controls (ECCN 3D006) have a delayed compliance date of October 14, 2022.
Government Decree 53/2022/ND-CP, signed 15 August 2022 and effective 1 October 2022, implements Article 26 of Vietnam's 2018 Law on Cybersecurity. It mandates in-country storage of three categories of data — personal data of users in Vietnam, user-generated data, and user-relationship data — for both domestic and foreign cyberspace- service providers, with a minimum 24-month retention period. Foreign enterprises providing telecoms, data storage, domain names, e-commerce, online payments, social networks, online video games, or messaging services to users in Vietnam must establish a Vietnamese branch or representative office within 12 months of a Minister of Public Security written request. The decree closes a four-year implementation gap on the 2018 Cybersecurity Law and is the principal Vietnamese digital-trade barrier alongside Decree 13/2023/ND-CP (Personal Data Protection).
Bangladesh's Cabinet approved the National Industrial Policy 2022 on 11 August 2022, replacing the National Industrial Policy 2016 as the country's foundational umbrella industrial-policy statute; the Ministry of Industries gazetted it on 29 September 2022. The policy sets a target to raise industry's share of GDP to 40% by 2027 and introduces a sector taxonomy covering export-diversification, special-development (electronics, automotive assembly, semiconductors, renewable energy, defence-electronics), priority, reserved, and controlled categories. CMSMEs (Cottage, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises) are designated the "main driving force of industrialisation," with sector-specific concessional finance, tax holidays, and cluster-development frameworks, alongside FDI incentives including Bangladeshi citizenship for investors committing USD 1 million. The policy for the first time formally incorporates Bangladesh's informal sector within a national industrial-policy framework, mandating a National Informal Sector Database and a 2022–2027 implementation action plan.
The CHIPS and Science Act (Public Law 117-167), signed into law by President Biden on 9 August 2022, appropriated $52.7 billion in direct semiconductor industry support: $39B in manufacturing incentives administered by the Commerce Department, $13.2B for R&D and workforce, and $0.5B for legacy-chip and supply-chain programs. It also created an Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit (Section 48D) — a 25% refundable investment tax credit on qualified semiconductor manufacturing property. The law included a "guardrails" clause prohibiting recipients from expanding advanced-node capacity in countries of concern (most prominently China) for 10 years following award.
On 4 August 2022 OFAC formally published in the Federal Register nine general licenses (GLs 17–25) that had previously been made available only on OFAC's website under EO 14065 (Donetsk/Luhansk regions) and, for GL 25, also EO 13685 (Crimea). GL 17, which authorised wind-down of Donetsk/Luhansk transactions, had already expired on 23 March 2022. GLs 18–25 remain in force and authorise a structured set of humanitarian and civil-society carve-outs — covering agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices, telecommunications, official international organisation business, personal remittances, internet-based communications, NGO activities, civil maritime services, and journalistic activities — within the otherwise restricted territory of Crimea, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), and the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR).
Loi n° 22-18 du 24 juillet 2022 relative à l'investissement (Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne n° 50 du 28 juillet 2022) is Algeria's first comprehensive investment-code overhaul since Ordonnance 01-03 du 20 août 2001 and its 2016 Loi 16-09 amendment. The law replaces the legacy framework, codifies a liberalised FDI regime — retaining 51% Algerian-equity floors only for strategic sectors (hydrocarbons extraction, mining extraction, military/security) — creates the Agence Algérienne de Promotion de l'Investissement (AAPI) as the new single-window FDI-promotion agency and the Conseil National de l'Investissement (CNI) chaired by the Premier Ministre, and defines three investment regimes: Régime des Secteurs, Régime des Zones (Sud + Hauts-Plateaux territorial incentives), and the Régime Structurant for large-scale strategic projects ≥ DZD 2bn (~USD 15M) that attract negotiated multi-pillar fiscal, customs, parafiscal, and social-contribution incentive packages. Eight implementing décrets exécutifs n° 22-296 through 22-303 were published in JORADP n° 60 du 18 septembre 2022, operationalising governance, incentive matrices, the digital Registre National des Investissements, and dispute-resolution architecture.
President Ilham Aliyev signed Presidential Sərəncam (Order) No. 3378 on 22 July 2022 approving the Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2022-2026, operationalising the Azerbaijan 2030: National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development (February 2021) across five pillars: (1) sustainably growing competitive economy, (2) dynamic inclusive socially just society, (3) competitive human capital and modern innovations, (4) Great Return to liberated territories, and (5) clean environment and green growth. The strategy serves as the master policy chassis for SOCAR's investment programme across upstream (Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli, Shah Deniz), midstream (Southern Gas Corridor — TANAP + TAP delivering ~12 bcm/year to Europe and Turkiye), and downstream (Heydar Aliyev Baku Refinery, SOCAR Turkiye STAR Refinery, SOCAR Petkim), and anchors the July 2022 EU-Azerbaijan Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy, under which Azerbaijan committed to supply more than 20 bcm/year to Europe by 2027. The strategy also provides the policy foundation for offshore wind and solar agreements with Masdar (UAE) and ACWA Power (Saudi Arabia) under the green-growth pillar, and for the Karabakh and East Zangezur economic-region reconstruction programme following the September 2023 reintegration.
Presidential Resolution No. PP-319 of 14 July 2022 directed Navoiuran State Enterprise to more than double uranium output from approximately 3,500 tU/year to 7,100 tU/year by 2030, expand the national uranium reserve base to 100,000 tonnes through new exploration, and develop domestic nuclear-fuel-cycle conversion capacity alongside rare-metal co-extraction. The resolution simultaneously reorganised the uranium and rare-earth sector into a vertically integrated state enterprise — Navoiuran — spun out of the former Navoiy MMC JSC, placing the full extraction-to-conversion chain under state control.
The UK laid the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (UKSI 2022/748), in force 5 July 2022, extending the Belarus sanctions regime to mirror measures already imposed on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The regulations ban export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes, and of critical-industry goods and technology including quantum-computing components, microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft/aircraft parts. They widen existing import bans to cover a greater range of petroleum/mineral products and prohibit import of arms, iron and steel products originating in or consigned from Belarus, and extend financial sanctions barring Belarusian companies from issuing debt or securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks, and barring UK persons from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance.
OFAC adopted a final rule on 1 July 2022 amending the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR, 31 CFR Part 594) to implement Executive Order 13886 ("Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism," 9 September 2019). The rule expands the designation criteria in §594.201 to reflect EO 13886's additions, allowing OFAC to block property of foreign persons who act on behalf of, or provide material support to, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) — broadening the perimeter beyond EO 13224's original focus on persons threatening international peace and stability through terrorism. Supporting amendments update cross-references and the definition of "effective date" throughout Part 594 to reflect the new authority baseline.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List, effective June 28, 2022. The entities — located across China, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the UAE, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — were designated for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Key grounds include support for China's military modernization and AI-enabled surveillance programs, Pakistan-based proliferation concerns, and supply-chain facilitation for Russia amid the Ukraine invasion. The rule also revised eleven existing entries (Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia) and corrected one entry (Pakistan).
On 29 June 2022 the Government of Fiji formally joined the Alliance of Countries for a Deep Sea Mining Moratorium at the United Nations Ocean Conference in Lisbon, Portugal. Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama committed Fiji to a precautionary moratorium on commercial seabed mining pending finalisation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) mining code and comprehensive scientific assessment of environmental impacts. Fiji confirmed it would not operationalise its International Seabed Minerals Management Act 2013 ahead of the ISA regulatory framework. The moratorium stance has been consistently reaffirmed under the subsequent Rabuka administration (2024, 2025), and at the ISA Pacific SIDS Regional Workshop in Suva in May 2026 Minister Filimoni Vosarogo confirmed Fiji remains aligned with the ISA process and will not activate domestic seabed-minerals licensing.
Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Belarus) Regulations via SOR/2022-167, registered and in force 25 June 2022, adding four new schedules targeting Belarus over its support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Schedule 3 bans export of advanced technologies (quantum computers, advanced manufacturing and cryogenic equipment); Schedule 4 bans export of luxury goods (Part 1) and import of luxury goods from Belarus (Part 2); Schedule 5 bans export of goods usable in weapons manufacturing, including raw materials such as tungsten, aluminium and titanium, engines, industrial machinery, vehicles, aircraft and maritime vessels. The same instrument added 13 Belarusian officials and 2 state entities to the asset-freeze list.
Azerbaijan's Milli Məclis adopted the Law on Investment Activity (Qanun No. 551-VIQ) on 22 June 2022, replacing the 1992 Law on Protection of Foreign Investments and consolidating the country's fragmented investor-rights framework into a single foundational statute. The Law establishes national-treatment and most-favoured-investor guarantees for all investors, restricts expropriation to public-purpose proceedings with full market-value compensation, and authorises profit and capital repatriation in convertible currency. It preserves the Investment Promotion Document (IPD) framework administered by the Ministry of Economy while updating the statutory authority for tax and customs incentive schedules, dispute-resolution pathways, and prohibited-sector definitions.
Loi n° 2022-408, promulgated by President Alassane Ouattara on 13 June 2022 and published in the Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d'Ivoire (JORCI) on 19 September 2022, is the foundational local-content statute governing the entire petroleum and gas value chain in Côte d'Ivoire. The law mandates employment priority for Ivorian nationals, preference for Ivorian-registered enterprises in goods-and-services procurement, expatriate-substitution timelines, and technology-transfer obligations on all concessionnaires, co-contractors, and sub-contractors operating in upstream and midstream petroleum and gas activities. Implementing Décret n° 2023-441 du 24 mai 2023 created the Comité de Suivi du Contenu Local under the Ministre du Pétrole and the Plateforme du Contenu Local digital monitoring system under the Direction Générale des Hydrocarbures (DGH), operationalising annual reporting and three-year forecasting plan requirements for operators.
The Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule on 6 June 2022 (effective 2 June 2022) consolidating corrections, clarifications, and substantive amendments to the series of EAR Russia/Belarus rules issued between February and May 2022. The most significant substantive change eliminates the EAR99 food and medicine carve-out for 146 footnote-3-designated military end-user entities already on the Entity List, subjecting all items subject to the EAR — including previously exempt food and medicine — to licensing requirements with a policy of denial for the FSB, SVR, and GRU. Additional provisions clarify luxury goods value thresholds, oil refinery sector controls, and civil telecommunications license review policy, and correct cross-references in the Foreign Direct Product Rules for Russia and Belarus.
The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities — 70 Russian and 1 Belarusian — to the Entity List, effective June 2, 2022, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The entities were designated as military end users acquiring or attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military, and are subject to a policy of denial for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Sixty-six entities receive a "footnote 3" military end-user designation, while five face outright denial with no license exceptions available beyond humanitarian food and medicine.
The Council of the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The regulation adds 65 individuals and 18 legal entities to Annex I, subjecting them to an EU-wide asset freeze and a prohibition on EU persons or entities making funds or economic resources available to them. The listed entities span Russia's defense-industrial base, military-linked vehicle and tyre manufacturing, and financial-market infrastructure.
On 3 June 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/879, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It bans the seaborne import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products, covering roughly two-thirds of EU oil imports from Russia at adoption (pipeline deliveries via Druzhba were temporarily exempted). It removes Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank from SWIFT (Annex XIV), bans EU operators from providing accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax consulting, business/management consulting and public-relations services to persons in Russia (new Article 5n), and adds three more Russian broadcasters to the EU broadcasting-suspension list (Annex XV). It entered into force on 4 June 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal.
Regulation (EU) 2022/868 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on European data governance — the Data Governance Act (DGA) — was published in the Official Journal on 3 June 2022, entered into force on 23 June 2022, and became fully applicable on 24 September 2023. The DGA is the second pillar of the EU data-economy framework (alongside GDPR for personal data and the Data Act 2023/2854 for industrial/IoT data) and establishes four structural mechanisms: (i) a harmonised public-sector data re-use regime for protected data held by public-sector bodies; (ii) a mandatory notification and structural-separation regime for data-intermediation service providers; (iii) a voluntary recognition framework for data-altruism organisations (RDAOs); and (iv) the European Data Innovation Board (EDIB) to co-ordinate national competent authorities and advise on common European data spaces and interoperability standards. The regulation is the foundational parent statute of the existing French SREN law filing (2024-05-21) and functions as enabling legislation for the EU's sectoral common-data-space programme (Health, Agriculture, Finance, Mobility, Green Deal, Energy, etc.).
BIS published a CFR correction to the Entity List (15 CFR Part 744, Supplement No. 4) fixing the entry for Kaliningradnefteprodukt OOO, a Russian petroleum products distributor based in Kaliningrad originally designated in February 2018 under Executive Order 13662 for operating in Russia's energy sector and being controlled by a sanctioned person. The correction updates the entity's name spelling and address details; the underlying license requirement (all EAR items for use in §746.5 Russian industry sector projects, presumption of denial) remains unchanged.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (FR Doc 2022-11761) on June 1, 2022 adding a new section (15 CFR § 743.6) to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) requiring BIS to notify Congress before issuing export licenses for semiautomatic firearms (ECCN 0A501.a) where a single license application meets or exceeds $4 million in value. The notification requirement applies to destinations outside Country Groups A:5 and A:6 (close US allies) and does not apply to exports under License Exception GOV for US government or NATO agency use. The rule is a Biden-era oversight measure adopted under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA); it is a predecessor step in the regulatory arc that culminated in the 2024 BIS Firearms IFR (FR Doc 2024-08813), which was later partially rescinded in 2025.
BIS finalized changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing controls on cybersecurity items — primarily intrusion software, command-and-control platforms, and surveillance tools capable of disrupting or monitoring information systems without authorization. The final rule, effective May 26 2022, revises License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports) originally established by an October 2021 interim rule and narrows end-user carve-outs for government end users in Country Group D:5 and A:6 destinations. Exports of affected ECCNs (4A005, 4D001, 4D004, 4E001, 5A001.j, 5B001, 5D001, 5E001) to Country Groups E:1 and E:2 remain prohibited; D:1 through D:5 government-end-user transactions require a license.
The Spanish Council of Ministers approved on 24 May 2022 the Strategic Project for the Recovery and Economic Transformation of Microelectronics and Semiconductors (PERTE Chip) within the framework of the Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia (financed in large part by NextGenerationEU funds). The package commits a public envelope of roughly EUR 12.25bn through 2027 across four lines: scientific R&D capacity (~EUR 1.165bn), chip design including fabless companies (~EUR 1.330bn), manufacturing-plant construction including front-end below-5nm and above-5nm fabs (~EUR 9.350bn), and dynamisation of ICT/electronics manufacturing including a venture fund for semiconductor startups (~EUR 0.400bn). The Sociedad Espanola para la Transformacion Tecnologica (SETT), formally constituted by Real Decreto 676/2024 of 16 July 2024, is the operational vehicle managing more than EUR 10.75bn of the envelope.
Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-102, registered 18 May 2022, adding Schedule 6 (luxury goods) and Schedule 7 (goods usable in weapons production/manufacturing) to the list of items prohibited for export to, and in Schedule 6's case also import from, Russia. Both schedules took effect 60 days after registration (17 July 2022). Schedule 6 covers luxury alcohol, tobacco, textiles, footwear, clothing, jewellery, kitchenware, art, and some machinery; Schedule 7 covers raw materials (including tungsten and aluminium), pumps, vehicle parts, construction equipment, watercraft, and medical/dental/surgical equipment. The regulation also added 14 individuals to the Schedule 1 asset-freeze list.
The Act on the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures (Law No. 43 of 2022), enacted 18 May 2022, establishes a four-pillar framework: (1) supply-chain resilience for "specified critical products," (2) security of critical infrastructure, (3) state-backed development of "specified critical technologies," and (4) non-disclosure of nationally sensitive patents. A December 2022 Cabinet Order designated 11 product categories as specified critical products, including semiconductors, storage batteries, permanent magnets, cloud programs, LNG, critical minerals, machine tools, and aircraft parts. Competent ministries must publish stable-supply plans, can fund private-sector surveys, and may provide subsidies to qualifying firms.
The Wet veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames ("Vifo Act") is the Netherlands' cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. Adopted by the States-General on 18 May 2022 (Stb. 2022, 215) and entered into force on 1 June 2023 together with two implementing decrees (Stb. 2023, 173 — main implementing decree; Stb. 2023, 172 — decree defining the scope of "sensitive technology"), the Act establishes mandatory pre-closing notification and a security review by the Bureau Toetsing Investeringen (BTI, part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate) for transactions affecting (i) "vital providers" in critical infrastructure sectors — energy, transport, telecoms, port operators, banking infrastructure — and (ii) Dutch undertakings active in "sensitive technology", defined to include EU Reg 2021/821 Annex I dual-use items, military goods, and additional national-security technologies. The regime applies retrospectively to transactions completed after 8 September 2020. It is the foundational instrument under which the Dutch national export-control measures on ASML DUV immersion lithography (filed: 2023-06-30 and 2024-09-07) operate, and the Dutch peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., and the UK NSI Act 2021.
OFAC final rule (FR Doc 2022-12445, 87 FR 35068) amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations at 31 CFR Part 515 to implement elements of the Biden administration's May 16, 2022 Cuba policy announcement supporting the Cuban people. The rule reinstates the group people-to-people educational travel general license (suspended under the Trump administration) for organizations sponsoring exchanges that promote meaningful contact with Cubans and support civil society; removes the $1,000 quarterly limit on family remittances to close relatives in Cuba; authorizes donative remittances to Cuban nationals not affiliated with the government or Communist Party; and expands authorizations for professional meetings and conferences in Cuba. Effective June 9, 2022.
The U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) expanded export-control sanctions on Russian industry by adding 205 HTS codes (478 Schedule B numbers) to Supplement No. 4 to Part 746 of the EAR, imposing a license requirement — with a presumption of denial — for all exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to or within Russia of covered industrial goods. The targeted categories span wood products, boilers, industrial machinery, pumps, compressors, textile and grinding equipment, and hydraulic motors, aligning U.S. controls with EU partner lists. The rule took retroactive effect May 9, 2022, two days before Federal Register publication on May 11, 2022.
At the Executive Branch's request, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an order suspending the general license authority in 10 CFR 110.21-110.24 for exports of source material, special nuclear material, byproduct material, and deuterium for nuclear end use to the Russian Federation, effective immediately on issuance (May 12, 2022) and published in the Federal Register on May 17, 2022. Exporters must now apply for a specific license under 10 CFR 110.31 for any such export to Russia, which the NRC evaluates case by case. The order followed the Executive Branch's determination that continued general-license exports to Russia were inimical to US common defense and security in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.
Canada registered SOR/2022-98, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, on 6 May 2022, adding five Russian defence-sector entities to Schedule 1 of the regulations: Zelenodolsk Shipyard JSC, Military Industrial Company LLC, Rosgvardia, UEC Klimov JSC and KAMAZ PTC. The listing triggers Canada's standard dealing/asset-freeze prohibitions against the named entities under the Special Economic Measures Act, part of Canada's ongoing sanctions response to Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
On 2 May 2022 OFAC published a comprehensive final rule in the Federal Register renaming the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 589) to the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations and replacing the abbreviated regulatory text that had been in place since 2014 with a fully elaborated framework. The new Part 589 incorporates interpretive guidance, definitional provisions, and consolidated general licenses implementing Executive Orders 13660, 13661, and 13662 — the original March 2014 Ukraine/Crimea-crisis authorities. The rule does not introduce new substantive prohibitions; it formalises and makes accessible the regulatory infrastructure that underlies subsequent GL issuances (e.g., GL 13Q/13R, GL 15K/15L) and OFAC designation actions under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions program.
The Subsidy Control Act 2022 (Royal Assent 28 April 2022; in force 4 January 2023) replaced EU state-aid rules as the UK's domestic subsidy-control framework, fulfilling an obligation under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). It establishes a principles-based self-assessment regime administered by a new Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU) at the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), allowing UK public authorities to grant subsidies without prior Commission approval while remaining compliant with WTO subsidy disciplines and TCA obligations.
On 21 April 2022 the UK announced import bans on Russian silver, wood products and other high-value goods (incl. caviar), alongside a 35-point tariff increase on selected Russian and Belarusian goods. The ban was legislated by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 10) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/689, made 20 June, in force 23 June 2022), which inserted a new Schedule 3D ("revenue generating goods") and prohibitions 46T-46W: import of Schedule 3D goods originating in or consigned from Russia, their acquisition, supply/delivery into the UK and related technical assistance are prohibited, subject to Part 7 exceptions and licences. Schedule 3D covers all of HS chapter 44 (wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal), HS 7106 silver, plus e.g. caviar, cement, potassium chloride and NPK fertilisers, pulp and kraft paper, glass, and aluminium plate.
On 20 April 2022 Mexico's Diario Oficial de la Federación published a reform to the Ley Minera (Mining Law) declaring lithium "patrimonio de la Nación" (national patrimony) and of public utility, adding Article 5 Bis to state that no further concessions, licenses, contracts, permits or authorizations for lithium exploration, exploitation, benefit or use will be granted to private parties — reserving the entire value chain exclusively to the State (Articles 1, 9 and 10 also amended). On 23 August 2022 a follow-on decree created "Litio para México" (LitioMx), a decentralized public agency governed by a board of five cabinet secretaries (Energy as chair, plus Finance, Economy, Interior and Environment) and technically supported by the Mexican Geological Service, holding exclusive rights to explore, exploit and commercialize Mexico's lithium deposits. The law was subsequently upheld as constitutional by Mexico's Supreme Court in March 2026 (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 78/2022, filed separately).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule expanding license requirements under the EAR for all items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) destined for Russia and Belarus, retroactively effective April 8, 2022. The rule also removes certain license exceptions that previously allowed aircraft-related transactions involving Belarus to proceed without authorization. Issued in direct response to Russia's continued aggression in Ukraine and Belarus's role in enabling it, this measure substantially tightens the multilateral export- control perimeter first established by BIS in late February 2022.
METI committed 476 billion yen (~$3.3bn) in direct subsidies covering approximately half the construction cost of Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing K.K. (JASM), a purpose-built joint venture fab at Kikuyo Town, Kumamoto Prefecture. JASM shareholders are TSMC (86.5%), Sony Semiconductor Solutions (6%), Denso (6%), and Toyota Motor (1.5 %). The fab manufactures 12nm, 16nm, 22nm, and 28nm mature-node chips targeting automotive-grade, industrial, and IoT applications. A groundbreaking ceremony was held on 13 April 2022; the facility officially opened on 24 February 2024 and reached commercial production in December 2024. JASM represents Japan's first new leading-edge wafer fab in decades and the largest single foreign direct investment in Japanese manufacturing history.
BIS amended the Export Administration Regulations to add Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland to the list of countries excluded from certain EAR license requirements that apply to items destined for Russia or Belarus. The exclusion recognizes that these four countries have implemented substantially similar export-control regimes aligned with US restrictions, and applies specifically to the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule under EAR Part 734.9. The change reduces the licensing burden for entities in these partner countries when producing or handling items using US-origin technology or equipment in transactions with Russia/Belarus, consistent with the broader allied coordination approach adopted after February 2022.
BIS published a technical correction to the Entity List (15 CFR Part 744, Supplement No. 4) fixing three errors in the February 14, 2022 final rule (87 FR 8180; FR Doc. 2022-03029) that added and revised Huawei entities. Two entries — Huawei Cloud Brazil (São Paulo) and Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (China, with 22+ affiliated addresses) — incorrectly cited §736.2(b)(3)(vi) as the Foreign Direct Product rule trigger instead of the correct §734.9(e) (the Huawei-specific FDP rule); a third error was a typographical fix to the footnote reference ("except for" → "EXCEPT\2\ for"). No new restrictions were created; the substantive export control status of all listed Huawei entities is unchanged, but exporters relying on the CFR text now have the correct regulatory citation for license requirement determinations.
On 8 April 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/576, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the fifth package of measures against Russia). It bans imports of Russian coal and other solid fossil fuels, wood, cement, rubber, fertilisers, high-end seafood and spirits; bans exports to Russia of jet fuel, quantum computers, advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and sensitive machinery; bars Russian and Belarusian road-freight operators from EU territory; and closes EU ports to Russian-flagged vessels. It entered into force on 9 April 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal (OJ L 111).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 120 entities under 120 entries to the Entity List, effective 1 April 2022 and published in the Federal Register on 7 April 2022. All 120 entities — located in Russia and Belarus — were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests in the context of Russia's further invasion of Ukraine beginning 24 February 2022. The rule imposes a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items and prohibits all license exceptions for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers to the listed parties. Ninety-five of the 120 entities are additionally designated under Footnote 3 of the Entity List as military end users, triggering the Russian/Belarusian Military End User foreign-produced direct product rule (MEU FDP Rule), extending US extraterritorial reach to non-US items made with US-origin technology.
Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Belarus) Regulations via SOR/2022-075, registered and in force 5 April 2022, in response to Belarus's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The amendment prohibits any person in Canada and any Canadian outside Canada from providing insurance, reinsurance or underwriting services for aviation and aerospace products owned, controlled, registered to, chartered by or operated by Belarus or a Belarusian person. A new section 3.6 separately establishes export prohibitions on goods and technologies listed on a Belarus Restricted Goods and Technologies List, incorporated by reference, aligning Canada's Belarus measures with its parallel Russia export-control regime. The same instrument added nine individuals (Belarusian oligarchs and defence officials) to the Schedule 1 asset-freeze list, outside this action's scope.
On 4 April 2022 Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs registered the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods—Russia) Amendment (No.1) Designation 2022, made under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. It amended the existing Export Sanctioned Goods—Russia designation to add further categories of goods to the list of items whose export, supply or transfer to Russia is prohibited, extending an export-ban regime introduced in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It took effect on registration.
Russian Government Resolution No. 506 of 29 March 2022, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and effective 30 March 2022, authorises the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg) to designate categories of goods exempt from articles 1252(4), 1359(6) and 1487 of the Russian Civil Code on national/regional exhaustion of trademark and other intellectual- property rights. Followed by Minpromtorg Order No. 1532 of 19 April 2022 publishing an initial list of 55 goods categories and named brands — including pharmaceuticals, electronics, automotive parts, mineral fuels, industrial chemicals, paper, textiles, base metals, and consumer goods — for which parallel (grey-market) imports without IP-holder consent are legalised. Designed as a sanctions-circumvention and supply-substitution instrument after the Western corporate exodus of March 2022; extended annually and most recently re-authorised through 31 December 2026.
Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.
SARS amended South Africa's Prohibited and Restricted Imports and Exports list on 2022-03-23 to add both import and export licensing requirements — administered with the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy — covering uranium ores and concentrates (HS 2612.10), molybdenum ores and concentrates (HS 2613.10), depleted-uranium transport containers and isotope projectors (HS 2844.10/20/30/40, 9022.19), nuclear-grade graphite, graphite blocks and graphite electrodes (HS 8545.11/19). Both directions of trade in these items now require a permit rather than moving freely across South African borders.
Australia designated aluminium ores (including bauxite), alumina and aluminium hydroxide as "export sanctioned goods" for Russia under the Autonomous Sanctions (Export Sanctioned Goods -- Russia) Designation 2022, banning their export from Australia to Russia effective 20 March 2022. Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the measure a day earlier as part of Australia's response to the invasion of Ukraine, framing it as an attack on Russia's aluminium industry, which sourced roughly 20% of its alumina from Australian supply. Rusal, Russia's dominant aluminium producer, was identified as the primary target.