Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 37 entities under 40 entries to the Entity List, effective December 17, 2021. The additions span three distinct threat rationales: (1) support for Chinese military modernization across semiconductors, submarine cables, armored vehicles, and defense electronics; (2) the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 affiliated institutes pursuing biotechnology processes for military end uses, including purported brain-control weaponry under EAR §744.11(b); and (3) a cross-border Iran sanctions-evasion network operating across China, Georgia, Malaysia, and Turkey that diverted US-origin items to Iran's defense industries and advanced conventional weapons programs. All 40 entries carry a presumption-of-denial licensing policy for all items subject to the EAR, with no license exceptions available.

The Union Cabinet approved the Semicon India Programme on 15 December 2021, establishing the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) as the nodal agency. The programme offers fiscal support of up to 50% of project cost for silicon semiconductor fabs, compound semiconductor facilities, display fabs, ATMP/OSAT units, and chip design. Total outlay: Rs 76,000 crore (approximately $10.2bn at 2021 exchange rates). By February 2024, the Cabinet had approved three major semiconductor units under ISM: Tata Electronics with PSMC (semiconductor fab, Dholera, Rs 91,526 crore), Tata Electronics OSAT (Morigaon, Assam, Rs 27,120 crore), and CG Power OSAT (Rs 7,584 crore), totalling over Rs 1.26 lakh crore in committed investment from private applicants.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

On November 4, 2021, BIS added four entities to the Entity List under a policy of denial: NSO Group and Candiru (Israel), Positive Technologies (Russia), and Computer Security Initiative Consultancy PTE (Singapore). NSO Group and Candiru were designated for supplying commercial spyware to foreign governments used to maliciously surveil government officials, journalists, activists, and academics; Positive Technologies and CSIC for trafficking cyber tools enabling unauthorized access to information systems. All four entities now require BIS licenses for any export, re-export, or in-country transfer of EAR-controlled items, with a presumption of denial.

BIS published an interim final rule on October 21, 2021 establishing new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs 4A005, 4D004, 4E001.c, and 5A001.j) for intrusion software systems, command-and-control platforms, and IP network surveillance tools, implementing the Wassenaar Arrangement 2017 cybersecurity decisions into the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule simultaneously created License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports), codified at § 740.22, to authorize exports to most destinations while imposing licence requirements — or outright prohibitions — for sales to Country Groups E:1/E:2 governments and certain D-group government end-users. Carve-outs for vulnerability disclosure and cyber-incident-response activities were included to protect legitimate security research. The effective date was subsequently delayed from January 19, 2022 to March 7, 2022 by a separate interim rule (FR 2022-00448), and the rule was finalized with revisions on May 26, 2022 (FR 2022-11282).

France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.

BIS amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the decision adopted at the Australia Group (AG) Virtual Implementation Meeting of May 2021, creating new ECCN 2D352 to control software designed for nucleic acid assemblers and synthesizers (ECCN 2B352.j) that is capable of designing and building functional genetic elements from digital sequence data. The rule also amends ECCN 2E001 to capture technology for the development of 2D352-controlled software. Exports to most non-allied destinations require a BIS licence under CB Column 2 and AT Column 1, and the classification of 2D352 software as a critical technology triggers mandatory CFIUS filing requirements for qualifying foreign investment.

On 22 July 2021, Australia's Minister for Industry, Science and Technology announced an AUD 14.8 million Modern Manufacturing Initiative grant to Lynas Rare Earths for a new Rare Earth Carbonate Refining Circuit at its planned Kalgoorlie, Western Australia processing facility. The published GrantConnect award record (GA200152, approved 16 June 2021) lists the contracted grant value to recipient Lynas Kalgoorlie Pty Ltd at AUD 15,618,958.30 (GST inclusive). The process reduces chemical consumption and processing cost for refining ore from Lynas's Mt Weld deposit onshore in Australia, reducing reliance on Chinese midstream rare earth refining capacity.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding six Russian technology entities to the Entity List, all designated consistent with Executive Order 14024 on blocking property associated with harmful foreign activities of the Russian government. The designated entities operate in Russia's technology sector and have been determined to support Russian intelligence services, including notable cybersecurity firms and defense-innovation institutions. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence for export, reexport, or transfer to these parties, subject to a presumption-of-denial review policy with no licence exceptions available. The rule also corrects an existing FSB entry to reference updated General Licence No. 1B.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).

On June 1, 2021, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published FR Doc 2021-11585 (86 FR 29189) notifying the public that, effective May 26, 2021, BIS had assumed jurisdiction over certain firearms-related "technology" and "software" — specifically digital files (CAD/AMF/G-code) for 3D-printed firearms and CNC milling instruction files — under ECCNs 0D501 and 0E501 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The transfer was triggered by the Ninth Circuit's April 27, 2021 vacatur of a March 6, 2020 district-court preliminary injunction that had blocked the technology/software prong of the broader January 23, 2020 USML-to-CCL transfer rule. Internet posting of such files now requires a BIS license (review policy: denial), completing the full implementation of the January 2020 rule transferring USML Categories I–III (firearms, guns, and ammunition) from ITAR/State Department to EAR/Commerce jurisdiction.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.

The German Federal Government adopted the 17th amendment to the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV, Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance), published 30 April 2021 and entering into force 1 May 2021, aligning Germany's FDI screening regime with EU Regulation 2019/452. The amendment adds 16 further sectors to the sector-specific mandatory-notification regime, on top of the 11 already covered, bringing the total to 27 -- including AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles/drones, semiconductors, quantum technology, satellite systems, cybersecurity, and critical raw materials. Filing thresholds are voting-rights acquisitions of 10% or more by a non-EU/EFTA investor in the newly added sectors, with subsequent review triggers at 20%, 25%, 40%, 50% and 75%.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on April 9, 2021 to extend military-intelligence end-use and end-user controls to Burma (Myanmar) and to apply U.S.-person activity prohibitions to Burma's military-intelligence entities — specifically the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) and the Directorate of Signal. The rule also corrected technical errors introduced by BIS's January 15, 2021 interim final rule (FR Doc 2021-01879), which had originally established the military-intelligence end-use and end-user control framework covering China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The addition of Burma responded directly to the February 1, 2021 SAC military coup and the Burmese military's use of surveillance technology to oppress civil society, restrict internet access, and imprison protesters.

On 24 March 2021, Canada's Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (François-Philippe Champagne) issued updated guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments under the Investment Canada Act. The revised guidelines (superseding 2016 guidance) identify four areas of heightened national-security concern in foreign direct investment review: sensitive personal data, sensitive technology, critical minerals, and investments by state-owned or state-influenced investors. The critical- minerals designation references the 31-mineral Critical Minerals List Canada had announced two weeks earlier (11 March 2021).

On 22 March 2021, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched Operation 300bn at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi — a 10-year national industrial strategy delivered by the newly created Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology (MoIAT, established July 2020). The strategy targets raising the industrial sector's annual GDP contribution from AED 133bn (~USD 36bn) to AED 300bn (~USD 82bn) by 2031, lifting R&D spend from AED 21bn to AED 57bn (1.3% → 2% of GDP), and supporting more than 13,500 industrial SMEs through an AED 30bn (~USD 8.2bn) Emirates Development Bank (EDB) financing portfolio. Eleven priority sub-sectors are organised into three baskets: Stimulating Growth (food/beverage, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment), Advanced Manufacturing (petrochemicals, rubber/plastics, machinery), and Industries of the Future (hydrogen, medical technology, space technology).

On 1 February 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a USD 30.4 million Defense Production Act Title III technology investment agreement with Lynas USA LLC, the U.S. subsidiary of Australia's Lynas Rare Earths Ltd, to establish domestic light rare earth element (LREE) separation capacity in Hondo, Texas. DOD framed the award as reducing reliance on China for rare earth oxides used in defense and commercial applications; the department projected that, if the Texas facility and Lynas's Malaysian operations are completed as planned, Lynas would supply roughly 25% of world rare earth oxide demand outside China.

Czech Republic's foundational horizontal FDI screening statute. Zákon č. 34/2021 Sb., o prověřování zahraničních investic — adopted by Parliament in January 2021, published in Sbírka zákonů on 29 January 2021, and entered into force on 1 May 2021 — transposes the cooperation obligations of EU Regulation 2019/452 and creates the first cross-sector pre-clearance regime for non-EU investments into Czech firms. The Act is administered by the Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu (MPO) and combines (i) a mandatory ex-ante consent regime for non-EU investments acquiring ≥10% in companies producing military material, selected dual-use goods, or operating critical / critical-information infrastructure, with (ii) a discretionary ex-officio review available up to 5 years post-closing for any other "public-order or internal-security" sensitive investment. The Government decides on MPO's recommendation; remedies include conditions, prohibition, and forced divestment, with fines up to 1% of the global net turnover of the foreign investor.

On 20 January 2021, DOE's Office of Fossil Energy (now FECM), managed through the National Energy Technology Laboratory, announced Funding Opportunity Announcement DE-FOA-0002404, making USD 28.35 million available for cost-shared R&D projects developing advanced midstream processing technologies for rare earth elements and critical minerals from coal and coal by-products, for industrial and manufacturing applications. Applications were due 1 March 2021, with up to eight Phase 1 awards anticipated; no specific recipients were named at announcement.