Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2668 actions· ✨ 89 recent

Egypt's Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade issued a ministerial decree on 31 March 2026 imposing definitive three-year safeguard duties on imports of flat-rolled steel products — covering hot-rolled coil (HRC), cold-rolled coil (CRC), hot-dip galvanized/galvannealed (HDG/GI), and pre-painted steel (PPGI) — effective 1 April 2026 and running through approximately 13 September 2028. The measure converts the 200-day provisional safeguard (Ministerial Decision No. 400/2025, effective 14 September 2025) into a definitive instrument and simultaneously extends coverage to CRC, HDG and PPGI products that had been subject to a separate parallel investigation launched September 2025; Egypt concurrently terminated the anti-dumping probe on CRC/HDG/PPGI from China and Turkey without imposing AD duties, making the safeguard the sole operative instrument. Duties are erga-omnes (all WTO Members, subject to Article 9.1 developing-country de minimis) and follow a three-tier declining-duty structure: CRC at 13.7%/min USD 83/t in Year 1, falling to 12.5%/min USD 76/t in Year 3; HDG at 14%/min USD 93/t declining to 13%; PPGI at 14.5% declining to 13.5%.

On 31 March 2026 the Government of Vietnam issued Decree 96/2026/ND-CP, the principal implementing decree for the Law on Investment 2025 (Law 143/2025/QH15). It takes effect on its signing date and replaces Decree 31/2021/ND-CP, Decree 19/2025/ND-CP and Decree 239/2025/ND-CP — the first comprehensive overhaul of Vietnam's general FDI-licensing framework since 2021. The decree operationalises the new Special Investment Procedure (a registration-and-commitment fast-track in industrial parks, export-processing zones, hi-tech parks, concentrated digital- technology zones, free-trade zones, international financial centres and economic-zone functional areas) and details the list of 16 specially-incentivised sectors covering semiconductor and chip manufacturing, AI, big data, digital technology and high-tech R&D. It also rewrites foreign-investor market-access conditions, document procedures and dispute / grievance mechanisms.

Minister of Trade Regulation No. 5 of 2026, signed on 26 March 2026 and effective 1 April 2026, is the fourth amendment to Permendag 23/2023 on Export Policy and Regulation. It introduces three substantively significant changes: (i) restricts issuance of Export Approval (Persetujuan Ekspor / PE) for ilmenite and rutile concentrate to holders of IUP/IUPK Operasi Produksi mining permits — eliminating the prior Izin Usaha Industri (IUI) industrial pathway — extending Indonesia's hilirisasi vertical-integration doctrine to titanium feedstock; (ii) removes the Eksportir Terdaftar (ET) registered- exporter requirement for industrial tin exports, simplifying the export chain to PE + Laporan Surveyor (LS) only; (iii) mandates electronic and automatic issuance of PE where the integrated INATRADE/SINSW system documentation is complete, digitising the export-licensing chain. Additional changes tighten kratom ET validity to a three-year cap and reassign marine-species transport- document authority from the Ministry of Forestry to the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.

Minister of Trade Regulation No. 6 of 2026 (Permendag 6/2026), signed 26 March 2026 and effective 1 April 2026, amends the appendix of Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export, making four substantive changes to Indonesia's prohibited-export list: (i) nitrogen-containing mineral and chemical fertilizers, including urea in all forms, are added to the prohibited-export list as a food-security instrument; (ii) rice is removed from the prohibited-export list, partially reversing a long-standing prohibition; (iii) rough wood, sawn wood, and wood carpentry and building products are added as value-added-export-requirement items, extending Indonesia's hilirisasi downstream-processing doctrine from minerals into the forestry-products sector; and (iv) rattan weaving materials remain prohibited for export. Together with the simultaneously enacted Permendag 5/2026 (fourth amendment to Permendag 23/2023 on export-licensing procedures), this forms Indonesia's most consequential 2026 export-regulation package.

The Korea Trade Commission (KTC) at its 471st plenary session on 26 March 2026 adopted a final affirmative anti-dumping determination against imports of vertical articulated industrial robots (≥4 axes, 6–600 kg payload capacity) from Japan and China, recommending definitive five-year duties of 17.45–18.64% on Japanese-origin robots (Fanuc 17.45%, Yaskawa 18.64%) and 15.96–19.85% on Chinese-origin robots (KUKA Guangdong, ABB Shanghai, Kawasaki China-branch). Final duties are significantly lower than provisional duties of 21.17–43.6% imposed since November 2025 following an investigation initiated in March 2025 on petition by HD Hyundai Robotics. This is the first trade-remedy case on the register covering the industrial-automation / robotics sector.

The Philippine Semiconductor and Electronics Industry (PSEI) Roadmap 2026–2030 was presented at the 4th SEIAC meeting at Malacañang on 23 March 2026 by BOI Executive Director Ma. Corazon Halili-Dichosa and formally rolled out by DTI in April 2026. The Roadmap targets $110 billion in annual exports by 2030 ($70B semiconductors + $40B electronics, approximately doubling the current ~$50B baseline) via value-chain ascent from assembly-test-packaging through IC design toward front-end wafer fabrication, supported by 128,000-worker upskilling over five years and up to three national laboratories in fabrication, R&D, and talent development.

South Africa's ITAC, acting on an application by ArcelorMittal South Africa and Columbus Stainless Steel, imposed definitive five-year anti-dumping duties on certain flat-rolled products of iron and steel (width ≥600 mm, HS 7208 and 7225 subheadings) from China (company-specific rates up to 47.92%), Japan (up to 57.23%) and Taiwan (24.20%), effective 19 March 2026 via SARS amendment to Schedule No. 2 of the Customs and Excise Act. The Commission found dumping from all three origins and material injury to the SACU regional industry (full findings in ITAC Report 767). Duties are layered on top of the existing 10% ordinary customs duty and 13% steel safeguard, substantially raising the landed cost of flat-rolled steel from Asia.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

South Africa's International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) recommended, and SARS implemented on 19 March 2026, definitive five-year anti-dumping duties on U, I and H sections of iron or non-alloy steel (structural steel, HS 7216.31, 7216.32, 7216.33 and 7216.40) imported from China (74.98%) and Thailand (20.32%). The investigation, initiated on an application by ArcelorMittal Rails and Structures (AMRAS), found dumped imports — totalling 28,800 tonnes in 2023/24, with China supplying ~65% — were causing material injury to the SACU domestic industry (full findings in ITAC Report 759). The definitive duties layer on top of an existing 10% ordinary customs duty and a 13% SACU-wide steel safeguard duty, bringing the effective total import burden on Chinese structural steel to approximately 98% above the base tariff.

The UK's steel safeguard measure (25% out-of-quota duty) expired 30 June 2026 and was replaced from 1 July 2026 by a new tariff-rate-quota trade measure, announced by the Department for Business and Trade on 19 March 2026. The new measure cuts overall duty-free quota volumes by 51% versus the expired safeguard and raises the out-of-quota tariff to 50% by value, applied across 20 steel product categories. Ukraine-origin steel is exempt; two non-alloy wire commodity codes drop to 0% duty from 1 October 2026.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the Bharat Audyogik Vikas Yojna (BHAVYA) on 18 March 2026 with a ₹33,660 crore (~USD 4.0bn) outlay over six years (FY 2026-27 to FY 2031-32) to develop 100 plug-and-play industrial parks of 100-1,000 acres each across all states and Union Territories. Financial assistance of up to ₹1 crore per acre supports core infrastructure (internal roads, underground utilities, drainage, common treatment, ICT), value-added infrastructure (ready-built sheds, built-to-suit units, testing labs, warehousing), and social infrastructure (worker housing). The scheme is sector-agnostic and is implemented by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation (NICDC) under DPIIT, with states forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and committing to single-window clearances. The first phase will deliver 50 parks.

Presidential Decreto 0264, signed on 16 March 2026 by President Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego with Minister of Commerce Diana Marcela Morales Rojas and Minister of Finance Germán Ávila Plazas, sets a 35% MFN import duty on 14 steel and metal-mechanical subpartidas (bars, profiles, tubes, wire products, barbed wire) covering HS chapters 72-73 imported from countries with which Colombia has no free-trade agreement — primarily China, Russia, Turkey, and India. The measure is valid for one year from its entry into force (15 days after Diario Oficial publication on 16 March 2026), after which the Comité de Asuntos Aduaneros, Arancelario y de Comercio Exterior must review its impact. It partially amends Decreto 1881 de 2021 and operationalises the Política Nacional de Reindustrialización (CONPES 4129), the Petro administration's flagship programme to reduce Colombia's hydrocarbon dependence by building new domestic manufacturing capacity.

Turkish President Erdoğan signed Presidential Decision No. 11068 on 16 March 2026, published in the Resmî Gazete on 17 March 2026, establishing a mandatory pre-clearance regime for the transit passage and re-export of controlled military items through Türkiye's customs territory. Covered items include military vehicles and defence equipment, weapons and ammunition and their spare parts, military explosives, and dual-use technologies associated with these categories, as defined under Law No. 5201. Any entity seeking to move such goods through Türkiye must obtain a "uygunluk yazısı" (compliance letter) from the Ministry of Trade, which reviews applications in consultation with relevant public institutions. The measure directly operationalises Türkiye's response to sustained US pressure over Iran-related sanctions evasion via Turkish transit corridors and entity-list additions naming Türkiye-based diversion networks.

India's Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) issued Press Note 2 of 2026 on March 15, 2026 (following Cabinet approval on March 10, 2026), recalibrating the Press Note 3 (2020) FDI framework for investments from countries sharing a land border with India. Global investors with up to 10% non-controlling Chinese (or other land-border) shareholding can now invest in India under the automatic route across sectors, while entities domiciled in China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Afghanistan continue to require prior government approval. For 40 designated strategic sub-sectors — including rare earth permanent magnets, polysilicon and ingot-wafer manufacturing, printed circuit boards, electronic capital goods, Li-ion batteries and machine tools — proposals will be decided within a binding 60-day window, with majority Indian ownership and control mandated at all times. Effective from the date of the corresponding amendment to the FEMA Non-Debt Instruments Rules.

On 13 March 2026 USTR Jamieson Greer and Ecuador's Minister of Production, Foreign Trade and Investment Luis Alberto Jaramillo signed the United States–Ecuador Agreement on Reciprocal Trade in Washington, formalising the framework agreed in November 2025. Ecuador commits to preferential treatment for >90% of its agricultural schedule (including tariff elimination on soybeans, fresh/processed fruit, alcoholic beverages, tea, tree/ground nuts, dairy, beef, pork and poultry), to discontinue applying the Andean Price Band System to US-origin agricultural goods, to accept US remanufactured goods and US motor-vehicle safety/emissions standards, and to commit on digital-trade non-discrimination plus the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. The US in return grants MFN tariff treatment to qualifying Ecuadorian goods that "cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced" in the US, by 1 August 2026 or entry into force (whichever is later). The Agreement enters into force 30 days after both parties notify completion of domestic procedures.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act for Korea-US Strategic Investment Management (한미 전략적 투자 관리를 위한 특별법) on 12 March 2026 by a bipartisan vote of 226-8-8, authorising a sovereign-backed US$350bn (~KRW 517tn) investment commitment to the United States over an annual US$20bn cap. The act creates the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation (한미전략투자공사), a new state-run entity with KRW 2tn (~US$1.36bn) government-financed paid-in capital, as the institutional vehicle to execute the bilateral investment MOU. Article 3 Clause 3 permits investment decisions to proceed despite insufficient commercial viability when national-security or supply-chain-stability grounds exist, subject to prior consent of the relevant National Assembly Standing Committee, operationalising the December 2025 Korea-US Strategic Trade and Investment Deal investment-pledge tranche.

On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.

The US Department of Commerce published its final affirmative determination of sales at less-than-fair-value in the antidumping investigation of animal feed-grade L-lysine (lysine) from China (case A-570-215) on 23 July 2026, following a preliminary determination published 6 March 2026 (91 FR 11030). Commerce found a China-wide weighted-average dumping margin of 139.83% (cash deposit rate 139.65% after subsidy-offset adjustment), based on adverse facts available after Commerce found Zhengzhou Longgu Trading Co., the sole company with a calculated margin, and the Eppen Group group of producers/exporters uncooperative and ineligible for a separate rate in the final determination. A group of separate-rate companies — including Anhui BBCA Biochemical, Heilongjiang Wanlirunda Biotechnology, and others exporting through trading intermediaries such as Agromate Sg, Ainore (Tianjin), and Aollen Biotech — received a 73.55% dumping margin (73.37% cash deposit rate). The order covers lysine regardless of form (HCl, sulfate, liquid) under HTSUS 2922.41.0090 and related subheadings. A companion countervailing-duty investigation (preliminary 22 January 2026, 91 FR 2745) was finalized the same day; suspension of liquidation runs from 6 March 2026, with a final AD order contingent on an ITC injury determination due within 45 days of the final LTFV finding.

On 1 May 2026 the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (the "Interim Trade Agreement", iTA) entered provisional application between the European Union and the four Mercosur states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — following its publication in the EU Official Journal on 27 February 2026 alongside the broader EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA). The iTA covers goods (eliminating duties on more than 90% of bilateral trade over a transition period including immediate cuts on cars, pharmaceuticals, wine and olive oil), services, government procurement at federal and state level, intellectual property (344 EU geographical indications protected), SPS/TBT disciplines, and a sustainability chapter. Mercosur receives tariff-rate quotas on agri-food exports (beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, honey). Provisional application proceeds pending full ratification of EMPA by the Council, European Parliament and all EU national parliaments and a pending CJEU opinion; only the trade pillar applies provisionally.

The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on February 26, 2026, finding that producers and exporters of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos received countervailable government subsidies. Preliminary subsidy rates are 125.87% for India; 85.99%–143.30% by individual Indonesian producer (104.38% all-others rate); and a uniform 80.67% for Laos. Commerce ordered US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits at these rates on subject imports pending a parallel antidumping investigation and final determinations later in 2026. The case originated from a petition filed in August 2025 by US crystalline silicon PV manufacturers.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, issued Notification No. 62/2025-26 on 24 February 2026 permitting the export of 25 Lakh Metric Tonnes (LMT) of wheat under HS Codes 10011900 (durum wheat - other) and 10019910 (other wheat) while keeping the headline export-policy classification as "Prohibited". A second tranche of 25 LMT was authorised by Notification No. 13/2026-27 on 27 April 2026, bringing the cumulative quota envelope to 50 LMT (5 million tonnes). Public Notice No. 05/2026-27 (30 April 2026) prescribed allocation modalities for the second tranche: 18 LMT for large exporters, 5 LMT for state trading entities and cooperatives, and 2 LMT for MSMEs, with online applications open 1-10 May 2026 and authorisations valid for six months. The mechanism partially unwinds the May 2022 blanket wheat export ban (DGFT Notification 06/2015-2020) which had been in continuous force for nearly four years, while preserving DGFT's authority to retighten via the prohibition baseline. Pre-existing government-to-government exports to meet third-country food security needs remain permitted outside the quota envelope.

On 21 February 2026 in New Delhi, during the State Visit of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, India and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Critical Minerals between India's Ministry of Mines and Brazil's Ministry of Mines and Energy. The MoU establishes a bilateral framework spanning the entire critical-minerals value chain — exploration, mining, processing, recycling, and refining — with explicit focus on rare-earth elements, lithium, nickel, cobalt, niobium, manganese, and other strategic minerals. It was issued alongside a broader Joint Statement targeting USD 30 billion in bilateral trade by 2030 and a ten-year strategic-partnership roadmap covering AI, defence, energy, agriculture, and digital transformation.

President Trump signed Executive Order "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" on 20 February 2026 (Federal Register doc 2026-03832, published 25 February 2026), terminating the additional ad-valorem duties imposed under nine prior IEEPA-based executive orders. The order followed within hours of the US Supreme Court's 6-3 decision the same day in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and vacating the Trump 2.0 IEEPA tariff regime. The EO directs CBP to cease collection "as soon as practicable"; CSMS guidance set the collection-end date at 12:00 a.m. eastern on 24 February 2026. The order explicitly preserves all underlying national-emergency declarations and all non-IEEPA trade actions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, Section 122 of the Trade Act, and Section 201 — so the Section 232 cascade and the paired Section 122 10% temporary surcharge (effective 24 Feb 2026) remain in force. This is the first SCOTUS-driven repeal of a presidential tariff regime in the modern era and recalibrates the entire post-2024 US tariff architecture by removing IEEPA as a legal pillar.

President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).

On 19 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Prabowo finalised the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) between the United States and Indonesia. The deal locks the US reciprocal tariff on Indonesian imports at 19% (down from the 32% threatened in April 2025), with 0% on a defined list of products and a textile/apparel quota benchmarked to US-cotton/MMF inputs. Indonesia commits to remove export restrictions on all industrial commodities — explicitly including critical minerals across the full value chain — and to grant US investors national treatment in mineral exploration, mining, processing and export. Indonesia also agrees to eliminate tariff barriers on >99% of US-origin goods, while a Freeport-McMoRan MOU extends the Grasberg copper-mine licence (~USD 10bn/yr revenue, world's 2nd largest copper mine) and a parallel commercial package totalling ~USD 33bn (energy USD 15bn, aerospace incl. Boeing USD 13.5bn, agriculture USD 4.5bn) is signed alongside.

On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.

On 12 February 2026, Ambassador Jamieson Greer of the Office of the United States Trade Representative oversaw the signing of the US-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The instrument was signed under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO). Headline terms: (i) US IEEPA reciprocal-tariff rate on Taiwan reduced from 20% to 15% and Section 232 auto-parts/timber/lumber rate cut from 25% to 15%; (ii) Taiwan eliminates or reduces 99% of its tariff barriers on US goods, most immediately and the remainder phased over three years; (iii) Taiwan side commits ~USD 85bn in directed purchases through 2029 (USD 44.4bn LNG/crude, USD 15.2bn civil aircraft and engines, USD 25.2bn power equipment); (iv) sectoral chapters covering tariffs, non-tariff barriers, digital trade, economic security, and high-tech supply-chain resilience. Operationally linked to the 15 January 2026 AIT-TECRO Memorandum of Understanding on investment, under which Taiwan pledges USD 250bn in direct Taiwanese-enterprise investment in the US plus USD 250bn in Taiwan-government credit guarantees (USD 500bn total) to fund US-side industrial parks/clusters in advanced semiconductors, energy, and AI manufacturing. Entry into force is conditional on Taiwan's Legislative Yuan completing its review.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

On 9 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Bangladesh Adviser Sheikh Bashir Uddin signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) between the United States and Bangladesh in Washington DC — USTR's first ART signing in South Asia, preceding the US-India interim-trade-framework finalisation by three days. The deal locks the US reciprocal tariff on Bangladesh-originating goods at 19% (down from 35% under the April 2025 IEEPA regime) and establishes a zero-percent mechanism for products on the Annex III aligned- partner list (EO 14346, 5 September 2025). Bangladesh commits to significant preferential market access for US industrial and agricultural goods — including chemicals, machinery, motor vehicles, medical devices, ICT equipment, energy products, soy, dairy, beef, poultry, tree nuts, and fruit — and to eliminating specified non- tariff barriers including acceptance of US Federal motor-vehicle safety and emissions standards, FDA certificates, and prior marketing authorisations for medical devices and pharmaceuticals.

On 6 February 2026 South African Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Parks Tau and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao signed the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Prosperity (CAEPA) in Pretoria. The framework — non-binding by design — covers four pillars: trade, investment, new-energy, and multilateral cooperation. China commits to provide duty-free access to South African exports under a follow-on Early Harvest Agreement (EHA) scheduled for conclusion by the end of March 2026; a progressive reduction of the 10% Chinese MFN tariff on South African fruit is already underway with full duty-free treatment for fruit scheduled for 1 May 2026. The signing took place against the backdrop of US "reciprocal" tariff pressure on South African exports (30% threatened, ~30,000 jobs at risk) and AGOA preference uncertainty, positioning China as a counterweight market. CAEPA is the first China-Africa bilateral framework structured as a quasi-FTA precursor rather than a FOCAC-style aid/concessional package.

On 6 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Modi announced a framework for an Interim Trade Agreement that resets the bilateral tariff posture installed in 2025. Two operative instruments: (i) an executive order signed 6 February eliminating, effective 7 February 2026, the additional 25% IEEPA "Russian-oil" duty on Indian imports imposed by EO 14329 (27 August 2025), conditional on India's commitment to cease buying Russian crude and to expand defence cooperation; and (ii) reduction of the EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff rate on India from 25% to 18% on listed product categories (textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, plastics and rubber, organic chemicals, home décor, artisanal products, certain machinery), to take effect on finalisation of the Interim Agreement. India commits to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products (DDGs, red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine, spirits) and to purchase >USD 500bn of US energy, ICT, coal, aircraft and aircraft parts, and precious-metals products over five years. The framework also commits the parties to negotiating "robust, ambitious, and mutually beneficial digital trade rules" and to addressing non-tariff barriers in medical devices, ICT import licensing, and food/agricultural standards. US tariff reductions on Indian generic pharmaceuticals, gems, diamonds, aircraft parts, and certain automotive components are flagged as contingent on completion of the full Interim Agreement.

The United Kingdom and the United States signed a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals in Washington DC on 4 February 2026 at the 2026 US Critical Minerals Ministerial. The MOU commits both Participants to intensify cooperative efforts to accelerate the secure supply of critical minerals and rare earths for defence manufacturing and advanced technologies, mobilising government financial tools (guarantees, loans, equity investments, offtake arrangements, insurance) and streamlining permitting timelines. On the UK side, the Department for Business and Trade committed up to £50 million in new funding to support critical mineral projects following the 2025 Spending Review. The instrument also includes a commitment to cooperate on price-floor mechanisms — the first bilateral price-floor cooperation filing on the IPTM register — as part of a broader US-led plurilateral initiative to establish reference prices countering non-market overproduction.

On 4 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard announced a U.S.-Mexico Action Plan on Critical Minerals — a first-of-its-kind 60-day bilateral work programme to develop coordinated trade policies and supply-chain mechanisms for critical minerals. The Action Plan tasks both governments with identifying a priority mineral list, exploring border-adjusted price floors as a candidate trade instrument, and consulting on how price floors could be incorporated into a binding plurilateral agreement on trade in critical minerals. It is framed as a confidence- building measure ahead of the USMCA Joint Review (statutory deadline 1 July 2026) and as the Mexico-side template that parallels concurrent USTR engagements with the EU and Japan.

On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.

On 4 February 2026, in Washington, DC, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding on Securing Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths. The MoU was one of eleven founding-member bilateral instruments signed simultaneously at the inaugural FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) Critical Minerals Ministerial and supersedes the September 2024 Biden-era US-Uzbekistan critical-minerals MoU. On 18 February 2026, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and EXIM signed Heads of Terms with Uzbekistan's Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade and the Fund for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan establishing a Joint Investment Framework — including a proposed U.S.–Uzbekistan Joint Investment Holding Company — covering critical minerals (exploration, extraction, processing), infrastructure, and energy under a three-year Economic Cooperation Programme valued at up to USD 35bn.

The Canada Border Services Agency initiated an anti-dumping investigation (Case OCTG6 2026 IN) on 2 February 2026 into oil and gas well casing originating in or exported from Austria, following a complaint by Tenaris Canada. On 4 May 2026 the CBSA issued a preliminary determination finding a dumping margin of 22.6% of export price for Voestalpine Tubulars GmbH & Co KG, the sole named Austrian exporter, but declined to impose provisional duties, assessing that they were "not necessary to prevent injury." The case covers oil and gas well casing under 28 HS tariff classification codes (7304.29.00.12-.29 and 7306.29.00.12-.29). The Canadian International Trade Tribunal's parallel injury inquiry (NQ-2026-002) is due to conclude by 1 September 2026; only a positive injury finding triggers definitive duties.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber Executive Committee (GECEX/CAMEX) imposed a five-year definitive antidumping duty on imports of pre-painted flat-rolled carbon steel products (coated on one or both faces with paint or varnish, supplied in coils, rolls or sheets; commonly called "aço pré-pintado") originating in China and India, classified under NCM codes 7210.70.10, 7210.70.20 (width ≥600 mm) and 7212.40.10, 7212.40.21, 7212.40.29 (width <600 mm). The measure was adopted at the 233rd extraordinary GECEX meeting on 30 January 2026 chaired by MDIC Minister Geraldo Alckmin and entered into force upon publication in the Diário Oficial da União (Edição 22, Seção 1, Pág. 1) on 2 February 2026. This is the first definitive AD imposition of 2026 in Brazil's accelerating defensive posture against Chinese and Indian steel overcapacity in downstream processed categories.

The US Department of Commerce preliminarily determined that countervailable subsidies are being provided to Indian producers and exporters of oleoresin paprika (a spice-extract colorant/flavoring used in processed food, following a petition by domestic producer Rezolex, Ltd. Co.). Commerce set preliminary subsidy-rate cash-deposit requirements of 18.56% for Mane Kancor Ingredients Private Limited, 25.41% for Synthite Industries Pvt. Ltd, and 22.95% for all other Indian exporters, triggering suspension of liquidation on covered entries effective 2026-02-06. Commerce also made an affirmative critical-circumstances finding in part, allowing retroactive duty application. The investigation was initiated 2025-07-15; a final determination was originally scheduled for 2026-06-15, aligned with a companion antidumping investigation on the same product.

Malaysia replaced its four-decade-old Promotion of Investments Act (PIA) 1986 manufacturing-incentive regime with the New Incentive Framework (NIF), effective 1 March 2026. Applications under PIA 1986 closed at 15:00 MYT on 28 February 2026; post-March applications are evaluated under the outcome-based National Investment Aspirations (NIA) Scorecard across six economic-outcome pillars. Companies choose between two mutually exclusive incentive options — a special corporate tax rate or an investment tax allowance — aligned with the Global Minimum Tax environment. A services-sector phase is scheduled for Q2 2026.

Bangladesh's Ministry of Commerce issued the Import Policy Order 2025-2028 on 29 January 2026 following Council of Advisers approval chaired by Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus, replacing the prior Import Policy Order 2021-2024 and establishing a modernised three-year import-management framework under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950. The Order permits export-oriented industries — including ready-made garments, leather, footwear, shipbuilding, and furniture — to import essential raw materials at zero duty through the bonded-warehouse mechanism, mandates full e-customs adoption for all duty and tax collection, and introduces risk-based post-clearance audit protocols. It is explicitly designed as the trade-management vehicle for Bangladesh's LDC graduation (effective November 2026), aligning the import regime with WTO non-tariff- barrier obligations and preparing for the loss of GSP/EBA preferences.

The Council of the EU adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing adds 4 individuals and 6 entities to the EU asset freeze, bringing the total under this regime to 24 individuals and 26 entities. Newly listed entities include Fanavaran Sanat Ertebatat Company and front-company trader Sahara Thunder (UAV electronic components and guidance systems), and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Khojir Missile Development and Production, and procurement firm Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Co. (ballistic missile manufacturing and propellant-precursor procurement). All funds and economic resources of the listed parties are frozen within the EU, and EU persons/entities are barred from making funds available to them.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the "Special Act on Strengthening and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Semiconductor Industry" (반도체산업 경쟁력 강화 및 지원에 관한 특별법) on 29 January 2026 by 199 votes in favour out of 206 members present, after roughly 18 months of inter-party deadlock. The act establishes (i) a Presidential Commission for Enhancing Semiconductor Competitiveness as the central inter-ministerial coordination body, (ii) a statutory five-year master plan with annual implementation plans, (iii) a dedicated semiconductor industry special account ("반도체산업 특별회계") to ring-fence funding for fabs, materials, parts and equipment, and packaging across the full memory + system-LSI + design + manufacturing supply chain, and (iv) authority to designate semiconductor clusters outside the greater Seoul area with relocation incentives. Promulgation by the Cabinet is expected shortly after passage; effectiveness contingent on enforcement-ordinance finalisation, expected Q3 2026. The KRW 2tn anchor envelope of the special account does not begin disbursing until 2027 because companion amendments to the National Finance Act were not enacted in time.

On 27 January 2026 the European Union and India announced the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement at the EU-India summit hosted at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, attended by PM Narendra Modi, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President António Costa. The deal — described by both leaders as the "mother of all deals" — covers ~25% of world GDP and ~2 billion people. The EU eliminates duties on 91% of tariff lines (covering 99.3% of bilateral trade by value); India eliminates duties on 86% of lines (covering 96.6% by value). Headline cuts include Indian tariffs on EU wines (150% → 75% at entry into force, falling to 20%), olive oil (45% → 0% over five years) and processed agri-food (up to 50% eliminated); EU tariffs are reduced/eliminated on Indian textiles, leather/footwear, gems and jewelry, marine products, tea, coffee, spices and certain agricultural and steel products. The agreement still requires Council adoption, European Parliament consent and approval by India's Union Council of Ministers; entry into force is expected in early 2027. Companion instruments concluded at the same summit include an EU-India Security and Defence Partnership and a Mobility and Migration Agreement.

Regulation (EU) 2026/261 of the European Parliament and of the Council (adopted 26 January 2026, in force 3 February 2026) sets a legally binding stepwise ban on imports of Russian-origin natural gas — both liquefied (LNG) and pipeline. Russian LNG under short-term contracts signed before 17 June 2025 is prohibited from 25 April 2026; long-term LNG contracts from 1 January 2027. Russian pipeline gas under short-term contracts is prohibited from 17 June 2026; long-term pipeline gas from 30 September 2027 (latest 1 November 2027 if EU storage targets remain on track). The regulation operates outside the Russia-sanctions architecture (Article 215 TFEU) as a REPowerEU internal-market instrument, with narrow operational-amendment carve- outs and no provision for volume increases.

On 2026-01-26 the US Department of Commerce initiated antidumping (LTFV) and countervailing duty investigations covering van-type trailers and subassemblies thereof from Canada, China, and Mexico, following a petition filed 2025-11-20 by the American Trailer Manufacturers Coalition (Great Dane, Stoughton Trailers, Wabash National). On 2026-06-15 Commerce issued its preliminary affirmative LTFV determination for China, setting a preliminary antidumping duty rate of 130.76% on Chinese van-type trailer imports, effective on publication and triggering CBP duty collection at the border. Companion countervailing-duty and Canada/Mexico proceedings are tracked separately.

On 2026-01-26 the US Department of Commerce initiated countervailing duty (anti-subsidy) investigations covering van-type trailers and subassemblies thereof from Canada, China, and Mexico, companion to the antidumping investigation covering the same product and countries. On 2026-06-05 Commerce published preliminary affirmative CVD determinations: China received an 82.37% subsidy rate for CIMC Baowell Industries/Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer and all other exporters, and a 128.78% adverse-inference rate for non-responsive companies; Mexico received rates of 1.90-1.95% for cooperating respondents (Hyundai de Mexico, Utility Trailer Manufacturing de México) and a 62.67% adverse-inference rate for five non-responsive companies. The Canada CVD investigation was terminated on 2026-05-27 after the petitioner withdrew that portion of the petition. Cash deposits at the preliminary rates began on Federal Register publication; final CVD determinations are scheduled for 2026-08-24 (China) and 2026-10-13 (Mexico).

Dubai's Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched AED 12.8 billion (~USD 3.5bn) in strategic expansion projects for the Dubai Silicon Oasis free zone, comprising a AED 11 billion (~USD 3.0bn) "District IO" technology district and a AED 1.8 billion (~USD 0.49bn) Block 14 mixed-use development. District IO targets smart mobility, 3D printing, robotics, X-Tech, AI, quantum computing and Web3 firms via 25 LEED-compliant buildings, R&D labs and data centres, with capacity for 6,500+ companies and a stated goal of AED 103bn GDP contribution and 70,000+ jobs by 2036. Global Trade Alert classifies the intervention as a financial grant plus an in-kind grant to the free zone.

The US Department of Commerce published its final affirmative countervailing-duty (CVD) determination on animal feed-grade L-lysine from China (case C-570-216) on 23 July 2026, the companion subsidy proceeding to the parallel antidumping case (A-570-215) finalized the same day. Commerce found Heilongjiang Wanlirunda Biotechnology Co., Ltd. and Shouguang Golden-land Industry & Trading Co., Ltd. received countervailable subsidies at 82.11%, while Inner Mongolia Eppen Biotech Co., Ltd. and all other Chinese producers/exporters were assigned a 48.21% subsidy rate. The preliminary CVD determination, published 22 January 2026, set the initial cash-deposit rates and suspension of liquidation; the final determination confirmed and aligned the case with the AD final determination for a joint ITC injury vote.