Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The UK Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2025 (SI 2025/1197) entered into force on 16 December 2025, extending the UK's strategic export control regime to cover quantum computing hardware (ECCN-aligned 4A506), advanced and cryogenic semiconductor technologies (3A501, 3A504, 3B501), and associated software and technology categories. The regulations also transfer existing national controls on quantum and advanced semiconductor items from the Export Control Order 2008 into the UK's assimilated Dual-Use Regulation (retained EU 428/2009 as amended), harmonising the UK's dual-use schedule with Wassenaar Arrangement 2024 updates. The action is explicitly calibrated as "Wassenaar Minus One" — aligning UK controls with the US BIS (EAR / ECCN framework) and EU (Regulation 2021/821 as amended) without requiring multilateral consensus on each item. It is the first UK statutory instrument since Brexit to add substantial new technology-specific dual-use controls targeting advanced semiconductor and quantum capabilities.

On 20 November 2025 the White House and US Department of Commerce / Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorised Abu Dhabi AI holding company G42 to import advanced computing chips — equivalent to approximately 35,000 Nvidia GB300 Blackwell processors — under the UAE-pioneered Regulated Technology Environment (RTE) compliance framework. The RTE is an Emirati-designed technology governance and audit architecture, developed by G42 and approved under BIS guidelines, with binding UAE-side controls to prevent onward diversion to foreign adversary nations. The authorisation accelerates the Stargate UAE project — a 1 GW AI compute cluster being built by G42 for OpenAI in partnership with Oracle, Cisco, NVIDIA, and SoftBank Group — and represents the first concluded major country-level advanced-compute authorisation following the May 2025 rescission of the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) issued a pre-notice (17 November 2025, doc. 經授貿字第 11450120760號) proposing amendments to the "Dual-Use Goods and Technology Export Control List" and the "General Military Goods List" under the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) regime, adding or reclassifying items in the basic-inorganic-chemicals, chemical-products, and engines/turbines categories to align with Wassenaar Arrangement list updates. Following the standard 60-day public-comment period, MOEA-ITA published the finalised amendment on 11 February 2026 (doc. 經貿字第 11550200140號), effective immediately, requiring exporters of the newly listed dual-use and military goods to obtain prior export licences regardless of destination.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry amended the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add four technology categories to the prior-notification-of-transfer list under the Technology Management Scheme through Public-Private Dialogue (TMS-PPD): quantum-dot materials, TADF (thermally-activated delayed fluorescence) emissive materials, phase-difference film, and flexible endoscopes. Announced 11 November 2025, promulgated 19 November 2025, and effective 19 January 2026. This is the first list-control update produced by the TMS-PPD mechanism, which was established in December 2024 as an annual METI–industry review process for adding emerging-technology items to prior-notification controls outside the slower Wassenaar Arrangement / FEFTA catch-all channels.

Japan's Cabinet adopted a Cabinet Order on 11 November 2025 (promulgated 14 November 2025, effective 14 February 2026) amending Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add three new list-control item categories: (i) peptide synthesizers and related components (Item group mapping to Australia Group 2023–2024 plenary dual-use biotechnology controls, aligning Japan with the US BIS implementation promulgated December 2024), (ii) powders of refractory metals or their alloys below specified particle-size and purity thresholds — tungsten, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, and rhenium powders used as additive- manufacturing feedstocks (Item 5(20), implementing a Wassenaar Arrangement plenary outcome on metal-powder dual-use), and (iii) modules, assemblies, or devices incorporating field-programmable logic devices (FPGAs) above specified gate-count and process-node thresholds (Item 7(10-2), extending Japan's semiconductor-component AI-compute perimeter). This is the first discrete Appended Table 1 list-control amendment filed under the post-October-2025 FEFTA catch-all- controls overhaul architecture.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.

China's Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, General Administration of Customs, and State Administration for Market Regulation jointly issued Announcement No. 54 of 2025 on 26 September 2025, imposing export licence management on pure electric passenger vehicles (HS 8703801090, motor vehicles equipped solely with an electric drive motor and bearing a VIN), effective 1 January 2026. Only vehicle manufacturers and their authorised distributors may apply, and only for their own-brand output; eligibility criteria require Category I exporters to maintain more than 50 overseas after-sales service and maintenance outlets, a minimum 20% spare-parts inventory rate, and a maximum 48-hour maintenance response time in major export markets. The measure is framed by Beijing as shifting the NEV export sector "from scale expansion to quality first" and curbing non-compliant, low-accountability export practices.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations to remove three foreign-owned semiconductor fabs operating in China — Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) Ltd, Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd, and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd — from the Validated End-User (VEU) Authorizations list (15 CFR Part 748). BIS framed the VEU program as a "loophole" that previously allowed these fabs to receive most US-origin chipmaking equipment, software and technology license-free, a privilege no US-owned fab in China ever had. After the effective date, every restricted shipment to these fabs will require an individual export license, reviewed case-by-case under the existing 2022/2023 advanced- computing controls. The rule is published as Federal Register document 2025-16735 (90 FR 42321), Docket BIS-2025-0555, RIN 0694-AK32.

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) jointly issued Announcement No. 28 of 2025 on 15 July 2025, partially adjusting the "Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export" first published under Announcement No. 57 of 2023. The revision adds new restricted-export entries covering LFP/LMFP cathode electrode material preparation technology, lithium carbonate/lithium hydroxide preparation technology, and gallium processing technology, extending Beijing's export-control perimeter from raw critical minerals into upstream battery-material process technology. The same revision removed three unrelated entries (traditional Chinese architectural technology and building environment-control technology) from the prohibited/restricted lists. The catalogue took effect immediately upon publication and followed a January 2025 public-consultation draft.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to add 12 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (11) and Taiwan (1) via Final Rule 2025-05427 (90 FR 14046), companion to the larger 70-entity rule (2025-05426) published the same day. Targets fall in three clusters: (i) Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence and Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology — added for acquiring US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, specifically developing large AI models and advanced computing chips for defense; (ii) the Inspur group — Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information Industry, Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong), Inspur (HK) Electronics, Inspur Software, and Inspur Taiwan — added as subsidiaries contributing to supercomputers for military end use; and (iii) Henan Dingxin, Nettrix Information Industry, Suma Technology, and Suma-USI Electronics — added for involvement in the development of Chinese exascale supercomputers. License requirements are for all items subject to the EAR; review policy is presumption of denial for the AI cluster and policy of denial for the supercomputer clusters.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

On 16 January 2025 the US Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (90 FR 4598; FR Doc 2025-00723) creating new ECCN 3A069 for high-parameter flow cytometers and liquid chromatography mass spectrometers specially designed for top-down proteomics, plus new ECCN 3E069 for related development and production technology. Items previously controlled under the catch-all ECCN 3A999 are migrated into the dedicated 3A069 classification, which carries National Security (NS), Regional Stability (RS), and Anti-Terrorism (AT) controls. Licensing policy is presumption of denial for destinations in Country Group D:1 and D:5, Macau, and Country Group E (i.e. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Venezuela). The rule also adds new EEI/AES filing requirements (§ 758.1(b)(11)) for all 3A069 exports to Country Group D destinations. Public comments were accepted until 17 March 2025.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China). The rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India. BIS determined the added entities have been involved in, are involved in, or pose a significant risk of becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. License requirements apply to all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy. The rule was effective on publication, January 16, 2025. This action is the companion piece to the same-day 16-entity Sophgo-cluster addition (FR 2025-00480) — together totalling the "27 Chinese companies" referenced in trade-press coverage.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 8 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (2), China (2), and Russia (4), citing actions contrary to US foreign-policy interests, primarily enabling human-rights violations through aerial attacks on civilians (Burma), Uyghur surveillance (China), and facial-recognition targeting of protesters (Russia). All designated entities require licenses for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule was effective immediately on publication, December 11, 2024.

Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2897 of 18 November 2024 amends Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 (restrictive measures over Iran's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine and to armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea region). It replaces Annex II with an expanded list of goods and technology whose sale, supply or export to Iran is prohibited where they could enable UAV or missile production, across ten technology categories, and adds Article 2a, a prohibition on transactions with the ports listed in Annex IV (Amirabad and Anzali). It entered into force on publication in the Official Journal.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.

In a final rule published at 89 FR 84766 (FR Doc 2024-23932), the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove BIS licence requirements on certain spacecraft and related items — including remote-sensing spacecraft and on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) items — for exports and reexports to Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The rule is effective immediately on publication (23 October 2024) and is part of a three-rule package modernising the US space-related export-control regime (companion IFR 2024-23958 broadens controls relief for ~40 additional destinations; companion proposed rule 2024-23975 floats a new License Exception Commercial Space Activities). The AU/CA/UK carve-out builds on the trilateral National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) framework.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (89 FR 80064; FR doc 2024-22587) amending the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 748.15) to expand the Validated End User (VEU) program with a new "Data Center VEU Authorization" pathway. The rule lets BIS pre-authorize specified data-center operators in third countries to receive advanced computing integrated circuits (ECCNs 3A090, 4A090 and related) and related technology without individual export licenses, conditional on vetted security plans, end-use monitoring, and reporting. Country Group D:5 destinations — China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba and 17 other arms-embargoed states — are categorically excluded. Eligible destinations include Egypt, Laos, Moldova, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the UAE — extending the US chip-equipment perimeter into a managed trusted-data-center channel for Gulf, MENA, and Central Asian AI build-out.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2024-08813) on April 30, 2024 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure export controls on firearms, ammunition, parts, accessories, and related technology and software (EAR Categories 0 and 1). The rule created new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for semi-automatic firearms, added Crime Control / Detection (CC) license requirements, narrowed license-exception eligibility, introduced a presumption of denial for many non-government end-users, and imposed a default 1-year license validity for semi-automatic firearms. Effective May 30, 2024; later rescinded (except for the new ECCNs) by FR Doc 2025-18992 on September 30, 2025.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

Ministerial order signed by the French Minister of Economy on 2 February 2024 and published in JORF n°0034 of 10 February 2024 establishing France's first national export-control list under Article 9 of EU Regulation 2021/821 on dual-use goods. The arrêté requires prior authorisation for exports to non-EU third countries of (i) quantum computers and their enabling technologies (qubit devices, control systems, measurement equipment) and (ii) equipment for the design, development, production, test and inspection of advanced electronic components, plus associated software and technology. The annex was substantively replaced by the Arrêté du 27 mars 2025 (explicit technical thresholds including ≥34-qubit systems with C-NOT error ≤10⁻⁴, HBM 6000+ processing performance, cryogenic cooling, dry-etch and EUV-mask tooling, and Si-28/Si-30/Ge isotopically-controlled materials) and is repealed by the Arrêté du 10 mars 2026 with entry into force 11 May 2026.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (88 FR 46071, Doc 2023-15343) adding four entities to the Entity List effective July 18, 2023. Intellexa S.A. (Greece) and Intellexa Limited (Ireland) — the corporate architecture behind the "Predator" commercial spyware platform — and Cytrox Holdings Zrt. (Hungary) and Cytrox AD (North Macedonia) — the developer of the underlying spyware technology — were listed for "trafficking in cyber exploits used to gain access to information systems, thereby threatening the privacy and security of individuals and organizations worldwide." All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for all four entities, effectively cutting off access to US-origin hardware, software, and technology.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 19 May 2023 strengthening existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The rule expands the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule — which applies EAR jurisdiction to foreign-made items produced with US technology or equipment — to cover the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. It also revises controls targeting Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, closing loopholes identified in prior rounds of Russia-Ukraine-related export-control rulemaking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) established a new Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and created Supplement No. 7 to Part 746 of the EAR, effective 24 February 2023, to address Iran's supply of UAVs to Russia for use against Ukraine. The rule adds twelve HTS-6 codes covering UAV-relevant components — aircraft engines, processors, capacitors, memories, and radio navigation equipment — many of which are EAR99 items outside existing ECCNs, requiring a new licence for exports and reexports to Iran. Simultaneously, the rule expands the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover these same items, closing a gap where foreign-produced items derived from US technology could transit to Russia via Iran without triggering EAR licence requirements.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/66, adopted 21 October 2022 and published in the Official Journal on 11 January 2023 (OJ L 9), replaces Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation) with an updated control list implementing the 2022 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Per GTA's tracking of the CN-code-level change, the update removed 7 six-digit CN codes and added 8 new ones. It entered into force on 12 January 2023, the day after publication.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 15 September 2022, adding new export-control categories covering quantum computing equipment and related technology (new licensing requirements under a near-total policy of denial), discrete chemicals and biologics including fentanyl precursors and CBW-related production equipment (new Supplement No. 6 to Part 746), and 57 EAR99 industrial items added to the industry-sector sanctions list (Supplement No. 4). Six entities were concurrently designated as Russian Military End Users (MEU), and MEU/MIEU licensing restrictions were extended worldwide (previously limited to six countries). The rule also extended the Foreign Direct Product Rule to additional categories of foreign-made items.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese entities — under seven entries — to the Entity List, effective August 24, 2022, for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization efforts. The entities span China's state-owned aerospace, space-technology, electronics, and control-systems research institutes. All seven entries carry a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement four emerging and foundational technology decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, pursuant to ECRA Section 1758. The rule adds new export controls on ultra-wide bandgap semiconductor substrates (gallium oxide Ga₂O₃ and diamond), ECAD software for Gate-All- Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) integrated circuit development, and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology for advanced gas turbine engines. Controls require a licence for items destined to countries listed in the NS:1 and AT:1 columns of the Commerce Country Chart; ECAD software controls (ECCN 3D006) have a delayed compliance date of October 14, 2022.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List, effective June 28, 2022. The entities — located across China, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the UAE, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — were designated for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Key grounds include support for China's military modernization and AI-enabled surveillance programs, Pakistan-based proliferation concerns, and supply-chain facilitation for Russia amid the Ukraine invasion. The rule also revised eleven existing entries (Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia) and corrected one entry (Pakistan).

BIS finalized changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing controls on cybersecurity items — primarily intrusion software, command-and-control platforms, and surveillance tools capable of disrupting or monitoring information systems without authorization. The final rule, effective May 26 2022, revises License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports) originally established by an October 2021 interim rule and narrows end-user carve-outs for government end users in Country Group D:5 and A:6 destinations. Exports of affected ECCNs (4A005, 4D001, 4D004, 4E001, 5A001.j, 5B001, 5D001, 5E001) to Country Groups E:1 and E:2 remain prohibited; D:1 through D:5 government-end-user transactions require a license.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 120 entities under 120 entries to the Entity List, effective 1 April 2022 and published in the Federal Register on 7 April 2022. All 120 entities — located in Russia and Belarus — were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests in the context of Russia's further invasion of Ukraine beginning 24 February 2022. The rule imposes a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items and prohibits all license exceptions for exports, reexports, or in-country transfers to the listed parties. Ninety-five of the 120 entities are additionally designated under Footnote 3 of the Entity List as military end users, triggering the Russian/Belarusian Military End User foreign-produced direct product rule (MEU FDP Rule), extending US extraterritorial reach to non-US items made with US-origin technology.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.

Effective 2 March 2022, the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) extended to Belarus the same sweeping EAR sanctions imposed on Russia following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The rule adds Commerce Control List (CCL)-based license requirements for Belarus with a policy of denial across virtually all categories, extends both the Russia Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and the Russia Military End User (MEU) FDP rule to cover Belarus and Belarusian military end users, and aligns Belarus with Russia's license review policy. The action was triggered by Belarus's active enablement of the Russian military operation from its territory.