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Guyana's National Assembly passed Act No. 18 of 2021 on 29 December 2021; it received presidential assent and was published in the Extraordinary Official Gazette on 31 December 2021. The Act establishes mandatory local-content obligations for all operators, contractors, and subcontractors engaged in petroleum operations in Guyana, defining a "Guyanese company" (≥51% Guyanese-owned, ≥75% Guyanese senior management, ≥90% other staff) and reserving 40 First Schedule categories of goods and services exclusively for Guyanese nationals and companies. All entities in the petroleum value chain must register with the Local Content Secretariat and submit annual local-content plans and compliance reports to the Minister of Natural Resources.

On 27 December 2021 the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted Law No. 86-VII ZRK "On Industrial Policy" (Закон Республики Казахстан "О промышленной политике"), the horizontal framework statute that defines and governs the full toolkit of state-support instruments available to industrial entities — subsidies, in-kind grants, special economic zone (SEZ) regimes, industrial zone regimes, offtake guarantees, public-procurement preferences, long-term tariff agreements, and the "single card of industrialization" monitoring framework. The law replaced the earlier 2014 industrial-and-innovative-development statute and consolidated previously dispersed authority for the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development (now Ministry of Industry and Construction) as the policy owner, with the Bank for Development of Kazakhstan (BDK / DBK) as the principal industrial- finance vehicle and Samruk-Kazyna and Tau-Ken Samruk as the state-equity vehicles. It is the enabling parent instrument under which all downstream Kazakh industrial-policy programmes (the 2023-12-28 REE Comprehensive Plan, the 2025-12-26 Subsoil Code amendments, the 18 October 2024 Investment Policy Concept until 2029, and the SEZ / industrial-zone regimes hosting Western FDI) operate. The statute has been amended eleven times between July 2022 and September 2025, including by Law 86-VIII ZRK of 21 May 2024 which revised Article 24 (state-support measures).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 37 entities under 40 entries to the Entity List, effective December 17, 2021. The additions span three distinct threat rationales: (1) support for Chinese military modernization across semiconductors, submarine cables, armored vehicles, and defense electronics; (2) the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 affiliated institutes pursuing biotechnology processes for military end uses, including purported brain-control weaponry under EAR §744.11(b); and (3) a cross-border Iran sanctions-evasion network operating across China, Georgia, Malaysia, and Turkey that diverted US-origin items to Iran's defense industries and advanced conventional weapons programs. All 40 entries carry a presumption-of-denial licensing policy for all items subject to the EAR, with no license exceptions available.

The Union Cabinet approved the Semicon India Programme on 15 December 2021, establishing the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) as the nodal agency. The programme offers fiscal support of up to 50% of project cost for silicon semiconductor fabs, compound semiconductor facilities, display fabs, ATMP/OSAT units, and chip design. Total outlay: Rs 76,000 crore (approximately $10.2bn at 2021 exchange rates). By February 2024, the Cabinet had approved three major semiconductor units under ISM: Tata Electronics with PSMC (semiconductor fab, Dholera, Rs 91,526 crore), Tata Electronics OSAT (Morigaon, Assam, Rs 27,120 crore), and CG Power OSAT (Rs 7,584 crore), totalling over Rs 1.26 lakh crore in committed investment from private applicants.

In December 2021 Sinomine Resource Group (SHA:002738), a Chinese specialty mining company, agreed to acquire the Bikita lithium mine in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe, from Bikita Minerals (Pvt) Ltd for USD 180 million. The acquisition was completed in January 2022. Sinomine subsequently committed an additional USD 300 million to expand operations and construct a spodumene concentrate processing plant on-site. Bikita is one of Zimbabwe's largest and oldest lithium operations, with significant spodumene (hard rock) lithium mineralisation. Under Sinomine's ownership it became the most significant lithium producer in Zimbabwe, with concentrate output feeding Chinese battery-grade lithium hydroxide refineries. Zimbabwe holds one of Africa's largest lithium reserves, and the Bikita acquisition was the first of several Chinese acquisitions of Zimbabwean lithium assets in 2021-2023. The acquisition followed Zimbabwe's 2019 ban on raw lithium ore exports (requiring in-country beneficiation) — a policy that created a competitive moat for investors willing to build processing capacity on-site, which Chinese companies with integrated battery supply-chain incentives were better positioned to fund than Western juniors. Sinomine's acquisition was part of a broader Chinese consolidation of Zimbabwean lithium: Huayou Cobalt, Chengxin Lithium, and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt each acquired significant stakes in other Zimbabwean lithium projects over the same period, creating a near-monopoly on Zimbabwe's emerging lithium sector.

China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2022 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会〔2021〕18号) on 13 December 2021, effective 1 January 2022. Within the bundled annual schedule, the commission cancelled the 20% provisional preferential export tariff on ferrochrome (HS 72024100/72024900) that had applied since May 2021, reverting it to the standard 40% export rate — a doubling. Ferrosilicon (HS 72022100/72022900) continued at the 25% rate it had already moved to when its own preferential rate was cancelled in May 2021. Both are framed as measures to restrain export of energy- and emissions-intensive primary ferroalloy products and preserve domestic steelmaking input supply.

In a final rule effective December 9, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-26633), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add Cambodia to Country Group D:5 (US arms-embargoed destinations), consistent with a simultaneous Department of State final rule adding Cambodia to ITAR §126.1. The rule also subjects Cambodia to military end-use (MEU) controls under EAR §744.21 and military-intelligence end-use/end-user (MIEU) controls under EAR §744.22. The stated rationale was deepening Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base, growing corruption, and human-rights abuses by the Cambodian government.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

On November 4, 2021, BIS added four entities to the Entity List under a policy of denial: NSO Group and Candiru (Israel), Positive Technologies (Russia), and Computer Security Initiative Consultancy PTE (Singapore). NSO Group and Candiru were designated for supplying commercial spyware to foreign governments used to maliciously surveil government officials, journalists, activists, and academics; Positive Technologies and CSIC for trafficking cyber tools enabling unauthorized access to information systems. All four entities now require BIS licenses for any export, re-export, or in-country transfer of EAR-controlled items, with a presumption of denial.

The Bahraini Council of Ministers, chaired by HRH Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and issued pursuant to directives of HM King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, launched the five-pillar Economic Recovery Plan on 31 October 2021 as the government's post-COVID-19 structural-adjustment and growth framework through 2024–2030. The plan catalyses a USD 30 billion strategic-projects pipeline, delivers six new priority-sector strategies (oil and gas, tourism, logistics, financial services, telecommunications/ICT, manufacturing), targets 20,000 new Bahraini jobs and 10,000 annual training slots, and mandates fiscal balance by 2024 including the doubling of VAT from 5% to 10% effective 1 January 2022 under Royal Decree 33/2021. It is the foundational parent framework for all subsequent Bahraini sectoral decrees and investment decisions through 2030, and is materially relevant to the global non-Chinese aluminium supply chain through Aluminium Bahrain (Alba), one of the world's largest non-Chinese primary aluminium smelters at approximately 1.5 million tonnes per annum.

BIS published an interim final rule on October 21, 2021 establishing new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs 4A005, 4D004, 4E001.c, and 5A001.j) for intrusion software systems, command-and-control platforms, and IP network surveillance tools, implementing the Wassenaar Arrangement 2017 cybersecurity decisions into the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule simultaneously created License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports), codified at § 740.22, to authorize exports to most destinations while imposing licence requirements — or outright prohibitions — for sales to Country Groups E:1/E:2 governments and certain D-group government end-users. Carve-outs for vulnerability disclosure and cyber-incident-response activities were included to protect legitimate security research. The effective date was subsequently delayed from January 19, 2022 to March 7, 2022 by a separate interim rule (FR 2022-00448), and the rule was finalized with revisions on May 26, 2022 (FR 2022-11282).

Turkey's Ministry of Trade amended the İhracı Kayda Bağlı Mallara İlişkin Tebliğ (İhracat: 2006/7) via two communiqués — Tebliğ İhracat 2021/8 (fertilizers, GTİP 3101–3105) and İhracat 2021/9 (sulphuric acid/oleum, GTİP 2807.00, and pure ammonia, GTİP 2814.10) — published in Official Gazette No. 31630 of 16 October 2021. The measure places these goods on the "goods whose export is subject to registration" list: exporters must register each shipment with the Istanbul Minerals and Metals Exporters' Association (İMMİB) before customs clearance, a monitoring/prioritisation gate intended to secure domestic fertilizer supply rather than an outright ban. Global Trade Alert logs the measure under its "export ban" category; the primary text is a registration requirement, not a prohibition, and this filing follows the primary text.

France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.

On 5 October 2021, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, jointly with the Ministry of Finance, MEXT and MLIT, published amendments to the Regulatory Notices under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) adding two new categories to the "Core Business Sectors" subject to mandatory prior-notification FDI screening: metal mining (including mineral exploration vessels and land/underwater survey activity) and manufacturing, repair/maintenance or software for equipment used in metal mining (exploration vessels, marine equipment, excavators, drilling machines). The stated purpose is to secure the stable supply of critical mineral resources including rare earths. The amendment took effect 4 November 2021 after a 30-day transitional period; any inward direct investment of 1% or more in a covered business now requires case-by-case government pre-approval.

The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.

The Union Cabinet approved the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for Specialty Steel on 22 July 2021; the scheme was notified in the Gazette of India on 29 July 2021 by the Ministry of Steel and detailed scheme guidelines were published on 20 October 2021. Total outlay: Rs 6,322 crore (~USD 850m) over five years (FY 2024-25 through FY 2028-29). The scheme covers five product categories (coated/plated products, high-strength / wear-resistant steel, specialty rails, alloy steel and steel wires, and electrical steel) across 19 sub-categories, and offers incentives of 4-12% on incremental sales for end-to-end domestic specialty-steel production with melted-and-poured input requirement. PLI 1.1 reopened applications on 6 January 2025; PLI 1.2 (third round) was launched in 2025-2026 with a revised four-category / 22-sub-category structure and incentive rates up to 15%.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding six Russian technology entities to the Entity List, all designated consistent with Executive Order 14024 on blocking property associated with harmful foreign activities of the Russian government. The designated entities operate in Russia's technology sector and have been determined to support Russian intelligence services, including notable cybersecurity firms and defense-innovation institutions. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence for export, reexport, or transfer to these parties, subject to a presumption-of-denial review policy with no licence exceptions available. The rule also corrects an existing FSB entry to reference updated General Licence No. 1B.

Germany's Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz (LkSG), promulgated 16 July 2021 (BGBl. I 2021 S. 2959), requires German-headquartered companies to conduct mandatory human-rights and environmental due diligence across their own operations and direct suppliers (with cause-based obligations extending to indirect suppliers). Enforced by BAFA with administrative fines up to EUR 8 million or 2% of global annual turnover for firms with revenue ≥ EUR 400 million. The act applies to ~3,000 German corporates from 1 January 2023 (≥3,000 employees) and was extended to ~5,000 firms from 1 January 2024 (≥1,000 employees). A September 2025 cabinet amendment removed the annual-reporting obligation and narrowed sanctionable omissions to serious violations.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four Burma-based entities to the Entity List effective July 6, 2021 under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), citing their support for the Myanmar State Administration Council (SAC) military that seized power on February 1, 2021. The listing covers King Royal Technologies Co., Ltd. (satellite communications services for the Burmese military) and three Wanbao-affiliated copper mining companies (Myanmar Wanbao Mining Copper Ltd., Myanmar Yang Tse Copper Ltd., and Wanbao Mining Ltd.) that maintain revenue-sharing arrangements with Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), a military conglomerate that funds Burma's Ministry of Defence. All four entities face a presumption-of-denial license policy with no exceptions permitted for any items subject to the EAR.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added five Xinjiang-based entities to the Entity List on June 24, 2021, citing their roles in human rights violations and forced labor against Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Muslim minority populations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The five entities — four major polysilicon and silicon producers plus the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) paramilitary body — are subject to a presumption-of- denial licensing policy for most items. Together the four polysilicon companies supplied a significant fraction of global polysilicon feedstock used in solar panel manufacturing.

The Law of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions was adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th NPC on 10 June 2021 (Presidential Order No. 90, President Xi Jinping) and entered into force on the same day. Comprising 16 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework for China's countermeasure regime against foreign states or organisations that "violate international law and basic norms of international relations" by imposing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese citizens and organisations — the parent authority under which every China countermeasure-list, Unreliable Entity List, blocking-statute, and supply-chain-security instrument in the IPTM register operates. Article 6 enumerates the countermeasure toolbox (visa denial, asset freezes, transaction prohibitions, and "other necessary measures"); Article 12 is the blocking-statute provision that prohibits PRC persons from implementing foreign discriminatory measures — first operationalised in May 2026 against five US-sanctions-compliant refineries.

The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

The Union Cabinet on 12 May 2021 approved the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme "National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) Battery Storage" with a Rs 18,100 crore (~USD 2.4 bn) outlay over five years to build 50 GWh of ACC and 5 GWh of "Niche" ACC manufacturing capacity in India. Selected bidders receive PLI cash incentives over five years on sale of cells made in India, gated on minimum 25% domestic value addition rising to 60% by year five and chemistry-agnostic eligibility (Li-ion, Na-ion, solid-state, flow, lead-acid). The MHI awarded the first 50 GWh tranche on 24 March 2022 (Hyundai Global Motors 20 GWh, Ola Electric 20 GWh, Reliance New Energy Solar 5 GWh, Rajesh Exports 5 GWh) under a QCBS global tender; the Hyundai Global Motors award was withdrawn after Hyundai Motor Company disowned the bidder in August 2022, triggering a re-tender of the orphaned capacity that completed in 2025.

Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.

Sri Lanka's Imports and Exports (Control) Regulations No. 07 of 2021, published as Gazette Extraordinary No. 2226/48 on 6 May 2021, banned the import of mineral and chemical fertilisers and placed agrochemicals (pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, rodenticides and plant-growth regulators) under a Special Import Licence requirement, applying to shipments with bills of lading issued on or after 6 May 2021. The measure operationalised the government's declared policy of converting Sri Lanka to fully organic agriculture. Facing a sharp drop in crop yields and food insecurity, the government repealed the restrictions from 30 November 2021.

Government Resolution No. 172 of 30 April 2021 approved the State Program for the Development of the Geological Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2030, directing the Main Directorate of Geology (GST.TJ) to expand exploration and reserve quantification across the Pamir, Tian Shan, and Kuraminsky belts covering 28 priority critical and strategic minerals. The programme targets a US$2.6 billion investment envelope across 76 sectoral projects in the 2025–2028 implementation tranche, with an explicit mandate to develop domestic processing and refining capacity for lithium, tungsten, nickel, and antimony. Tajikistan holds an estimated 50% of Asian antimony reserves and the Rasht Valley niobium-tantalum belt (major discoveries confirmed by the Tajik Geological Survey in July 2025), making this programme the foundational state instrument for all subsequent TJ critical-minerals FDI inflows and bilateral minerals diplomacy.

The German Federal Government adopted the 17th amendment to the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV, Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance), published 30 April 2021 and entering into force 1 May 2021, aligning Germany's FDI screening regime with EU Regulation 2019/452. The amendment adds 16 further sectors to the sector-specific mandatory-notification regime, on top of the 11 already covered, bringing the total to 27 -- including AI, robotics, autonomous vehicles/drones, semiconductors, quantum technology, satellite systems, cybersecurity, and critical raw materials. Filing thresholds are voting-rights acquisitions of 10% or more by a non-EU/EFTA investor in the newly added sectors, with subsequent review triggers at 20%, 25%, 40%, 50% and 75%.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese supercomputing entities to the Entity List, imposing a license requirement covering all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) with a presumption of denial. The entities were designated for procuring and building supercomputers used by China's military actors, supporting China's military modernization, and aiding the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hypersonic weapons programs. This was the Biden administration's first Entity List action targeting China's supercomputing sector.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on April 9, 2021 to extend military-intelligence end-use and end-user controls to Burma (Myanmar) and to apply U.S.-person activity prohibitions to Burma's military-intelligence entities — specifically the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) and the Directorate of Signal. The rule also corrected technical errors introduced by BIS's January 15, 2021 interim final rule (FR Doc 2021-01879), which had originally established the military-intelligence end-use and end-user control framework covering China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The addition of Burma responded directly to the February 1, 2021 SAC military coup and the Burmese military's use of surveillance technology to oppress civil society, restrict internet access, and imprison protesters.

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade issued Regulation (Permendag) No. 18 of 2021 on 1 April 2021, establishing an omnibus schedule of goods prohibited from export and goods prohibited from import. Global Trade Alert logs the measure as bundling an export ban and an import ban that took effect 19 November 2021, with tracked coverage spanning precious and semi-precious stones/metals, jewellery and related articles, and fertilizers/pesticides. The regulation consolidated and repealed several prior prohibited- goods instruments. It was later superseded by Permendag No. 47 of 2025.

On 24 March 2021, Canada's Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (François-Philippe Champagne) issued updated guidelines on the National Security Review of Investments under the Investment Canada Act. The revised guidelines (superseding 2016 guidance) identify four areas of heightened national-security concern in foreign direct investment review: sensitive personal data, sensitive technology, critical minerals, and investments by state-owned or state-influenced investors. The critical- minerals designation references the 31-mineral Critical Minerals List Canada had announced two weeks earlier (11 March 2021).

On 22 March 2021, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched Operation 300bn at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi — a 10-year national industrial strategy delivered by the newly created Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology (MoIAT, established July 2020). The strategy targets raising the industrial sector's annual GDP contribution from AED 133bn (~USD 36bn) to AED 300bn (~USD 82bn) by 2031, lifting R&D spend from AED 21bn to AED 57bn (1.3% → 2% of GDP), and supporting more than 13,500 industrial SMEs through an AED 30bn (~USD 8.2bn) Emirates Development Bank (EDB) financing portfolio. Eleven priority sub-sectors are organised into three baskets: Stimulating Growth (food/beverage, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment), Advanced Manufacturing (petrochemicals, rubber/plastics, machinery), and Industries of the Future (hydrogen, medical technology, space technology).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added four entities to the Entity List effective March 8, 2021 as the first BIS Export Administration Regulations (EAR) response to the February 1, 2021 Burmese military coup. The four listed entities are Burma's Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) — the two ministries responsible for the coup and the two military-owned commercial conglomerates that generate revenue for the Ministry of Defence. All four entities face a presumption-of-denial license review policy covering all items subject to the EAR, with no license exceptions available.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security added 14 entities across Russia, Germany, and Switzerland to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, effective March 4, 2021. Ten Russian entities — including the 27th Scientific Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense (associated with Russia's chemical weapons activities) and nine members of the Chimmed Group distribution network (Chimmed Group, Femteco, Interlab, LabInvest, OOO Analit Products, OOO Intertech Instruments, Pharmcontract GC, Rau Farm, Regionsnab) — were listed for proliferation activities supporting Russia's WMD programs. Three German entities (Chimconnect GmbH, Pharmcontract GmbH, Riol-Chemie) and one Swiss entity (Chimconnect AG) were simultaneously listed as foreign-front nodes in the same procurement network. A license is required for all EAR-subject items; no license exceptions apply. The rule also corrects six pre-existing entries (one Germany, five China).

The Biden administration on 2 March 2021 determined, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act), that Russia used a Novichok-class nerve agent against opposition figure Alexei Navalny in August 2020 — the third CBW Act invocation against Russia (after Salisbury 2018 and its follow-on 2019 round). The determination triggered mandatory statutory sanctions including termination of US foreign assistance to Russia (except humanitarian aid and food/agricultural commodities), suspension of US arms and defense-article sales and export authorisations to Russia, and denial of US government credit and financial assistance. Seven Russian government officials linked to the poisoning were concurrently designated by Treasury/OFAC. The measures take effect after a mandatory 15-day congressional notification period and remain in force for at least 12 months unless Russia certifies Chemical Weapons Convention compliance and takes other required steps.

On 1 February 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a USD 30.4 million Defense Production Act Title III technology investment agreement with Lynas USA LLC, the U.S. subsidiary of Australia's Lynas Rare Earths Ltd, to establish domestic light rare earth element (LREE) separation capacity in Hondo, Texas. DOD framed the award as reducing reliance on China for rare earth oxides used in defense and commercial applications; the department projected that, if the Texas facility and Lynas's Malaysian operations are completed as planned, Lynas would supply roughly 25% of world rare earth oxide demand outside China.

Czech Republic's foundational horizontal FDI screening statute. Zákon č. 34/2021 Sb., o prověřování zahraničních investic — adopted by Parliament in January 2021, published in Sbírka zákonů on 29 January 2021, and entered into force on 1 May 2021 — transposes the cooperation obligations of EU Regulation 2019/452 and creates the first cross-sector pre-clearance regime for non-EU investments into Czech firms. The Act is administered by the Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu (MPO) and combines (i) a mandatory ex-ante consent regime for non-EU investments acquiring ≥10% in companies producing military material, selected dual-use goods, or operating critical / critical-information infrastructure, with (ii) a discretionary ex-officio review available up to 5 years post-closing for any other "public-order or internal-security" sensitive investment. The Government decides on MPO's recommendation; remedies include conditions, prohibition, and forced divestment, with fines up to 1% of the global net turnover of the foreign investor.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC) to the Entity List on the basis of its involvement in the PRC's unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea and efforts to intimidate and coerce other South China Sea coastal states. In the same rule, Beijing Skyrizon Aviation Industry Investment Co., Ltd. was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List, while two Russian entities (Vsmpo-Avisma and Molot Oruzhie) were removed from the MEU List as duplicate entries. The rule took effect January 14, 2021, one day before publication in the Federal Register.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule on January 15, 2021 substantially expanding the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 744 end-use and end-user control framework to cover military-intelligence entities in China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The rule created a new license requirement for exports of ANY EAR-subject item to named military-intelligence end-users — including EAR99-classified items — and separately imposed restrictions on U.S. persons worldwide providing "support" to military-intelligence end-uses or end-users without a BIS licence. It also broadened chemical and biological weapons controls from "will directly assist" to "will support," expanding the reach of §744.4 and §744.3 on WMD-delivery systems. A technical correction published March 17, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-05623) fixed a drafting error in Instruction 9 that would have inadvertently deleted §744.3(a)(3)(i)-(ii), the rocket systems and UAV provisions.

The US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published abbreviated Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations at 31 CFR Part 585, codifying the sanctions framework established by Executive Order 13936 of July 14, 2020 ("The President's Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization"). The regulations prohibit all transactions with persons designated under EO 13936 — those determined to have undermined Hong Kong's autonomy or contributed to the erosion of freedoms guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration — and add designated persons to the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. OFAC published the rules in abbreviated form for immediate public guidance, with intent to supplement with full interpretive guidance, general licenses, and licensing policy.