Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The Office of the United States Trade Representative released the 2026 Special 301 Report on 30 April 2026, designating Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) — the most severe category under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2242). This is the first PFC designation since Ukraine held the status from 2013 through 2015, a gap of approximately 11 years. The PFC designation triggers a statutory 30-day window (expiring ~30 May 2026) within which USTR must decide whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A), which could lead to tariffs, withdrawal of trade benefits, or other Section 301 enforcement remedies against Vietnam. Separately, the EU was added to the Watch List for the first time, citing AI training-data, geographical-indications, and customs-enforcement concerns.

The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative antidumping duty (AD) determinations on April 23, 2026 (Federal Register publication April 28, 2026), finding that crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos are being sold in the US at less than fair value. Preliminary dumping margins are 123.04% for India, 35.17% for Indonesia, and 22.46% for Laos, with Commerce ordering US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting AD cash deposits at those rates (107.77% adjusted cash-deposit rate for India; 22.06% for Laos). This runs parallel to, and stacks on top of, the CVD case on the same merchandise and countries (see responds_to), meaning combined AD+CVD cash-deposit burdens on subject imports now exceed 100% for all three origins. Final AD determinations are due July 13, 2026 (India, Indonesia) and September 9, 2026 (Laos).

On 13 April 2026 the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement, in trilogue with the Commission, on the new EU steel safeguard regulation that will replace the existing WTO-safeguard-based measure (Regulation (EU) 2019/159, last tightened by Implementing Regulation 2025/612) expiring on 30 June 2026. The agreement adopts the core architecture of the Commission's October 2025 proposal (procedure 2025/0726(COD)): an overall duty-free tariff-rate quota of approximately 18.3 million tonnes per year — a roughly 47% reduction versus the 2024 safeguard quotas — covering 30 product categories, with the out-of-quota customs duty raised from 25% to 50%. The deal also introduces a mandatory "country of melt and pour" declaratory requirement on steel imports and obliges the Commission to assess, within two years, whether the country of melt-and-pour should become the basis for country-specific TRQ allocations (closing transhipment loopholes that have allowed Chinese-melted steel to enter via third-country processors). The co-legislators added a reinforced and time-bound review mechanism: a first Commission review of product scope within six months of entry into force, with subsequent biennial scope reviews thereafter. Statutorily, this is a NEW instrument — a regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, not an implementing act under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards / Regulation (EU) 2015/478 — so it is filed as a new action with a `responds_to` link to the predecessor regime. Formal adoption by Council and EP plenary is expected in May 2026 ahead of the 1 July 2026 application date.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 834 on 31 March 2026 promulgating the "Provisions on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security" (18 articles), adopted at the State Council executive meeting on 13 March 2026 and effective on the date of publication. The Provisions are the first dedicated PRC administrative regulation on industrial- and supply-chain security and consolidate authorities drawn from the National Security Law, Foreign Relations Law, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and Foreign Trade Law into a horizontal defensive framework. They establish a cross-agency coordination mechanism spanning roughly 15 central departments (industrial, security, cyberspace, customs and financial regulators) plus provincial governments; create a security-investigation system; and vest broad countermeasure authority over both foreign states (Article 14 — import/export prohibitions and special levies) and foreign organisations and individuals (Article 15 — import/export bans, China-investment bars, transaction prohibitions, entry bars and revocation of work or residence permits, with extension to effectively-controlled subsidiaries). The Provisions also impose compliance, information-sharing, strategic-reserve and emergency-response obligations on PRC organisations and individuals, and authorise requisition, mandated production and directed transportation in the event of supply-chain disruption.

The UK Finance Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026, establishes the primary statutory framework for the United Kingdom Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (UK CBAM), granting HM Revenue & Customs the assessment, collection, and enforcement powers needed to apply a carbon-content levy on imports of aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, and iron & steel from 1 January 2027. Two tranches of draft secondary legislation (the CBAM Regulations 2026 covering administration, rate calculation/carbon-price relief, emissions and verification, and transitory provisions) were published for technical consultation on 10 February 2026 (closing 24 March 2026) and again in Spring 2026 (closing 21 May 2026). The mechanism imposes a UK ETS-linked benchmark price on the embedded carbon of in-scope imports, with a credit for verified third-country carbon prices already paid, and — unlike the EU CBAM — has no transitional reporting phase and a narrower initial sectoral scope (no electricity).

Turkish President Erdoğan signed Presidential Decision No. 11068 on 16 March 2026, published in the Resmî Gazete on 17 March 2026, establishing a mandatory pre-clearance regime for the transit passage and re-export of controlled military items through Türkiye's customs territory. Covered items include military vehicles and defence equipment, weapons and ammunition and their spare parts, military explosives, and dual-use technologies associated with these categories, as defined under Law No. 5201. Any entity seeking to move such goods through Türkiye must obtain a "uygunluk yazısı" (compliance letter) from the Ministry of Trade, which reviews applications in consultation with relevant public institutions. The measure directly operationalises Türkiye's response to sustained US pressure over Iran-related sanctions evasion via Turkish transit corridors and entity-list additions naming Türkiye-based diversion networks.

The US Department of Commerce published preliminary affirmative countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on February 26, 2026, finding that producers and exporters of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (whether or not assembled into modules) from India, Indonesia, and Laos received countervailable government subsidies. Preliminary subsidy rates are 125.87% for India; 85.99%–143.30% by individual Indonesian producer (104.38% all-others rate); and a uniform 80.67% for Laos. Commerce ordered US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits at these rates on subject imports pending a parallel antidumping investigation and final determinations later in 2026. The case originated from a petition filed in August 2025 by US crystalline silicon PV manufacturers.

Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı No. 10790 (Resmi Gazete 31 December 2025, issue 33124 3rd reprint), in force 1 January 2026, restructures Türkiye's annual import-tariff architecture across 4,344 product lines from non-EU origins. The decree (i) introduces or expands additional customs duty (Ek Mali Yükümlülük / İlave Gümrük Vergisi) of 5%–48% on non-EU imports of iron and non-alloy steel, copper, aluminium, and base-metal household goods; (ii) introduces forward-looking import-surveillance measures across 172 products under 36 notifications, with reference-price floors that cap effective duty relief on under-valued shipments; (iii) updates duties on 324 Customs Tariff Statistical Positions across 21 chapters (219 HS lines raised by 2.4–15 percentage points; 8 lines under HS 7225/7228/8528/8529 raised by 3–14 points; 2 lines reduced by 6 points); (iv) opens duty-free tariff quotas for 35 industrial-product categories — including 27 battery / lithium-cell HS codes through 1 February 2027, 8m m² of plastic-treated textiles through 31 December 2026, and 40,725 tons of organic chemicals and aluminium sheets (16 February–31 December 2026); and (v) imposes a permit regime (6-month validity) on used and refurbished goods. EU and EU-Customs-Union origins remain exempt under A.TR preferential rules; the structural asymmetry vs non-EU partners is the core mechanism. Stated rationale (Ministry of Trade): support domestic production, prevent unfair competition, increase employment, reduce the current-account deficit.

On 9 December 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 79 of 2025, reinstating an export-licence management system for ~300 HS-coded steel products effective 1 January 2026. Exporters must obtain a per-contract licence supported by a manufacturer-issued product quality inspection certificate; licences are issued by MOFCOM (for centrally-administered SOEs) and provincial / sub-provincial commerce departments. The regime is the first reinstatement of Chinese steel-export licensing in 16 years (since 2009) and applies the export-licensing instrument — previously used for critical minerals and dual-use goods — to a non-critical bulk commodity for the first time.

On 13 November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Korea released a Joint Fact Sheet reaffirming the July 2025 announcement of the Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — the first standalone US-Korea trade-and-investment agreement since the 2012 KORUS FTA. USTR issued the implementing Federal Register notice (90 FR 55964, Notice 2025-21940) on 3 December 2025, effective 4 December 2025, with retroactive HTSUS application to 1 November 2025 for autos and auto parts and to 14 November 2025 for reciprocal-tariff goods, timber, lumber, derivatives, and certain aircraft and aircraft parts. On the US tariff side: (i) the country-specific IEEPA reciprocal tariff on Korean originating goods is set at the higher of the KORUS FTA / MFN rate or 15% (parallel to the Japan and EU framework deals); (ii) the Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, timber, lumber and wood derivatives are reduced to 15% (no incremental duty when the pre-existing KORUS/MFN rate already meets or exceeds 15%); (iii) Korean exports of qualifying goods on the Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners (PTAAP) list are exempt from reciprocal tariffs (covering generic pharmaceuticals and unavailable natural resources); (iv) Section 232 pharmaceuticals capped at 15%; semiconductors granted MFN-style "no less favourable" treatment in any future sectoral deal. On the investment side, Korea commits to a USD 350bn package: USD 150bn into US shipbuilding ("Approved Investments") plus USD 200bn into US strategic industries via a separate Strategic Investments MOU, with annual currency-funding cap of USD 20bn. Non-tariff commitments include streamlined US biotech approvals on the Korean side, US meat and cheese market access, fair treatment for US digital services, removal of Korea's 50,000-unit cap on US vehicles meeting FMVSS, and joint WTO support for the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

Presidential Decree (Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı) No. 10436, published in the Resmi Gazete on 22 September 2025, amends Türkiye's Import Regime Decision and the Additional Customs Duty Decision to standardise additional customs duty on passenger-vehicle imports (HS 8703) from all countries other than the ~24 FTA/customs-union partners (EU member states, South Korea, UK, Qatar and others). Rates are set at 25% or a minimum of USD 6,000/unit for conventional and non-plug-in hybrid vehicles, 30% or a minimum of USD 7,000/unit for plug-in hybrids, and 30% or a minimum of USD 8,500/unit for battery-electric vehicles. The decree enters into force 60 days after publication (21 November 2025), with a 30-day transition window in which declarations registered under the prior (lower or absent) duty regime are grandfathered.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14324, "Suspending Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries," on 30 July 2025 (published in the Federal Register on 5 August 2025 as FR doc 2025-14897, 90 FR 37775). The order eliminated the Section 321(a)(2)(C) administrative exemption that had allowed shipments valued at $800 or less to enter the United States duty-free, applying the suspension to all countries of origin rather than the China/Hong Kong-only carve-out imposed earlier in 2025. DHS/CBP published a Notice of Implementation on 2 September 2025 (FR doc 2025-16802) modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule so that covered low-value goods must be entered via formal or informal ACE entry types and pay applicable duties; goods shipped through the international postal network were instead made subject to a new flat ad valorem or specific per-item duty rate set by HTSUS annex. The suspension took effect for entries on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on 29 August 2025. A DHS/CBP rule published 24 June 2026 (FR doc 2026-12670) converted the non-postal suspension from time-limited to indefinite and closed the remaining international-postal-network exemption to formal/ informal entry procedures as well.

Mexico's tax authority (SAT), acting under SHCP, published the Cuarta Resolución de Modificaciones a las Reglas Generales de Comercio Exterior para 2025 in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 28 July 2025, raising the flat tax rate applied under the simplified customs regime for low-value courier and parcel shipments (goods valued at USD 2,500 or less) from 19% to 33.5%, effective 15 August 2025. The increase applies to shipments from countries without a free trade agreement with Mexico — in practice overwhelmingly China-origin goods — and is aimed at cross-border e-commerce platforms (Shein, Temu, AliExpress) as well as triangulated goods routed through courier channels by other importers including large retailers. The measure is framed by SHCP as combating under-invoicing and non-tariff-preference triangulation via the courier de minimis channel.

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1564 of 24 July 2025 is the EU's largest-ever trade countermeasure package: additional customs duties on approximately €93 billion of US-origin goods (Annexes I–XIII) plus an export prohibition on specified EU products to the United States (Annex XIV), adopted under Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 (the EU commercial-policy enforcement regulation) in response to the second Trump administration's Section 232 reinstatement and automobile tariffs. The regulation supersedes and repeals Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 and three earlier rebalancing CIRs. Application was suspended from 5 August 2025 following the EU-US trade framework agreement of 27 July 2025; the suspension was extended by a further six months from 4 February 2026. CIR 2025/1564 remains in force as a conditionally-reinstateable rebalancing framework while negotiations continue.

On 14 July 2025 President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in his capacity as Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, signed four gazette notifications designating IFC Colombo 1 (Private) Limited, Ceylon Real Estate Holdings (Private) Limited, Clothespin Management and Development (Private) Limited, and ICC Port City (Private) Limited as "Primary Businesses of Strategic Importance" inside the Colombo Port City Special Economic Zone, established under the Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act No. 21 of 2021. Cumulatively the four projects represent approximately USD 1.2 billion of inbound FDI commitments, with IFC Colombo 1 (a China Harbour Engineering Company / CHEC Port City Colombo subsidiary) alone committing USD 142.71 million and Ceylon Real Estate Holdings (a Browns Investments PLC subsidiary) committing a real-estate complex on 30,629.92 sqm. The original gazettes granted 35-year exemptions under the Inland Revenue Act (running to 13 July 2060) and ~25-year exemptions under the Value Added Tax Act, Finance Acts (Nos. 11 of 2002 and 5 of 2005), Excise (Special Provisions) Act, Customs Ordinance, Ports and Airports Development Levy Act and Sri Lanka Export Development Act, conditional on each designee executing its land-lease agreement with the Commission within six months of gazette publication.

Regulation (EU) 2025/1227, published 20 June 2025, imposes an additional 50% ad valorem customs duty on top of the standard Common Customs Tariff rate on roughly 101 tariff lines of agricultural products originating in or exported from Russia or Belarus, closing the remaining gap in the agri-tariff regime first opened in 2024. Fertilisers from the two countries face a separate, gradually escalating specific duty — starting around EUR 40-45 per tonne on top of the existing 6.5% ad valorem rate for the 2025-26 period, rising in annual steps to EUR 430 per tonne by 2028. The measure enters into force 1 July 2025 and is explicitly framed by the Council and Parliament as a further squeeze on Russian export revenue used to fund the war against Ukraine, extending the July 2024 agri-tariff regulation (EU) 2024/1392 to cover the products it left out.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.

Sri Lanka Customs published the National Imports Tariff Guide (NITG) 2025 with operative effect from 1 January 2025, releasing the consolidated preamble and chapter schedules during March 2025. The NITG is Sri Lanka's annual canonical import-regime instrument: it codifies the Customs Import Duty (CID) schedule together with the four principal para-tariffs — Ports and Airports Development Levy (PAL) under Act No. 18 of 2011, Export Development Board (EDB) Cess under Act No. 40 of 1979, Special Commodity Levy (SCL) under Act No. 48 of 2007, and Excise (Special Provisions) Duty — alongside Value Added Tax and the Social Security Contribution Levy (SSCL). For 2025 the NITG carries forward the para-tariff rationalisation programme initiated under the IMF Extended Fund Facility (March 2023 – 2027), with the preamble's exemption lists for PAL, CESS, SCL and VAT serving as the operational rulebook for trading partners and importers across the entire HS schedule.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

On 26 July 2024 President Erdoğan unveiled the HIT-30 (High-Technology Investment Programme), Türkiye's largest single industrial-finance instrument since the 2018 Investment Office reform, allocating USD 30 billion in state support over 2024-2030 to attract investment across 37 priority programmes spanning electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, solar/wind energy, green hydrogen, hyperscale data centres, biotechnological medicine, industrial robotics, and R&D. The Ministry of Industry and Technology is the operating agency, with the Industrialization Executive Committee chaired by the President providing high-level oversight; an Industrialisation Executive Committee under the President directs sectoral allocations. Headline tools include USD 4.5bn earmarked for an 80 GWh battery-manufacturing capacity (with USD 6,000/MWh grants through 2030), USD 2.5bn for 15 GW of domestic solar-cell capacity, USD 1.7bn for wind-component manufacturing, USD 1bn for top-1000 corporate R&D centre support (covering 50% of personnel costs for 5 years), corporate tax reductions, social-security-contribution coverage, energy-cost subsidies covering 50% of bills for energy-intensive projects, customs/VAT exemptions, and free or discounted land allocation in organised industrial zones. Programme targets at least USD 20bn in private-sector co-investment.

On 27 June 2024 the Argentine Congress passed Law 27.742, the "Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos" ("Ley Bases"), the flagship economic reform of the Milei administration. The law was published in the Boletín Oficial on 8 July 2024 and Title VII established the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) — a promotional regime designed to attract large-scale capex into mining, energy, oil & gas, LNG, steel, forestry, tourism, infrastructure, and technology. Implementing Decree 749/2024 was issued on 23 August 2024 and the regime became fully operational with Resolution 1074/2024 on 22 October 2024. RIGI offers single-project vehicles ("VPUs") that commit at least USD 200M (with sector-specific thresholds rising to USD 600M and up to USD 2B for long-term "strategic export" projects) a 30-year regulatory, tax, customs and foreign-exchange stability guarantee. Headline benefits include a reduced 25% corporate income tax (vs. 35% standard), accelerated depreciation, full deductibility of inflation adjustments, an import-duty exemption on capital goods and inputs, a phased relaxation of central-bank obligations to repatriate and convert export proceeds (20% free after year one, 40% after year two, 100% after year three), and reduced dividend withholding tax. Disputes are subject to international arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. As of mid-2025, RIGI's project pipeline reached USD 33.9B in submitted applications, of which roughly USD 15.7B (46.5%) had been approved across nine projects spanning steel (Sidersa), energy/LNG (PAE Southern Energy, YPF Argentina LNG), three mining projects, and infrastructure. The flagship approval was Rio Tinto's USD 2.5B Rincón battery-grade lithium carbonate plant in Salta (initial 53,000 t/yr, scaling to 60,000 t/yr by 2028) — the first mining project approved under the regime, on 21 May 2025. Strategically, RIGI is Argentina's bid to compete with Chile's lithium framework and Brazil's industrial policies for upstream-critical-minerals capex. Combined with the lifting of Argentina's FX controls (cepo cambiario) in April 2025 it sharply re-rates the country's project-economics math for multinationals — particularly in the Lithium Triangle, the Vaca Muerta shale, and pipeline/LNG infrastructure. Whether the 30-year stability guarantee survives a future change of government is the dominant political-risk overhang on the regime.

Presidential Decree (Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı) No. 8639, dated 7 June 2024 and published in the Resmi Gazete on 8 June 2024, amends Türkiye's Decision on the Application of Additional Customs Duty on Imports to impose a 40% additional ad valorem duty (or USD 7,000 per unit, whichever is higher) on China-origin passenger vehicles classified under HS heading 8703 — covering internal-combustion, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and battery-electric models. The measure entered into force 30 days after publication, on 7 July 2024, with an exemption for imports made under an Investment Incentive Certificate (Yatırım Teşvik Belgesi) — explicitly designed to channel Chinese OEMs into domestic Turkish assembly.

On 2 May 2024 Türkiye's Ministry of Trade announced that all export, import and transit transactions with Israel, covering all product groups, were halted, as the second phase after the 9 April 2024 restriction on 54 product groups. Customs declarations naming Israel as country of shipment, destination or origin are no longer registered. The ministry stated the halt stays in force until Israel declares a ceasefire in Gaza and allows uninterrupted humanitarian aid access.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced (Announcement No. 33 of 2023) export-licensing controls on graphite products, effective 1 December 2023. The regime covers natural flake graphite and products thereof (including spherical graphite and graphite powder used in lithium-ion battery anodes) as well as high-purity, high-hardness, and high-strength synthetic graphite materials. Exporters must obtain dual-use-item licences from MOFCOM citing end-user and end-use; licences are granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came three days after the 17 October 2023 BIS advanced-chip-controls expansion, continuing the proportional-response pattern established with Ga/Ge in July.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced an export licensing regime covering eight gallium-related items (including gallium metal, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride wafers and ingots) and six germanium- related items (including germanium metal, germanium oxide, germanium tetrachloride). Effective 1 August 2023, exporters must obtain a dual-use-item licence from MOFCOM citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The measure was framed as protecting national security and interests, though the timing immediately followed the Dutch ASML DUV controls and US chip-equipment escalations.

OFAC issued a determination under Executive Order 14071 (Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions) effective December 5, 2022, establishing a $60/barrel price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil. The measure prohibits US persons from providing six categories of covered services — trading/commodities brokering, financing, shipping, insurance (including reinsurance and P&I), flagging, and customs brokering — for the maritime transport of Russian crude oil unless the oil is purchased at or below $60/bbl. The determination was coordinated with the EU, G7 nations, and Australia as a unified coalition instrument designed to reduce Russian oil revenues while keeping global energy markets supplied. Three general licenses (GL 55, 56, 57) carved out limited exemptions for Japan's Sakhalin-2 imports, certain EU landlocked states, and vessel emergencies.

Angola's Ministry of Transport formalised a 30-year concession to Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR — Trafigura 49.5% / Mota-Engil 49.5% / Vecturis S.A. 1%) for the operation, management and maintenance of the Lobito Corridor — comprising the 1,300 km Benguela Railway from the Port of Lobito to Luau (Angola-DRC border) and the Lobito port mineral terminal. The international tender was won on 4 November 2022; the concession contract was signed on 4 July 2023 at a ceremony attended by the Presidents of Angola, the DRC and Zambia. LAR commenced operations in January 2024. The concession is paired with the trilateral Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement (LCTTFA), signed at Lobito Port on 27 January 2023 by the Transport ministers of Angola, the DRC and Zambia, which establishes the cross-border customs/transit framework for the corridor.

The US Department of Commerce preliminarily determined that producers and exporters of silicon metal from Kazakhstan received countervailable subsidies at a 120.00% economy-wide rate, and instructed US Customs and Border Protection to begin collecting cash deposits from importers at that rate. The countervailing-duty investigation was initiated 2020-07-27 following a June 2020 petition by Globe Specialty Metals, Inc. and Mississippi Silicon LLC, the same domestic petitioners behind the concurrent antidumping cases against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, and Malaysia. 2019 Kazakh silicon metal imports subject to the case were valued at approximately $14.9 million.

Mexico's Ley de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Trade Act, LCE), published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 27 July 1993 and entering into force 28 July 1993, is the foundational statute governing Mexico's entire external trade regulatory architecture. The LCE establishes the legal authority for the SECOFI/SE-administered antidumping (AD), countervailing duty (CVD), and safeguard investigation regime (Titles V–VII); the TIGIE tariff-schedule and tariff-classification framework; the IMMEX maquila and PROSEC sectoral-promotion programs; rules of origin for USMCA and other preferential trade agreements; and Mexico's export- licensing and strategic-material restriction framework. The LCE has been amended repeatedly through 2021 and remains the overarching parent authority for all Mexican trade-remedy proceedings administered by UPCI (Unidad de Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales) under the Secretaría de Economía.

The Tariff Act of 1930 (Pub. L. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, codified principally at 19 U.S.C. Chapter 4) is the foundational US statute governing customs revenue, tariff classification, and trade-remedy administration, signed by President Hoover on 17 June 1930. The Act's original Smoot-Hawley tariff schedules are widely cited as a contributing factor to the contraction of global trade during the Great Depression, but the statute's enduring significance lies in its creation of (i) the Title VII antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) proceedings framework administered jointly by Commerce ITA and the USITC — the parent authority for every US AD/CVD order in force today — and (ii) Section 337 (19 U.S.C. §1337), the USITC unfair-import and IP-exclusion-order regime under which ~50+ active investigations are conducted annually against semiconductor, biotech, electronics, and other technology imports. Title I's customs-valuation and HTSUS tariff- classification framework underpins all US import-revenue collection; Title VII AD/CVD authority was updated by the GATT Tokyo Round Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (URAA) to align with WTO Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements.