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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 7 September 2026 the UK made the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/983), laid before Parliament 8 September 2026 and due to come into force 29 September 2026. The instrument substantially rewrites the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 and the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2019, adding new financial restrictions (bans on loans, credit and joint ventures with Iranian manufacturing, oil/gas, petrochemical and uranium interests; a ban on UK banks opening accounts or representative offices for Iranian banks; an insurance/reinsurance ban; a ban on trading Iranian government bonds issued after the regulation date), new trade-control chapters covering gold/precious metals/diamonds, energy-related goods and services, and sectoral software, new import bans on Iranian gold, oil, petrochemicals and natural gas, and new aircraft/shipping parts restricting Iranian cargo flights, chartering of specified vessels, and UK port entry and ship registration for sanctions-evading vessels.
On 24 August 2026, the Director of OFAC, in consultation with the Department of State and pursuant to 31 CFR 560.802, determined that section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 shall apply to the aviation, digital asset, gold, shipping, and technology sectors of the Iranian economy, effective the same day and formally published in the Federal Register on 27 August 2026 (FR Doc 2026-17487). The determination — part of a Treasury campaign publicly branded "Operation Economic Outcast" — exposes any person operating in, or knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the sale, supply, or transfer of significant goods or services to or from, these five sectors to secondary-sanctions and SDN-listing risk under E.O. 13902, and extends potential correspondent/ payable-through account restrictions to foreign financial institutions that knowingly facilitate such transactions. OFAC did not publish sector definitions and concurrently suspended several general licenses covering educational exchange, personal remittance, conference, and academic/ sports-exchange activity with Iran (administered separately via GL AA and GL BB, wind-down through 8 September 2026).
On 29 July 2026 Allied Gold Corporation (TSX/NYSE: AAUC) and Zijin Gold International Company Ltd. terminated their previously announced C$5.5B (~US$3.9-4B) arrangement agreement, under which Zijin Gold would have acquired 100% of Allied Gold, after concluding the deal's closing conditions would not be satisfied by the 29 July 2026 outside date. Trade press (ION Analytics/Dealreporter, Investing News Network, Ecofin Agency) reports the transaction stalled because China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) required in-depth review over two concerns: the premium Zijin was paying relative to Allied's market valuation, and geopolitical-risk concentration from Allied's exposure to Mali, which supplies roughly half of Allied's gold output (via the Sadiola mine). In place of the full takeover, Zijin Gold agreed same-day to a non-brokered private placement subscribing for ~12.8 million Allied common shares at C$32.55/share (~US$295M gross proceeds), taking a 9.2% stake expected to close on or about 10 August 2026. This is the first Chinese outbound mining M&A the register has logged since 2025-04-23, following a roughly 16-month gap, and marks an outbound-investment-screening precedent constraining a Chinese SOE-adjacent acquirer's exposure to Sahel political risk.
On 19 June 2026, President Mamadi Doumbouya chaired a strategic meeting in Conakry with industrial, semi-industrial and artisanal gold operators and gold-buying counters, announcing that "l'exportation de l'or brut appartient désormais au passé" — a formal and permanent prohibition on exporting unrefined gold mined in Guinea. All gold must henceforth be refined domestically, primarily via the state-backed Nimba Gold Refinery (Gbessia, Conakry), before any international sale. Operators who continue exporting raw gold risk suspension or revocation of their operating licence and mining convention. The measure extends Guinea's Simandou 2040 local-transformation doctrine — already applied to bauxite and iron ore — to the gold sector for the first time.
On 8–9 April 2026 the Argentine Cámara de Diputados gave final passage (137–111 with 3 abstentions) to a bill amending Ley 26.639 (the 2010 Régimen de Presupuestos Mínimos para la Preservación de los Glaciares y del Ambiente Periglacial), after the Senate had already approved the reform in February 2026 (40–31 with 1 abstention). The Executive promulgated the law as Ley 27.804 via Decreto 271/2026, published in the Boletín Oficial on 24 April 2026. The reform narrows the federal protection floor by limiting strict protection to glaciers and periglacial geoforms with proven hydrological function, and transfers to provincial governments the authority to define the technical and scientific criteria delimiting protected areas — directly unblocking the "ABCD" copper pipeline (Agua Rica/MARA, Filo del Sol, Josemaría, Los Azules, El Pachón) and adjacent lithium and gold projects whose prior periglacial-buffer encumbrance had stalled an estimated USD 30bn of investment, ~70% in copper / gold / silver.
On 12 March 2026 Senegal's Primature held a press conference releasing mid-term findings of the National Commission for the Re-evaluation and Renegotiation of Petroleum, Gas, and Mining Contracts, created in August 2024 under Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko's reform programme. The Commission identified a 1,075.9 billion FCFA shortfall in the mining sector — concentrated in unpaid taxes/royalties and unauthorised tax exemptions at ICS (Industries Chimiques du Sénégal) — and announced the termination of four offshore oil-exploration blocks (Djifer Offshore, Kayar Offshore, Saint-Louis Offshore, Rufisque Offshore). Renegotiation of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project, operated by BP with Kosmos Energy and Woodside as partners on the Senegal-Mauritania maritime border, is under active examination; the Primature projects 900 bn FCFA in incremental fiscal revenue 2026-2040 from the contract revision programme. This is Senegal's first major instance of retroactive resource-contract review under the Sonko-Faye government and establishes the legal-political baseline for subsequent contract renegotiations across the 27 mining contracts and remaining hydrocarbon licences under Commission review.
The Ecuadorian National Assembly approved on 26 February 2026 (vote 77-70, urgent-economic-matter procedure) the Ley Orgánica para el Fortalecimiento de los Sectores Estratégicos de Minería y Energía, the statutory complement to President Daniel Noboa's Decreto Ejecutivo 273 of 31 December 2025. The law was published in the Quinto Suplemento of Registro Oficial on 2 March 2026 with no presidential objection and entered into force the same day. It comprises 28 articles, two general provisions and one transitory provision. The mining title codifies the 3–8% sliding royalty scale and channels 60% of royalty receipts to social investment via decentralised governments (45% provincial / 35% municipal / 20% parochial) — the legislative anchor for the regime introduced by Decree 273. The energy title amends the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica to recognise distributed generation, self-supply and autonomous energy districts, and establishes exception-route participation for foreign state-owned enterprises and popular/solidarity-economy organisations alongside private capital. A controversial Galápagos-adjacent provision permitting expedited mining/energy procedures has triggered domestic constitutional challenge.
On 3 February 2026 the European Commission opened an in-depth Phase II investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) — the second FSR ex officio case and the first targeting the renewable-energy wind-OEM sector — into whether Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. and its EU affiliates received Chinese foreign subsidies (grants, preferential tax treatment, and state-bank preferential financing) that distort competition for wind-turbine supply and services in the EU internal market. The case (FS.100143) follows the April 2024 preliminary-review opening and subjects Goldwind to an 18-month Phase II investigation with potential redressive-measures decision. The action structurally extends the FSR enforcement perimeter from security equipment (Nuctech, FS.100068) into the green-transition energy-equipment supply chain.
On 27 January 2026 President Gabriel Boric presented Chile's National Critical Minerals Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Minerales Críticos, NCMS) — the country's first horizontal critical-minerals governance framework, identifying 14 minerals as priorities for development and establishing five strategic pillars: production and diversification of critical minerals; responsible mining; development opportunities based on critical minerals; enabling capacities; and strategic international positioning. The strategy was developed through a multi-year participatory process coordinated through Cochilco and Sernageomin, involving a 16-member high-level advisory committee, 120 specialists from 56 institutions, regional workshops and a public consultation. It materially broadens Chile's mineral policy beyond the 2023 lithium-specific National Lithium Strategy to a cross-cutting framework that underpins future bilateral critical-minerals MOUs and positions Chile as a strategic raw-materials partner for the US, EU and Japan under their respective IRA/CRMA/GX supply-chain frameworks.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 18 individuals and entities that make up the "rahbar" shadow-banking networks of sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli and Shahr Bank, including Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE Ltd, UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE and HMS Trading FZE, Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company and Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, and UK-based Nanshan Ltd. Separately, OFAC designated senior Iranian security officials, including SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani, for their role in the regime's violent crackdown on peaceful protesters that began in December 2025. The financial designations were made under E.O. 13902 (Iran's financial/petroleum/petrochemical sectors) and the human-rights designations under E.O. 13553 and E.O. 13876, in furtherance of NSPM-2; Treasury noted it sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft under the same maximum-pressure campaign in 2025.
On 27 December 2025, Codelco and SQM formally closed NovaAndino Litio SpA, the 50:50 joint venture (with a golden share for state-owned Codelco) mandated by the 2023 National Lithium Strategy to bring the Salar de Atacama under state operational control. The vehicle is formed by merging Codelco's subsidiary Minera Tarar SpA with SQM's SQM Salar SpA, governed by a six-director board (three Codelco, three SQM), and runs until 2060 under a CORFO contract amendment that extends operations beyond SQM's previous 2030 lease expiry. SQM manages operations 2025-2030, Codelco from 2031 onward; the Chilean state captures up to ~70% of operating margins through 2030 and ~85% from 2031. As part of the closing, SQM transferred all of its mining concessions in the Salar de Maricunga to Codelco. President Boric and the Cabinet Económico formally endorsed the venture on 29 December 2025, when the first board meeting was held in Santiago.
On 26 December 2025 the Peruvian executive promulgated and published in El Peruano Ley N° 32537, modifying Decreto Legislativo 1293 to extend the Registro Integral de Formalización Minera (REINFO) — Peru's artisanal-and-small-scale mining formalisation registry — through 31 December 2026, or until the new MAPE Law and its regulations enter into force, whichever occurs first. The statute is the parent instrument above DS 009-2025-EM (May 2025) and pushes the formalisation regime — which previously had a 30 June 2025 sunset under Ley 32213 — out by another 18 months. It also (i) orders a national MAPE census run by INEI, MINEM and INGEMMET (to begin within six months and conclude within twelve), (ii) requires REINFO registrants to declare real operational coordinates within 120 days via the Ventanilla Única de Formalización Minera, (iii) compels regional governments to transfer their formalisation paper and digital archives to MINEM within 60 days, and (iv) directs SUNAFIL to issue payroll-compliance verification rules for REINFO holders within 60 days. The law affects ~80,000+ artisanal and small-scale miners and is the statutory ceiling under which Peru's gold and copper-concentrate export chain operates.
On 4 December 2025, the United States and the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on Trade and Investment, executed at a White House trilateral ceremony alongside the parallel U.S.-Rwanda framework and witnessed by President Trump, President Tshisekedi (DRC), and President Kagame (Rwanda). The Agreement creates a Strategic Minerals Reserve (SMR) and a Strategic Asset Reserve (SAR) under DRC sovereignty, gives U.S. persons preferential access to SAR assets, and commits DRC and its state-owned enterprises to route at least 30% of their commercialised cobalt volumes through the Sakania-Lobito Corridor within five years. A Joint Steering Committee (JSC) co-chaired by State and DRC's Ministry of Economy holds its inaugural meeting on 4-5 February 2026, designating the initial SAR asset list and launching implementation. The DFC announced a proposed equity investment in a Gécamines-Mercuria copper/cobalt joint venture as the first commercial vehicle under the framework.
The Ivorian Council of Ministers adopted on 3 December 2025 the Politique Intégrée des Ressources Minérales et de l'Énergie (PIRME), a 15-year cross-sector extractive and energy industrial-policy strategy requiring CFA 38,000 billion (~USD 68bn) across three five-year phases to 2040. The policy targets doubling the mining-energy sector's GDP contribution from 7% (2022) to 14% by 2040, positioning it as the economy's second pillar after agriculture. Core mandates include a 50% local transformation target for gold, a 10 million-tonne iron-ore production target, a 500,000 bbl/day oil production target, 45% renewable energy integration, and a 38% reduction in energy-sector emissions — backed by national-content and value-addition requirements across mining, hydrocarbons, and electricity sub-sectors.
On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).
Colombia's Ministerio de Minas y Energía filed Proyecto de Ley 282 de 2025 in Congress on 1 October 2025 — the first comprehensive reform of the national Mining Code since Ley 685/2001. The bill replaces the existing extractivist concession model with a state-directed planning framework that designates Strategic Mineral Areas (AME) for copper, lithium, and nickel under direct state control aligned with energy-transition goals. It establishes excluded zones (ZEM) and permitted zones (ZAM), restructures the concession and royalty regime to expand community and ethnic-peoples' participation rights, and redefines minerals as national public-interest assets rather than private-sector concession targets. As of May 2026 the bill was advancing through Senate committee deliberation.
On 8 September 2025 at Prime Minister House in Islamabad, U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM, Missouri) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan's Frontier Works Organization (FWO, Pakistan Army-affiliated and the country's largest miner of critical minerals) committing to an initial USD 500 million investment programme covering antimony, copper, gold, tungsten, and rare-earth elements, with an envisaged poly-metallic refinery inside Pakistan. Embassy Islamabad Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Zach Harkenrider attended the signing. The first shipment of rare earths and other critical minerals from Pakistan to the United States was dispatched on 2 October 2025, marking the operational start of the partnership. The instrument forms the strategic- minerals limb of a broader Pakistan–U.S. realignment paired with U.S. EXIM Bank's USD 1.25 billion financing commitment for the Reko Diq copper-gold project (announced 10 December 2025) — a single coherent bilateral package positioning Pakistan as a non- PRC source of refined critical minerals to the United States.
Republic Act 12253, signed by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. on 4 September 2025, replaces the Philippines' long-standing flat-royalty regime for large-scale metallic mining with a five-tier margin-based royalty (1–5% on income from mines outside mineral reservations; 5% retained inside reservations) layered on a five-tier windfall-profits tax (1–10% on profits above a 30% margin), and ring-fences each mining agreement as a separate taxable entity. The law amends the National Internal Revenue Code (RA 8424) and is projected to raise an additional PHP 25.08 bn over 2026–2029. The new fiscal regime became operative on 17 February 2026, 150 days after effectivity, with DOF-issued IRR.
Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.
Loi n° 25-12 du 3 août 2025 governing mining activities, promulgated by President Tebboune and published in the Algerian Journal Officiel n° 52 on 7 August 2025, replaces Loi 14-05 of 2014 and is Algeria's first comprehensive mining-code overhaul in eleven years. The reform raises the foreign-ownership ceiling in mining-exploitation companies to 80% of share capital (with a non-dilutable 20% reserved for an Algerian State-owned enterprise), abolishes the prior "strategic substances" category and the statutory monopoly that accompanied it, and allows foreign companies to apply directly for prospection authorisations and exploration permits without first incorporating a local entity. The 51/49 majority-Algerian rule remains in place for quarries and for the hydrocarbons regime — the reform is mining-specific.
Vietnam's Government adopted Decree 193/2025/ND-CP on 2 July 2025 (effective retroactively from 1 July 2025) as the primary operational statute elaborating the Law on Geology and Minerals No. 54/2024/QH15. The decree decentralises licensing for most mineral categories to provincial People's Committees while preserving central Ministry of Agriculture and Environment (MAE) authority over strategic and critical minerals, including rare earths, gold, uranium, and thorium. It codifies a three-tier Group I/II/III mineral classification, imposes a 100% financial-capacity bond requirement for exploration licences, sets a 40-working-day processing deadline, and defines the closed-enterprise framework that makes Vietnam's 1 January 2026 raw rare-earth export ban operationally enforceable through a Prime-Minister-designated list of licensed enterprises.
On 11 June 2025 the Burkinabè Conseil des Ministres adopted Décret N°2025-0598/PRES/PM/MEMC, formally completing the transfer of five gold-mining assets to the state-owned Société de Participation Minière du Burkina (SOPAMIB): two operating gold mines (Wahgnion Gold SA and SEMAFO Boungou SA, formerly held by Endeavour Mining subsidiaries) and three exploration-stage companies (Ressources Ferké SARL, Gryphon Minerals Burkina Faso SARL, and Lilium Mining Services Burkina Faso SARL). The underlying share-and-social-interest transfer agreement was concluded on 24 August 2024 between the Burkinabè state and Endeavour Mining / Lilium Mining; the June 2025 decree formalises SOPAMIB's full legal ownership. Executed under President Capt. Ibrahim Traoré's "sovereign ownership of mining resources" doctrine and the authority granted by the 2024 Code Minier (Loi N°016-2024/ALT), the decree marks the first comprehensive operating-mine nationalisation in the AES bloc (Alliance des États du Sahel) and signals that Sahel resource nationalism has moved from legislative code-amendment into direct operating-asset seizure.
Peru's Ministry of Energy and Mines published Decreto Supremo N° 009-2025-EM in El Peruano on 18 May 2025, approving the implementing regulation for Law 32213 (Dec 2024). The decree operationalises the extension of the REINFO mining-formalisation registry deadline through 30 June 2025 (extendable +6 months), reaffirms MINEM as the rector authority over the small-scale and artisanal mining (MAPE) formalisation process, and creates SIPMMA — the Sistema Interoperable de Pequeña Minería y Minería Artesanal — as a state interoperable system for operational traceability of minerals, explosives, chemical inputs and controlled products. A controversial Article 10 had also opened a "REINFO hereditario" path allowing succession transfer of registry inscriptions; that provision was derogated two weeks later by DS 010-2025-EM (1 Jun 2025) under domestic and international anti-illegal-mining pressure.
On 23 April 2025 CMOC Group (HKG:3993) announced the acquisition of TSXV-listed Lumina Gold Corp — 100% owner of the Cangrejos (Los Cangrejos) gold-copper project in El Oro Province, southwestern Ecuador — via a court-sanctioned plan of arrangement at C$1.27/share (C$581M / ~USD 420M); the transaction closed on 24 June 2025 through a Singapore subsidiary, making Cangrejos Ecuador's largest primary gold deposit under full Chinese operational control. On 27 April 2026 CMOC's Ecuadorian subsidiary ODIN Mining del Ecuador signed a 26-year exploitation contract with Ecuador's Ministry of Energy and Mines committing >$1.7B in total investment (~$54M advance royalties, $34M paid on signing); commercial production is targeted for 2028 at ~11.5 t/yr gold (~370,000 oz/yr), making the state-projected total revenues $4.39B over the mine life. The acquisition extends CMOC's critical-mineral portfolio — anchored in DRC cobalt/copper — into Ecuadorian gold and copper, concentrating a globally significant undeveloped gold-copper deposit under Chinese operational control ahead of the competing 2026 Ecuador–US Critical Minerals Bilateral Framework.
On 21 April 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Resolution No. PP-145 "On the Privatization of Large Enterprises with State Participation on International Markets," establishing the 2025–2028 roadmap for selling minority equity stakes (10–25%) in 12 major state-owned enterprises via IPO/SPO on international and domestic exchanges, and full/near-full stakes in 29 further enterprises through competitive public tenders. The resolution introduced a three-tier asset-segmentation framework — large SOEs (IPO/SPO with international advisor mandates), medium SOEs (domestic stock-exchange sale), and small assets/real estate (e-platform sale) — and mandated engagement of international investment banks and a State Privatization Commission to oversee implementation. It was issued the same day as the sister Presidential Decree UP-70 "On the Privatization Program for 2025," which approved a 2025 annual program targeting 30 trillion UZS (~USD 2.4 bn) in state-asset disposals across 115 companies, 659 real-estate properties, and 6,100 hectares of land.
Government Regulation No. 19 of 2025 on Types and Rates of Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP) applicable to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 11 Apr 2025 and effective 26 Apr 2025 (15 working days after promulgation), revokes PP 26/2022 and replaces fixed mining royalty rates with a progressive tiered system anchored to international benchmark prices (HMA for nickel, HBA for coal). Headline shifts: nickel ore from fixed 10% to 14–19% by HMA tier; ferronickel 2% → 4–6%; nickel matte 2% → 3.5–5.5%; NPI 5% → 5–7%; copper cathode 2% → 4–7%; tin 3% → 3–10%; gold 3.75–10% → 7–16%; coal up to 13.5% at HBA >USD 90 for >5,200 kcal/kg grades. The regulation is the cornerstone fiscal lever of the Prabowo nickel-downstreaming/hilirisasi 2.0 strategy alongside RKAB-quota tightening that cut national nickel quotas from 272m to 150m tonnes for 2025.
Pakistan launched the National Minerals Harmonisation Framework 2025 and the Mines & Minerals Act 2025 at the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum (Islamabad, 8–9 April 2025), consolidating six regulatory frameworks, eight legislative instruments, and 36 rule sets into a unified federal-provincial licensing system. The framework — convened by the SIFC and Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — establishes a two-tier licensing structure (large-scale: PKR 500M+; small-scale: PKR 25M–500M), mandatory appellate tribunal, and a "Mines and Minerals Force" to counter illegal mining in Sindh and Balochistan. Fiscal-incentive reforms aim to raise investor IRR from 14.5% to approximately 18%, underpinned by Reko Diq as the flagship precedent for future large-scale foreign-capital mineral projects.
Ghana's Parliament passed the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 (Act 1140) on 29 March 2025; presidential assent followed on 2 April 2025, with full operational effect from 1 May 2025. The Act repeals PNDCL 219 (1989) and establishes the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) as the sole statutory licensor and exclusive primary buyer, seller, assayer, grader, weigher and exporter of all gold produced by the country's licensed Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) sector. Large-scale mining operations remain outside the monopsony. Effective 1 May 2025, no person other than GoldBod may export ASM gold from Ghana, and all gold trading and marketing businesses must hold a GoldBod licence (application window for Ghanaian-owned firms opened 22 April 2025). Proceeds from all ASM gold exports settle through the Bank of Ghana, channelling foreign-exchange flows from roughly 30% of national gold output — Ghana is the world's #6 producer and Africa's largest — into formal central-bank reserves. The stated objectives are to combat smuggling, capture the smuggling-loss premium for the state, support Bank of Ghana gold-reserves accumulation, and generate foreign exchange. The Act sits alongside the Bank of Ghana's Domestic Gold Purchase Programme as the legal infrastructure for Ghana's gold-as-reserve-asset strategy.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14241 on 20 March 2025 (Federal Register publication 25 March 2025) invoking Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III sections 301, 302, and 303 — and selected Title VII authorities — for domestic critical-mineral production, and delegated those authorities to the Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The order operationalises the "national energy emergency" declared by EO 14156 (Jan 2025) to waive certain DPA §303 congressional-notification thresholds, designates "mineral production" as an Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program priority, expands the EO definition of "critical minerals" to include uranium, copper, potash, gold (and any further item designated by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council), and directs the Departments of the Interior, Energy, Treasury, and EXIM Bank to mobilise federal lands, permitting, and financing to expand US upstream and midstream capacity. EO 14241 is the cross-cutting domestic-mineral umbrella authority of the second Trump administration, paired with FY2025 supplemental appropriations (USD 2bn National Defense Stockpile, USD 5bn Industrial Base Fund) and complemented by the 24 April 2025 follow-on EO on offshore minerals and the 8 April 2025 coal amendment.
New Zealand's Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), under Resources Minister Hon Shane Jones, launched the country's first national Minerals Strategy and first Critical Minerals List on 31 January 2025 at OceanaGold's Waihi gold mining operation in Hauraki. The Critical Minerals List identifies 37 minerals essential to New Zealand's economy, national security, and technology needs — including gold and metallurgical coal added in the final version (up from 35 minerals in the September 2024 draft consultation). The Minerals Strategy sets a target of doubling New Zealand mineral exports from approximately NZD 1.2 billion/year to NZD 3 billion by 2035, supported by a Wood Mackenzie advisory assessment (December 2024) that identified 21 of the 37 listed minerals as domestically produced or having domestic production potential.
On 31 October 2024, the President of Uzbekistan signed Law No. LRU-987 "On Subsoil" (Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan "O nedrakh"), a wholesale recodification of Uzbekistan's mining and subsoil regime that entered into force on 2 February 2025. The new statute expands from 51 articles in the prior version to 172 articles, comprehensively overhauling licensing, royalty, and foreign-investor terms for hard minerals (including rare earths, copper, uranium, gold, lithium) and hydrocarbons. Drafting was developed in collaboration with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), signalling strategic intent to attract Western mining capital and align UZ subsoil regime with international good practice ahead of the Almalyk/Navoi IPO track and downstream critical-minerals programmes.
China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.
Decree 0977, signed 2 August 2024 by the Petro administration, regulates Article 231 of the National Development Plan (Law 2294/2023) by adding Chapter 12 to Title V, Part 2, Book 2 of Decreto 1073 de 2015, the consolidated mining-and-energy regulation. The decree creates a new state-managed territorial category — Distritos Mineros Especiales para la Diversificación Productiva — split into two tracks: "Distritos Mineros para la Vida y la Paz" (zones of high informal-mining presence, formalisation focus) and "Distritos Mineros para la Transición Energética Justa" (decarbonisation and productive-reconversion focus, principally coal phase-out zones). The decree restructures where, how, and under what licensing terms large-scale mining is permitted in Colombia, the world's #1 thermal coal exporter to Europe and a major LatAm producer of gold, copper and nickel.
Loi n°016-2024/ALT was unanimously adopted by Burkina Faso's Assemblée Législative de Transition on 18 July 2024 and promulgated on 31 July 2024 under the Traoré military-transition government. The 309-article statute replaces Loi n°036-2015/CNT (26 July 2015) and its amendment Loi n°012-2023/ALT (25 July 2023), and is the central legal vehicle for the junta's resource-nationalism agenda. Headline structural changes raise the state's free-carried interest in any new mining venture from 10% to 15% (Article 66) and grant an additional ~30% paid-participation right that may be exercised by the state or a state-mandated investor; mineral processing and sales — notably gold — now require prior administrative authorization; domestic-investor capital-opening, local content, and overproduction penalties are strengthened. Four implementing decrees (mining-title procedures, mining taxes/royalties, sector-approval conditions, capital opening to national investors) were under validation as of October 2024 and are required for full effect.
Décret n°2024-0396/PT-RM of 9 July 2024 fixes the conditions and modalities for applying Loi n°2023-040 of 29 August 2023 (the new Code Minier of the Republic of Mali). The decree, adopted in Council of Ministers on 3 July 2024 and signed by the transition presidency, operationalises the 2023 statute that replaces the 2019 mining code (Loi n°2019-022). The new framework raises maximum cumulative state-plus-Malian-private participation in mining ventures to roughly 30–35% (10% free-carry to the state, plus an additional 20% paid participation right and 5% reserved to local private investors), reshapes the fiscal regime (royalties, taxes, exemptions) for new permits and conventions, and pairs with companion local-content Loi n°2023-041 of the same date. The 2024 implementing decree is the operative trigger date for downstream investor disputes (Barrick Loulo-Gounkoto suspension, B2Gold Fekola contract renegotiations, Allied Gold Sadiola, Ganfeng Goulamina lithium ramp).
On 29 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1864, amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 to extend Belarus's sanctions regime so that it mirrors the restrictive measures already in force against Russia, closing routes used to circumvent the Russia sanctions via Belarus. The package bans the import of gold, diamonds, helium, coal and other mineral products (including crude oil) originating in or exported from Belarus; bans the import of goods and technology on the EU Common Military List if of Belarusian origin; extends the export ban on dual-use goods, oil-refining and LNG-liquefaction equipment, maritime-navigation goods and luxury goods to Belarus; prohibits transit via Belarus of EU-exported firearms and ammunition; and broadens the road-transport ban. The measures entered into force on 1 July 2024, the day after publication in the Official Journal.
On 27 June 2024 the Argentine Congress passed Law 27.742, the "Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos" ("Ley Bases"), the flagship economic reform of the Milei administration. The law was published in the Boletín Oficial on 8 July 2024 and Title VII established the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) — a promotional regime designed to attract large-scale capex into mining, energy, oil & gas, LNG, steel, forestry, tourism, infrastructure, and technology. Implementing Decree 749/2024 was issued on 23 August 2024 and the regime became fully operational with Resolution 1074/2024 on 22 October 2024. RIGI offers single-project vehicles ("VPUs") that commit at least USD 200M (with sector-specific thresholds rising to USD 600M and up to USD 2B for long-term "strategic export" projects) a 30-year regulatory, tax, customs and foreign-exchange stability guarantee. Headline benefits include a reduced 25% corporate income tax (vs. 35% standard), accelerated depreciation, full deductibility of inflation adjustments, an import-duty exemption on capital goods and inputs, a phased relaxation of central-bank obligations to repatriate and convert export proceeds (20% free after year one, 40% after year two, 100% after year three), and reduced dividend withholding tax. Disputes are subject to international arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. As of mid-2025, RIGI's project pipeline reached USD 33.9B in submitted applications, of which roughly USD 15.7B (46.5%) had been approved across nine projects spanning steel (Sidersa), energy/LNG (PAE Southern Energy, YPF Argentina LNG), three mining projects, and infrastructure. The flagship approval was Rio Tinto's USD 2.5B Rincón battery-grade lithium carbonate plant in Salta (initial 53,000 t/yr, scaling to 60,000 t/yr by 2028) — the first mining project approved under the regime, on 21 May 2025. Strategically, RIGI is Argentina's bid to compete with Chile's lithium framework and Brazil's industrial policies for upstream-critical-minerals capex. Combined with the lifting of Argentina's FX controls (cepo cambiario) in April 2025 it sharply re-rates the country's project-economics math for multinationals — particularly in the Lithium Triangle, the Vaca Muerta shale, and pipeline/LNG infrastructure. Whether the 30-year stability guarantee survives a future change of government is the dominant political-risk overhang on the regime.
President Paul Biya signed Loi n°2023/014 on 19 December 2023, replacing the 2016 mining code (Loi n°2016/017) and significantly enlarging state control over Cameroon's mineral sector. The law vests SONAMINES (Société Nationale des Mines) with an exclusive statutory monopoly over the purchase and commercialisation of gold and diamonds nationwide, mandates a 10% non-dilutable free-carry equity stake for the state in all mining enterprises, and introduces a production-sharing mechanism (1–5% of finished product for precious substances; 2–15% of raw ore for others) layered on top of revised ad valorem royalties (5% for precious metals, 3% for base metals, 10% for radioactive substances). The code provides the legal framework for SONAMINES-led reindustrialisation of large iron-ore and bauxite projects, including Mbalam-Nabeba and Minim-Martap.
The Mining (New Porgera) (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act No. 16 of 2023), passed by Papua New Guinea's National Parliament on 29 November 2023 and certified 30 November 2023, created the statutory framework enabling the Porgera gold mine to reopen under the New Porgera Ltd joint venture — with PNG state and local stakeholders holding 51% and Barrick Gold 49%. The Act formalised four agreements signed on 13 October 2023 (Mining Development Contract, Special Mining Lease 13, Fiscal Stability Agreement, and Landowner Compensation Escrow), allowing the mine to resume operations on 22 December 2023 after a 2020 closure when the Marape government refused to renew Barrick Niugini Limited's prior special mining lease. This 51% state-and-community majority template now governs the legal architecture for all future PNG resource concessions.
Loi n° 2023-040 of 29 August 2023, adopted by the Conseil National de Transition (CNT) and promulgated by the Président de la Transition Colonel Assimi Goïta, repeals and replaces the prior Mali Code Minier (Ordonnance n° 2019-022/P-RM du 27 septembre 2019) and constitutes the foundational mining statute for all mineral-title issuance, foreign-investment participation, fiscal architecture, and state-control mechanisms in the Republic of Mali. Key structural innovations include a 35% Malian-side equity floor (10% free-carry to the state + 20% paid- participation option + 5% reserved to local Malian private investors), a special permitting regime for substances minérales d'intérêt stratégique (lithium, uranium, thorium, tungsten, tantalite, cobalt, and rare-earth elements), and zones d'intérêt stratégique reserved for the state and state-controlled vehicles. The Code is the parent statute under which Décret n° 2024-0396/PT-RM (the 2024 implementing decree) and Loi n° 2023-041 (the companion local-content law) operate, and under which the Barrick Loulo-Gounkoto standoff, B2Gold Fekola renegotiation, Allied Gold Sadiola settlement, and Ganfeng Goulamina fiscal escalation are situated.
Loi n° 2023-041 of 29 August 2023 establishes Mali's mandatory local-content framework for the mining sector, requiring titulaires de permis miniers and their sub-contractors to prioritise Malian nationals, local communities, national enterprises, and locally produced goods and services in the procurement and execution of all mining activities. The law mandates three-year renewable procurement plans with cascading preference from Malian citizens to ECOWAS citizens to others, and imposes capacity-building, training, and technology-transfer obligations on licence-holders. It is the procurement-side companion statute to the simultaneously adopted Code Minier (Loi 2023-040), operating under its own implementing decree Décret 2024-0397/PT-RM (July 2024).
Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.
The Investitionskontrollgesetz (InvKG, "Investment Control Act") is Austria's horizontal, statutory FDI screening regime. Published as Article 1 of the Federal Law BGBl. I Nr. 87/2020 on 24 July 2020 and entering into force on 25 July 2020, the Act replaced the previous narrow §§25a–25e Außenwirtschaftsgesetz 2011 (Foreign Trade Act) regime — under which fewer than 10 permits were issued from 2013 to mid-2020 — and transposes EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The InvKG introduces mandatory ex-ante notification and approval of non-EU / non-EEA / non-Swiss acquisitions where the acquirer crosses any of the 10% / 25% / 50% voting-rights thresholds in an Austrian target operating in the critical sectors listed in Annex Part 1 (especially sensitive: defence, energy / water / telecoms critical infrastructure, dual-use technology, cybersecurity, AI, quantum technology, robotics, semiconductors, biotech, health, vaccines) and 25% / 50% in the sectors listed in Annex Part 2 (broader, including media, food-security, electronic communications infrastructure, financial infrastructure). Administered by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Wirtschaft (BMAW), with case decisions taken in coordination with the Komitee für Investitionskontrolle (inter-ministerial Investment Control Committee) and, where the case is escalated to the EU cooperation mechanism, the Commission and EU peer Member States. The InvKG is Austria's functional peer of US CFIUS / FIRRMA, UK NSI Act 2021, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., Italy Golden Power Decree, Netherlands Wet Vifo, Denmark investeringsscreeningsloven, and Belgium ISC. Sunset clause: originally limited to 30 June 2022 under §17(2) InvKG; permanently extended by BGBl. I Nr. 80/2022 of 14 July 2022.
Royal Decree No. M/140, dated 19 Shawwal 1441H (11 June 2020), promulgated Saudi Arabia's Mining Investment Law, replacing the 2004 Mining Investment Law (Royal Decree M/47). The law establishes a modern licensing framework under the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM) and the Saudi Geological Survey (SGS), introduces five license categories (reconnaissance, exploration, exploitation, small-mine, building-materials quarry), permits 100% foreign ownership in mining, and sets out royalty and fiscal terms aligned with Vision 2030's goal of developing an estimated $1.3 trillion in identified mineral wealth. The law took effect on 1 January 2021 and serves as the statutory parent of every Saudi mining licensing round and strategic minerals initiative launched since that date.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.
On 26 July 2018 the Serbian government agreed to sell a 63% stake in RTB Bor — the state-owned copper mining complex in eastern Serbia — to Zijin Mining Group (HKG:2899) for approximately USD 350 million plus a committed investment of USD 1.26 billion over five years. The transaction closed on 24 September 2018 after Chinese MOFCOM and Serbian government approvals. RTB Bor operates the Bor open-pit copper mine and the Čukaru Peki underground mine. Under Zijin's management, combined annual copper output reached 296,000 tonnes in 2025, making Zijin the second-largest copper producer in Europe after KGHM (Poland). The complex also produces significant gold as a by-product. The acquisition was facilitated by the China-Serbia comprehensive strategic partnership and BRI connectivity framework. The Serbian government accepted Chinese investment at a discount to assessed asset value in exchange for committed capital expenditure in a region with limited Western private-sector appetite for brownfield copper. EU membership negotiations and EU state-aid rules complicated alternative European financing structures. Zijin financed the acquisition through a combination of corporate balance sheet and China Development Bank-syndicated loans. The Čukaru Peki mine, which was not included in the initial RTB Bor asset base, received a separate Zijin investment commitment exceeding USD 800 million.
Tanzania's Parliament enacted Act No. 5 of 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, as part of a landmark resource-nationalism legislative trio (alongside Act No. 6 on unconscionable contract renegotiation and Written Laws Miscellaneous Amendments No. 7), signed into law by President John Magufuli on 4 July 2017. The Act vests all of Tanzania's natural wealth and resources — minerals, oil and natural gas, fisheries, wildlife, forestry, water, and related sub-surface assets — as the permanent and inalienable property of the People of the United Republic, held in trust by the President on their behalf. Key operative provisions prohibit international commercial arbitration of natural-resource disputes (mandating adjudication within Tanzanian courts under Tanzanian law), empower Parliament to review and require renegotiation of any natural-resource arrangement containing "unconscionable terms," impose an in-country banking rule on earnings from natural wealth extraction, and authorise statutory override of contractual stabilisation clauses embedded in pre-2017 mining development agreements. The Act is the foundational parent statute underpinning all subsequent Tanzanian mining-sector reform, including the 2024 Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act critical/strategic minerals classification and the 2025 Finance Act mining amendments.
Loi n° 2014-138, adopted by the Assemblée nationale and promulgated by President Alassane Ouattara on 24 March 2014, is the foundational mining-rights statute governing all mineral prospecting, research, and exploitation in Côte d'Ivoire. Its 197 articles across 16 titles repeal the prior Loi n° 95-553 (1995 Code Minier) and establish the modern permit regime, a 10% state free-carry in all industrial mining projects via SODEMI, and the royalty + ad valorem fiscal architecture that underpins every subsequent mining-convention and fiscal-law amendment. As West Africa's second-largest gold producer (approx. 45 t/yr) with growing bauxite and manganese exploration, CI's mining-code architecture is a material determinant of supply-chain access for Western and Chinese industrial consumers of these commodities.
Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.
South Africa's Precious Metals Act 37 of 2005 establishes a standing, discretionary ministerial export-approval regime for platinum group metals. Section 12(2) provides that "no person may export any unwrought or semi-fabricated metals of the platinum group except with the written approval of the Minister which shall be granted subject to the promotion of equitable access to, and the orderly local beneficiation of such metals." The Act was assented to and published in the Government Gazette on 21 April 2006 (Act 37 of 2005) and commenced on 1 July 2007 per Presidential proclamation under s.25 (Government Gazette 30071 of 12 July 2007). South Africa supplies roughly 70-80% of global mined platinum, rhodium and iridium output, making this the register's first PGM-specific ZA export instrument (prior ZA filings — MPRDA 2002, the 2025 Mineral Resources Development Bill, IDS 2026 — are generic mining-law/industrial-policy instruments rather than PGM-specific export controls).