Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.

France updated its 2020 National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Strategy at the Comité interministériel de l'Innovation on 10 April 2025, releasing SNH II under the direction of the Prime Minister and Industry Minister Marc Ferracci. The 2025 actualisation revises capacity targets to 6.5 GW of low-carbon hydrogen production by 2030 and 10 GW by 2035, funded within the France 2030 plan's €9 billion hydrogen envelope (€4 bn for electrolysers, €1.5 bn for end-uses, €2 bn for IPCEI Hy2Tech/Hy2Use French share). A new €4 billion price-support mechanism guarantees low-carbon hydrogen competitiveness against fossil hydrogen for 15 years; the strategy aligns France's "décarboné" taxonomy to include both nuclear-electricity-based and renewable-electricity-based hydrogen, distinct from EU RFNBO additionality rules.

In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.

On 2 October 2025, Navoiyuran State Enterprise (45%), French nuclear-fuel-cycle company Orano SA (45%), and Japanese trading house ITOCHU Corporation (10%) completed the restructuring of their Nurlikum Mining joint venture, unlocking industrial development of the South Djengeldi uranium deposit in Uzbekistan's Kyzylkum Desert (Navoi region). The initial shareholder framework was signed in Paris on 10 March 2025. The project plans to produce approximately 500 tU/year over a ten-year mine life using in-situ leaching (ISL) technology, with production start targeted for Q4 2025, creating a Western-and-Japan-supply-chain-aligned uranium stream distinct from the Rosatom/ Kazatomprom-dominated channel.

On 27 February 2025, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted Law No. 33/2025 amending Law No. 174/2021 on the mechanism for examining investments of importance for state security. The law entered into force on 20 April 2025 after publication in Monitorul Oficial Nr. 144-147 of 20 March 2025 (promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 118-X of 17 March 2025). Key operative changes expand the protected-sector perimeter to explicitly enumerate 17 categories covering data processing and storage, AI, robotics, cybersecurity, semiconductors, quantum, nanotechnology and biotechnology alongside the pre-existing energy, transport, communications, defence and aerospace pillars; add new grounds for refusal (money-laundering suspicion, corruption convictions, foreign-government control, cybersecurity risk, access to personal data of citizens); introduce enhanced Council powers including retroactive review of previously approved investments and fines of up to 5% of annual turnover (capped at MDL 5 million); and carve out intra-group transactions, asset sales below EUR 1 million, and state-owned-enterprise dealings. The Screening Council became operational in July 2025.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to impose a new "Regional Stability – Pakistan" (RS-PAK) licence requirement on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to Pakistan of items classified under six previously-uncontrolled-for-Pakistan ECCNs: 1B999, 2A992, 2B999 (excluding 2B999.h.2), 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. The covered items — process-control equipment, high-pressure piping and valves, oscilloscopes, electronic test equipment, magnetometers, and related dual-use industrial gear — are associated with unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile end-uses. Licence applications are reviewed case-by-case to assess diversion risk to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programmes, and to entities already on the Entity List or front companies acting on their behalf. Issued as a final rule under ECRA §1762(a) (no notice-and-comment); originally effective 25 November 2024 with the corresponding amendatory instructions, with the substantive licence requirement effective 26 December 2024 (post C1-2024-27648 correction published 29 November 2024).

Mongolia's State Great Hural adopted a comprehensive package of amendments to the 2009 Nuclear Energy Law on 21 November 2024 (approved by 68.1% of votes), restructuring the country's uranium-sector governance across three principal axes. The amendments introduce a dynamic three-tier uranium royalty framework — 5% basic (AMNAT) + 5% special + 0–9% price-linked incremental royalty, yielding approximately 14–19% aggregate — that replaces a flat-rate structure with a price-elastic mechanism designed to capture uranium supercycle upside for the Mongolian state. The law also prohibits export of radioactive minerals in raw ore form (mandatory domestic processing to at least yellowcake/U₃O₈ before export), prohibits import, transit, and disposal of foreign spent nuclear fuel in Mongolia, and provides the parliamentary legal underpinning for the ~USD 1.6 billion Orano (France)– Mongolia state investment agreement on the Zuuvch-Ovoo in-situ-leach uranium deposit (Dornogovi province), signed October 2024, targeting first production in 2028 with eventual ramp-up to ~2,500 t/yr uranium output.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), Bolivia's state lithium SOE, signed a contract in September 2024 with Uranium One Group — a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom state nuclear corporation — for the design, construction, and initial operation of an industrial direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) carbonation plant at Salar de Uyuni, with initial capacity of 14,000 t/yr lithium carbonate (expandable to 25,000–45,000 t/yr), representing a total investment exceeding USD 970 million and a 51%/49% profit-split in Bolivia's favour. The contract was approved by Bolivia's Comisión de Economía Plural in February 2025 amid corruption allegations, then suspended by parliamentary motion on 14 February 2025; a Bolivian court issued a further precautionary suspension order on 27 May 2025 on human-rights, environmental, and Mother Earth rights grounds, while the Arce government continued to insist on legislative ratification through at least 29 May 2025.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.

On 20–21 June 2024 Niger's Ministry of Mines, acting under the CNSP military-transition government, formally notified the Director General of Imouraren SA (the Orano subsidiary holding the Imouraren uranium permit) that the perimeter of the "IMOURAREN Permit" returned to the public domain of Niger and was freed of all derived rights, in application of articles 59 and 61 of Ordinance no. 93-16 of 2 March 1993 (Niger Mining Law). The decision followed a 7 June 2024 ministerial "note d'information" giving Orano until 19 June to engage development works under the earlier 19 March 2024 mise en demeure, and the Ministry's finding that Orano's 26 April 2024 exploitation plan "did not meet our expectations". Imouraren is one of the world's largest known uranium deposits at ~200,000 t U (Orano-disclosed reserves, originally permitted to AREVA in January 2009 with mine-build paused after the 2011 Fukushima uranium-price collapse). Orano had held 63.4% of Imouraren SA against 36.6% by Niger state-owned Sopamin. Orano notified the public on 20 June 2024 that it took note of the decision, and on 4 December 2024 initiated ICSID arbitration against the Niger state contesting the revocation. The action is the first leg of the 2024–2025 Niger-Orano break (followed by the December 2024 announcement of loss of operational control over Somaïr / Cominak / Imouraren and the June 2025 Somaïr nationalisation announcement).

The Kyrgyz Republic's parliament adopted on 13 June 2024 — and President Sadyr Japarov signed into law on 27 June 2024 — amendments to the Law "On Subsoil" (No. 49 of 19 May 2018) that lift the constitutional-status prohibition on geological exploration, prospecting, and development of uranium and thorium deposits enacted in 2019 under President Jeenbekov. The law simultaneously invalidates the standalone 2019 prohibition statute and introduces a voluntary state-equity transfer mechanism allowing mining-rights holders to transfer company shares to the state for strategically important gold and coal deposits. Together with the January 2024 Presidential Decree No. 5 (Polymetals and REE National Project), the amendment forms the second pillar of President Japarov's mining reset, re-opening the Kyzyl-Ompol uranium-REE-ilmenite deposit in Issyk-Kul oblast (est. 2,000+ tU resource + significant Th₂O₃, REE, and ilmenite by-products) to Western and Asian operators for the first time since 2019.

BIS published a two-part final rule amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for cameras, systems, and related components, effective March 8, 2024. Part one creates new ECCN 6A293 controlling ultra-high-speed cameras (minimum exposure time ≤1 microsecond AND throughput ≥13.43 Giga-pixels per second at 205,000 fps) for nuclear nonproliferation (NP) reasons with no License Exception STA eligibility, capturing instruments used in weapons-test diagnostics not previously covered by 6A003 or 6A203. Part two lifts military-end-user (MEU) restrictions on ECCNs 0A504, 6A002, 6A003, 6A993.a, and 8A002.d for Country Group A:1 destinations (32 closest US allies including EU member states, Canada, Japan, Australia, UK, and South Korea), aligning controls with commercial availability and established allied strategic relationships.

On 18 October 2023 the Governor in Council registered Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations (SOR/2023-220) under the Special Economic Measures Act, citing Iran's proliferation- sensitive nuclear activities and weapons-of-mass-destruction-related programme as a grave breach of international peace and security. The amendment prohibits Canadians and Canadian entities from exporting, selling or supplying to Iran dual-use goods and technology, conventional arms (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships), Missile Technology Control Regime-listed equipment, and technical data related to ballistic missiles and nuclear-weapon delivery systems; it also bars importing arms and related material from Iran. The same instrument adds 156 entities and 18 individuals to Canada's Iran sanctions list (asset freeze / dealings prohibition).

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

Published August 29, 2023, this correction amends the Commerce Country Chart table (15 CFR Part 738, Supplement No. 1) to restore entries for the People's Republic of China and Macau under the Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP) column 2 that were erroneously omitted or mis-rendered in the August 21, 2023 correction notice (FR Doc 2023-18047). The correction is technically procedural but operationally significant: it formally establishes the NP2 "X" markings for China and Macau that trigger BIS licensing requirements for items in ECCNs 1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, and 2E290. Prior to the underlying August 14, 2023 final rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

Published August 21, 2023, BIS issued this correction to its August 14, 2023 final rule (FR Doc 2023-17243, 88 FR 55021) that expanded Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements for exports to the People's Republic of China and Macau. The correction addressed a typographical error in the Commerce Country Chart table (15 CFR Part 738, Supplement No. 1) as it appeared in the original Federal Register publication. The corrected tabular presentation introduced a secondary error that was subsequently fixed by a second correction notice (C1-2023-18047) published August 29, 2023; the substantive policy — NP2 licensing requirements for ECCNs 1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, and 2E290 destined for China and Macau — was established by the original August 14 rule and remained unchanged throughout the erratum chain.

BIS published a final rule on August 18, 2023, amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions reached at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary meetings in Nur-Sultan (June 2019) and Warsaw (June 2022). The rule revises five existing Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to align with multilateral commitments made by NSG participating governments. Changes include decontrolling water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns from ECCN 1B22, clarifying isotope purification scope in ECCN 1B231, and updating mass-unit terminology in ECCN 3A233. The rule takes effect immediately upon publication.

Effective August 11, 2023, BIS amended 15 CFR Parts 738 and 742 to add the People's Republic of China and Macau to Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements under the Export Administration Regulations. The rule inserts NP2 "X" column markings for China and Macau in the Commerce Country Chart, subjecting exports of eight ECCN families (1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, 2E290) to a BIS licence requirement. The measure was motivated by China's military modernisation, military-civil fusion strategy, and nuclear force expansion; prior to this rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

Decree-Law No. 104 of 10 August 2023 ("Decreto Asset" / Omnibus Decree, GU n.186 of 10 Aug 2023, in force 11 Aug 2023) was converted with amendments into Law No. 136 of 9 October 2023 (GU n.236 of 9 Oct 2023). The conversion law materially expanded Italy's "Golden Power" foreign-direct-investment screening regime (DL 21/2012). Two key extensions: (i) intra-group transactions involving entities outside the EU are no longer exempt from the exercise of special powers — only the prior notification carve-out was preserved; (ii) acts, resolutions and operations concerning intellectual-property rights in artificial intelligence, semiconductor production, cybersecurity, aerospace, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, and food production technologies fall within scope when one or more counter-parties sit outside the EU. The Prime Minister also obtained an explicit veto power over transactions creating "exceptional situations" not already covered by sectoral or EU prudential / merger rules, including those touching qualifying holdings in the financial sector.

On 24 February 2023, the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the US Department of State announced a package of sanctions designations under the executive order blocking property of persons engaged in harmful foreign activities of the Russian government (E.O. 14024). The State Department describes designating over 60 individuals and entities, including Russian officials and entities in Russia's advanced-technology sector, three enterprises that develop and operate Russia's nuclear weapons, and three civil nuclear entities within the Rosatom structure. The Treasury Department announced parallel designations, including four entities in the metals and mining sector.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/66, adopted 21 October 2022 and published in the Official Journal on 11 January 2023 (OJ L 9), replaces Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation) with an updated control list implementing the 2022 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Per GTA's tracking of the CN-code-level change, the update removed 7 six-digit CN codes and added 8 new ones. It entered into force on 12 January 2023, the day after publication.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 24 entities across 26 entries to the Entity List, effective December 8, 2022, covering Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. Three distinct enforcement clusters are addressed: Russian defense-electronics firms and their foreign affiliates supporting Russia's military-industrial base post-Ukraine invasion; Singapore-based front companies that supplied controlled items to PASNA, an Iran-based Specially Designated National; and Pakistani and Emirati entities engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic-missile proliferation. One entity (Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC) was simultaneously removed from three entries covering Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Presidential Resolution No. PP-319 of 14 July 2022 directed Navoiuran State Enterprise to more than double uranium output from approximately 3,500 tU/year to 7,100 tU/year by 2030, expand the national uranium reserve base to 100,000 tonnes through new exploration, and develop domestic nuclear-fuel-cycle conversion capacity alongside rare-metal co-extraction. The resolution simultaneously reorganised the uranium and rare-earth sector into a vertically integrated state enterprise — Navoiuran — spun out of the former Navoiy MMC JSC, placing the full extraction-to-conversion chain under state control.

The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities — 70 Russian and 1 Belarusian — to the Entity List, effective June 2, 2022, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The entities were designated as military end users acquiring or attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military, and are subject to a policy of denial for all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Sixty-six entities receive a "footnote 3" military end-user designation, while five face outright denial with no license exceptions available beyond humanitarian food and medicine.

At the Executive Branch's request, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an order suspending the general license authority in 10 CFR 110.21-110.24 for exports of source material, special nuclear material, byproduct material, and deuterium for nuclear end use to the Russian Federation, effective immediately on issuance (May 12, 2022) and published in the Federal Register on May 17, 2022. Exporters must now apply for a specific license under 10 CFR 110.31 for any such export to Russia, which the NRC evaluates case by case. The order followed the Executive Branch's determination that continued general-license exports to Russia were inimical to US common defense and security in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

SARS amended South Africa's Prohibited and Restricted Imports and Exports list on 2022-03-23 to add both import and export licensing requirements — administered with the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy — covering uranium ores and concentrates (HS 2612.10), molybdenum ores and concentrates (HS 2613.10), depleted-uranium transport containers and isotope projectors (HS 2844.10/20/30/40, 9022.19), nuclear-grade graphite, graphite blocks and graphite electrodes (HS 8545.11/19). Both directions of trade in these items now require a permit rather than moving freely across South African borders.

The Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 91 entities (across 96 entries) to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, in direct response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The listed entities span ten destinations — Belize, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malta, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom — and include Russian military research institutes, shipbuilding facilities, aerospace and electronics manufacturers, and suspected front companies in third countries used to circumvent EAR controls. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR; the review policy is denial for 86 entities and case-by-case (for US Government-supported space programs) for five.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 14, 2022, on nuclear nonproliferation and national security grounds. Five Pakistani engineering and chemical companies, one Chinese metal-powder manufacturer (Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co. Ltd.), and one UAE-based trading company (Odyssey General Trading FZC) were determined to be acting contrary to US foreign policy or national security interests. All seven entries impose a license requirement covering all EAR-jurisdiction items, with no license exceptions available; the license review policy is presumption of denial for the Chinese entity and per 15 CFR § 744.2(d) for the Pakistani and UAE entities.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.

France 2030 is a €54 billion public investment plan unveiled by President Emmanuel Macron on 12 October 2021 to fund breakthrough innovation and reindustrialisation across ten strategic priorities — small modular nuclear reactors, green hydrogen, low-carbon transport (incl. two million EVs/year), food/agritech, twenty drug therapies for cancer and chronic disease, cultural industries, space, deep-sea exploration, semiconductors and electronic components, and robotics/digital (AI/cloud). Two cross-cutting rules require 50% of investment to flow to decarbonisation and 50% to emerging innovative players. Operationalised from the 2022 budget law, the plan is coordinated by the Secrétariat général pour l'investissement (SGPI) under the Prime Minister and delivered by ANR, ADEME, Bpifrance and Caisse des Dépôts / Banque des Territoires.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule, in conjunction with a companion NRC rulemaking, transferring export licensing authority for non-nuclear deuterium from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Regulations. Deuterium and deuterium compounds (including heavy water) with a deuterium-to-hydrogen atom ratio exceeding 1:5000 that are intended for non-nuclear end use are added to ECCN 1C298 and made subject to Nuclear Proliferation (NP) controls on the Commerce Country Chart. Exports to NP column 2–controlled destinations require a BIS licence; deuterium for actual nuclear-reactor end use remains under NRC jurisdiction.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).

Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2019 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 22 ECCNs across nine CCL categories — including nuclear and conventional arms-related items, materials, manufacturing equipment, semiconductors, laser/sensor systems, and aerospace. The rule harmonises US controls with those of Wassenaar Participating States, maintaining competitive parity among allied exporters while preserving national-security licensing for non-partner destinations. Separately, the rule eliminated email notification and self-classification reporting obligations for most mass-market encryption products and publicly available encryption source code, reducing associated compliance submissions by an estimated 60–80%.

From 1 January 2021, the end of the EU exit transition period, the UK introduced a standalone import licensing requirement — the Nuclear Materials Import Licence (NMIL) — for "relevant" nuclear materials entering the UK, administered at the time by the Office for Nuclear Regulation under an Open General Import Licence framework and published via GOV.UK guidance on 31 December 2020. Coverage spans tariff heading 2612 (uranium ore and concentrates) and 2844 (plutonium, uranium-233, enriched uranium, natural uranium and related compounds/alloys, including spent or irradiated fuel elements). The requirement replaced the free-circulation treatment nuclear material imports from EU member states previously had inside the single market.

The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress on 17 October 2020 (Presidential Order No. 58) and entered into force on 1 December 2020. Comprising 5 chapters and 49 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework governing China's export-control regime over dual-use items, military items, nuclear items, and other goods, technologies, services, and data whose export could affect national security or China's non-proliferation obligations. The law introduces comprehensive licensing requirements, end-user and end-use certification, deemed-export and re-export controls with extraterritorial reach, a Controlled Entities List (CEL) with matching-entity restrictions, and substantial criminal and administrative penalties — and it is the parent statutory authority under which every China export-control implementing instrument in the IPTM register operates.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 47 entities across 51 entries to the EAR Entity List effective 22 September 2020, covering entities in China, Hong Kong, Iran, Pakistan, Canada, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK. All 47 entities were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. For 39 of the 47 entities BIS imposed a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption-of-denial review policy; the remaining eight face case-by-case review. The round targeted Iranian dual-use procurement networks, Chinese military-affiliated research institutes, and Pakistan-linked proliferators, reinforcing the layered export-control perimeter across multiple adversary programs simultaneously.

On 27 December 2017 President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed Code No. 125-VI ZRK "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use," a wholesale recodification replacing the 2010 Subsoil Use Law that entered into force on 29 June 2018 (with certain provisions deferred to 1 January 2019). The Code establishes the licensing architecture for all mineral extraction in Kazakhstan — the world's leading uranium producer (~40% of global U₃O₈ output, ~22,000 tU/yr) and a top-11 oil exporter (~1.8 mbpd) — covering solid minerals, hydrocarbons, and uranium under a single codified framework. For solid minerals the Code introduces a liberalised "first-come first-served" auction-free licence model for non-strategic deposits and a state-tender model for strategic deposits, alongside subsoil-use rights transfer and pledge provisions governing all M&A in the sector. For uranium the Code codifies the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom's statutory role as state operator over all uranium blocks, with government priority pre-emption rights and mandatory Kazatomprom participation in all production licences. For hydrocarbons the Code establishes the concession and production-sharing framework governing the pre-salt Caspian mega-projects (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan) and the model contract architecture for petroleum products. Horizontal obligations — local Kazakh-content procurement floors, social-package requirements, and environmental-restoration mine-closure security — apply across all subsoil-use categories. Structurally this Code is the parent statute for every subsequently filed KZ action: the 2023-12-28 REE Comprehensive Plan and the 2025-12-26 Kazatomprom uranium-priority amendments both operate under delegated authority created by this Code.

The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.

South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.