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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 19 March 2026 the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) announced the selection of 38 German projects across 12 federal Länder for the IPCEI Advanced Semiconductor Technologies (IPCEI AST) — the next Important Project of Common European Interest on semiconductors under EU State Aid Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The federal commitment is EUR 3 billion drawn from the Sondervermögen Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralität (SVIK), the EUR 100 bn special-purpose vehicle enacted via SVIKG in September 2025. The 38 selected projects span AI chips and chiplets, photonic integrated circuits, advanced manufacturing equipment, sensor technologies, and power electronics, with approximately one-third being startups and SMEs. The measure operationalises Germany's Microelectronics Strategy (October 2025) at the project-funding layer and is the first major SVIK semiconductor-tranche deployment.
On 7 January 2026 the National Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry Policy Committee (the "Semiconductor Board"), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Ekniti Nitithanprapas, endorsed the Draft National Strategy for the Development of the Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Industry, prepared by the Board of Investment (BOI) with Roland Berger after a public hearing in October 2025. The 25-year roadmap (2026-2050) targets more than THB 2.5 trillion (~USD 79.6 billion) in investment, training of more than 230,000 highly-skilled engineers, and construction of a complete upstream-to- downstream semiconductor ecosystem with phased milestones for 2030, 2040 and 2050. The strategy prioritises five product groups where Thailand has competitive potential — Power chips, Sensors, Photonics, Analog and Discrete chips — and explicitly aims to move the country beyond OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) into IC design and upstream wafer fabrication ("Made-in-Thailand chips"). Implementation runs through a five-pillar BOI support mechanism: long-term low-interest financing and grants, human-capital development, technology upgrade of the Microelectronics Technology Centre (TMEC), specialised industrial clusters with guaranteed renewable-energy and water security, and streamlined regulatory approvals including a new BOI "FastPass" fast-track facility (16 pilot projects worth THB 170 billion already processed).
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 8/2026 on 3 January 2026, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 95 individuals and 70 legal entities, the large majority of them Russian citizens, residents, and companies. The designees manufacture or supply communications equipment, radio-electronic warfare (REB) systems, and microelectronics for Russia's defense-industrial complex, alongside chemical, mining, metallurgical, and fuel-and-energy-sector entities and their managers. The decree entered into force on 6 January 2026, the date of official publication.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.
The European Investment Bank and STMicroelectronics signed a EUR 500 million financing agreement, the first tranche of a EUR 1 billion credit line approved by the EIB, to support semiconductor research, development and high-volume manufacturing investments at ST's Catania and Agrate sites in Italy and its Crolles site in France. About 60% of the facility is earmarked for high-volume manufacturing capacity and 40% for R&D. It is the ninth financing agreement between EIB and STMicroelectronics since 1994, bringing cumulative EIB financing to the company to roughly EUR 4.2 billion, and is explicitly framed by the EIB around European semiconductor competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
SETT, the operational vehicle of Spain's PERTE Chip programme, announced a EUR 9.5 million public investment in Ideaded, a Viladecans (Barcelona) company developing microchips on alternative substrates to silicon. The funding is earmarked to complete Spain's first pilot plant for silicon-alternative microchips, financed under the Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia (NextGenerationEU). Target output is 50 wafers/month (first wafer expected 2026) plus up to 300 million RFID antennas/year, aimed at advanced-computing, AI and defence applications.
On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.
On 15 October 2025 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the Microelectronics Strategy of the Federal Government, jointly presented by the Federal Ministry for Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE). The strategy is the first comprehensive cabinet-adopted German microelectronics policy framework in over a decade and operationalises Germany's contribution to the European Chips Act envelope. It is organised around three pillars — Research, Skilled Labour and Production — and creates a "Chips Office" to coordinate stakeholder interaction and implementation. It establishes a competence centre for chip design and a flagship "supercomputer in the car" project, and is framed as a key implementation instrument under the High-Tech Agenda Germany (HTAD) and as Germany's contribution to the September 29 2025 Semicon Declaration signed by all 27 EU member states calling for a revised EU Chips Act II.
On 18 September 2025, as part of the third phase of France's national AI strategy under the France 2030 programme, the government opened the "Pionniers de l'intelligence artificielle" (Pioneers of AI) call for projects, operated by Bpifrance and the NALU ("Numérique, Algorithmes, Logiciels et Usages") agency program led by Inria. The scheme funds disruptive AI technologies and applications across industrial robotics, healthcare, energy production/distribution and manufacturing through a three-phase funnel: Phase 1 (technical feasibility, EUR 100k-200k over 6-12 months), Phase 2 (demonstrator, EUR 400k-800k over 6-18 months) and Phase 3 (market launch, EUR 3-8M over 1-3 years), with projects re-vetted for technological and economic relevance between phases. Submissions run 11 September 2025 to 9 June 2026 across multiple deadline windows; as of the government's 18 June 2026 update, 51 projects (23 in a first round, 28 in a second) had been selected, including firms such as IMIND (microelectronics), Skipper NDT, Sagacity Health, Lutece Dynamics, HyprView, DeepLife, Phagos and Wintics, alongside multiple Inria-led projects.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.
BIS amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to clarify controls on radiation hardened integrated circuits (rad-hard ICs) and equipment — including computer and telecommunications devices — that incorporate them. The rule affirms the availability of License Exception GOV for rad-hard ICs acquired pursuant to an official written request or directive from the Department of Defense or Department of Energy. It also expands License Exception GOV to cover microelectronics exports, reexports, and in-country transfers made under U.S. Government contracts that explicitly provide for such transactions, removing export-control obstacles for official government business. Published at 89 FR 18353–59 (FR Doc 2024-05267), effective on publication date.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).
President Biden signed Executive Order 14105 on 9 August 2023, "Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern", establishing the first dedicated US outbound-investment screening regime. The EO directs Treasury to prohibit or require notification of US investments in Chinese (and Hong Kong, Macau) entities engaged in three categories of technology: (1) semiconductors and microelectronics, (2) quantum information technologies, (3) artificial intelligence systems. After a public-comment process, Treasury issued the final rule (31 CFR Part 850) on 28 October 2024, effective 2 January 2025.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.
The Bureau of Industry and Security added 24 entities across 26 entries to the Entity List, effective December 8, 2022, covering Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates. Three distinct enforcement clusters are addressed: Russian defense-electronics firms and their foreign affiliates supporting Russia's military-industrial base post-Ukraine invasion; Singapore-based front companies that supplied controlled items to PASNA, an Iran-based Specially Designated National; and Pakistani and Emirati entities engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic-missile proliferation. One entity (Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC) was simultaneously removed from three entries covering Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added seven Chinese entities — under seven entries — to the Entity List, effective August 24, 2022, for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization efforts. The entities span China's state-owned aerospace, space-technology, electronics, and control-systems research institutes. All seven entries carry a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.
The UK laid the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (UKSI 2022/748), in force 5 July 2022, extending the Belarus sanctions regime to mirror measures already imposed on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The regulations ban export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes, and of critical-industry goods and technology including quantum-computing components, microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft/aircraft parts. They widen existing import bans to cover a greater range of petroleum/mineral products and prohibit import of arms, iron and steel products originating in or consigned from Belarus, and extend financial sanctions barring Belarusian companies from issuing debt or securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks, and barring UK persons from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance.
The Spanish Council of Ministers approved on 24 May 2022 the Strategic Project for the Recovery and Economic Transformation of Microelectronics and Semiconductors (PERTE Chip) within the framework of the Plan de Recuperacion, Transformacion y Resiliencia (financed in large part by NextGenerationEU funds). The package commits a public envelope of roughly EUR 12.25bn through 2027 across four lines: scientific R&D capacity (~EUR 1.165bn), chip design including fabless companies (~EUR 1.330bn), manufacturing-plant construction including front-end below-5nm and above-5nm fabs (~EUR 9.350bn), and dynamisation of ICT/electronics manufacturing including a venture fund for semiconductor startups (~EUR 0.400bn). The Sociedad Espanola para la Transformacion Tecnologica (SETT), formally constituted by Real Decreto 676/2024 of 16 July 2024, is the operational vehicle managing more than EUR 10.75bn of the envelope.
On 28 February 2022, South Korea's government condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and announced it would strengthen export control review to block strategic items -- microelectronics, telecommunications equipment, sensors, navigation equipment, avionics, marine equipment, and aircraft components -- from reaching Russia. The statement also committed Korea to joining the exclusion of designated Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system, with implementation details to follow through interagency consultation, alongside plans to release strategic petroleum reserves and divert LNG cargoes to Europe.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4501–4568) is the foundational US statute governing wartime and emergency industrial mobilization. Signed by President Truman on 8 September 1950 during the Korean War, the Act empowers the President to compel industrial priority-rated ordering (Title I / DPAS), authorize direct investment in domestic production capacity for critical industries (Title III), and conduct investment security review (Title VII, precursor to CFIUS). Reauthorized approximately 50 times, most recently extended through September 2025 by Pub. L. 115-263 (2018) and further extended under NDAA FY2026; it has been invoked by every Administration since 1950 and has accelerated dramatically since 2020 to target critical-minerals processing, semiconductor manufacturing, battery supply chains, biopharmaceuticals, and energy infrastructure.