Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

India's Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways notified operational guidelines on 26 December 2025 for two paired shipbuilding subsidy schemes with a combined outlay of ₹44,700 crore (~USD 5.4bn). SBFAS (₹24,736 crore corpus) provides 15–25% per-vessel financial assistance tiered by vessel category, with milestone-linked disbursement and a 40% scrap-value credit for vessels broken at Indian yards. SbDS (₹19,989 crore outlay) funds greenfield shipbuilding clusters, brownfield-yard modernisation, and establishment of an India Ship Technology Centre. Both schemes are valid to 31 March 2036 with an in-principle extension to 2047, with applicability for shipbuilding contracts signed from 24 September 2025. On 7 January 2026 the guidelines were amended to include chemical tankers under SBFAS Category-1.

Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) and the Cabinet Office jointly published the Shipbuilding Revival Roadmap (造船業再生ロードマップ) on 26 December 2025, redefining shipbuilding as a "national strategic industry" within an All-Japan shipping-and-shipbuilding framework. The Roadmap targets doubling domestic shipbuilding capacity from ~9 million GT to 18 million GT by 2035 (re-capturing roughly 20% global market share) backed by a ¥1 trillion (~USD 6.4 bn) public-private investment commitment over three staged phases (2026-28 automation, 2029-31 facility expansion, 2032-34 dock-operation support), mandates consolidation of domestic shipbuilders into 1-3 groups by 2028, and is funded in its first three years by a ¥120 bn FY2025 supplementary budget enacted in December 2025.

The Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 on 18 December 2025, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, to add 41 vessels to Annex XLII of the Russia sanctions regime. Of these, 36 vessels are designated for transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products while engaging in irregular and high-risk shipping practices characteristic of the "shadow fleet," 5 vessels are designated for transporting stolen Ukrainian grain and cultural property, and 1 vessel (GT HONOR) is designated for facilitating violation or circumvention of EU sanctions. Listed vessels are banned from access to EU member-state ports and locks and from a broad range of maritime-transport-related services, effective 19 December 2025. The measure is an incremental listing update between the 19th (Regulation 2025/2033, October 2025) and 20th (Regulation 2026/506, April 2026) numbered sanctions packages, rather than a new package itself.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.

On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.

On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.

On 11 December 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six shipping companies — registered in the Marshall Islands (4), British Virgin Islands (1), and the United Kingdom (1) — and their six crude-oil tankers as blocked property under Executive Order 13850 for operating in Venezuela's oil sector. The vessels (WHITE CRANE, KIARA M, MONIQUE, LATTAFA, H. CONSTANCE, and TAMIA) had loaded Venezuelan crude in September/October 2025 and allegedly used AIS spoofing and other deceptive shipping practices to evade detection. The same action separately designated four individuals — including two nephews of Cilia Flores (Nicolas Maduro's wife) under the counter-narcotics authority EO 14059, a former PDVSA official under EO 13692, and a Panamanian facilitator under EO 13850 — but the shipping-company/tanker designations are the action's primary trade-control component.

Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.

On 10 November 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce and four other departments issued Announcement No. 73 of 2025, adjusting the "Catalogue of Precursor Chemicals for Export to Specific Countries (Regions)" and adding the United States, Canada and Mexico to the "Specific Countries (Regions) Directory" under the Interim Provisions on the Management of Exports of Precursor Chemicals to Specific Countries (Regions). Exporters must now apply for a license before shipping 13 newly listed categories of precursor chemicals (used in illicit fentanyl and other synthetic-drug manufacture) to these three countries; exports of the same chemicals to other destinations remain unrestricted. The measure took effect the same day it was announced.

New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.

At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

China's Ministry of Transport (Water Transport Bureau, document 交办水〔2025〕59号), acting under the PRC International Maritime Transport Regulations, issued a measure on 10 October 2025 imposing escalating special port service fees on U.S.-linked vessels calling at Chinese ports from 14 October 2025. Fees apply at the first Chinese port of call per voyage to (i) U.S.-owned, (ii) U.S.-operated, (iii) ≥25% U.S.-equity, (iv) U.S.-flagged, or (v) U.S.-built vessels, charged per net ton on a stepped schedule (¥400/NT from 14 Oct 2025, ¥640/NT from 17 Apr 2026, ¥880/NT from 17 Apr 2027, ¥1,120/NT from 17 Apr 2028) and capped at five voyages per vessel per year. The measure is the first MOT-issued trade-remedy instrument in the IPTM register and the direct, named-target mirror response to USTR's 17 April 2025 Section 301 maritime Notice of Action. Both regimes were mutually suspended for one year from 10 November 2025 through 9 November 2026 following the 30 October 2025 Trump-Xi Busan meeting.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

Russia's government imposed a temporary ban on exports of diesel fuel, marine (bunker) fuel and other gas oils (EAEU HS codes 2710 19 421 0 - 2710 19 429 0), including volumes purchased on exchange trading, effective 1 October 2025. The measure was framed as a domestic fuel-market stabilisation tool and initially exempted direct refinery producers from the ban. Russia is one of the world's largest diesel/gasoil exporters, so a full-coverage export halt on these grades has global gasoil-market significance, not just a regional effect. The ban has since been extended and tightened four times through mid-2026 (see amendments).

India's Union Cabinet, chaired by PM Narendra Modi, approved a ₹25,000 crore ($3bn) Maritime Development Fund (MDF) on 24 September 2025 as part of the broader ₹69,725 crore shipbuilding and maritime package. The MDF comprises a ₹20,000 crore Maritime Investment Fund (MIF) — a blended-finance Category-I Alternative Investment Fund with the Government of India contributing up to 49% of capital at concessional rates and the remaining 51% raised from ports and private/commercial investors — and a ₹5,000 crore Interest Incentivization Fund (IIF) that subsidises loan interest costs for shipyards and shipowners to lower the effective cost of debt. The fund is designed to run through FY 2026-36 and is projected to catalyse up to ₹1.5 lakh crore (~$18bn) in maritime-sector investment by 2030, covering shipbuilding, ship repair, ports, inland waterways, coastal shipping and tonnage-capacity expansion.

Decreto 685/2025, signed by President Javier Milei with Chief of Cabinet Guillermo Francos and Economy Minister Luis Caputo, cuts Argentina's Derecho de Exportación (DEX) rate to 0% on 145 meat and live-animal products (98 six-digit NCM codes) — bovine, poultry, porcine, caprine, and ovine — from the previously applicable 5% rate. Published in the Boletín Oficial on 23 September 2025 and effective 24 September, the measure runs through 31 October 2025. Exporters must liquidate at least 90% of foreign-exchange proceeds within three business days of shipping- permit authorization or lose the 0% rate retroactively. Government and press estimates put the anticipated foreign-exchange liquidation impact at USD 800M-1.2B over the window, against an estimated USD 150-200M fiscal cost in foregone export-duty revenue.

Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.

Japan lowered its price cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, effective for contracts concluded on or after 12 September 2025, aligning with the EU's July 2025 cut under its 18th sanctions package. The measure bars Japanese entities from importing, or providing shipping, insurance, financing or other services for, Russian crude priced above the new cap. In the same package Japan added 47 Russian entities and 9 individuals, 6 Crimea/Donbas-linked persons and entities, and 3 third-country entities to its asset-freeze list (transactions now require Ministry of Finance approval), and imposed export prohibitions on 2 Russian entities and 9 entities in third countries. Japan's own Russian crude imports are minimal (~0.1% of total crude imports, Jan-Jul 2025), so the measure is primarily a coalition-alignment and shipping/insurance-chokepoint action rather than a material change to Japan's own energy sourcing.

New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.

On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.

On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.

On 3 September 2025, OFAC announced a civil penalty settlement with Fracht FWO Inc. — a Houston, Texas-based freight forwarder and US subsidiary of Switzerland-headquartered Fracht AG — under which the company agreed to pay USD 1,610,775 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple OFAC sanctions programs. The violations arose from Fracht FWO's brokering of cargo shipments involving EMTRASUR, a wholly owned subsidiary of OFAC-designated Venezuelan state airline CONVIASA, on a Mexico-to-Argentina route on which Iranian crew members were subsequently discovered. Fracht self-initiated a voluntary disclosure to OFAC after learning of the Iranian crew involvement, triggering mitigating credit, and undertook extensive remedial compliance measures. The settlement resolves apparent violations of the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR), Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (WMDPSR), Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR).

On 2 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra'i, a dual Iraqi/St Kitts-and-Nevis citizen, along with his UAE-based shipping manager Babylon and five Marshall Islands-registered shell companies (Tryfo Navigation, Keely Shiptrade, Odiar Management, Panarea Marine, Topsail Shipholding) that hold registered ownership of nine Liberia-flagged tankers (ADENA, LILIANA, CAMILLA, DELFINA, BIANCA, ROBERTA, ALEXANDRA, BELLAGIO, PAOLA). The network blends Iranian crude with Iraqi oil via ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian Gulf and at Iraqi ports, then markets the blend as solely Iraqi-origin to evade US sanctions, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian regime and al-Samarra'i. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902 and blocks all US property and interests of the designated individual, entities and vessels.

Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to certify, from 21 August 2025, that vessels calling at Turkish ports have no Israeli ownership or agency ties and carry no military or hazardous cargo destined for Israel; Israeli-flagged or Israeli-linked ships were barred from Turkish ports outright, and Turkish-flagged vessels were barred from calling at Israeli ports. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed and formalised the measures — alongside a parallel closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government/military flights — in an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on 29 August 2025, stating Türkiye had "completely cut off trade with Israel." The measure operationalises and tightens enforcement of Türkiye's broader Israel trade suspension (in place since May 2024) by closing the maritime transshipment channel that had allowed indirect trade to continue.

On 12 August 2025 the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF) amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 497, adopting — within its own delegated competence and ahead of the full Federal Council decision — an interim tranche of measures aligning Switzerland with the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025). The amendment lowers the Russian-crude price cap and updates the associated Annex 28 price-threshold table, extends export prohibitions on transport services, adds port-access restrictions covering 105 additional shadow-fleet vessels, and widens controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments for Russian financial institutions. It also extends asset-freeze listings to entities in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Mauritius, Azerbaijan, India and the UAE implicated in circumvention. The measure took effect 12 August 2025. The Federal Council closed out the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the 18th package on 29 October 2025 (see responds_to).

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 21 July 2025 the UK announced 137 new sanctions designations under its Russia regime, targeting 135 oil tankers identified as part of Russia's "shadow fleet" plus two enabling companies: Litasco Middle East DMCC (a Dubai-based trading arm linked to Lukoil, sanctioned for moving Russian oil on shadow-fleet vessels) and Intershipping Services LLC (sanctioned for registering shadow-fleet vessels under the Gabonese flag). FCDO states the targeted vessels have carried an estimated $24 billion of cargo since the start of 2024, and that Intershipping's flag-registration activity has enabled up to $10 billion/year in Russian state-linked shipping. The action was announced alongside a further lowering of the UK/EU Crude Oil Price Cap and runs as a companion measure to the EU's 18th sanctions package (Council Regulation 2025/1494), adopted three days earlier.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Guinea's Council of Ministers activated a longstanding right in the Mining Code on 14 July 2025, mandating that at least 50% of all bauxite export volumes be shipped on Guinean-flag vessels. To operationalise the mandate, the government simultaneously created Guinéenne des Transports Maritimes (GUITRAM), a 100% state-owned maritime company designated as the exclusive Guinean-flag carrier for the mandated share. A complementary Guinea Bauxite Index (GBX) was launched simultaneously to establish a state-managed reference price for export pricing. The measures redirect freight revenues — estimated at $15–25 per tonne — from existing (predominantly Chinese-controlled) shipping operators toward the Guinean state, applied to approximately 130 Mt/year of exports that constitute roughly 60% of global seaborne bauxite supply.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a network of UAE- and UK-based companies controlled by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said that has smuggled Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi crude since at least 2020, plus five additional shadow-fleet vessel owners based in Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The action, taken pursuant to E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum sector) and E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism), also identifies several tankers as blocked property and marks the eighth round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's Iran maximum-pressure campaign. Concurrently, the State Department designated six additional entities and four vessels under E.O. 13846.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated four individuals, twelve entities, and two vessels in what Treasury called its single largest action to date against Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis), pursuant to Executive Order 13224 as amended. The designated network — Sana'a- and Hudaydah-based oil-trading front companies (including Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives, Star Plus Yemen, Tamco Establishment, Royal Plus Shipping, and Abbot Trading) and their Houthi operator-owners — facilitates black-market oil and oil-derivative sales that fund Houthi militant operations, while shipping firms Best Way Tanker Corp, Ocean Voyage LLC, and Atlantis M. Shipping Co were designated for discharging over 120,000 combined metric tons of gasoline and LPG at the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port via the vessels Valente and Atlantis MZ after the April 2025 expiration of Counter Terrorism General License 25A. The action builds on OFAC's June 2024–April 2025 cadence of designations against Houthi leaders, weapons-procurement operatives, and suppliers.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated one individual, eight entities, and one vessel pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators) for procuring and transshipping sensitive machinery to Iran's Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (RRA), a producer of UAV components and aerospace software for the IRGC. The vessel SHUN KAI XING, owned by Hong Kong-based Unico Shipping Co Ltd and chartered by Singapore-based V-Shipping Pte Ltd, was carrying the machinery for RRA and an affiliated firm when its cargo was inspected; the designated network — including China-based Shenzhen Xinxin Shipping, Dongguan Zanyin Machinery and Equipment, Athena Shipping, shipmaster Zhang Yanbing, and Turkiye-based Edisa Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi — then falsified bills of lading to obscure the Iran-bound, RRA-consigned cargo after the inspection.

New Zealand's Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 3) 2025, made under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022, came into force on 19 June 2025 designating seven entities and ten individuals -- including North Korean, Iranian and Belarusian actors supporting Russia's war effort and Russian actors involved in drone and weaponry production. The same instrument created a new "restricted ship" category under Regulation 8 and sanctioned 27 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet under it, and expanded the Regulation 12 legal-services exception. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on New Zealand persons supplying services to them.

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).

On 20 May 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List, adding 82 entries (20 individuals and 62 entities) under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. OFSI's accompanying Financial Sanctions Notice confirms all 82 are now subject to an asset freeze and trust services sanctions. The package covers three clusters: further members of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA) disinformation network (first designated in 2024); Russian financial institutions including the St Petersburg Currency Exchange, the Petersburg Settlement Center, and the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency; and individuals and companies supporting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" logistics, including a British national accused of ship procurement and two tanker captains. The measures were published in coordination with the EU's 17th sanctions package, announced the same day.

On 13 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated nearly two dozen firms and individuals — including Hong Kong-based intermediary Star Energy International Limited — for operating in Iran's illicit international oil trade on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy), the Tehran-based oil-sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). The designated network spans commercial intermediaries and shipping counterparties across China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the last a hub for ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian-origin crude. Designations were made under counter-terrorism (SDGT) and Iran Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) authorities as part of the administration's maximum-pressure campaign to cut off military and IRGC-linked revenue from Iran's oil exports.

On 8 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated China-based "teapot" refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. and its Singapore-based broker subsidiary Xing AO Energy PTE. LTD., three firms tied to a Dongying Port (Shandong) terminal that has received Iranian crude from shadow-fleet tankers, and six Hong Kong-, UK-, and Marshall Islands-owned shadow-fleet vessels (STAR TWINKLE 6, LAMD, SKADI, BIG MAG, IMPALAS, THANE) plus their owning shipping companies and two vessel captains. It is OFAC's third action against an Iranian-oil teapot refinery and its first targeting Shandong port terminal operators, taken under E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum/ petrochemical sector) and E.O. 13846 (NIOC support) as part of the administration's NSPM-2 maximum-pressure campaign.

The European Commission approved, under EU State aid rules (Case SA.111368), Italy's reintroduction of tax and social-security relief for shipping companies that register vessels in the Italian International Register ("Registro Internazionale"). The scheme, worth an estimated EUR 5.4 billion, runs for a ten-year period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2033 and grants qualifying operators — including cruise-ship shipboard concessionaires — corporate income-tax reductions, withholding-tax credits, and exemptions from seafarer social-security and welfare contributions. The stated aim is to encourage ship registration under EU/EEA flags, strengthen the competitiveness of the Italian-flagged fleet, and raise compliance with EU social, environmental and safety standards; undertakings in financial difficulty are excluded.

Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce issued Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 750(I)/2025 on 4 May 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 (XXXIX of 1950), prohibiting (i) the import into Pakistan of goods of Indian origin by third countries via sea, land, and air; (ii) the transit through Pakistan of goods imported from India by third countries via sea and air; and (iii) exports from third countries to India via Pakistani sea, land, and air routes. The SRO was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary (Part I) and took effect immediately. A clarification memorandum issued by the Ministry of Commerce on 8 May 2025 confirmed exemptions for Reshipment-on- Board (RoB) cargo and for shipments where the bill of lading or letter of credit was issued before 4 May 2025. The 10 May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire did not lift the SRO; it remains in force.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

USTR concluded its Section 301 investigation (initiated 17 April 2024) into China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and on 17 April 2025 issued a Notice of Action imposing tiered port-entry service fees on Chinese-owned, -operated, and Chinese-built vessels arriving at U.S. ports starting 14 October 2025 (USD 50/net ton escalating to USD 80/NT in Apr 2026, USD 110/NT in Apr 2027, and USD 140/NT in Apr 2028; capped at 5 charges per vessel per year). The action also proposed a 100% tariff on China-built or China-component ship-to-shore cranes and additional 20-100% tariffs on China-origin shipping containers, truck chassis, and chassis parts. The entire action was subsequently suspended for one year (10 Nov 2025 through 9 Nov 2026) by USTR Modification Notice (FR 2025-19873) at presidential direction following the 1 Nov 2025 Trump-Xi trade deal.

The Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) opened "Investeringsstøtten" (Investment Support), a DKK 1 billion grant pool running 2025-2030, targeting the CO2-intensive companies most exposed to Denmark's phased-in industrial CO2 tax. Eligible firms must emit on average at least 1,500 tonnes of CO2/year and see tax payments rise by at least 2.3% of gross value added under the new levy. In its first annual tranche (2025), the pool disbursed DKK 36 million, funding up to 60% of eligible costs at a rate of DKK 1,000 per tonne of CO2 abated for investments such as fossil-fuel boiler replacement with heat pumps or district heating. Qualifying sectors include general industrial processes, mineralogical processing, oil refining, domestic shipping ("indenrigssøfart" — including domestic ferries), and North Sea offshore activity. Legal basis is the "Aftale om Grøn skattereform for industri mv." (Green Tax Reform Agreement for Industry) of 22 June 2022, implemented via a Danish executive order (bekendtgørelse) on CO2-reduction subsidies for CO2-intensive enterprises, and notified to the European Commission under the General Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014.

On 24 February 2025, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted the 16th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 amending Regulation 833/2014 and a cluster of associated regulations (2025/389, 2025/390, 2025/392, 2025/398, 2025/401). The package introduces the EU's first import ban on Russian primary aluminium (CN 7601) under a 275 kt transition quota (~80% of 2024 volumes), expels 13 additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial-messaging system, adds 74 vessels (153 total) to the shadow-fleet port-access and services ban, prohibits any temporary storage of Russian crude and petroleum products in EU ports, bans transactions with major Russian airports (Moscow Vnukovo, Zhukovsky) and ports (Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk) used for sanctions circumvention, extends flight-ban coverage to 25 third-country airlines operating domestic Russian routes, and adds 83 asset-freeze listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) under Regulation 269/2014. Parallel measures cover Belarus and the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Entry into force on 25 February 2025.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), with the UK Foreign Office, announced on 13 January 2025 a sanctions package targeting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" — vessels operated outside Western maritime insurance and flag-state registries to evade the G7+ Russian crude price cap (set at $60/bbl since December 2022). The package designated 18 vessels (oil tankers transporting Russian crude in violation of the cap) and traders, with separate designations of two LNG carriers and two oil-services firms. This is the largest single UK shadow-fleet designation to date and was synchronised with EU Council and US OFAC packages in mid-January 2025.

On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.