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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor equipment. Company profile →
EKSMA Optics is the trading name of Optolita UAB, a Vilnius, Lithuania-based manufacturer of laser and nonlinear-optical crystals, optical components (mirrors, lenses, filters, windows), electro-optics (Pockels cells and drivers), and opto-mechanics, with an in-house ion-beam-sputtering coatings department. It traces back to the EKSMA workshop founded in 1983 as a spin-out of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Physics; the components business was formally reorganized into Optolita UAB / EKSMA Optics on 1 July 2008, as the sister company to laser-systems maker Ekspla under the EKSMA Group umbrella. It is privately held; no public financial disclosure is available.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where EKSMA Optics produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Silver and gallium — both are constituent elements of the company's AgGaS2 (AGS) and AgGaSe2 (AGSe) nonlinear crystals, used for mid-IR frequency conversion; gallium in particular is subject to China's 2023 export-licensing regime.
Tungsten — a constituent of the potassium-gadolinium/yttrium-tungstate host crystals (Yb:KGW, Nd:KGW) in the laser-crystal catalog; a minor, embedded exposure rather than a bulk input, but a genuine one. No company-specific evidence was found for tin, tantalum, helium, or silicon usage (present in the prior sector-derived stub); these have been d…
Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
Lithium — present in several marketed nonlinear-optical crystal lines: LBO (lithium triborate), LiIO3 (lithium iodate), and LiNbO3/MgO:LiNbO3 (lithium niobate), used for frequency conversion and electro-optic modulation.
Germanium — the company runs a dedicated germanium-components product line (Ge windows held from stock; other Ge optics on request) for IR optics; germanium is a by-product metal with a small, concentrated (China-dominant) global refining base.
Silver and gallium — both are constituent elements of the company's AgGaS2 (AGS) and AgGaSe2 (AGSe) nonlinear crystals, used for mid-IR frequency conversion; gallium in particular is subject to China's 2023 export-licensing regime.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
US · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with President Xi and me" — China to supply "full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, up front" to US; if formally enacted, would suspend or ease China's April 2025 rare earth export licensing regime (filed 2025-04-04-china-mofcom-rare-earth-export-licensing) for US-bound shipments; China's Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang confirmed "in principle" framework consensus from the June 5 Trump-Xi call; tariff framework: US 55% / China 10%; China April 2025 rare earth controls (heavy/medium REEs, including Dy/Tb NdFeB magnets, SmCo magnets) remain formally active — no MOFCOM suspension announcement found as of June 15, 2026; the deal is political but not yet implemented as a formal regulation or bilateral MOU
source ↗Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
United States supplies 13% of world neodymium mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇺🇸 US: 🇨🇳 CN 83% · 🇦🇺 AU 8.9% · 🇲🇲 MM 6.7% · 🇹🇭 TH 1.4% — shares renormalised after removing US.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungstenneodymiumlithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — a constituent of the potassium-gadolinium/yttrium-tungstate host crystals (Yb:KGW, Nd:KGW) in the laser-crystal catalog; a minor, embedded exposure rather than a bulk input, but a genuine one. No company-specific evidence was found for tin, tantalum, helium, or silicon usage (present in the prior sector-derived stub); these have been d…
Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
Lithium — present in several marketed nonlinear-optical crystal lines: LBO (lithium triborate), LiIO3 (lithium iodate), and LiNbO3/MgO:LiNbO3 (lithium niobate), used for frequency conversion and electro-optic modulation.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymiumlithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 110d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
Lithium — present in several marketed nonlinear-optical crystal lines: LBO (lithium triborate), LiIO3 (lithium iodate), and LiNbO3/MgO:LiNbO3 (lithium niobate), used for frequency conversion and electro-optic modulation.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 4.1% of world lithium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: lithium supply outside BR is 🇦🇺 AU 34%, 🇨🇳 CN 22%, 🇨🇱 CL 20% (shares renormalised after removing BR); neodymium supply outside BR is 🇨🇳 CN 72%, 🇺🇸 US 14%, 🇦🇺 AU 7.7% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumtungstenneodymiumlithiumgermanium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Silver and gallium — both are constituent elements of the company's AgGaS2 (AGS) and AgGaSe2 (AGSe) nonlinear crystals, used for mid-IR frequency conversion; gallium in particular is subject to China's 2023 export-licensing regime.
Tungsten — a constituent of the potassium-gadolinium/yttrium-tungstate host crystals (Yb:KGW, Nd:KGW) in the laser-crystal catalog; a minor, embedded exposure rather than a bulk input, but a genuine one. No company-specific evidence was found for tin, tantalum, helium, or silicon usage (present in the prior sector-derived stub); these have been d…
Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches galliumtungstenneodymiumlithiumgermanium · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 69d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗Silver and gallium — both are constituent elements of the company's AgGaS2 (AGS) and AgGaSe2 (AGSe) nonlinear crystals, used for mid-IR frequency conversion; gallium in particular is subject to China's 2023 export-licensing regime.
Tungsten — a constituent of the potassium-gadolinium/yttrium-tungstate host crystals (Yb:KGW, Nd:KGW) in the laser-crystal catalog; a minor, embedded exposure rather than a bulk input, but a genuine one. No company-specific evidence was found for tin, tantalum, helium, or silicon usage (present in the prior sector-derived stub); these have been d…
Neodymium — core lasing-medium dopant in the company's Nd:YAG and Nd:KGW laser gain crystals, marketed as its most popular solid-state laser media; neodymium supply is >85% China-refined, giving this product line direct exposure to Chinese rare-earth export policy.
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed mine…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS res…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
4 of 81 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in semiconductors — read via the graph's chipmaking equipment node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+12 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+36 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.