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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: electronics. Company profile →
Wistron Corporation is a Taiwan-headquartered ODM (original design manufacturer) for the ICT industry, spun off from Acer in 2001 and listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It designs and assembles notebook PCs, desktop and professional-display systems, and enterprise/AI server and storage hardware for brand customers (historically including Dell, HP, and Lenovo, and — until divesting its India iPhone-assembly plant to Tata Electronics in 2023 — Apple). Its cloud/AI server subsidiary Wiwynn Corporation is a separate Taiwan-listed company serving hyperscale data-center customers.
Wistron does not mine, smelt, or refine minerals itself; its exposure runs through the bill of materials in the electronics it assembles and through its suppliers' smelters and refiners.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇹🇼 Taiwan, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Silicon — **structural component**. The semiconductor die inside every processor, memory, and controller chip Wistron integrates; Wistron procures finished chips rather than fabricating silicon, so its exposure is to upstream chip-supply risk rather than a raw-material purchase.
Indium — **trace additive**. Indium tin oxide (ITO) is the standard transparent-conductive coating in the touch panels and displays used in Wistron's notebook and professional-display lines — an extremely thin layer by mass but with no drop-in substitute at scale.
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Antimony — **trace additive**. Used as a flame-retardant synergist (antimony trioxide) in the plastic enclosures of notebooks and IT hardware to meet fire-safety standards.
Lithium — **structural component**. Notebook and server backup batteries Wistron integrates are lithium-ion; lithium is the defining active material of that cell chemistry, though Wistron sources finished cells/packs rather than raw lithium.
Copper — **bulk input**. PCB traces, wiring harnesses, and heatsinks across notebook, server, and networking products; a mass-share input to essentially every unit assembled.
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Silver — **trace additive**. Present at low weight-percent in the tin-silver-copper (SAC) solder alloy standard for lead-free assembly, and in some electrical contacts.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobaltcopper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 57d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Copper — **bulk input**. PCB traces, wiring harnesses, and heatsinks across notebook, server, and networking products; a mass-share input to essentially every unit assembled.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
DR Congo supplies 74% of world cobalt mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇮🇩 ID 66% · 🇷🇺 RU 12% · 🇲🇬 MG 6.1% · 🇵🇭 PH 5.6% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobaltlithiumcopper · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 110d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Lithium — **structural component**. Notebook and server backup batteries Wistron integrates are lithium-ion; lithium is the defining active material of that cell chemistry, though Wistron sources finished cells/packs rather than raw lithium.
Copper — **bulk input**. PCB traces, wiring harnesses, and heatsinks across notebook, server, and networking products; a mass-share input to essentially every unit assembled.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 4.1% of world lithium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: lithium supply outside BR is 🇦🇺 AU 34%, 🇨🇳 CN 22%, 🇨🇱 CL 20% (shares renormalised after removing BR); cobalt supply outside BR is 🇨🇩 CD 78%, 🇮🇩 ID 15%, 🇷🇺 RU 2.6% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 74d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper — **bulk input**. PCB traces, wiring harnesses, and heatsinks across notebook, server, and networking products; a mass-share input to essentially every unit assembled.
China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 20 Jul 2026, 79d pending
On ~29 June 2026 the Autorité de Régulation et de Contrôle des Marchés des Substances Minérales Stratégiques (ARECOMS) ordered that all first-half-2026 cobalt export quotas left unused by 30 June 2026 be forfeited and recovered, with a 5 July 2026 cutoff, and reallocated into ARECOMS's discretionary "strategic quota" pool (already ~10% of the 96,600 t/yr authorised volume) earmarked for national-interest local-processing projects. This is an escalation/operationalisation of the filed 2025-02-22 ARECOMS cobalt quota system: it concentrates additional volume under state discretionary control, tightens the effective free-market allocation for producers (Glencore/KCC, CMOC, ERG) on the world's dominant cobalt chokepoint (~76% of mine supply), and — via the linked customs-notification malfunction that blocked quota-linked export declarations after 1 July 2026 — created a real short-run supply interruption. IPTM action would be an AMENDMENT to 2025-02-22-drc-arecoms-cobalt-export-ban-quota-system.
source ↗Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
DR Congo supplies 74% of world cobalt mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇮🇩 ID 66% · 🇷🇺 RU 12% · 🇲🇬 MG 6.1% · 🇵🇭 PH 5.6% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungstenlithiumtantalum · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
Lithium — **structural component**. Notebook and server backup batteries Wistron integrates are lithium-ion; lithium is the defining active material of that cell chemistry, though Wistron sources finished cells/packs rather than raw lithium.
Tin, tantalum, tungsten, cobalt — Wistron's own Conflict Minerals Policy names these four (plus gold and mica, outside this platform's scored set) as minerals it screens suppliers for under OECD due-diligence guidance, covering the DRC and nine adjoining countries; it added cobalt to the policy's scope in 2020. Tin is a **bulk input** (tin-silver-copper solder used acr…
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed mine…
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
Indonesia = ~20% of global refined tin exports (Bangka Belitung); a ban on refined-tin exports would force downstream solder/semiconductor-packaging manufacturing domestically; disrupts global electr…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
5 of 107 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (electronics) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-07), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+4 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+10 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+36 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.