Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

President Trump signed Executive Order 14404, "Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy," on 1 May 2026. The order operationalises the country-specific national emergency declared by EO 14380 (29 January 2026) — which had been preserved after the SCOTUS *Learning Resources* vacatur of the IEEPA tariff authority — by establishing a sectoral OFAC blocking regime. Section 2 authorises asset-blocking against any foreign person determined by the Secretary of Treasury (in consultation with State) to operate in Cuba's energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sectors, or "any other sector" subsequently designated. Section 3 suspends entry under INA § 212(f) for covered aliens. Section 4 authorises secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant transactions for blocked persons, with both correspondent-account and SDN-listing remedies. The EO itself includes no annex of named designations — those are issued by OFAC under separate determinations.

On April 30, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added former Democratic Republic of the Congo President Joseph Kabange Kabila to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List pursuant to Executive Order 13413, as amended by Executive Order 13671 (the DRC sanctions program), for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support to the March 23 Movement (M23) and its political-military coalition the Congo River Alliance (Alliance Fleuve Congo, AFC). Treasury press release SB0480 ("Treasury Sanctions Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President for Ties to Armed Conflict") frames the designation as enforcement of the Washington-brokered DRC-Rwanda framework: M23 controls a substantial share of mineral-rich eastern DRC (cobalt, coltan, tin, tungsten, gold) and AFC's renewed rebellion has fuelled a mass-displacement crisis. The notice was published in the Federal Register on May 5, 2026 (FR Doc. 2026-08672). The designation blocks all property and interests in property of Kabila subject to US jurisdiction and prohibits US-person dealings with him. It is a discrete enforcement step under the broader US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (4 December 2025 — the "Washington Accords") and complements earlier 2026 designations of Rwanda Defence Force-linked actors. Treasury frames the action as signalling that political support to M23/AFC, not just direct military or commercial activity, will trigger blocking sanctions.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

On 26 February 2026 USTR published a Federal Register notice (90 FR 9686, docket USTR-2026-0034) inviting public comment on the design of a plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals and accompanying policy actions to strengthen critical-mineral supply-chain resilience. The notice signals that the agreement under consideration would include "a commitment by all parties to implement minimum prices or other price mechanisms, with appropriate border measures" — a coordinated price-floor/border-adjustment regime across like-minded partners to incentivise ex-China mining, processing, and refining investment. Comments were due 19 March 2026.

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (DOD, GSA, and NASA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 17 February 2026 (FR Doc 2026-03065, 91 FR 7223) implementing Section 5949(a) of the NDAA FY2023 (Pub. L. 117-263), which bars executive agencies from acquiring electronic products or services containing semiconductor components designed, produced, or provided by SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, or their affiliates. A Part B prohibition extends the restriction to "critical systems" whose subsystems incorporate covered semiconductors regardless of COTS sourcing. The comment period closed 20 April 2026; proposed prohibitions take effect 23 December 2027.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

On 6 February 2026 Presidents Trump and Modi announced a framework for an Interim Trade Agreement that resets the bilateral tariff posture installed in 2025. Two operative instruments: (i) an executive order signed 6 February eliminating, effective 7 February 2026, the additional 25% IEEPA "Russian-oil" duty on Indian imports imposed by EO 14329 (27 August 2025), conditional on India's commitment to cease buying Russian crude and to expand defence cooperation; and (ii) reduction of the EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff rate on India from 25% to 18% on listed product categories (textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, plastics and rubber, organic chemicals, home décor, artisanal products, certain machinery), to take effect on finalisation of the Interim Agreement. India commits to eliminate or reduce tariffs on all US industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products (DDGs, red sorghum, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, wine, spirits) and to purchase >USD 500bn of US energy, ICT, coal, aircraft and aircraft parts, and precious-metals products over five years. The framework also commits the parties to negotiating "robust, ambitious, and mutually beneficial digital trade rules" and to addressing non-tariff barriers in medical devices, ICT import licensing, and food/agricultural standards. US tariff reductions on Indian generic pharmaceuticals, gems, diamonds, aircraft parts, and certain automotive components are flagged as contingent on completion of the full Interim Agreement.

In a final rule published in the Federal Register on 4 February 2026 (effective 3 February 2026), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) deleted the "X" designation for Cambodia from Country Group D:5 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), removing Cambodia from the EAR's list of arms-embargoed destinations. The action conforms the EAR to a Department of State final rule of 7 November 2025, which removed Cambodia as an arms-embargoed destination under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) §126.1. Cambodia remains designated in Country Group D:1 and remains subject to the military and military-intelligence end-use/end-user controls in EAR §§744.21 and 744.22.

On 4 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard announced a U.S.-Mexico Action Plan on Critical Minerals — a first-of-its-kind 60-day bilateral work programme to develop coordinated trade policies and supply-chain mechanisms for critical minerals. The Action Plan tasks both governments with identifying a priority mineral list, exploring border-adjusted price floors as a candidate trade instrument, and consulting on how price floors could be incorporated into a binding plurilateral agreement on trade in critical minerals. It is framed as a confidence- building measure ahead of the USMCA Joint Review (statutory deadline 1 July 2026) and as the Mexico-side template that parallels concurrent USTR engagements with the EU and Japan.

On 4 February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) at the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, attended by representatives from 54 countries and the European Commission. FORGE is the successor to the 2022 Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and is structured as a plurilateral coalition that creates a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, including coordinated price-floor mechanisms designed to counter adversarial market manipulation — explicitly framed against Chinese mineral-supply dominance. The Republic of Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026. Eleven bilateral critical-minerals frameworks/MoUs were signed simultaneously (Argentina, Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, UAE, UK, Uzbekistan), and FORGE is paired with Project Vault, an EXIM Bank direct loan facility of up to USD 10 billion to back FORGE-aligned critical-mineral projects.

On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.

BIS issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) on 21 January 2026 (effective 20 January 2026) easing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls on certain civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technology. The IFR makes two changes: (i) ECCN 9A012.a.1 commercial UAVs with maximum endurance under one hour can now be exported License-Free (NLR) to most Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States (Country Group A:1, excluding Malta, Russia, Ukraine), versus the prior limitation to UK / Australia / Canada only; and (ii) License Exception STA (Strategic Trade Authorization) is expanded to cover certain MT-controlled UAVs that cannot deliver a 500kg payload to 300+ km — including long-range cargo-delivery drones and ECCN 9A120 agricultural-spraying UAVs — for export to Country Group A:5 partners and allies. The IFR implements the export-promotion directive in §6 of EO 14307 (Unleashing American Drone Dominance, 6 June 2025). Comment period closes 19 February 2026.

On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and entities in Venezuela and Iran on 30 December 2025 for facilitating Iran's proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic-missile inputs. Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA (EANSA) and its chair, Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez, were designated for negotiating directly with Iran's Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) and overseeing local assembly of QAI's Mohajer-series UAVs, re-branded in Venezuela as the ANSU series — an arrangement OFAC states has run since 2006. Separately, three Iran-based persons were designated for procuring sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid and nitrocellulose — precursor chemicals for ballistic-missile propellant and warhead production — on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), a unit of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The action was taken under Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators and supporters) and Executive Order 13949 (Iran conventional-arms activities), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

On 20 October 2025, President Donald J. Trump and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed at the White House the "United States-Australia Framework for Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths" — a non-binding common-policy instrument committing both governments to provide at least USD 1 billion each in financing within six months (USD 3bn+ joint commitment against an USD 8.5bn project pipeline and a stated USD 53bn recoverable-resource pipeline). The framework establishes a US-Australia Critical Minerals Supply Security Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Australian Minister for Resources, mandates streamlined permitting for mining/separation/processing projects, and explicitly couples the US demand-side architecture (DPA Title III + Defense Logistics Agency stockpile) to Australia's Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve. Concurrent with signing, EXIM issued seven Letters of Interest totalling USD 2.2bn (unlocking up to USD 5bn) to Arafura Rare Earths, Northern Minerals, Graphinex, La Trobe Magnesium, VHM, RZ Resources, and Sunrise Energy Metals; the US Department of War separately committed to a 100 metric-ton-per-year advanced gallium refinery in Western Australia, and Australia took USD 200m concessional equity in the Alcoa-Sojitz Wagerup gallium project and USD 100m equity in the Arafura Nolans rare-earths project.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published a final rule in the Federal Register on September 30, 2025 (FR Doc 2025-18992) rescinding the April 30, 2024 Firearms Export License Requirements interim final rule in its entirety, with the sole exception of preserving the new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) it had introduced for firearms and ammunition. The rule also amends the EAR to remove the Congressional notification requirement for certain semi-automatic firearms license applications. It is effective on publication.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14307 on 6 June 2025 establishing the first whole-of-government Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) industrial-policy framework. The order (i) directs federal agencies to prioritise procurement and operation of US-manufactured UAS and to identify and rescind purchases of foreign-made drones where consistent with national security; (ii) tasks the FAA with proposing a Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rule within 30 days and publishing a final BVLOS rule within 240 days; (iii) creates an eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) with at least five projects selected within 180 days; and (iv) instructs the Federal Acquisition Security Council to publish a "Covered Foreign Entity List" within 30 days, operationalising the §1709 FY24 NDAA architecture that targets Chinese drone manufacturers (DJI, Autel and successor entities). Published in the Federal Register on 11 June 2025 (90 FR 24727).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) finalized amendments to its Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) regulation at 15 CFR Part 700, originally proposed February 7, 2024. The final rule clarifies long-standing standards and procedures by which BIS provides Special Priorities Assistance (SPA) under the Defense Production Act of 1950, revises Schedule I to delineate Department of Commerce DPAS jurisdiction from other agencies' priority-rating authorities, and applies non-substantive technical edits reflecting updates since the regulation was last amended in 2014. The rule takes effect August 21, 2024.

Final rule by the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register on 10 May 2024 (89 FR 40369; FR Doc 2024-10280; effective 30 May 2024) making conforming and clarifying amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The most substantive change removes Cyprus from EAR Country Group D:5 — codifying in the EAR the suspension of the US arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus previously announced by the Department of State. The rule also standardises destination names (Swaziland → Eswatini, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) → North Macedonia, Turkey → Türkiye), corrects inadvertently-listed NS1/RS1/MT1 license requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom, removes obsolete footnote 3 designations, and removes redundant standalone references to "Russia" and "Russian Federation" in EAR provisions that already invoke Country Group D:5 (which encompasses both). The rule is largely administrative; the Cyprus D:5 removal is its only operational change to license requirements.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2024-08813) on April 30, 2024 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure export controls on firearms, ammunition, parts, accessories, and related technology and software (EAR Categories 0 and 1). The rule created new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for semi-automatic firearms, added Crime Control / Detection (CC) license requirements, narrowed license-exception eligibility, introduced a presumption of denial for many non-government end-users, and imposed a default 1-year license validity for semi-automatic firearms. Effective May 30, 2024; later rescinded (except for the new ECCNs) by FR Doc 2025-18992 on September 30, 2025.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

A joint advisory issued January 26, 2024 by six US agencies (USTR, State, Treasury, Commerce, DHS, and Labor) updating businesses on supply-chain risks associated with Burma's post-coup military regime (SAC). The advisory warns of reputational, economic, and legal exposure for entities operating in or sourcing from Burma and specifically flags heightened due-diligence requirements for metal importers, the SAC's opaque network of corporate affiliates in Thailand, Singapore, India, and the UAE that complicate traceability, and cross-border reporting gaps for goods and funds transfers. Targeted sectors include rare earths (dysprosium, terbium), base metals and gold mining, timber, aviation services and jet fuel, computer chips and ICT equipment, and small arms components.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-01408, 89 FR 4804, effective 23 January 2024) strengthens the EAR sanctions architecture against Russia and Belarus by adding 94 HTS-6 entries to the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5/§746.8) — covering hand tools, parachutes, aircraft training simulators, and airplane/helicopter components — and expands the de minimis threshold for foreign-made goods incorporating US-origin 600-series and 9×515 items destined for Russia or Belarus. A parallel provision targets Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia by adding HTS code 852910 (antennas and antenna reflectors) to the §746.7 Iran export-control list. The rule also refines Crimea licensing to permit exports supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces deployments in occupied territories.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex agreed at Technical Experts Meetings in 2018, 2019, and 2021, revising six ECCNs (1C111, 2A101, 2B119, 6A107, 9A101, and 9E515). The rule simultaneously expands license exception eligibility for MT-controlled items — adding one new authorization and broadening four existing exceptions — for exports to allies and partners not in Country Groups D:4 or D:5. BIS estimates the changes will reduce MT-related license applications by approximately 400 per year, easing compliance burden on defence and aerospace exporters dealing with allied governments.

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List, effective November 21, 2023 (FR Doc. 2023-25684). Three entities — Aerofalcon S.L. (Spain), Novax Group S.A. (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Russia, Venezuela), and Zero Waste Global SA (Panama, Venezuela) — were listed for circumventing US sanctions by supplying Nicolás Maduro's government with US-origin aircraft parts using fraudulent export documentation. A fourth entity, Si2 Microsystems Private Limited (India), was listed for supplying Russian defense-sector consignees with US-origin integrated circuits in violation of Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii) Russia/Belarus export restrictions. All entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR items with a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added thirteen entities to the Entity List effective November 2, 2023 — twelve in Russia and one in Uzbekistan — for posing a significant risk of supporting Russia's war against Ukraine through the procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The designated group includes ZALA Aero Group, the Kalashnikov Concern-linked maker of the Lancet loitering munition and Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone. A license requirement now applies to all items subject to the EAR exported, reexported, or transferred to these parties, with a license review policy of denial for everything except food and medicine designated EAR99 (case-by-case), and the Russia/Belarus Military End User Foreign Direct Product rule applies.

BIS implements December 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement plenary decisions by amending Commerce Control List ECCNs 9A001, 9A003, 9E001, 9E002, and 9E003 via an interim final rule effective October 18, 2023. The rule moves technology for developing supersonic-capable aero gas turbine engine components from ECCN 9E001 to a new paragraph 9E003.k, preserving development-phase controls even after an engine obtains civil certification. BIS simultaneously extends to supersonic engines the civil-certification release from 9A001 to 9A991 already available for subsonic engines, and opens a 45-day public comment period (deadline December 4, 2023) on whether to restrict Strategic Trade Authorization eligibility for ECCN 9E003.k for certain Country Group A:5 partner-country destinations.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.

BIS added 28 entities to the EAR Entity List across seven countries, targeting four distinct threat clusters: a Russia GRU/UAV diversion network spanning China, Finland, Germany, and Russia; an Iran Shahed-series UAV procurement chain operating through Chinese front companies (designated under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP Rule); Pakistan-linked suppliers procuring for unsafeguarded nuclear activities; and two Oman-based entities supporting Yemen's Houthi forces. Russia's dominant titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA was also added as a military end user. One Chinese entity (Zhejiang Perfect New Material) was simultaneously removed from the Military End User List.

Effective August 11, 2023, BIS amended 15 CFR Parts 738 and 742 to add the People's Republic of China and Macau to Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP2) licensing requirements under the Export Administration Regulations. The rule inserts NP2 "X" column markings for China and Macau in the Commerce Country Chart, subjecting exports of eight ECCN families (1A290, 1C298, 2A290, 2A291, 2D290, 2E001, 2E002, 2E290) to a BIS licence requirement. The measure was motivated by China's military modernisation, military-civil fusion strategy, and nuclear force expansion; prior to this rule, neither China nor Macau was subject to NP2 controls in the EAR.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR, 15 CFR Part 710) to lower the concentration threshold above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical trigger declaration and export/import reporting obligations — from 30% to 10% by weight or volume. The three affected Schedule 2A chemicals are Amiton (a nerve-agent precursor), PFIB (a fluoromonomer byproduct), and BZ (an incapacitating agent). The change implements OPCW Conference of States Parties Decision C-14/DEC.4 (2009) and takes immediate effect on publication; 10% is the statutory floor set by the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA).

BIS issued a correcting amendment to the EAR Entity List to add China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd. — an AVIC subsidiary and specialist precision-bearing manufacturer — that was included in the preamble of the June 14, 2023 final rule (88 FR 38739) but inadvertently omitted from the regulatory text. The entity was designated for acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization, including hypersonic weapons development, air-to-air missiles, and weapon lifecycle management using Western software. All EAR-subject items require a licence with a presumption of denial; retroactive effective date of June 16, 2023.

BIS published a final rule adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the EAR Entity List and removing one entity (Fiber Optic Solutions, Latvia), effective June 12, 2023. The additions span ten countries — China (31 entities), UAE (5), Pakistan (4), South Africa (3), UK (2), and one each in Kenya, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand — targeting four principal threat clusters: China's military modernization and hypersonic-weapons supply chain, an international network of flight-training academies (TFASA and affiliates) providing Western pilot training to Chinese military personnel, Pakistan-linked procurement for unsafeguarded ballistic-missile programs, and UAE/South Africa-based dual-use diversion networks. All listed entities require a BIS licence, with most subject to a presumption of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule on 19 May 2023 strengthening existing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The rule expands the Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule — which applies EAR jurisdiction to foreign-made items produced with US technology or equipment — to cover the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine. It also revises controls targeting Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, closing loopholes identified in prior rounds of Russia-Ukraine-related export-control rulemaking.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eleven entities across Burma, China, Nicaragua, and Russia to the Entity List, effective March 28, 2023, under a human rights foreign policy rationale. Three Burmese trading companies and two Russian aviation-parts suppliers were designated for selling, procuring, and servicing military equipment enabling the Burmese military regime's attacks on civilians; five Xinjiang-based electronics manufacturers were added for activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests; and the Nicaraguan National Police was designated for serious human rights abuses. The rule simultaneously codified in the EAR that protection of human rights worldwide is an explicit basis for Entity List designations — a precedent-setting regulatory amendment extending the existing national-security and foreign-policy framework.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) established a new Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and created Supplement No. 7 to Part 746 of the EAR, effective 24 February 2023, to address Iran's supply of UAVs to Russia for use against Ukraine. The rule adds twelve HTS-6 codes covering UAV-relevant components — aircraft engines, processors, capacitors, memories, and radio navigation equipment — many of which are EAR99 items outside existing ECCNs, requiring a new licence for exports and reexports to Iran. Simultaneously, the rule expands the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover these same items, closing a gap where foreign-produced items derived from US technology could transit to Russia via Iran without triggering EAR licence requirements.

The Bureau of Industry and Security expanded EAR sanctions against Russia and Belarus effective 24 February 2023, adding 322 HTS-6 industrial items to Supplement No. 4 to Part 746 (oil-and-gas equipment, flat-rolled steel, pumps, turbines, marine and aviation engines) and 276 luxury goods to Supplement No. 5. Supplement No. 6 was amended to add biological and chemical-synthesis equipment including bioreactors, peptide synthesizers, and nucleotide reagents, targeting Russia's biodefence and dual-use procurement pathway. The rule also migrated Supplement No. 2 from Schedule B to HTS-6 identifiers to align with allied partner frameworks, added Taiwan to the list of countries excluded from licence requirements, and extended Section 744.7 end-use restrictions to cover in-country transfers inside Russia and Belarus.

BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 16 ECCNs across computing, electronics, lasers, sensors, and aerospace domains. The most operationally significant change raised the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) threshold for digital computers under ECCN 4A003.b from 29 to 70 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), reducing the licensing burden for high-performance computing exports to Wassenaar partner countries while preserving controls to non-partners. Corresponding revisions to License Exception APP (15 CFR Part 740) and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) align the broader EAR framework with the updated multilateral thresholds.