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On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

South Korea's 13th National Strategic Technology Special Committee (chaired by MSIT) adopted the 2026 Annual Implementation Plan for the First Basic Plan for National Strategic Technology Development (2024–2028), committing KRW 8.6 trillion in 2026 R&D investment — a ~30% YoY increase from KRW 6.5 trillion in 2025 — across 19 NEXT strategic-technology fields encompassing AI, semiconductors, quantum, displays, and secondary batteries, coordinated across 23 ministries. The plan is supplemented by KRW 46.6 trillion in policy finance delivered through Korea Development Bank (KDB), Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF), and Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), providing the horizontal funding-coordination architecture that operationalises all sector-specific Korean strategic-technology legislative instruments.

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (DOD, GSA, and NASA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 17 February 2026 (FR Doc 2026-03065, 91 FR 7223) implementing Section 5949(a) of the NDAA FY2023 (Pub. L. 117-263), which bars executive agencies from acquiring electronic products or services containing semiconductor components designed, produced, or provided by SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, or their affiliates. A Part B prohibition extends the restriction to "critical systems" whose subsystems incorporate covered semiconductors regardless of COTS sourcing. The comment period closed 20 April 2026; proposed prohibitions take effect 23 December 2027.

Italy's Department for Digital Transformation (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) and Invitalia S.p.A. signed an implementing agreement on 4-5 February 2026 establishing the EUR 733 million "Fondo Nazionale per la Connettività" (National Connectivity Fund), financed under PNRR Mission 1, Component 2, Investment 7. The fund provides non-repayable public grants to private telecom operators for ultra-broadband network build-out through 2029, targeting a minimum 1 Gbit/s download / 200 Mbit/s upload connection for covered property units, and requires a minimum 30% private co-financing share per project. Invitalia manages the fund through 31 December 2030.

On 29 January 2026, European Council President António Costa and Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a Joint Statement in Hanoi upgrading EU-Vietnam bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) — the highest tier in Vietnam's diplomatic hierarchy, placing the EU on the same level as Vietnam's CSPs with China, Russia, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, France, and the United States. The CSP establishes a reinforced bilateral cooperation framework spanning critical raw materials, semiconductor supply chains, artificial intelligence, trusted 5G infrastructure, climate and energy transition, security and defence (including cyber and maritime), and full implementation of the 2019 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) tariff-elimination schedule plus ratification of the EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement (EVIPA). It is the EU's eleventh CSP globally and its second in Southeast Asia (after Singapore, 2024), and constitutes the foundational bilateral parent framework for all future EU-Vietnam cooperation under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) Article 13 third-country strategic-project designation pipeline, given Vietnam's approximately 22 Mt rare-earth reserves — the world's second-largest deposit after China.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed the Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (人工智慧基本法) on third reading on 23 December 2025, and President Lai Ching-te promulgated the 20-article statute on 14 January 2026, bringing it into force immediately. The Act designates the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) as the central AI-policy competent authority and codifies seven governance principles — sustainability and well-being, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, cybersecurity and safety, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability — that apply to all public-sector AI procurement and high-risk sectoral applications. The statute establishes a statutory foundation for the Taiwan AI Action Plan 2.0, mandates an Executive Yuan National AI Strategy Committee, and provides authority for sector-specific implementing regulations by FSC, NCC, MOHW, and MOTC across finance, telecoms, medical, and autonomous-vehicle AI within a two-year window. As the first national AI governance statute in the Greater China region and the third globally after the EU AI Act and South Korea's AI Basic Act, it frames regulatory expectations for the companies at the heart of the global AI hardware supply chain — TSMC, NVIDIA ODM partners, and advanced-packaging incumbents — that are headquartered or operate substantially in Taiwan.

On 22 December 2025 the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released Public Notice DA-25-1086, adding to the Covered List (under section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA) all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country, plus communications and video-surveillance equipment/services produced by DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics (and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and licensing/JV partners). The designation is comprehensive by scope — every foreign-made drone from consumer quadcopters to large uncrewed systems, with no size/performance carve-out — and blocks the FCC from granting any new equipment authorization to covered UAS/components going forward. Previously authorized models already in the US market are not revoked. A follow-on Public Notice (DA-26-22, 7 January 2026) narrowed the scope with a temporary exemption (see amendments).

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) approved Resolução nº 829/2025 at its 232nd ordinary meeting on 18 December 2025, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty of USD 47.46 per kilogram on imports of single-mode optical fibres (core diameter < 11 micrometres; NCM 9001.10.11) originating in China for a period of up to five years effective from DOU publication on 22 December 2025. The measure concludes a SECEX/DECOM investigation opened in August 2024 on petition by Prysmian Cabos e Sistemas do Brasil S/A and Furukawa Electric Latam / Lightera (collectively the entire domestic production base), which found material injury caused by dumped Chinese imports that supplied over 70% of the Brazilian market during the period of investigation. Industry associations Telcomp, Abramulti, Feninfra, and Abrint publicly criticised the measure, estimating a 170% increase in imported-fibre costs with downstream implications for Brazilian broadband roll-out economics.

The Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 (No 81 of 2025) is the largest rewrite of New Zealand's Overseas Investment Act 2005 since the 2018 residential-land amendment. The Bill (Government Bill 171) was introduced by the Minister of Finance in June 2025, passed all three readings in the House of Representatives, received Royal Assent on 19 December 2025, and was brought into force on 6 March 2026 by the Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 Commencement Order 2026 (SL 2026/2). The Act replaces the OIA's residual "investor test" discretion with a single statutory national-interest test applied to all "sensitive asset" transactions, introduces a new s 29B repeat-investor mechanism (Treasury does not re-litigate investor risk factors on subsequent applications outside strategically important businesses), creates new military / dual-use technology call-in transactions and critical-direct-supplier call-in transactions (amended s 85), and adds a no-change-of-control transaction category. Administered by The Treasury (policy lead) and Toitū Te Whenua LINZ (operations / case handling), with consent decisions issued by the responsible Ministers.

On 19 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Assembly adopted in final vote the Federal Act on the Screening of Foreign Investments (Bundesgesetz über die Prüfung ausländischer Investitionen, Investitionsprüfgesetz / IPG; popularly the "Lex China", parliamentary business 22.035). The Act introduces Switzerland's first general ex-ante FDI-screening regime: acquisitions of control over Swiss companies active in security-critical sectors by foreign state-controlled investors require prior approval by SECO, with escalation to the Federal Council. The optional- referendum window runs until 17 April 2026; entry into force is not expected before 2027 once implementing ordinances are adopted. Critical sectors named in the Act include military and dual-use goods, electricity grids and generation, water supply, pharma and health, telecommunications, transport infrastructure and financial-market infrastructure.

The French state, through the Agence des participations de l'État (APE), injected EUR 749.3 million into satellite operator Eutelsat's EUR 1.5 billion rights-issue capital increase, completed in two tranches (late November and early December 2025). The investment lifts the French state's stake to 29.65%, making it Eutelsat's largest shareholder. The Ministry of Economy framed the operation as reinforcing "industrial and digital sovereignty," financing Eutelsat's expansion into low-earth-orbit (LEO) constellations and its role in the EU's IRIS² sovereign satellite programme, positioned as a European counterweight to Starlink.

Vietnam's National Assembly passed Law on Cybersecurity No. 116/2025/QH15 on 10 December 2025 (434 of 443 deputies in favour), effective 1 July 2026. The law supersedes both the 2018 Cybersecurity Law (Law 24/2018/QH14) and the 2015 Law on Cyber Information Security, consolidating cybersecurity, cyber-information-security, and network-information-security into a unified Ministry of Public Security-led framework. It retains data-localization obligations for foreign digital-service providers handling personal data, user-generated content, and relationship graphs of Vietnamese users (minimum 24-month retention), introduces 6-hour urgent / 24-hour standard content take-down windows on MPS request, expressly prohibits AI/deepfake forgery of images, voices, and videos for illegal purposes, and mandates child-safety platform measures.

On 10 November 2025 the European Commission conditionally approved, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), the c. €14.7bn acquisition of German polymer and polyurethane producer Covestro AG by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The Phase II investigation identified foreign-subsidy distortions including an unlimited UAE State guarantee covering ADNOC and a committed capital increase by ADNOC's state-backed parent into Covestro. To clear the transaction, ADNOC committed to remove the State guarantee, Covestro committed to maintain existing R&D cooperation agreements with EU competitors, and Covestro committed to license its present and future sustainability-related patents (c. 200 patents) to qualifying EU market participants on pre-established transparent terms for ten years. This is the second-ever FSR Phase II conditional clearance (after the September 2024 e&/PPF Telecom decision) and the first FSR remedy package to deploy sustainability-IP licensing as a structural commitment.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

President Trump signed Executive Order "Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security" on September 25, 2025, certifying a restructuring plan as a "qualified divestiture" under the 2024 PAFACA law and directing the Attorney General not to enforce the Act for 120 days while the transaction closes. The plan creates TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, valued at roughly $14 billion, with a new US-investor consortium (Oracle, Silver Lake and MGX at 15% each, plus other investors, totaling 50%), affiliates of existing ByteDance investors holding 30.1%, and ByteDance itself retaining 19.9%. Oracle will run US data storage and algorithm retraining/oversight; the deal closed January 22, 2026.

Italy enacted Legge 23 settembre 2025, n. 132 — "Disposizioni e deleghe al Governo in materia di intelligenza artificiale" — published in Gazzetta Ufficiale Serie Generale n. 223 of 25 September 2025 (atto 25G00143) and entered into force on 10 October 2025. The statute makes Italy the first EU member state to enact a comprehensive national AI law complementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act), designating AgID (Agency for Digital Italy) and ACN (National Cybersecurity Agency) as national oversight authorities under Presidency-of-the-Council-of-Ministers coordination. It sets sectoral rules for healthcare, labour, intellectual professions, public administration and the judiciary; authorises up to €1 billion in state-backed venture capital (via CDP Venture Capital) for AI, cybersecurity and telecoms; creates criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for harmful deepfakes; mandates parental consent for under-14 users; and delegates secondary legislation to the Government across multiple domains.

On 17 September 2025 the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government issued Hufubangui [2025] No. 8, a five-year (26 September 2025 - 25 September 2030) state-aid framework to accelerate frontier-technology innovation and cultivate "future industries" across six domains — future manufacturing, future information, future materials, future energy, future space and future health. Targeted technology areas include cell and gene therapy, brain-computer interfaces, biomanufacturing, embodied intelligence (humanoid robotics/AI hardware), fourth-generation semiconductors, silicon photonics, 6G, neuromorphic computing, quantum technology, controlled nuclear fusion and regenerative medicine. Support is disbursed as tiered direct subsidies rather than tax relief, with named ceilings up to CNY 30 million per proof-of-concept/R&D platform and CNY 20 million per high-quality incubator or first-product/batch innovation award.

Act L of 2025 (2025. évi L. törvény) is the Hungarian National Assembly statute that elevates a set of war-emergency government decrees — including the foreign-investment screening regime previously embedded in Government Decree 561/2022 — to permanent statutory level. Promulgated in Magyar Közlöny and entered into force on 19 August 2025, the Act preserves Hungary's "Second Regime" of FDI screening operating in parallel with the General Regime (which implements EU Reg 2019/452 since 2019). The Second Regime applies to a broad set of strategic sectors — energy, transport, communications, telecoms, pharmaceuticals, food processing, defence, financial services and healthcare — and requires approval from the Minister of National Economy for qualifying acquisitions (direct or indirect majority, ≥5% interest, ≥3% in listed companies, or ownership/operation of strategic infrastructure) where transaction value reaches HUF 350 million (~EUR 890,000). Notification is due within 10 days of signing; the MoE originally had 30 business days (extendable +15 calendar days). The Act also entrenches the Hungarian state right of first refusal on photovoltaic generation companies (NACE 35.11'08, excluding sub-50 kVA household installations), exercised through MNV Zrt. The Special Regime is structurally distinct from the General Regime and represents Hungary's peer to the German AWG §§55-62, French Décret 2014-479, Dutch Wet Vifo, and Italian Golden Power. Amended by Act XCIII of 2025 (in force 17 December 2025), which extended the MoE screening deadline to 45 business days and excluded bank-financing security arrangements from notification.

The FCC adopted a Report and Order (FCC 25-49) on 7 August 2025 — the first comprehensive overhaul of submarine cable landing license rules since 2001 — effective 26 November 2025. The order prohibits Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) agreements that would give entities from designated foreign adversary countries (China including Hong Kong and Macau, Cuba, Iran, DPRK, Russia, and Venezuela) control over Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) on US cable landings, and mandates new annual reporting plus certification/disclosure requirements covering ownership, cybersecurity and physical security plans, and FCC Covered List compliance. The order operationalises the FCC's bifurcated policy package: accelerating legitimate commercial cable buildout while hardening national-security review for foreign-adversary-connected infrastructure.

Czech Act No. 265/2025 Sb., promulgated in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, is the first material amendment of the Czech Republic's foundational FDI screening statute (Act No. 34/2021 Sb.) since its enactment. The amendment broadens the perimeter of mandatory pre-closing FDI screening by cross-referencing the simultaneously-enacted Cybersecurity Act (Act No. 264/2025 Sb., transposing NIS2 Directive 2022/2555): entities designated as providers of "regulated services" under the Cybersecurity Act's "regime of higher obligation" automatically fall within mandatory FDI-screening scope, extending screening reach beyond the prior military-material / dual-use / critical-infrastructure perimeter to cover a broad sweep of digital, technology, healthcare, energy, and financial-services operators. The amendment also adds a confidentiality-sharing channel between MPO and NÚKIB, enabling coordinated supply-chain-security assessments for high-risk-vendor reviews under the new Cybersecurity Act.

The Polish Sejm passed the Act of 9 July 2025 amending the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments, signed by the President on 21 July 2025 and effective 24 July 2025. The amendment removes the time-limited "Specialised Rules" tier (introduced in 2020 under the Anti-COVID Shield) and makes Poland's FDI screening regime permanent. Review competence is transferred from the President of UOKiK (the competition authority) to the minister responsible for economic affairs (currently the Minister of Finance and Economy), and a new trigger covering "an international situation distorting the market or competition" is added alongside the existing public-order, security and health grounds.

On 2025-07-08 President Trump issued a Section 721 (Defense Production Act) order retroactively prohibiting Hong Kong-based Suirui International Co., Ltd.'s 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC, a US video-wall and audio-visual technology maker, from Foxconn. CFIUS found the transaction posed a national security risk because a Chinese military company holds an indirect interest in Suirui Group and can appoint one of its directors, creating a risk that Jupiter's products — used in military and critical- infrastructure environments — could be compromised. The order requires Suirui to fully divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of the order (extendable at CFIUS's discretion) and bars Jupiter from holding interests in Suirui-linked Asian subsidiaries formed after the 2020 deal.

On 1 July 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Aeza Group, a St. Petersburg, Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) provider, along with two affiliated companies and four Aeza Group leaders (Arsenii Penzev, Yuri Bozoyan, Vladimir Gast, Igor Knyazev), for supplying server infrastructure that shielded ransomware operators, infostealer groups, and darknet drug marketplaces from law-enforcement takedown. In coordination with the UK's National Crime Agency, OFAC also designated Aeza International Ltd., a UK front company Aeza used to lease IP addresses to cybercriminals. The action was taken under Executive Order 13694 (as amended by E.O. 14144 and E.O. 14306) and builds on OFAC's February 2025 designation of BPH provider ZServers.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber executive committee (GECEX) issued Resolution No. 732, dated 20 May 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 21 May 2025, amending Annexes II and VI of Resolução Gecex nº 272/2021 — the instrument that adapted Brazil's Common Mercosur Nomenclature (NCM) and Common External Tariff (TEC) to the 2022 Harmonized System revision. The amendment recomposes the TEC toward its full bound level for products on the IT/telecom (LEBIT) and capital-goods (BK) special-tariff exception lists, while carving out roughly 925 NCM codes across some 585 six-digit HS subheadings from the recomposition; secondary reporting describes the net effect as duty cuts on select data-processing and telephone equipment paired with duty increases across the broader excepted product set. Global Trade Alert classifies the measure as a "Red" (trade-restrictive) import-tariff intervention.

Thailand's Cabinet approved in principle on 22 April 2025 the urgent revision of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999), directing the Ministry of Commerce to overhaul the foundational 25-year-old statute governing foreign participation in Thai economic activities, explicitly shifting the guiding principle from "protection" of domestic entrepreneurs to "enhancing competitiveness." In January 2026, the Department of Business Development operationalised the reform by announcing a 10-sector List-3 delisting package — including telecommunications services not owning network infrastructure, software development, financial-services categories (treasury centres, derivatives agency, collateralised lending, credit guarantee), petroleum drilling services, management services for affiliated companies, and domestic agricultural commodity trading — that would allow wholly-foreign-owned subsidiaries without a Foreign Business Licence (FBL). Simultaneously, the revision introduces a shift from a legal-shareholding test to an actual-control / beneficial-ownership test in nominee-shareholder enforcement, tightening the anti-front-company architecture while liberalising legitimate foreign-investment routes. Full statutory enactment via parliamentary process is expected mid-to-late 2026.

On 21 April 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Resolution No. PP-145 "On the Privatization of Large Enterprises with State Participation on International Markets," establishing the 2025–2028 roadmap for selling minority equity stakes (10–25%) in 12 major state-owned enterprises via IPO/SPO on international and domestic exchanges, and full/near-full stakes in 29 further enterprises through competitive public tenders. The resolution introduced a three-tier asset-segmentation framework — large SOEs (IPO/SPO with international advisor mandates), medium SOEs (domestic stock-exchange sale), and small assets/real estate (e-platform sale) — and mandated engagement of international investment banks and a State Privatization Commission to oversee implementation. It was issued the same day as the sister Presidential Decree UP-70 "On the Privatization Program for 2025," which approved a 2025 annual program targeting 30 trillion UZS (~USD 2.4 bn) in state-asset disposals across 115 companies, 659 real-estate properties, and 6,100 hectares of land.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

The Nigeria Data Protection Commission issued the General Application and Implementation Directive (GAID) 2025 on 20 March 2025, the principal implementing directive of the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA). The GAID came fully into force on 19 September 2025, replacing the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation (NDPR) 2019 as the operative enforcement instrument. It applies extraterritorially to any data controller or processor established outside Nigeria that processes personal data of Nigerian data subjects, imposes a tripartite cross-border transfer framework (adequacy decisions, Transfer Instruments, and statutory exceptions), mandates Data Protection Impact Assessments for AI and high-risk technologies, and carries a civil-penalty ceiling of 2% of annual gross revenue or NGN 10 million for designated data controllers and processors of major importance (DCPMIs), whichever is greater.

On 24 February 2025 President Prabowo Subianto launched Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia's new state investment-management agency, consolidating around USD 900bn–1tn of Indonesian state-owned-enterprise assets — including Pertamina, PLN, Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Telkom, MIND ID, Antam and Inalum — into a single super-holding modelled on Singapore's Temasek. Danantara was created by the Third Amendment to the BUMN Law (Law No. 1 of 2025, enacted 24 February 2025) and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 on its organisation and governance, with board appointments formalised by Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2025. The agency reports directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and is mandated to deploy SOE balance-sheet capacity into Prabowo's 8% growth target via co-investment in mineral downstreaming, refinery and EV-battery build-out, food security, and semiconductor / data-centre infrastructure.

Joint Communication JOIN(2025) 9 final, adopted 21 February 2025, establishes the EU's first cable-infrastructure-specific resilience framework. It introduces a four-pillar Cable Security Toolbox (prevention, detection, response/recovery, deterrence), designates Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs) for priority public funding, and allocates €347 million under the Connecting Europe Facility Digital programme for cross-border subsea cable diversification, redundancy, and repair-ship capacity. The plan also formalises EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Undersea Infrastructure follow-on workstreams and establishes an attribution and diplomatic-response framework for cable-sabotage incidents, referencing Baltic Sea cable-cutting events from 2023 to 2025.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Cyber Response Capability Enhancement Act (重要電子計算機に対する不正な行為による被害の防止に関する法律, Law No. 42 of 2025) on 16 May 2025, together with companion arrangement legislation. Commonly known as the Active Cyber Defense (ACD) Law, the statute authorises (i) government monitoring of foreign-origin internet traffic transiting designated Japanese communication infrastructure for national-security threat indicators, (ii) pre-emptive access and neutralisation operations against attacker infrastructure abroad by the National Police Agency and the Self-Defense Forces under unified command, and (iii) mandatory cyber-incident reporting and government cooperation duties on critical-infrastructure operators. Implementation is phased through November 2027, with the NISC reorganised into the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) under the Cabinet Secretariat from July 2025.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.

Malaysia's Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act A1727), gazetted 17 October 2024, enters its third and final commencement phase on 1 June 2025 per commencement order P.U.(B) 522/2024. Phase 3 activates sections 6 and 9 of the amending Act, which impose mandatory Data Protection Officer (DPO) appointment thresholds, a 72-hour breach-notification duty to the Commissioner, and a statutory data-portability right, bringing Malaysia's PDPA broadly into alignment with GDPR and the ASEAN Model AI Governance Framework.

On 22 December 2024 the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam, under General Secretary Tô Lâm, issued Resolution 57-NQ/TW designating science, technology, innovation, and national digital transformation as Vietnam's "top strategic breakthrough" through 2030 with vision to 2045. The resolution targets ≥50% digital-economy share of GDP, top-30 global ranking in innovation and digital transformation, and at least 10 globally-competitive Vietnamese digital-technology enterprises by 2030. It identifies data, AI, blockchain, and IoT as priority bottlenecks and operates as the parent/umbrella authority under which all subsequent Government, National Assembly, Prime-Ministerial and Ministerial tech-industrial instruments are formulated. Operational implementation runs through Government Resolution 03/NQ-CP of 9 January 2025 (action programme).

On 6 September 2024 China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) jointly issued Order No. 23, the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access (2024 Edition), effective 1 November 2024. The 2024 list reduces nationwide restrictions from 31 to 29 entries, removing the last two manufacturing- sector restrictions (publication printing must be Chinese-controlled; investment in TCM-decoction steaming/roasting/calcination processes and confidential-formula proprietary Chinese-medicine production prohibited). Restrictions remain in services (telecommunications value-added, healthcare, education) and in 21 prohibited categories (news publishing, postal monopoly, fishing, gene therapy, tobacco). The 2021 edition is repealed on the same date.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), enacted as Division H of P.L. 118-50 (21st Century Peace through Strength Act), prohibits app stores and internet hosting services from distributing, maintaining, or updating "foreign adversary controlled applications" — defined explicitly to include ByteDance Ltd and its subsidiaries (TikTok). ByteDance was given 270 days from enactment (until January 19, 2025) to execute a "qualified divestiture" — selling TikTok to an owner with no operational relationship with a foreign adversary — or face a nationwide distribution ban. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the law's constitutionality in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland (January 17, 2025), rejecting First Amendment challenges and affirming the national-security rationale grounded in data-collection concerns.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 of 26 February 2024, published in the Official Journal on 8 March 2024, establishes the EU's first dedicated policy framework for the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure. It creates an informal Submarine Cable Infrastructure Expert Group of Member State authorities chaired by the Commission with ENISA participation, introduces the Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEI) designation mechanism for priority Union funding, and mandates a consolidated Union-wide risk and vulnerability assessment culminating in a Cable Security Toolbox of mitigating measures. Scope covers cables, landing stations, terrestrial tail connections, repair centres, and cable-laying vessel capacity. The recommendation is non-binding under TFEU Article 292 but constitutes the foundational soft-law framework that the later 2025 Cable Security Action Plan (JOIN(2025) 9) operationalises with binding CPEI lists and €347M CEF Digital funding.

On 21 February 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Decree DP-37 approving the 2024 State Program for the Implementation of the "Uzbekistan-2030" Strategy under the slogan "Year of Support for Youth and Business". The decree converts the parent Uzbekistan-2030 doctrine (DP-158 of 11 September 2023) into binding annual execution targets covering SOE privatisation and IPO programmes (Navoi MMC, Almalyk MMC, Uzbekistan National Investment Fund), industrial localisation, sectoral investment lines, "green economy" and water-management benchmarks, and youth-business support measures. DP-37 functions as the master annual operationalisation instrument for Uzbekistan's 2024 industrial and investment policy stack, anchoring the downstream subsoil recodification (LRU-987, Oct 2024) and critical-minerals national programme (March 2025).

The Significant Investments Review Act 2024 (Act No. 1 of 2024) is Singapore's first horizontal, cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 9 January 2024, assented to by the President on 6 February 2024 and gazetted on 14 February 2024; the Act commenced on 28 March 2024 under the SIRA 2024 (Commencement) Notification (S 228/2024), together with the Significant Investments Review Regulations 2024 (S 229/2024). The Act creates an "ownership-and-control" layer over a limited number of "designated entities" the Minister for Trade and Industry has identified as critical to Singapore's national-security interests, plus an "any entity" call-in power exercisable against firms that have acted against Singapore's national-security interests, regardless of whether they are designated. Acquisitions of ≥5% require post-closing notification within 7 days; acquisitions of ≥12% / ≥25% / ≥50% and cessations of ≥50% / ≥75% controller status require prior ministerial approval. Administered by the Office of Significant Investments Review (OSIR) within MTI. SIRA is the Singaporean structural peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479, the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the Canada ICA national-security review.

Tunisia's Finance Law for 2024 (Loi Nº 2023-52, promulgated 22 December 2023) introduces a 4-year full exemption from corporate income tax (IS) and personal income tax (IR) for newly created enterprises that obtain an investment declaration certificate during 2024 or 2025. Qualifying enterprises must commence effective operations within 2 years of the declaration date and maintain Tunisian-standard accounts; excluded sectors include financial services, conventional energy, mining, real-estate promotion, commerce, and telecoms operators. The measure is Tunisia's principal post-Loi 2016-71 targeted investment-attraction instrument and opens the IPTM register's first Tunisia-issuer action, closing a full-geographic blank in MENA/Maghreb coverage.

Signed by President Javier Milei and the entire cabinet on 20 December 2023 and published in the Boletín Oficial extraordinario on 21 December 2023, Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia 70/2023 declares a public emergency across economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, pension, tariff, sanitary, and social matters until 31 December 2025 (Article 1) and enacts 366 articles across 16 titles that fundamentally restructure Argentina's regulatory framework. The DNU repeals or amends dozens of statutes to deregulate foreign trade (repealing the Compre Nacional buy-preference law Ley 18.875 and the price-control framework Ley 27.345), opens privatisation of state enterprises (Aerolíneas Argentinas, ENARSA, Banco Nación, Correo Argentino, Trenes Argentinos), dismantles the Ley de Abastecimiento price-control regime, liberalises civil aviation cabotage to foreign carriers, deregulates hydrocarbons export and mining permitting, and replaces the severance-pay regime with a capitalisation-fund system. It is the foundational enabling framework for all subsequent Milei-administration deregulatory instruments filed on the IPTM register, including RIGI (Law 27.742), Decreto 38/2025, Decreto 449/2025, and Decreto 563/2025.

Lov 2023-06-20 nr. 77 (Lov om endringer i sikkerhetsloven — eierskapskontroll og lovens virkeområde), adopted by the Storting on 9 June 2023, signed 20 June 2023, in force 1 July 2023, is Norway's first substantive overhaul of Chapter 10 (Eierskapskontroll / ownership control) of the 2018 Security Act (Sikkerhetsloven). The amendment widens the scope of undertakings that can be brought under ownership control beyond entities directly linked to a "grunnleggende nasjonal funksjon" (fundamental national function) to include businesses of vital importance to national-security interests and businesses of significant importance to fundamental national functions, lowers and adds notification thresholds, and equips the King in Council with enhanced powers to block, condition, or unwind qualifying acquisitions. The reform converts a narrow security-classified regime into a broad horizontal FDI-screening architecture for Norway, the host of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund and a NATO frontline state.

On 17 June 2023, the Prime Minister's Office issued a formal notification establishing the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), an apex civil-military body chaired by the Prime Minister with the Chief of Army Staff and federal/ provincial leadership as members. SIFC operates as a "single window" to fast-track foreign direct investment in five strategic sectors: Defence Production, Agriculture and Livestock, Minerals, IT and Telecommunication, and Energy. The council is the principal vehicle through which Pakistan is channelling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereign capital — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain — into headline projects including the Reko Diq copper-gold restart, Saudi/UAE minerals MoUs, and the 2025 Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum. SIFC received statutory backing on 18 August 2023 via the Board of Investment (Amendment) Act, 2023, which inserted Chapter II-A giving SIFC overriding authority over other laws.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1903 amends Regulation (EU) 2022/263 so that its import ban and export restrictions, previously limited to the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, also cover the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine's Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It was adopted on 6 October 2022 alongside the eighth Russia sanctions package and entered into force the day after publication in the Official Journal.

Government Decree 53/2022/ND-CP, signed 15 August 2022 and effective 1 October 2022, implements Article 26 of Vietnam's 2018 Law on Cybersecurity. It mandates in-country storage of three categories of data — personal data of users in Vietnam, user-generated data, and user-relationship data — for both domestic and foreign cyberspace- service providers, with a minimum 24-month retention period. Foreign enterprises providing telecoms, data storage, domain names, e-commerce, online payments, social networks, online video games, or messaging services to users in Vietnam must establish a Vietnamese branch or representative office within 12 months of a Minister of Public Security written request. The decree closes a four-year implementation gap on the 2018 Cybersecurity Law and is the principal Vietnamese digital-trade barrier alongside Decree 13/2023/ND-CP (Personal Data Protection).

The Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule on 6 June 2022 (effective 2 June 2022) consolidating corrections, clarifications, and substantive amendments to the series of EAR Russia/Belarus rules issued between February and May 2022. The most significant substantive change eliminates the EAR99 food and medicine carve-out for 146 footnote-3-designated military end-user entities already on the Entity List, subjecting all items subject to the EAR — including previously exempt food and medicine — to licensing requirements with a policy of denial for the FSB, SVR, and GRU. Additional provisions clarify luxury goods value thresholds, oil refinery sector controls, and civil telecommunications license review policy, and correct cross-references in the Foreign Direct Product Rules for Russia and Belarus.