Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 21 July 2025 the UK announced 137 new sanctions designations under its Russia regime, targeting 135 oil tankers identified as part of Russia's "shadow fleet" plus two enabling companies: Litasco Middle East DMCC (a Dubai-based trading arm linked to Lukoil, sanctioned for moving Russian oil on shadow-fleet vessels) and Intershipping Services LLC (sanctioned for registering shadow-fleet vessels under the Gabonese flag). FCDO states the targeted vessels have carried an estimated $24 billion of cargo since the start of 2024, and that Intershipping's flag-registration activity has enabled up to $10 billion/year in Russian state-linked shipping. The action was announced alongside a further lowering of the UK/EU Crude Oil Price Cap and runs as a companion measure to the EU's 18th sanctions package (Council Regulation 2025/1494), adopted three days earlier.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Guinea's Council of Ministers activated a longstanding right in the Mining Code on 14 July 2025, mandating that at least 50% of all bauxite export volumes be shipped on Guinean-flag vessels. To operationalise the mandate, the government simultaneously created Guinéenne des Transports Maritimes (GUITRAM), a 100% state-owned maritime company designated as the exclusive Guinean-flag carrier for the mandated share. A complementary Guinea Bauxite Index (GBX) was launched simultaneously to establish a state-managed reference price for export pricing. The measures redirect freight revenues — estimated at $15–25 per tonne — from existing (predominantly Chinese-controlled) shipping operators toward the Guinean state, applied to approximately 130 Mt/year of exports that constitute roughly 60% of global seaborne bauxite supply.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a network of UAE- and UK-based companies controlled by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said that has smuggled Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi crude since at least 2020, plus five additional shadow-fleet vessel owners based in Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The action, taken pursuant to E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum sector) and E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism), also identifies several tankers as blocked property and marks the eighth round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's Iran maximum-pressure campaign. Concurrently, the State Department designated six additional entities and four vessels under E.O. 13846.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated four individuals, twelve entities, and two vessels in what Treasury called its single largest action to date against Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis), pursuant to Executive Order 13224 as amended. The designated network — Sana'a- and Hudaydah-based oil-trading front companies (including Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives, Star Plus Yemen, Tamco Establishment, Royal Plus Shipping, and Abbot Trading) and their Houthi operator-owners — facilitates black-market oil and oil-derivative sales that fund Houthi militant operations, while shipping firms Best Way Tanker Corp, Ocean Voyage LLC, and Atlantis M. Shipping Co were designated for discharging over 120,000 combined metric tons of gasoline and LPG at the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port via the vessels Valente and Atlantis MZ after the April 2025 expiration of Counter Terrorism General License 25A. The action builds on OFAC's June 2024–April 2025 cadence of designations against Houthi leaders, weapons-procurement operatives, and suppliers.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated one individual, eight entities, and one vessel pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators) for procuring and transshipping sensitive machinery to Iran's Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (RRA), a producer of UAV components and aerospace software for the IRGC. The vessel SHUN KAI XING, owned by Hong Kong-based Unico Shipping Co Ltd and chartered by Singapore-based V-Shipping Pte Ltd, was carrying the machinery for RRA and an affiliated firm when its cargo was inspected; the designated network — including China-based Shenzhen Xinxin Shipping, Dongguan Zanyin Machinery and Equipment, Athena Shipping, shipmaster Zhang Yanbing, and Turkiye-based Edisa Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi — then falsified bills of lading to obscure the Iran-bound, RRA-consigned cargo after the inspection.

New Zealand's Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 3) 2025, made under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022, came into force on 19 June 2025 designating seven entities and ten individuals -- including North Korean, Iranian and Belarusian actors supporting Russia's war effort and Russian actors involved in drone and weaponry production. The same instrument created a new "restricted ship" category under Regulation 8 and sanctioned 27 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet under it, and expanded the Regulation 12 legal-services exception. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on New Zealand persons supplying services to them.

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).

On 20 May 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List, adding 82 entries (20 individuals and 62 entities) under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. OFSI's accompanying Financial Sanctions Notice confirms all 82 are now subject to an asset freeze and trust services sanctions. The package covers three clusters: further members of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA) disinformation network (first designated in 2024); Russian financial institutions including the St Petersburg Currency Exchange, the Petersburg Settlement Center, and the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency; and individuals and companies supporting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" logistics, including a British national accused of ship procurement and two tanker captains. The measures were published in coordination with the EU's 17th sanctions package, announced the same day.

On 13 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated nearly two dozen firms and individuals — including Hong Kong-based intermediary Star Energy International Limited — for operating in Iran's illicit international oil trade on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy), the Tehran-based oil-sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). The designated network spans commercial intermediaries and shipping counterparties across China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the last a hub for ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian-origin crude. Designations were made under counter-terrorism (SDGT) and Iran Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) authorities as part of the administration's maximum-pressure campaign to cut off military and IRGC-linked revenue from Iran's oil exports.

On 8 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated China-based "teapot" refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. and its Singapore-based broker subsidiary Xing AO Energy PTE. LTD., three firms tied to a Dongying Port (Shandong) terminal that has received Iranian crude from shadow-fleet tankers, and six Hong Kong-, UK-, and Marshall Islands-owned shadow-fleet vessels (STAR TWINKLE 6, LAMD, SKADI, BIG MAG, IMPALAS, THANE) plus their owning shipping companies and two vessel captains. It is OFAC's third action against an Iranian-oil teapot refinery and its first targeting Shandong port terminal operators, taken under E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum/ petrochemical sector) and E.O. 13846 (NIOC support) as part of the administration's NSPM-2 maximum-pressure campaign.

The European Commission approved, under EU State aid rules (Case SA.111368), Italy's reintroduction of tax and social-security relief for shipping companies that register vessels in the Italian International Register ("Registro Internazionale"). The scheme, worth an estimated EUR 5.4 billion, runs for a ten-year period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2033 and grants qualifying operators — including cruise-ship shipboard concessionaires — corporate income-tax reductions, withholding-tax credits, and exemptions from seafarer social-security and welfare contributions. The stated aim is to encourage ship registration under EU/EEA flags, strengthen the competitiveness of the Italian-flagged fleet, and raise compliance with EU social, environmental and safety standards; undertakings in financial difficulty are excluded.

Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce issued Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO) 750(I)/2025 on 4 May 2025 under Section 3(1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 (XXXIX of 1950), prohibiting (i) the import into Pakistan of goods of Indian origin by third countries via sea, land, and air; (ii) the transit through Pakistan of goods imported from India by third countries via sea and air; and (iii) exports from third countries to India via Pakistani sea, land, and air routes. The SRO was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary (Part I) and took effect immediately. A clarification memorandum issued by the Ministry of Commerce on 8 May 2025 confirmed exemptions for Reshipment-on- Board (RoB) cargo and for shipments where the bill of lading or letter of credit was issued before 4 May 2025. The 10 May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire did not lift the SRO; it remains in force.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

USTR concluded its Section 301 investigation (initiated 17 April 2024) into China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance and on 17 April 2025 issued a Notice of Action imposing tiered port-entry service fees on Chinese-owned, -operated, and Chinese-built vessels arriving at U.S. ports starting 14 October 2025 (USD 50/net ton escalating to USD 80/NT in Apr 2026, USD 110/NT in Apr 2027, and USD 140/NT in Apr 2028; capped at 5 charges per vessel per year). The action also proposed a 100% tariff on China-built or China-component ship-to-shore cranes and additional 20-100% tariffs on China-origin shipping containers, truck chassis, and chassis parts. The entire action was subsequently suspended for one year (10 Nov 2025 through 9 Nov 2026) by USTR Modification Notice (FR 2025-19873) at presidential direction following the 1 Nov 2025 Trump-Xi trade deal.

The Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen) opened "Investeringsstøtten" (Investment Support), a DKK 1 billion grant pool running 2025-2030, targeting the CO2-intensive companies most exposed to Denmark's phased-in industrial CO2 tax. Eligible firms must emit on average at least 1,500 tonnes of CO2/year and see tax payments rise by at least 2.3% of gross value added under the new levy. In its first annual tranche (2025), the pool disbursed DKK 36 million, funding up to 60% of eligible costs at a rate of DKK 1,000 per tonne of CO2 abated for investments such as fossil-fuel boiler replacement with heat pumps or district heating. Qualifying sectors include general industrial processes, mineralogical processing, oil refining, domestic shipping ("indenrigssøfart" — including domestic ferries), and North Sea offshore activity. Legal basis is the "Aftale om Grøn skattereform for industri mv." (Green Tax Reform Agreement for Industry) of 22 June 2022, implemented via a Danish executive order (bekendtgørelse) on CO2-reduction subsidies for CO2-intensive enterprises, and notified to the European Commission under the General Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014.

On 24 February 2025, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted the 16th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 amending Regulation 833/2014 and a cluster of associated regulations (2025/389, 2025/390, 2025/392, 2025/398, 2025/401). The package introduces the EU's first import ban on Russian primary aluminium (CN 7601) under a 275 kt transition quota (~80% of 2024 volumes), expels 13 additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial-messaging system, adds 74 vessels (153 total) to the shadow-fleet port-access and services ban, prohibits any temporary storage of Russian crude and petroleum products in EU ports, bans transactions with major Russian airports (Moscow Vnukovo, Zhukovsky) and ports (Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk) used for sanctions circumvention, extends flight-ban coverage to 25 third-country airlines operating domestic Russian routes, and adds 83 asset-freeze listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) under Regulation 269/2014. Parallel measures cover Belarus and the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Entry into force on 25 February 2025.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), with the UK Foreign Office, announced on 13 January 2025 a sanctions package targeting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" — vessels operated outside Western maritime insurance and flag-state registries to evade the G7+ Russian crude price cap (set at $60/bbl since December 2022). The package designated 18 vessels (oil tankers transporting Russian crude in violation of the cap) and traders, with separate designations of two LNG carriers and two oil-services firms. This is the largest single UK shadow-fleet designation to date and was synchronised with EU Council and US OFAC packages in mid-January 2025.

On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.

Regulation (EU) 2025/40, published in the Official Journal on 22 January 2025 and entering into force on 11 February 2025, replaces the 1994 Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC with a directly-applicable Regulation. It mandates binding recycled-content targets for plastic packaging (by polymer and format, reaching 30–65% by 2030 with higher targets by 2040), minimum reusable-packaging shares for beverages and transport, recyclability standards for all packaging placed on the EU market from 2030, deposit-return-scheme obligations for beverage containers from 2029, and bans on specified single-use plastic packaging formats. General application begins 12 August 2026, with staggered compliance windows extending to 2030 and beyond, affecting all non-EU exporters shipping consumer goods, beverages, or e-commerce fulfilment into the EU single market.

On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.

Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2897 of 18 November 2024 amends Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 (restrictive measures over Iran's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine and to armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea region). It replaces Annex II with an expanded list of goods and technology whose sale, supply or export to Iran is prohibited where they could enable UAV or missile production, across ten technology categories, and adds Article 2a, a prohibition on transactions with the ports listed in Annex IV (Amirabad and Anzali). It entered into force on publication in the Official Journal.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

On 2 August 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned Lei nº 14.948/2024 (with partial veto, Mensagem nº 741) at a ceremony in the Pecém Industrial-Port Complex in Ceará, following Senate and Chamber approval of PL 2308/2023; the law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 August 2024. The statute establishes Brazil's first comprehensive legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen: it (i) creates the National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy (PNH2BC) under the National Energy Policy umbrella, (ii) sets a statutory definition of "low-carbon hydrogen" as fuel/industrial input with lifecycle GHG intensity ≤ 7 kg CO₂e/kg H₂, (iii) institutes the Brazilian Hydrogen Certification System (SBCH2) for origin and emissions accreditation, (iv) creates the Special Incentive Regime for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production (Rehidro), suspending PIS/Pasep and Cofins for five years on capital-goods, raw-materials and services purchases by qualified producers, and (v) authorises the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Hidrogênio de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (PHBC) — a tax-credit envelope capped at BRL 18.3 bn between 2028 and 2032 (subsequently regulated by Lei nº 14.990/2024 sanctioned 30 September 2024). ANP gains regulatory authority over hydrogen transportation, storage and import/export licensing, while the law amends Leis nºs 9.427/1996 (ANEEL) and 9.478/1997 (Petroleum Law) to integrate hydrogen into the energy-policy and electricity-regulation framework. Industry reporting at sanction cited >USD 30 bn in announced project pipeline, concentrated in Northeast renewable-rich states (Ceará, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte) leveraging Pecém, Suape and Açu as hydrogen-derivative export terminals.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.

On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The package introduces the EU's first targeted measures against Russian LNG (a ban on EU-port transhipment to third countries after a 9-month transition, and a prohibition on EU investment and goods/services exports to Russian LNG projects under construction such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG), bans EU entities outside Russia from using the SPFS Russian financial-messaging system, designates 27 named "shadow-fleet" tankers under a new vessel-specific port-access ban, and imposes a "best-efforts" obligation on EU parents to ensure non-EU subsidiaries do not engage in sanctions circumvention. It adds 116 new listings (69 individuals, 47 entities), including third-country circumvention enablers, to the asset-freeze and travel-ban regime.

On 2 June 2024, Treasurer Jim Chalmers signed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers (Disposal of Interests in Northern Minerals Limited) Orders 2024 (F2024N00475), directing five China-linked foreign investors to divest a combined 613,573,632 shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) to non-associates by 2 September 2024 on national-security grounds. The five named investors are Yuxiao Fund Pte Ltd, Black Stone Resources Limited, Indian Ocean International Shipping and Service Company Limited, Ms Ximei Liu, and Mr Xi Wang, together holding approximately 10.4% of NTU's total shares. NTU owns the Browns Range Heavy Rare Earths Project in the East Kimberley region of Western Australia — one of the few commercial-scale dysprosium and terbium deposits outside China. This is the foundational FATA s.69(2) disposal-order instrument; non-compliance led to an AUD 14 million Federal Court penalty in January 2026 and a second tranche of disposal orders against six further China-linked investors in May 2026.

Japan's Act on the Promotion of Supply and Utilization of Low-Carbon Hydrogen and its Derivatives for a Smooth Transition to a Decarbonized, Growth-Oriented Economic Structure (the Hydrogen Society Promotion Act) was enacted by the Diet on 17 May 2024, promulgated 24 May 2024, and came into force on 23 October 2024. It is Japan's first legislation specifically targeting hydrogen. The Act establishes a 15-year price-gap Contract-for-Difference (CfD) subsidy backstopping the delivered cost of certified low-carbon hydrogen, ammonia, synthetic methane and synthetic fuels supplied to Japan, plus a "Hub Support" capex grant for shared port/pipeline/storage infrastructure. METI is the competent authority and JOGMEC the implementing agency. Total subsidy envelope is ~3 trillion yen (~USD 20bn) financed via GX Transition Bonds under the 2023 GX Promotion Act.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed 35 persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective 22 August 2023, spanning seven destinations: 27 entities in China, plus one each in Indonesia, Singapore, Turkey, and UAE; two in Pakistan; and two Russian entities removed as a conforming change after being escalated to the more restrictive Entity List. The 33 cooperative removals follow successful completion of end-use checks verifying each party's bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the UVL Statement requirement for US exporters shipping EAR-subject items to these parties.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 persons across 13 countries to the Unverified List (UVL) on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides through end-use checks. The largest concentration is in China (14 entities), followed by the UAE (5) and Turkey (4), with single entries in Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, and Singapore. UVL placement suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement and file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System before shipping any item subject to the EAR. Published 24 March 2023 (88 FR 17706, FR Doc 2023-06171); effective 24 March 2023.

Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/97 of 5 January 2023 formally identified Cameroon as a non-cooperating third country under Article 31 of Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 (IUU Regulation), issuing the EU's first "red card" to a West African flag state. The Commission found that Cameroon systematically registered fishing vessels — including vessels with documented prior IUU histories — without adequate monitoring or flag-state control over their activities outside Cameroonian territorial waters. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/405, adopted 20 February 2023, confirmed the identification and triggered the operative trade consequences: a total prohibition on imports into the EU single market of wild-capture fishery products caught by Cameroon-flagged vessels, a bar on EU vessels chartering or operating under the Cameroonian flag, and a prohibition on EU operators purchasing from or transhipping with Cameroon-flagged vessels in any waters.

On 4 January 2023 the Union Cabinet of India, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the National Green Hydrogen Mission with an initial financial outlay of ₹19,744 crore (≈USD 2.3 bn) covering FY2023-24 through FY2029-30. The bulk of the outlay — ₹17,490 crore — funds the Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT) programme for electrolyser-manufacturing incentives and green-hydrogen production incentives. ₹1,466 crore is allocated to pilot projects (steel, mobility, shipping, ports, decentralised hydrogen), ₹400 crore to R&D, and ₹388 crore to other Mission components (skilling, regulatory framework, certification). The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is the lead implementing agency. Headline targets by 2030: at least 5 MMT/year of domestic green-hydrogen production capacity, with ≈125 GW of associated additional renewable- energy capacity, mobilisation of >₹8 lakh crore (≈USD 100 bn) of total investment, creation of >600,000 jobs, and avoidance of ≈50 MMT/year of CO₂ emissions. The Mission is positioned as the supply-chain underpinning for India's hard-to-abate decarbonisation (refining, fertilisers, steel) and as the basis for a green-hydrogen export industry leveraging India's low-cost solar resource. MNRE notified the SIGHT scheme guidelines on 28 June 2023, splitting the programme into Component I (Electrolyser Manufacturing Incentive, ₹4,440 crore) and Component II (Green Hydrogen Production Incentive, ₹13,050 crore for Mode-1; subsequent Mode-2A and Mode-2B tranches added for sector-specific tenders). Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) is the implementing agency for both components and runs the competitive reverse-auction tenders.

OFAC issued a determination under Executive Order 14071 (Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions) effective December 5, 2022, establishing a $60/barrel price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil. The measure prohibits US persons from providing six categories of covered services — trading/commodities brokering, financing, shipping, insurance (including reinsurance and P&I), flagging, and customs brokering — for the maritime transport of Russian crude oil unless the oil is purchased at or below $60/bbl. The determination was coordinated with the EU, G7 nations, and Australia as a unified coalition instrument designed to reduce Russian oil revenues while keeping global energy markets supplied. Three general licenses (GL 55, 56, 57) carved out limited exemptions for Japan's Sakhalin-2 imports, certain EU landlocked states, and vessel emergencies.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on 8 February 2022 to add 33 persons — all based in China — to the Unverified List (UVL) under EAR §744.15(c), on the basis that BIS could not satisfactorily complete end-use checks for these entities for reasons outside US Government control. Placement on the UVL bars exporters from using any EAR license exception when shipping controlled items to listed parties and requires exporters to obtain a certified UVL Statement from the entity or secure a BIS export licence. Sectors represented include semiconductor manufacturing equipment, optoelectronics, UAVs, specialty chemicals, and biotechnology.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 11, 2021 after completing successful end-use checks that verified their bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The three removed parties are DMA Logistics GmbH (Germany), Halm Elektronik GmbH (Germany), and Integrated Production and Test Engineering / IPTE (Mexico). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the requirement for US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before shipping items subject to the EAR to these parties.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA, Chapter 13) received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018 and established the UK's autonomous post-Brexit sanctions legal framework. Part 1 empowers Ministers (FCDO, HM Treasury) to impose financial, trade, immigration, aircraft, and shipping sanctions by statutory instrument for purposes including UN compliance, national security, foreign-policy objectives, and promotion of human rights and democracy. Part 2 grants Ministers authority to make AML and counter-terrorist-financing regulations aligned with FATF standards, previously derived from EU Anti-Money-Laundering Directives. SAMLA is the parent enabling statute for every UK sanctions regime in force post-Brexit, including 30+ thematic and geographic regulations covering Russia (SI 2019/855), Iran, DPRK, Belarus, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela, cyber, chemical weapons, global anti-corruption, and global human rights; under SAMLA, OFSI (HM Treasury) holds civil monetary-penalty and criminal-referral enforcement powers. Structurally peer to US IEEPA, EU Council Regulation framework, CN AFSL 2021, and JP FEFTA as the G7+CN foundational sanctions-statute cluster.