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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 44 of 2026 (3 October 2026) initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imports of para-nitrotoluene (对硝基甲苯, 4-nitrotoluene, HS 29042020 — an intermediate used in dyes, pigments, pesticides and pharmaceuticals) originating in the European Union. The petition was filed by Jiangsu Huaihe Chemical Co., Ltd. and Hubei Dongfang Chemical Co., Ltd. on behalf of China's domestic industry. The dumping investigation period runs 1 July 2025–30 June 2026; the injury investigation period runs 1 January 2022–30 June 2026. No provisional measures or duties are imposed by this announcement; MOFCOM expects to conclude by 3 October 2027, extendable by six months. Press reporting cites the petitioners' preliminary evidence as alleging a dumping margin exceeding 100%, but that figure is not disclosed in the MOFCOM text itself. The probe lands six days before EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is due in Beijing (8–9 October 2026) for talks aimed at defusing EU-China trade tension.
The European Commission adopted Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2107 of 22 September 2026, imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of continuous filament glass fibre products ("GFR" — glass fibre reinforcements/rovings) originating in Egypt for a further five years, following an expiry review under Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1037. The review found continued subsidisation of the Egyptian GFR industry above the de minimis threshold during the 2024 review- investigation period, via preferential financing, capital-investment support, VAT/import-duty exemptions and rebates, and provision of land for less-than-adequate remuneration. The measure continues the 13.1% countervailing duty first imposed by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/870 in June 2020.
The US Department of Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative determination (case A-570-228) that tin mill products from China are being sold in the US at less than fair value, finding a China-wide dumping margin of 136.52% based on adverse facts available (no Chinese producer/exporter responded to the investigation), adjusted to a 130.17% cash deposit rate after offsetting the parallel countervailing-duty determination. Commerce also made a preliminary affirmative finding of critical circumstances, extending provisional measures and cash-deposit collection retroactively. The investigation was petitioned by United States Steel Corporation and the United Steelworkers union; final determinations are scheduled for around 1 December 2026.
The US Department of Commerce issued a preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination (case C-570-229) finding that producers/exporters of tin mill products from China received countervailable subsidies at a rate of 66.61% ad valorem, applied both to the individually-examined respondents (Shougang Holding Trade (Hong Kong) Ltd. and Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.) and to the all-others rate, based on facts available with adverse inferences after non-cooperation. Commerce also made a preliminary affirmative finding of critical circumstances, and directed CBP to suspend liquidation and collect cash deposits on entries from the date of publication. The final CVD determination is aligned to issue alongside the companion antidumping determination, currently scheduled no later than 2026-11-30.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 38 of 2026 extends the deadline for China's anti-dumping investigation into pecan imports originating in Mexico and the United States from September 25, 2026 to March 25, 2027, citing case complexity under Article 26 of China's Anti-Dumping Regulations. The investigation was originally initiated on September 25, 2025 (Announcement No. 52 of 2025). It does not itself change any duty rate or scope; it prolongs the pendency of a case under which MOFCOM had already imposed preliminary anti-dumping duties (in the form of cash deposits, from August 11, 2026) of up to 54.3% pending a final determination now due by the new deadline.
On 9 September 2026 President Trump signed five proclamations under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 responding to Canada's 8 September 2026 retaliatory tariffs on roughly $20bn of US exports (steel, dairy, agricultural equipment). The proclamations impose outright import bans on certain Canadian alcoholic-beverage and dairy products that had been subject to the 50% Section 338 duties imposed 22 August 2026 (following Canada's continued discrimination against US alcohol and dairy commerce), and separately exclude certain Canadian motor-vehicle-sector products from importation for the same reason. The proclamations also modify the product scope of the July 20, 2026 Section 338 tariff actions, removing items such as rock salt and cement and adding others, including all-terrain vehicles and additional dairy products. The import bans take effect 29 September 2026; the product-list modifications take effect 15 September 2026. The duties/bans apply regardless of USMCA origin and stack on top of Section 232 tariffs.
China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued a preliminary anti-dumping ruling on imports of dichlorosilane (DCS, SiH2Cl2, HS 28539090) originating from Japan, finding dumping and material injury to the domestic DCS industry. Effective September 8, 2026, importers must post cash deposits with Chinese customs at company-specific provisional rates: 99.2% for Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd. and all other Japanese producers, and 80.8% for Denal Silane Co., Ltd. DCS is a precursor gas used in chip-fab thin-film deposition (epitaxial, silicon-carbide, silicon-nitride, oxide and polysilicon films) for logic, memory and analog semiconductors. The investigation was initiated January 7, 2026 (MOFCOM Announcement 2026 No. 2); a final determination is pending.
Commerce initiated periodic administrative reviews of antidumping duty (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) orders with July anniversary dates, following timely requests under 19 CFR 351.213(b). Among the named respondents are JFE Steel Corporation and Nippon Steel Corporation (Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from Japan, A-588-873), POSCO and Hyundai Steel Company (Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products from South Korea, A-580-878/C-580-879), China Steel Corporation (Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products from Taiwan, A-583-856), Interpipe entities (Oil Country Tubular Goods from Ukraine, A-823-815), and Goodluck India Limited and Tube Investments of India Ltd. (Cold-Drawn Mechanical Tubing from India, A-533-873). The notice also covers unrelated AD/CVD orders on goods including pasta, mattresses, citric acid, paper shopping bags, tires and PET film from other countries. Review periods are predominantly 1 July 2025 - 30 June 2026; Commerce intends to issue final results no later than 31 July 2027. This is a review of existing orders, not a new duty — current cash-deposit rates continue unchanged pending the review's outcome.
On 4 June 2026 USTR published a formal Notice of Determination in the Federal Register (doc 2026-11158, docket USTR-2025-0043) concluding that Brazil's acts, policies, and practices in six areas — digital trade and electronic payment services, unfair preferential tariffs, anti-corruption enforcement, IP protection, ethanol market access, and illegal deforestation — are unreasonable and burden US commerce. Simultaneously, USTR proposed a 25% ad valorem tariff on all Brazilian-origin goods, subject to ~1,600 HTS subheading exclusions including approximately 430 civil-aircraft lines. A public hearing is scheduled for 6 July 2026 and USTR faces a statutory deadline of 15 July 2026 to finalise any responsive action; the tariff has not yet taken effect.
On June 3, 2026, USTR formally initiated a Section 301 investigation (FR Doc. 2026-11043) into Vietnam's acts, policies, and practices relating to intellectual property protection and enforcement. This is the first Vietnam-specific Section 301 investigation carrying tariff-imposition authority — distinct from the Special 301 process (Section 182, which designates but cannot impose tariffs) and from the simultaneous June 2, 2026 forced-labor Section 301 (60 economies) and March 11, 2026 overcapacity Section 301. USTR proposes additional duties of 10–12.5% on Vietnamese goods if the investigation confirms actionable IP failures. The public comment period closes July 6, 2026.
Via Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 26-03, series of 2026, signed on 20 May 2026, the Philippine DTI removed China and Indonesia from the list of developing countries exempt from the definitive general safeguard measure on ordinary Portland cement (Type 1) and blended cement, imposing a safeguard duty of PHP 349 per metric tonne (≈ US$6.09/t; PHP 14 per 40 kg bag) on imports from those two origins for three years. The removal follows the Philippine Tariff Commission's monitoring, which found China's share of total cement imports rising from 11% in 2025 to 23% in Q1 2026 and Indonesia's from 6% to 8% over the same period — both exceeding the 3% de minimis threshold that conferred exemption under the parent DAO 25-15. The underlying definitive safeguard, covering all non-exempt origins, first took effect in February 2026 following a serious-injury determination by the Tariff Commission.
USTR formally initiated the second statutorily mandated four-year review of its Section 301 investigation into China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation (Federal Register 2026-08806, published May 6, 2026). The review covers tariff actions imposed on approximately $300 billion of Chinese goods across Lists 1–4B (25% on most lists; 7.5% on List 4A) and will determine whether those actions should be continued, modified, or terminated. Interested parties may file continuation requests in two 60-day windows: May 7–July 5, 2026 (for the July 6, 2018 action) and June 24– August 22, 2026 (for the August 23, 2018 action). DISTINCT from the March 2026 Section 301 excess-capacity investigations (which target 16 economies on overcapacity sectors) and from the June 2026 Section 301 forced-labor enforcement action (60 economies); this review is China-specific, IP/TT-focused, and mandated by the original Biden-era statutory clock under Section 304(c) of the Trade Act of 1974.
The UK Finance Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026, establishes the primary statutory framework for the United Kingdom Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (UK CBAM), granting HM Revenue & Customs the assessment, collection, and enforcement powers needed to apply a carbon-content levy on imports of aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, and iron & steel from 1 January 2027. Two tranches of draft secondary legislation (the CBAM Regulations 2026 covering administration, rate calculation/carbon-price relief, emissions and verification, and transitory provisions) were published for technical consultation on 10 February 2026 (closing 24 March 2026) and again in Spring 2026 (closing 21 May 2026). The mechanism imposes a UK ETS-linked benchmark price on the embedded carbon of in-scope imports, with a credit for verified third-country carbon prices already paid, and — unlike the EU CBAM — has no transitional reporting phase and a narrower initial sectoral scope (no electricity).
On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.
The US Department of Commerce published its final affirmative determination of sales at less-than-fair-value in the antidumping investigation of animal feed-grade L-lysine (lysine) from China (case A-570-215) on 23 July 2026, following a preliminary determination published 6 March 2026 (91 FR 11030). Commerce found a China-wide weighted-average dumping margin of 139.83% (cash deposit rate 139.65% after subsidy-offset adjustment), based on adverse facts available after Commerce found Zhengzhou Longgu Trading Co., the sole company with a calculated margin, and the Eppen Group group of producers/exporters uncooperative and ineligible for a separate rate in the final determination. A group of separate-rate companies — including Anhui BBCA Biochemical, Heilongjiang Wanlirunda Biotechnology, and others exporting through trading intermediaries such as Agromate Sg, Ainore (Tianjin), and Aollen Biotech — received a 73.55% dumping margin (73.37% cash deposit rate). The order covers lysine regardless of form (HCl, sulfate, liquid) under HTSUS 2922.41.0090 and related subheadings. A companion countervailing-duty investigation (preliminary 22 January 2026, 91 FR 2745) was finalized the same day; suspension of liquidation runs from 6 March 2026, with a final AD order contingent on an ITC injury determination due within 45 days of the final LTFV finding.
The US Department of Commerce published its final affirmative countervailing-duty (CVD) determination on animal feed-grade L-lysine from China (case C-570-216) on 23 July 2026, the companion subsidy proceeding to the parallel antidumping case (A-570-215) finalized the same day. Commerce found Heilongjiang Wanlirunda Biotechnology Co., Ltd. and Shouguang Golden-land Industry & Trading Co., Ltd. received countervailable subsidies at 82.11%, while Inner Mongolia Eppen Biotech Co., Ltd. and all other Chinese producers/exporters were assigned a 48.21% subsidy rate. The preliminary CVD determination, published 22 January 2026, set the initial cash-deposit rates and suspension of liquidation; the final determination confirmed and aligned the case with the AD final determination for a joint ITC injury vote.
The US Department of Commerce issued affirmative preliminary countervailing duty (CVD) determinations on hardwood and decorative plywood from China, Indonesia, and Vietnam, finding countervailable government subsidies in all three countries. Preliminary subsidy rates are 81.34% for China, 2.40% to 128.66% for Indonesia (case-by-case, non-cooperating producer PT Mustika Buana Sejahtera at the top of the range), and 4.37% to 26.75% for Vietnam. Commerce published the determinations in the Federal Register on 22 January 2026, triggering CBP collection of cash deposits at these rates pending final determinations. A parallel antidumping (AD) investigation on the same product and countries runs on a separate track (see responds_to) with preliminary AD margins of 187.27% (China), up to 84.94% (Indonesia), and 196.14% (Vietnam) announced 25 February 2026 — AD and CVD duties stack cumulatively.
The US Department of Commerce issued a countervailing duty (CVD) order on steel concrete reinforcing bar (rebar) from Algeria, effective 6 July 2026, imposing a 72.94% subsidy-offset rate on Tosyali Iron Steel Industry Algeria SPA and, by default, all other Algerian producers — a rate based on facts available with adverse inferences after the Algerian government and/or exporters did not fully cooperate with Commerce's subsidy questionnaires. Because USTR determined Algeria is not a "Subsidies Agreement country," the US ITC was not required to make an injury determination, so the CVD order took effect on Commerce's final subsidy determination alone. This is a separate legal track from the parallel antidumping case on the same product (see responds_to) — the AD investigation used a 127.32% margin, the CVD order uses 72.94%, and both stack as cumulative duties on Algerian rebar. Parallel countervailing-duty investigations on Egypt and Vietnam remained at the preliminary stage as of Commerce's 13 January 2026 determinations, with net subsidy rates set at 29.51% (Egypt) and 1.08% (Vietnam); these are provisional cash-deposit rates pending each country's final CVD determination.
China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2026 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会公告2025年第11号) on 29 December 2025, effective 1 January 2026. The plan sets provisional import tariff rates below MFN levels on 935 products, while cancelling provisional rates on certain other products (reverting them to standard MFN rates). It adds new national tariff subheadings for intelligent bionic robots, bio-aviation kerosene, forest-grown ginseng, and other items, bringing the total tariff schedule to 8,972 lines. The government frames the provisional-rate cuts — covering key components and advanced materials such as CNC hydraulic air cushions for stamping presses, recycled "black powder" (黑粉) lithium-ion battery feedstock, artificial blood vessels and infectious-disease diagnostic kits — as support for "high-level sci-tech self-reliance" and modernisation of the industrial system. China also continues zero-tariff treatment on 100% of tariff lines for the 43 least-developed countries with diplomatic relations with China, and continues Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement preferential rates for Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2614, adopted 12 December 2025 and published in the Official Journal on 22 December 2025, amends Regulation (EU) 2021/2283 and issues a wholesale replacement of the EU's autonomous import tariff-rate quota (ATQ) list, superseding the prior version dated December 2013 and its last update in June 2025. It applies from 1 January 2026 and grants duty-free or reduced-duty access, within fixed volume ceilings, for a broad set of agricultural and industrial inputs including basic organic chemicals, tanning/dyeing extracts, and fertilizer/pesticide inputs not produced in sufficient quantity within the Union. Global Trade Alert logs it as a "Red" (trade-liberalising but discriminatory-in-effect) intervention because the quota volumes are finite even though the duty treatment is erga omnes.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement 2025 No. 72 on 16 December 2025, the final anti-dumping determination concluding a five-year package of definitive duties on imports of certain pork and pig by-products originating in the European Union. Final duty rates range from 4.9% to 19.8% by exporter — significantly lower than the provisional security-deposit rates applied since 10 September 2025 (31–44%), with excess provisional deposits to be refunded. The measure covers fresh, chilled, and frozen pork; edible offal of pigs; pig fat and pig-fat products; and pig intestines, bladders, and stomachs across HS Chapters 02, 05, and 15, and entered into force on 17 December 2025 for a period of five years.
On 13 November 2025, the United States and the Republic of Korea released a Joint Fact Sheet reaffirming the July 2025 announcement of the Korea Strategic Trade and Investment Deal — the first standalone US-Korea trade-and-investment agreement since the 2012 KORUS FTA. USTR issued the implementing Federal Register notice (90 FR 55964, Notice 2025-21940) on 3 December 2025, effective 4 December 2025, with retroactive HTSUS application to 1 November 2025 for autos and auto parts and to 14 November 2025 for reciprocal-tariff goods, timber, lumber, derivatives, and certain aircraft and aircraft parts. On the US tariff side: (i) the country-specific IEEPA reciprocal tariff on Korean originating goods is set at the higher of the KORUS FTA / MFN rate or 15% (parallel to the Japan and EU framework deals); (ii) the Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, timber, lumber and wood derivatives are reduced to 15% (no incremental duty when the pre-existing KORUS/MFN rate already meets or exceeds 15%); (iii) Korean exports of qualifying goods on the Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners (PTAAP) list are exempt from reciprocal tariffs (covering generic pharmaceuticals and unavailable natural resources); (iv) Section 232 pharmaceuticals capped at 15%; semiconductors granted MFN-style "no less favourable" treatment in any future sectoral deal. On the investment side, Korea commits to a USD 350bn package: USD 150bn into US shipbuilding ("Approved Investments") plus USD 200bn into US strategic industries via a separate Strategic Investments MOU, with annual currency-funding cap of USD 20bn. Non-tariff commitments include streamlined US biotech approvals on the Korean side, US meat and cheese market access, fair treatment for US digital services, removal of Korea's 50,000-unit cap on US vehicles meeting FMVSS, and joint WTO support for the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.
On 5 February 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Argentine Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno signed in Washington the United States-Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment (ARTI), formalising the framework jointly announced on 13 November 2025. The agreement is the first standalone bilateral trade-and-investment instrument concluded by the second Trump administration and the first FTA-style agreement signed under the post-IEEPA reciprocal-tariff architecture (Executive Order 14257, "Liberation Day"). On the US side, the ARTI sets out three tariff schedules: (i) Schedule 2A suspends additional reciprocal tariffs under EO 14257 for specified Argentine-origin goods (covering "unavailable natural resources" and non-patented pharmaceutical inputs); (ii) Schedule 2B grants a zero additional reciprocal tariff for designated Argentine agricultural products under EO 14360; and (iii) caps additional ad-valorem duties on other goods at 10% above MFN rates, inclusive of IEEPA reciprocal tariffs. On the Argentine side, illustrative tariff-rate quotas include duty-free access for 80,000 MT of US beef in calendar year 2026, 1,000 MT for cheese, 870 MT for almonds, 40 MT in-shell + 40 MT shelled for pistachios, 80,000 litres for wine (<2 L bottles), and preferential treatment for 10,000 motor vehicles meeting defined technical parameters. Argentina additionally commits to broader preferential market access on medicines, chemicals, machinery, information-technology products, medical devices, and a wide range of agricultural goods, alongside IP-enforcement upgrades (counterfeit/pirated-goods enforcement, patentability criteria, patent-backlog reduction, geographical indications) and investment-facilitation commitments that align Argentina's regime with US-preferred standards on regulatory cooperation, labour and environment.
At the APEC Busan summit on 30 October 2025, Presidents Trump and Xi reached the "Economic and Trade Arrangement Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," subsequently implemented on the US side by the executive order "Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates Consistent with the Economic and Trade Arrangement" (issued 4 November 2025; effective 12:01 am EST on 10 November 2025; published in the Federal Register on 7 November 2025 as 90 FR 50729 / 2025-19826) and on the Chinese side by a series of MOFCOM and State Council Tariff Commission announcements (notably MOFCOM 2025 No. 90 of 8–9 November 2025). The arrangement is structurally parallel to the already-filed US-Japan, US-Korea and US-Taiwan framework deals but uniquely material because it freezes the highest-stakes bilateral tariff and export-control confrontation of the post-2024 reset. Core US commitments: (i) reciprocal-tariff "additional ad valorem rate of duty" on PRC-origin goods reduced from a prior 20% IEEPA-fentanyl + 10% IEEPA-reciprocal stack to a 10% rate (i.e., the prior 24% / 34% scheduled escalation is suspended), extended through 10 November 2026; (ii) US BIS suspends the so-called "affiliates rule" expanding entity-list controls to majority-owned subsidiaries of listed Chinese firms; (iii) USTR pauses Section 301 maritime / shipbuilding / logistics countermeasures against Chinese vessels for one year. Core PRC commitments: (i) MOFCOM suspends for one year (until 10 November 2026) the 9 October 2025 extraterritorial rare-earth export-control package — including controls on REE processing equipment, lithium-battery manufacturing equipment, and superhard materials; (ii) PRC suspends retaliatory tariffs on a broad swath of US agricultural products through 31 December 2026; (iii) commitment to purchase ≥25 million metric tonnes of US soybeans annually in 2026-2028 and to resume sorghum and log imports; (iv) suspension of MOFCOM antitrust and "unreliable-entity" probes against named US semiconductor and chip-equipment companies; (v) cooperation on fentanyl precursor enforcement. The arrangement does not repeal underlying authorities (IEEPA tariffs, MOFCOM export-control list, Entity List) — it is a calibrated mutual freeze with a one-year sunset and quarterly review checkpoints.
Turkish port authorities began requiring shipping agents to certify, from 21 August 2025, that vessels calling at Turkish ports have no Israeli ownership or agency ties and carry no military or hazardous cargo destined for Israel; Israeli-flagged or Israeli-linked ships were barred from Turkish ports outright, and Turkish-flagged vessels were barred from calling at Israeli ports. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed and formalised the measures — alongside a parallel closure of Turkish airspace to Israeli government/military flights — in an extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on 29 August 2025, stating Türkiye had "completely cut off trade with Israel." The measure operationalises and tightens enforcement of Türkiye's broader Israel trade suspension (in place since May 2024) by closing the maritime transshipment channel that had allowed indirect trade to continue.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1564 of 24 July 2025 is the EU's largest-ever trade countermeasure package: additional customs duties on approximately €93 billion of US-origin goods (Annexes I–XIII) plus an export prohibition on specified EU products to the United States (Annex XIV), adopted under Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 (the EU commercial-policy enforcement regulation) in response to the second Trump administration's Section 232 reinstatement and automobile tariffs. The regulation supersedes and repeals Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 and three earlier rebalancing CIRs. Application was suspended from 5 August 2025 following the EU-US trade framework agreement of 27 July 2025; the suspension was extended by a further six months from 4 February 2026. CIR 2025/1564 remains in force as a conditionally-reinstateable rebalancing framework while negotiations continue.
On 15 July 2025 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated a Section 301 investigation into six categories of Brazilian "acts, policies, and practices" alleged to be unreasonable or discriminatory and to burden US commerce: (1) digital trade and electronic payment services (specifically the Banco Central do Brasil's operation of the Pix instant-payments system, alleged to disadvantage US payment providers); (2) unfair, preferential tariffs (Brazil's preferential tariff treatment for selected partners that excludes US exports); (3) anti-corruption enforcement (alleged interference with US-linked enforcement matters); (4) intellectual property protection (insufficient enforcement against piracy and counterfeiting); (5) ethanol market access (Brazil's reversal of near-zero ethanol tariffs imposed during the 2017-2024 window); and (6) illegal deforestation (the trade-distorting effect of unenforced environmental rules on Brazilian commodity exports). The Federal Register notice (USTR-2025-0043, FR doc 2025-13498) published on 18 July 2025 set written-comment and hearing-request deadlines for 18 August 2025 and a public hearing for 3 September 2025 at the US International Trade Commission. A determination on whether Brazil's practices are actionable, and what remedies (including retaliatory tariffs, withdrawal of trade concessions, or formal WTO action) USTR will pursue, is statutorily due within 12 months of initiation — i.e. by 15 July 2026.
New Zealand Customs Service, acting under section 8 of the Tariff Act 1988, published Tariff Concession Approvals, Withdrawals and Declines Notice (No. 17) 2025 in the Gazette on 4 July 2025. The notice grants new duty-free tariff concessions on goods across tariff items 3919-9405 (adhesive tapes and films, fibreglass products, industrial machinery, heating/cooling equipment, electronic controls and marine vessels) not manufactured domestically, effective 1 July 2025, while withdrawing a comparable set of prior concession approvals effective 30 June 2025. This is a routine, periodic administrative tariff-concession cycle rather than a discrete policy announcement.
New Zealand Customs Service, acting under section 8 of the Tariff Act 1988, published Tariff Concession Approvals, Withdrawals and Declines Notice (No. 18) 2025 in the Gazette on 4 July 2025. The notice withdraws 16 previously approved duty-free tariff concessions spanning laminated films, building panels, filtering and aggregate-processing equipment, thermostatic valves, railway safety systems and anti-pollution barriers, effective 14 days from publication, with importers given one calendar month to lodge objections. This is a routine, periodic administrative tariff-concession withdrawal cycle rather than a discrete policy announcement.
The Australian Border Force published Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. TC 25/25 on 2 July 2025 under sections 269K and 269R of the Customs Act 1901, covering new Tariff Concession Order (TCO) applications and TCOs made for goods not produced domestically (solvents, adhesives, geotextiles, ceramics, glass fibre fabric, HDPE/LLDPE resins, subsea and rail hardware), each carrying a 5% general-tariff duty-free concession, plus revocations and a cheese quota allocation notice. This is a routine, periodic administrative tariff-concession cycle rather than a discrete policy announcement.
The Australian Border Force published Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. TC 25/22 on 11 June 2025 under sections 269K, 269R and 269SE of the Customs Act 1901. The gazette lists new Tariff Concession Order (TCO) applications, eight TCOs made (moving corrosion inhibitors, compostable- film polymers, furnace cooling systems, aseptic food-processing machinery, reverse-osmosis filters, oilfield drilling parts and pallet-manufacturing robotics from the 5% general tariff rate to duty-free), one withdrawn application, and five local-manufacturer-initiated TCO revocations (reinstating the 5% general tariff rate on steel access-box, formwork and crown-seal products effective 22-24 January 2025). This is a routine, periodic administrative tariff-concession cycle rather than a discrete policy announcement.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 25 of 2025 (18 May 2025) issued the final ruling in the anti-dumping investigation into copolyacetal (共聚聚甲醛, polyoxymethylene copolymer/POM copolymer, an engineering plastic used in automotive parts, electronics and precision components) imported from the United States, the EU, Taiwan and Japan, initiated 19 May 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 18 of 2024). MOFCOM found dumping, material injury to the domestic industry and a causal link, and imposed anti-dumping duties effective 19 May 2025 for a five-year term under Article 38 of China's Anti-Dumping Regulations. Rates: 74.9% for US companies; 42.0% for EU companies; 3.8%-32.6% for Taiwan-region companies (named companies at the low end, "other Taiwan companies" at 32.6%); 33.9%-43.7% for Japanese companies (named companies at the low end, "other Japanese companies" at 35.5% per the 2026 succession notice). On 20 August 2026, MOFCOM Announcement No. 36 of 2026 ruled that Daicel Corporation succeeds to Polyplastics Co., Ltd.'s 35.5% rate and Daicel HPP Taiwan Co., Ltd. succeeds to Polyplastics Taiwan Co.'s 3.8% rate, both following corporate reorganizations, effective 21 August 2026 (filed below as an amendment).
On 10–11 May 2025 in Geneva, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and USTR Jamieson Greer met with PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng and on 12 May 2025 issued the "Joint Statement on US-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva," producing the first bilateral de-escalation of the post-2 April 2025 reciprocal-tariff stand-off. The agreement was implemented on the US side via Executive Order 14298 of 12 May 2025 ("Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discussions With the People's Republic of China," published in the Federal Register 21 May 2025 as 90 FR 21831 / 2025-09297) and on the Chinese side via State Council Tariff Commission Announcement No. 4 of 2025. Effective 12:01 a.m. EDT on 14 May 2025, both sides suspended for 90 days (through 12 August 2025) the 24 percentage points of additional ad valorem duty layered on top of the prior 10% reciprocal rate, while the 10% reciprocal rate itself was retained. On the US side this reduced the headline reciprocal-tariff burden on PRC-origin goods from a 125% scheduled rate (under EOs 14259 and 14266) to 10%; combined with the still-in-force 20% IEEPA-fentanyl tariff under Executive Order 14195 (separately filed: `2025-02-01-us-trump-fentanyl-tariffs-canada-mexico-china`), the effective additional rate on most Chinese imports came down to ~30%. China made a parallel 24pp suspension on US-origin goods (from a 125% retaliatory rate to 10%) and additionally suspended non-tariff countermeasures imposed since 2 April 2025 (export controls, unreliable-entity designations, MOFCOM probes). The truce is structurally a calibrated freeze of the reciprocal-tariff ladder under the April 2025 regime, not a repeal: the underlying EO 14257 / IEEPA framework remains intact and was scheduled to re-engage at the 24pp escalated rate on 12 August 2025 absent further extension. The Geneva agreement is the precursor to the August 2025 Stockholm extension and the October 2025 Busan Economic and Trade Arrangement (separately filed: `2025-10-30-us-china-busan-economic-trade-arrangement`).
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 of 14 April 2025, adopted under Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 (the EU enforcement regulation for international trade rights), reinstates the EU's 2018 and 2020 commercial rebalancing measures against the United States and adds new countermeasures in response to the second Trump administration's 10 February 2025 Section 232 proclamations, which restored a universal 25% tariff on steel imports and raised the aluminium tariff to 25% effective 12 March 2025 (filed as 2025-02-11-us-section-232-steel-aluminum-global-tariff-reinstatement). The combined package targets approximately €26 billion of EU imports from the United States — matching the scope of US measures affecting EU exports — and combines the reinstatement of pre-existing duties on a first tranche of products (steel, aluminium, agricultural goods, motorcycles, and other industrial items originally subject to the 2018 and 2020 lists) with new duties on roughly €18 billion of additional US-origin goods spanning poultry, beef, certain seafood, nuts, eggs, dairy, sugar and vegetables on the agricultural side, and steel, aluminium, textiles, leather, appliances, plastics and wood products on the industrial side. Tariff rates layer onto MFN duties at up to 50% for some products, mirroring the structure of the 2018 measures. On the same day the Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/786, which suspends application of Articles 2 and 3 of 2025/778 for 90 days, until 14 July 2025, to allow space for bilateral negotiations following the US 9 April 2025 announcement of a 90-day pause on its own reciprocal-tariff regime (2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime). The legal scaffolding therefore exists and is in force, but no duties were collected during the suspension window. This is the first standalone EU rebalancing instrument adopted against the United States in the second Trump administration and the first major use of Reg 654/2014 since the 2018-2020 Section 232 episode.
President Trump signed three Executive Orders on 1 February 2025 (EO 14193, 14194, 14195) declaring national emergencies under IEEPA over the cross-border flow of fentanyl + illegal migration, and using that authority to impose new tariffs: 25% on imports from Canada (with a reduced 10% rate on Canadian energy products), 25% on imports from Mexico, and an additional 10% on imports from China (separate from pre-existing Section 301 + Section 232 tariffs). The tariffs took effect 4 February 2025. On 3 February 2025 the administration announced a 30-day pause for both Canada and Mexico following bilateral border-enforcement commitments; the China tariff was not paused. China responded 4 February with retaliatory tariffs of 15% on US LNG/coal/farm equipment and additional measures. The package set the precedent for the broader 2 April 2025 "Liberation Day" reciprocal-tariff regime (filed: 2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime).
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement 2025 No. 3 on 9 January 2025, the Final Determination of its Trade and Investment Barrier (TIB) investigation into the European Commission's enforcement practices under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). MOFCOM concluded that EC practices in FSR investigations targeting Chinese enterprises in rail transport, photovoltaics, wind energy, and security-equipment public procurement constitute trade and investment barriers under Article 3 of China's Rules on Trade and Investment Barrier Investigations (对外贸易壁垒调查规则). The determination documents €20.88 billion in estimated economic losses — including €10.18 billion from abandoned bids — and finds de-facto discrimination against Chinese SOEs relative to investors from other jurisdictions. MOFCOM committed to taking "necessary measures" including bilateral consultations, multilateral dispute settlement, or "other appropriate measures" to safeguard Chinese enterprises' legitimate rights and interests.
The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026 following a transitional reporting period that began October 2023. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, importers of goods in six carbon-intensive sectors (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) must now purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to embedded carbon emissions. The Q1 2026 certificate price was set at EUR 75.36 per tonne CO2, calculated from EU ETS auction prices. In 2026, the adjustment factor is 2.5%, rising annually to 100% by 2034.
China's State Council Tariff Commission published its annual "2023 Tariff Adjustment Plan" (税委会公告2022年第11号) on 28 December 2022, effective 1 January 2023. Alongside routine import-side changes (provisional-rate cancellations reverting some goods to MFN rates, and an eighth-step MFN cut on 62 information-technology products from 1 July 2023), the plan raises export tariffs on aluminum and aluminum alloy to support "transformation, upgrading and high-quality development" of the domestic industry. Global Trade Alert logs this export-tax increase as the "certainly harmful" intervention within the bundled state act; a separate import-tariff cut is logged as liberalising.