Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On June 21, 2026, OFAC issued Iran-related General License X (GL X), authorizing transactions otherwise prohibited under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 587), the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 589), and WMD-proliferation sanctions authorities — including new purchases and loadings of Iranian-origin crude oil, petrochemical, and petroleum products, a materially broader carve-out than the cargo-already-loaded window granted by the preceding General License U. Just 16 days later, on July 7, 2026, OFAC issued General License X1, revoking and superseding GL X: as of that date new purchases or loadings of Iranian-origin crude oil, petrochemical, or petroleum products were no longer authorized. GL X1 itself subsequently expired. OFAC formally published both web licenses in the Federal Register on September 30, 2026 — a retrospective publication of licenses already issued and, by then, already revoked and expired.

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

On March 20, 2026, OFAC issued Iran-related General License U (GL U), temporarily authorizing the sale, delivery, offloading and — notably, for the first time in decades — importation into the United States of Iranian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, but only for cargo already loaded onto vessels as of 12:01 a.m. EDT that day. The window ran through April 19, 2026, after which the authorization lapsed. The license excluded any transaction touching Cuba, North Korea, or Russian-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, and did not waive any other, non-Iran sanctions program. OFAC formally published GL U (and the separate, entity-specific GL V wind-down license for Hengli Petrochemical) in the Federal Register on June 10, 2026 — a retrospective publication of licenses already issued and, by then, already expired.

The Council of the EU adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing adds 4 individuals and 6 entities to the EU asset freeze, bringing the total under this regime to 24 individuals and 26 entities. Newly listed entities include Fanavaran Sanat Ertebatat Company and front-company trader Sahara Thunder (UAV electronic components and guidance systems), and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Khojir Missile Development and Production, and procurement firm Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Co. (ballistic missile manufacturing and propellant-precursor procurement). All funds and economic resources of the listed parties are frozen within the EU, and EU persons/entities are barred from making funds available to them.

On January 23, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight vessel-owning/management firms — based in the UAE, India, Oman, the Seychelles, and the Marshall Islands — and identified nine of their tankers as blocked property, for transporting hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian crude oil, LPG, naphtha and high-sulfur fuel oil to buyers across East Asia, South Asia and East Africa. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum/petrochemical sector) as part of the maximum-pressure campaign under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, and OFAC concurrently issued General License T authorizing limited safety, environmental and cargo-offloading transactions involving the newly blocked vessels.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 18 individuals and entities that make up the "rahbar" shadow-banking networks of sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli and Shahr Bank, including Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE Ltd, UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE and HMS Trading FZE, Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company and Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, and UK-based Nanshan Ltd. Separately, OFAC designated senior Iranian security officials, including SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani, for their role in the regime's violent crackdown on peaceful protesters that began in December 2025. The financial designations were made under E.O. 13902 (Iran's financial/petroleum/petrochemical sectors) and the human-rights designations under E.O. 13553 and E.O. 13876, in furtherance of NSPM-2; Treasury noted it sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft under the same maximum-pressure campaign in 2025.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Decree No. 8/2026 on 3 January 2026, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 95 individuals and 70 legal entities, the large majority of them Russian citizens, residents, and companies. The designees manufacture or supply communications equipment, radio-electronic warfare (REB) systems, and microelectronics for Russia's defense-industrial complex, alongside chemical, mining, metallurgical, and fuel-and-energy-sector entities and their managers. The decree entered into force on 6 January 2026, the date of official publication.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and entities in Venezuela and Iran on 30 December 2025 for facilitating Iran's proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ballistic-missile inputs. Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA (EANSA) and its chair, Jose Jesus Urdaneta Gonzalez, were designated for negotiating directly with Iran's Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) and overseeing local assembly of QAI's Mohajer-series UAVs, re-branded in Venezuela as the ANSU series — an arrangement OFAC states has run since 2006. Separately, three Iran-based persons were designated for procuring sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid and nitrocellulose — precursor chemicals for ballistic-missile propellant and warhead production — on behalf of Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), a unit of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO). The action was taken under Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators and supporters) and Executive Order 13949 (Iran conventional-arms activities), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities based in Iran, the UAE, Turkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany and Ukraine for operating procurement networks that supply Iran's ballistic missile and UAV programmes, including missile propellant precursors and UAV components. The action is Treasury's second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the 27 September 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran ("snapback") over its non-compliance with international nuclear and missile commitments. Designated entities include Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), which Treasury says has worked with the IRGC-Qods Force to advance Iran's UAV programme. All property and interests of the designated parties subject to US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006) and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2040 (amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP), widening the EU's Belarus restrictive-measures regime in lockstep with the 19th Russia sanctions package adopted the same day. The package widens the export ban to industrial goods (salts, ores, rubber articles, tyres, millstones, construction materials, electronic components, rangefinders, propellant chemicals, metals/oxides/alloys), extends the import ban to all acyclic hydrocarbons, introduces a new prior-licensing requirement for services supplied to Belarus, its government, or public bodies, and mirrors the Russia regime's space, AI, and high-performance/ quantum-computing service restrictions. A companion instrument, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2039, adds 5 new asset-freeze listings (2 individuals + 3 entities, including JSC Holography Industry, Horizont Holding, and ICT Horizont). Entered into force 24 October 2025.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

On 6 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 8 Mexican individuals and 12 Mexico-based companies under Executive Order 14059 for supplying fentanyl precursor chemicals and laboratory equipment to the Sinaloa Cartel's "Los Chapitos" faction, led by fugitive brothers Archivaldo Ivan and Jesus Alfredo Guzman Salazar (sons of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera). The network is centred on Sumilab, a chemical and lab-equipment supplier previously sanctioned by OFAC in May 2023, which restructured through affiliated pharmaceutical, laboratory, chemical, cleaning-supply and real-estate front companies to continue operating after the earlier designation. All property and interests in property of the designated persons within US jurisdiction or held by US persons are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from transacting with them.

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) renamed the Syria-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 569) as the Promoting Accountability for Assad and Regional Stabilization Sanctions Regulations (PAARSS) and amended the renamed regulations to implement the January 15, 2025 Syria-related Executive order (which expanded the national emergency declared in E.O. 13894) and E.O. 14312 of June 30, 2025 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions"). The final rule was effective on publication, 25 September 2025. Substantively, broad Syria-program sanctions are revoked while targeted sanctions remain on Bashar al-Assad and his associates, human rights abusers, Captagon traffickers, persons linked to Syria's past chemical-weapons or other proliferation activities, ISIS and Al-Qa'ida affiliates, and Iran and its proxies operating inside Syria.

New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.

On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.

On 3 September 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Guangzhou Tengyue Chemical Co., Ltd., a China-based chemical manufacturer, along with two of its representatives, Huang Xiaojun and Huang Zhanpeng, pursuant to Executive Order 14059 for materially contributing to the international proliferation of illicit drugs. The company was found to have manufactured and sold synthetic opioids — including nitazenes — and analgesic cutting agents such as xylazine and medetomidine to U.S. buyers. The designation blocks all U.S.-person property and transactions involving the three designated persons and any entity 50%-or-more owned by them; the FBI simultaneously announced a related federal indictment against Guangzhou Tengyue, the two individuals, and roughly 22 other China-based individuals and businesses for conspiracy to commit drug trafficking.

Presidential Decree No. 606 of 29 August 2025 amends the standing list of foreign-owned Russian assets under "temporary management" (established by Decree No. 302 of 25 April 2023) to add the shares of Air Liquide's Russian subsidiaries, transferring control to M-Logistika LLC, a Russian company. Reported affected entities include Air Liquide's joint venture with steelmaker Severstal and regional operating units (Alabuga, Balakovo, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Kstovo, Kuzbass, Sever Liquid Gas), covering the bulk of the French industrial-gas group's Russian footprint. The decree entered into force on its date of official publication and is one of a running series of company-specific amendments to Decree 302, Russia's reciprocal-response mechanism for placing "unfriendly state" companies' Russian assets under state administration.

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 22 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two individuals and five entities under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating revenue generation and material support to the Houthis (Ansarallah) through petroleum importation and money laundering. The network — Muhammad Al-Sunaydar's Arkan Mars petroleum companies (Yemen/UAE) and Yahya Mohammed Al Wazir's Al-Saida Stone for Trading and Agencies and Amran Cement Factory — coordinated roughly $12 million of Iranian petroleum imports through the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port with an Iranian IRGC-linked petrochemical trading entity, and laundered approximately €6 million through bulk-coal front-company transactions. The action builds on a cadence of OFAC designations against Houthi revenue and weapons-procurement networks running since mid-2024.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $3,882,797 civil settlement with Unicat Catalyst Technologies LLC, an Alvin, Texas-based specialty catalyst supplier, resolving 13 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 CFR Part 560) and one apparent violation of the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR, 31 CFR Part 591). OFAC determined the conduct egregious; Unicat had voluntarily self-disclosed. The settlement was concurrent with separate actions by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The violations, spanning 2016–2021, involved the supply of catalyst products and consulting services to Iranian customers via a Dutch affiliate and Chinese supplier, and the sale of catalysts to Orinoco Iron S.C.S., a blocked Venezuelan government-owned entity, routed through a Chinese intermediary.

Canada made SOR/2025-143, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-06-13. The regulations add 14 new items (743-756) to Part 2 of Schedule 1, designating Russian quantum-technology institutions and firms — including the Moscow State University Quantum Technology Centre, the National University of Science and Technology's Centre for Quantum Communications, QRate, and Rusnano — triggering a dealings ban and asset freeze. The same instrument adds a new import prohibition on coal products (Schedule 5.01) and a new export prohibition on jet fuel and additives (Schedule 5.02) and on chemical/ biological-weapons-related items (Schedule 10.1), and extends the existing metals import ban (Schedule 11) to further product lines — all coming into force 60 days after registration (~2025-08-12), with a 120-day grace period for pre-existing contracts.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).

On 8 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated China-based "teapot" refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. and its Singapore-based broker subsidiary Xing AO Energy PTE. LTD., three firms tied to a Dongying Port (Shandong) terminal that has received Iranian crude from shadow-fleet tankers, and six Hong Kong-, UK-, and Marshall Islands-owned shadow-fleet vessels (STAR TWINKLE 6, LAMD, SKADI, BIG MAG, IMPALAS, THANE) plus their owning shipping companies and two vessel captains. It is OFAC's third action against an Iranian-oil teapot refinery and its first targeting Shandong port terminal operators, taken under E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum/ petrochemical sector) and E.O. 13846 (NIOC support) as part of the administration's NSPM-2 maximum-pressure campaign.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

On April 29, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated twelve Iran- and PRC-based entities and individuals under Executive Order 13382 for a network procuring ballistic-missile propellant ingredients for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Treasury names sodium perchlorate, dioctyl sebacate and sodium chlorate as the procured chemicals; sodium perchlorate is a precursor of ammonium perchlorate, which is MTCR-controlled. No shipment quantities or trade values were disclosed.

On 11 October 2024, the Secretary of the Treasury — acting in consultation with the Secretary of State and pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 — determined that the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy are sectors of strategic concern, exposing non-US persons that operate in or knowingly facilitate significant transactions with those sectors to secondary sanctions and SDN-listing risk. The determination was issued in response to Iran's 1 October 2024 ballistic- missile attack on Israeli targets and was formally published in the Federal Register on 19 November 2024 (FR Doc 2024-26800). Concurrent with the determination, OFAC designated an international network — including Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars — that had shipped millions of barrels of Iranian crude on behalf of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff to the People's Republic of China.

Poland's Minister of Development and Technology, Waldemar Buda, established a temporary compulsory administrator (tymczasowy zarządca przymusowy) over the Grupa Azoty S.A. shares held by sanctioned Russian oligarch Vyacheslav Kantor through three holding vehicles — Norica Holding S.à r.l. (Luxembourg), Opansa Enterprises Limited and Rainbee Holdings Limited (both Cyprus) — which together controlled 19.82% of the state-linked fertiliser and chemicals group, worth over PLN 0.5bn. The ministry cited Kantor's inclusion on Poland's sanctions list and the protection of the country's economic and energy security, and stated its intent to find a buyer for the stake and compensate Kantor. The Provincial Administrative Court in Warsaw (WSA) later overturned the decision establishing the administration; the ministry did not appeal, and the ruling became final around 30 July 2024, ending the administrator's mandate — though the underlying EU/Polish sanctions on Kantor continue to freeze his ability to exercise any rights attached to the shares.

Switzerland's Federal Council amended the Ordinance on measures related to the situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72) to align with the remainder of the EU's tenth sanctions package, effective 8pm on 29 March 2023. The amendment extends the existing Russia import ban to additional petroleum products (including petroleum jelly and petroleum coke), bitumen/asphalt, bituminous mastics, carbon and synthetic rubber, adds further export controls and designations linked to drone transfers to Russia, and tightens reporting obligations in the financial sector.

On 25 February 2023, one year into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2023/427, the 10th package of sanctions, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. It entered into force on publication the following day (26 February 2023). The package bans imports of asphalt and synthetic rubber from Russia (with a temporary transitional import quota for rubber products running to 30 June 2024), expands the export ban on dual-use and advanced-technology goods, suspends further Russian media broadcasting licences in the EU, and designates 87 individuals and 34 entities — including Iranian persons and entities involved in drone manufacture and supply, and 96 entities tied to Russia's defence-industrial base — to the EU asset-freeze/travel-ban list.

On 24 February 2023, to mark the one-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK government announced a new sanctions package including an import ban on over 140 goods (including iron and steel products processed in third countries), an export ban on battlefield-relevant goods, and 92 new asset-freeze designations. The measures were legislated by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/440), which came into force on 21 April 2023, except the third-country-processed iron and steel import provision (Regulation 3), which came into force on 30 September 2023.

On 16 December 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474, the 9th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. It entered into force on publication the following day (17 December 2022). The package extends the prohibition on new EU investment from the Russian energy sector to the Russian mining and quarrying sector, bans exports of aircraft and drone engines and their parts to Russia (and to any third country that could re-supply drones to Russia), adds 168 entities to the sectoral export- control annex covering chemicals, nerve agents, night-vision and radio- navigation equipment, electronics and IT components, and prohibits EU advertising, market-research, product-testing and technical-inspection services to Russia. A parallel Council Decision/Implementing Regulation designated a further 141 individuals and 49 entities to the EU asset-freeze and travel-ban list.

On 6 October 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, as the EU's eighth package of restrictive measures against Russia. It entered into force 7 October 2022. The regulation's headline measure creates the legal basis for an oil price-cap mechanism: a ban on maritime transport to third countries of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, becoming operational once the Council sets an actual cap level by a separate decision (the G7/EU $60/bbl cap followed on 3 December 2022). The package also expands import bans on steel products (phased through 2024), firearms and ammunition, wood pulp and paper, and certain chemicals, cosmetics and jewellery materials; extends export bans on aviation-sector goods; bans the provision of architectural, engineering, IT-consultancy and legal advisory services to the Russian government and Russian companies; and imposes restrictions on Russian-flagged vessels at the Russian Maritime Register.

On 3 June 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/879, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It bans the seaborne import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products, covering roughly two-thirds of EU oil imports from Russia at adoption (pipeline deliveries via Druzhba were temporarily exempted). It removes Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank from SWIFT (Annex XIV), bans EU operators from providing accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax consulting, business/management consulting and public-relations services to persons in Russia (new Article 5n), and adds three more Russian broadcasters to the EU broadcasting-suspension list (Annex XV). It entered into force on 4 June 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal.

On 8 April 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/576, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the fifth package of measures against Russia). It bans imports of Russian coal and other solid fossil fuels, wood, cement, rubber, fertilisers, high-end seafood and spirits; bans exports to Russia of jet fuel, quantum computers, advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and sensitive machinery; bars Russian and Belarusian road-freight operators from EU territory; and closes EU ports to Russian-flagged vessels. It entered into force on 9 April 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal (OJ L 111).

The Biden administration on 2 March 2021 determined, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act), that Russia used a Novichok-class nerve agent against opposition figure Alexei Navalny in August 2020 — the third CBW Act invocation against Russia (after Salisbury 2018 and its follow-on 2019 round). The determination triggered mandatory statutory sanctions including termination of US foreign assistance to Russia (except humanitarian aid and food/agricultural commodities), suspension of US arms and defense-article sales and export authorisations to Russia, and denial of US government credit and financial assistance. Seven Russian government officials linked to the poisoning were concurrently designated by Treasury/OFAC. The measures take effect after a mandatory 15-day congressional notification period and remain in force for at least 12 months unless Russia certifies Chemical Weapons Convention compliance and takes other required steps.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA, Chapter 13) received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018 and established the UK's autonomous post-Brexit sanctions legal framework. Part 1 empowers Ministers (FCDO, HM Treasury) to impose financial, trade, immigration, aircraft, and shipping sanctions by statutory instrument for purposes including UN compliance, national security, foreign-policy objectives, and promotion of human rights and democracy. Part 2 grants Ministers authority to make AML and counter-terrorist-financing regulations aligned with FATF standards, previously derived from EU Anti-Money-Laundering Directives. SAMLA is the parent enabling statute for every UK sanctions regime in force post-Brexit, including 30+ thematic and geographic regulations covering Russia (SI 2019/855), Iran, DPRK, Belarus, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela, cyber, chemical weapons, global anti-corruption, and global human rights; under SAMLA, OFSI (HM Treasury) holds civil monetary-penalty and criminal-referral enforcement powers. Structurally peer to US IEEPA, EU Council Regulation framework, CN AFSL 2021, and JP FEFTA as the G7+CN foundational sanctions-statute cluster.