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The DRC Council of Ministers, at its 87th extraordinary session on 29 May 2026, adopted decrees expanding the list of strategic mineral substances from 3 (cobalt, germanium, coltan) to 9, adding lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, and rare earth elements. Under the 2018 Mining Code framework, strategic minerals attract a 10% royalty versus the standard 3.5% for base metals, representing a nearly threefold increase in the state's royalty take on the newly classified substances. The measure was presented by Minister of Mines Louis Watum Kabamba and confirmed by RTNC state broadcaster and Bloomberg reporting (31 May 2026). DRC produces an estimated 60–70% of global tantalum supply; the reclassification extends upstream royalty escalation to six additional high-value critical materials — including Manono lithium deposit output, tantalum refinery streams, and any tungsten, niobium, uranium, or REE operations active or under development.

Peru's executive branch issued Decreto Supremo N° 006-2026-EM (published in El Peruano, 29 May 2026), formally recognising uranium and lithium as critical and strategic minerals of growing international relevance on the basis of their role in energy transition, electromobility, clean energy storage, and smart-city development. The decree simultaneously declares the inaugural International Forum "Uranium and Lithium: Pillars of Energy Leadership for Mining, Technological and Smart City Development in Peru and the World" (7–8 July 2026, Lima) to be of national importance, mandating MINEM and the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation (MVCS) to jointly organise the event. The focal resource zone is the Macusani Plateau in Puno (estimated 4.6 Mt LCE lithium resources plus uranium deposits), home to American Lithium Corp's Falchani and Macusani projects.

Russia and Kazakhstan signed three intergovernmental agreements on 28 May 2026 during President Putin's state visit to Astana, formalising construction of Kazakhstan's first nuclear power plant at Ulken village on Lake Balkhash. The plant will comprise two VVER-1200 power units (total ~2.4 GW capacity); Russia will provide a state export credit financing ~85% of the estimated USD 14.4 billion construction cost. The IGAs cover: (1) basic principles and conditions of cooperation for construction of the "Balkhash" NPP; (2) state export credit terms; and (3) cooperation in nuclear and radiological safety regulation. Construction is targeted to commence in 2027, with the first unit operational by 2034.

On 23 May 2026 President Javier Milei, Economy Minister Luis Caputo, and Chief of Staff Manuel Adorni announced the "Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones en Nuevas Industrias" (Super RIGI), and on 26 May 2026 submitted the bill (Mensaje 181/2026, expediente 0005-PE-2026) to the Cámara de Diputados — pending Congressional approval as of filing. The regime applies a US$1 billion minimum investment threshold (with ≥20% committed in the first two years), a 15% corporate income tax rate (vs 25% under the base 2024 RIGI), accelerated depreciation of 60%/20%/20% over three years, immediate export-duty exemption (vs year 3 under RIGI), import-tariff exemption, and 30-year regulatory stability across tax, customs, social security, and FX matters. A progressive FX-liberalisation schedule allows 20% / 40% / 100% free disposal of export-generated foreign currency in years 1 / 2 / 3+. Target sectors are industries that "do not currently exist or are in experimental/pilot phase in Argentina," including semiconductors, AI data centres, advanced biotech, 100% electric vehicles, lithium value chain (downstream processing, cathode, battery), green hydrogen, solar panels, wind turbines, onshore LNG, SMR nuclear, aerospace, uranium value chain, potassium and phosphorus fertilisers, and new petrochemicals.

Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development gazetted a formal Mineral Classification and Declaration on 22 May 2026, signed by Minister Dr Polite Kambamura, classifying 14 minerals as "critical" (nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, REE, chrome, PGMs, manganese, antimony, uranium, ruthenium, tungsten, niobium — plus metallurgical coal as "special critical") and 10 as "strategic" (limestone, potash, phosphorus, iron ore, pyrites, oil, gas, coal, gold, diamonds). The declaration mandates minimum state shareholding through designated Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in all critical-mineral exploitation operations and prohibits export of listed minerals in raw or unbeneficiated form without a ministerially-approved conditional transitional plan specifying a local beneficiation timeline.

President Tokayev signed Decree U2600001233 on 15 April 2026, formally adopting the Strategy for the Development of the Nuclear Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2050. The 30-year framework marks a structural pivot for the world's largest uranium producer (~45% of global mined supply) from a raw-ore export model toward domestic nuclear-energy sovereignty, targeting at least three operational NPPs by 2050 (a fourth under assessment), 5% of national electricity from nuclear by 2035, and 50% combined nuclear and renewables by 2050. The strategy mandates SMR evaluation for regional deployment, a 1% R&D levy on uranium miners' production costs through 2030, and the development of a Kazakh "nuclear cluster" producing high-value fuel-cycle goods and services rather than raw uranium concentrate alone.

Zimbabwe's Cabinet approved a comprehensive Minerals Value Chain Framework on April 14-15, 2026, following a presentation by Vice-President Dr Constantino Chiwenga. The framework introduces four binding instruments: a mandatory Value-Added Compliance Certificate (VACC) required for any mineral export permit; eight regional beneficiation Special Economic Zones; a mine-to-market smart tracking corridor; and a national analytical-laboratory network anchored at state universities. The framework operationalises the existing raw-mineral export ban architecture into a coherent governance and compliance regime, targeting zero leakage and full domestic value-addition across Zimbabwe's critical-mineral endowment.

Peru's Congress enacted Ley N° 32560 on 22 March 2026, establishing the country's first legal framework for nuclear electricity generation and the deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). The law tasks MINEM, MINAM, and the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN) with jointly assessing SMR viability across Peruvian departments, explicitly aiming to use domestic uranium resources as feedstock. Private investment in nuclear power is permitted under a free-competition regime, with mandatory National Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) review and citizen participation required at all project phases.

The Mongolian Government prepared and submitted to parliament a two-track legislative package: (i) a standalone Law on Supporting Critical Minerals Projects, sponsored by MP B. Uyanga, that creates a formal Cabinet-administered list of critical minerals, simplifies and fast-tracks exploration-licence procedures for designated critical-mineral deposits, and mandates that no less than 60% of total benefits from those deposits flow to the public via the National Wealth Fund (Win-Win principle); and (ii) companion Cabinet-approved amendments to the parent Minerals Law introducing the same critical-mineral definition, a dual-track licensing system (first-come-first-served plus tenders), and escalating fees on inactive licences to deter speculative hoarding. The package was formally on the agenda of the 2026 Spring Session of the State Great Khural (commenced 16 March 2026); as of May 2026 the bills remain in parliamentary review pending enactment.

France's third Programmation Pluriannuelle de l'Énergie (PPE3), adopted by Décret n° 2026-76 of 12 February 2026 and published in the Journal Officiel on 13 February 2026, sets the framework for public energy policy in metropolitan continental France from 2026 to 2035. The decree codifies a 60% decarbonised-energy-consumption target by 2030 (from 42% in 2023), a 34% electrification share (585 TWh), and a reduction of fossil fuels to 40% of final energy consumption by 2030 (from 58% in 2023). It also formalises the EPR2 new-build programme (6 + 8 optional reactors) within the long-range generation-mix architecture, pairs with the Stratégie Nationale Bas-Carbone (SNBC3) for a net-zero-2050 trajectory, and includes an annex on clean-mobility development (SDMP).

On 2 February 2026 the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) Board approved a Direct Loan of up to USD 10 billion to an independently governed public-private partnership establishing the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve ("Project Vault"), alongside nearly USD 2 billion of private-sector investment for an envelope of approximately USD 12 billion. The reserve will physically stockpile the 60 minerals on the USGS 2025 Critical Minerals List across multiple US storage facilities, with participating original equipment manufacturers (Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital, Boeing) committing to specific volumes and grades and trading partners (Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas, Traxys) handling sourcing. EXIM characterises the transaction as the largest single financing in its 92-year history and the first use of EXIM authority as the financing vehicle for a domestic strategic-minerals stockpile rather than for export-credit insurance abroad.

On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.

On 26 December 2025 the President of Kazakhstan signed a law amending the Code "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use" with respect to the hydrocarbon and uranium sectors, followed on 30 December 2025 by a parallel set of amendments implementing presidential instructions on broader subsoil-use governance. Both packages take effect on 2 March 2026. The uranium amendments grant the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (KAP) a statutory priority right to obtain exploration licences over prospective uranium areas listed in the State Subsoil Fund Management Programme, and to reserve blocks containing uranium mineralisation or deposits. Where uranium mineralisation is discovered on a solid-mineral block held by a third-party subsoil-user, an extension of that licence is conditional on the licensee surrendering the uranium-bearing block to the State; private subsoil-users no longer obtain priority production rights for uranium they discover. The amendments also raise the minimum direct or indirect Kazatomprom interest in any uranium mining project from 50% to 75%, and permit subsequent transfer to investors or joint-venture partners only subject to that 75% floor. The 30 December 2025 package establishes the National Geological Service as a non-privatisable national operator subordinate to the authorised subsoil-exploration agency and as the operator responsible for managing geological information; it also creates a Unified Subsoil Use Platform digital infrastructure (open geological-information database integrated with the Unified State System for Management of the Fuel and Energy Complex). The hydrocarbon track of the law shortens block-reservation periods and pushes unallocated plots into electronic-auction allocation to accelerate competitive exploration. The amendments accompany an announced USD 500m state geological-exploration programme.

Bolivia's Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía published the framework of the Proyecto de Ley del Litio on 25 December 2025, with President Rodrigo Paz formally proposing the 121-article bill in January 2026. The law is the first post-Ley 928 (1992) national-level lithium statutory regime: it delimits a sub-zone of the Salar de Uyuni as a heritage tourism-reserve to protect local livelihoods, reorients the remaining salar areas for industrial production via an international bidding process open to private capital acting independently or in mixed-JV alliances with state-owned YLB, and provides the statutory anchor for Congressional ratification of the pending YLB-Uranium One and YLB-Hong Kong CBC contracts. As a bill (Proyecto de Ley) it was advancing through committee in the Cámara de Diputados as of early 2026, with a national consensus summit scheduled for mid-2026 to socialise the text before full plenary passage.

Decreto Supremo Nº 5503, signed 17 December 2025 by the Paz administration on its first business day in office, declares a national Economic, Financial, Energy and Social Emergency and enacts a 120-article comprehensive stabilization package. Headline measures: a 15-year fiscal and legal stability guarantee for "strategic" foreign investment in mining, hydrocarbons, energy, agro-industry, infrastructure and export-manufacturing; a fast-track 30-day investment-approval procedure; 0% import tariff on industrial machinery, equipment and key inputs through 2026; accelerated depreciation for 2026 fixed-asset acquisitions (excluding extractive mining and hydrocarbons); discretionary write-off of pre-October 2025 tax interest and penalties; and elimination of fuel subsidies (with a 6-month transition price freeze). The decree restructures Bolivia's investment-incentive architecture and signals a pivot from the Morales/Arce-era resource nationalism toward foreign-capital attraction — directly material for the Salar de Uyuni lithium pipeline (CBC, Uranium One, Citic Guoan tenders).

On 12 December 2025 the Finnish Parliament (Eduskunta) approved Act 1361/2025, amending the Mining Minerals Tax Act (kaivosmineraalivero- laki, Act 314/2023) on the basis of government bill HE 127/2025. The amendment raises the value-based royalty on taxable metals contained in mined metallic ores from 0.6% to 2.5% (a 4.2× increase) and lifts the tonnage royalty on industrial minerals and other useful rock from €0.20 to €0.60 per tonne (3× increase). Iron is newly added to the list of taxable metals (alongside silver, gold, cobalt, chromium, copper, lithium, nickel, lead, palladium, platinum, uranium and zinc). Tax revenue is split 80% to the state and 20% to mining municipalities. The amendment enters into force on 1 January 2026.

On December 9, 2025 in Niamey, Niger's state uranium company TNUC and Uranium One Group JSC (a Rosatom State Corporation subsidiary) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to jointly obtain permits for new uranium deposits, conduct geological exploration of prospective sites, and establish new uranium mining operations in Niger. The agreement completes Niger's post-coup pivot from French-controlled uranium channels (Orano/SOMAÏR expelled 2024–2025) to Russian-aligned supply, routing future NE yellowcake production through the Rosatom global enrichment network. A companion Rosatom–Niger MoU on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation (NPP feasibility and reactor construction) was signed in the same period.

On 18 November 2025, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House visit (17-19 November 2025), the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on Securing Uranium, Metals, Permanent Magnets, and Critical Minerals Supply Chains. The framework was signed by US Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum and Saudi Minister of Energy H.R.H. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, and positions Saudi Arabia (via Ma'aden + Public Investment Fund vehicles) as a regional hub for processing rare earths and producing permanent magnets, supports a US-backed rare-earths refinery in the Kingdom, and channels Saudi capital — alongside the broader USD ~1 trillion Saudi investment commitment in the US announced the same week — into US and allied critical-mineral projects. It is paired with a separate joint declaration on civil nuclear cooperation (Section 123 Agreement contemplated) and was operationalised one day later by the 19 November 2025 binding term sheet between MP Materials, the US Department of War, and Ma'aden to develop a rare-earth refinery in Saudi Arabia (Department of War financing the US side's 49% stake; Ma'aden retaining ≥51%).

On 6 November 2025 in Washington, DC, US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Kazakhstan's Minister of Industry and Construction Yersayin Nagaspayev signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Critical Minerals Cooperation during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's state visit and the C5+1 Presidential Summit. The MoU establishes a framework for joint exploration, processing, and supply-chain transparency for tungsten, uranium, and rare-earth elements, with the explicit objective of building "resilient, non-Chinese supply-chains" for the global energy transition. The instrument is paired with up to USD 900 million in potential US financing to Cove Kaz Capital Group for tungsten development and sits inside a broader USD 17 billion package of Washington-signed agreements that lifts headline US-Kazakhstan economic engagement to a reported USD 117 billion.

On 5 November 2025 the Riksdag voted in favour of the Government's proposal to repeal Sweden's 2018 moratorium on uranium mining and exploration. The decision amends the Environmental Code (Miljöbalken) and the Minerals Act (Minerallagen) to reclassify uranium as a "concession mineral" — a mineral "especially useful for society" — allowing bedrock exploration and full mining-concession applications under Sweden's existing mineral-rights framework. The new rules enter into force on 1 January 2026. Sweden hosts an estimated 27% of Europe's known uranium reserves (per the Geological Survey of Sweden, SGU); the reversal is the first European uranium-mining policy opening of the post-Chernobyl era and complements the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (which lists uranium as a strategic raw material) and the emerging EU Nuclear Common Industrial Agenda.

On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.

Namibia's Cabinet at its 22nd meeting on 23 September 2025 approved a Nuclear Industry Strategy mandating uranium value-addition (conversion and fuel fabrication objectives), pre-feasibility studies for Small Modular Reactors, radioisotope production, and industrial irradiation facilities. The strategy establishes the Nuclear Institute of Namibia (NIN) to drive implementation and coordinates with the IAEA on the 19 infrastructure milestones required for nuclear-power-developing countries. Cabinet simultaneously approved amendments to the Atomic Energy and Radiation Protection Act (Act No. 5 of 2005) to create an independent nuclear regulatory authority, a four-stage reactor-licensing framework, and Namibia's first statutory provisions for radioactive waste management; oversight transfers from the Ministry of Mines and Energy to the National Planning Commission (Office of the President).

Loi n° 25-12 du 3 août 2025 governing mining activities, promulgated by President Tebboune and published in the Algerian Journal Officiel n° 52 on 7 August 2025, replaces Loi 14-05 of 2014 and is Algeria's first comprehensive mining-code overhaul in eleven years. The reform raises the foreign-ownership ceiling in mining-exploitation companies to 80% of share capital (with a non-dilutable 20% reserved for an Algerian State-owned enterprise), abolishes the prior "strategic substances" category and the statutory monopoly that accompanied it, and allows foreign companies to apply directly for prospection authorisations and exploration permits without first incorporating a local entity. The 51/49 majority-Algerian rule remains in place for quarries and for the hydrocarbons regime — the reform is mining-specific.

On 18 July 2025 Kazakhstan's Parliament adopted Law No. 215-VIII ZRK "On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Taxation Matters," which abolishes the legacy priority-investment-project and special-investment-contract regimes under the Entrepreneurial Code and replaces them with three new contractual instruments — the Investment Agreement, the Investment Obligations Agreement, and the Simplified Investment Contract — effective 1 January 2026. The law is the binding legal operationalisation of the October 2024 Concept of Investment Policy until 2029 (filed), the US-Kazakhstan Critical Minerals MOU of November 2025 (filed), and the EU-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership Roadmap 2025-2026 (filed), providing a contractual-certainty architecture for the USD 150 billion FDI-attraction target that previous "priority investment project" frameworks lacked. A statutory effectiveness-evaluation obligation (first of its kind in Central Asia) for assessing the socio-economic impact of granted investment preferences enters force separately on 1 July 2026.

Kazakhstan's Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 214-VIII ZRK ("On Taxes and Other Mandatory Payments to the Budget"), signed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on 18 July 2025 and effective 1 January 2026, replaces the 2017 Tax Code (Code No. 120-VI ZRK) with a wholesale recodification of the Kazakh tax regime. The most consequential IPTM-relevant provision restructures the uranium mineral extraction tax (MET) from a flat 6% rate to a differentiated schedule of 4–18% tiered by annual production volume per subsoil use agreement, supplemented by uranium-price-band surcharges of 0.5–2.5% above $70–$110/lb thresholds. The code also introduces a tenfold MET reduction for processing man-made mineral formations (mining waste / tailings reclamation) to incentivise circular-economy mineral recovery, and for exploration or production licenses issued after 31 December 2026, replaces MET with a tiered royalty regime — ore 13%, concentrate 10%, refined metals 7% — grandfathering existing operating projects under MET. The processing-grade discount (ore → concentrate → metal) is an explicit incentive to push value-added steps onshore within Kazakhstan. Directly material to Kazatomprom (NAC Kazatomprom JSC), the world's largest uranium producer supplying approximately 43% of global output, and to all solid-mineral operators (chromium, copper, zinc, gold) commencing new subsoil use agreements after January 2027.

On 14 July 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Resolution No. 845 "On the approval of the lists of minerals and components of strategic and critical importance, and the lists of subsoil areas (mineral deposits) of strategic and/or critical importance," establishing Ukraine's first national taxonomy for critical-minerals governance: 11 strategic minerals (incl. uranium, titanium, zirconium, copper, nickel, tantalum, strontium, niobium, beryllium, aluminium, fluorite) and 28 critical minerals (incl. lithium, rare earths, vanadium, gallium, indium, caesium, tin). The resolution simultaneously designates 60 subsoil-area blocks for electronic auction of special permits for subsoil use and 26 deposits for competitive tender under Production Sharing Agreements, operationalising Chapter 13 (Critical Raw Materials Management) of Ukraine's Plan under the Ukraine Facility (Resolution No. 244-p of 18 March 2024) and providing the domestic licensing scaffolding through which obligations under the 30 April 2025 US-Ukraine Mineral Resources Agreement and EU Critical Raw Materials Act strategic-partnership track will flow.

On 19 June 2025 the Council of Ministers of Niger, presided over by the head of the CNSP transition government, adopted a draft ordonnance nationalising the Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR SA), the joint venture that operates Niger's only currently producing uranium mine at Arlit. The communiqué transfers all SOMAÏR shares and assets to the Nigerien State and provides for compensation to existing shareholders net of legal obligations including mining-site rehabilitation costs. SOMAÏR was 63.40% owned by Orano (the French state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company, ex-AREVA) and 36.60% by state-owned SOPAMIN; the government cited "irresponsible, illegal and disloyal" conduct by Orano, the expiry of the prior mining convention on 31 December 2023, and a finding that Orano had taken 86.3% of cumulative production between 1971 and 2024 versus its 63.4% shareholding. The same Council of Ministers also nationalised the electricity utility NIGELEC. Orano announced the same day that it would seek full compensation through arbitration and reserved criminal-action rights against third parties acquiring SOMAÏR uranium stock.

South Africa's Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources (DMPR) released the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy on 20 May 2025 following Cabinet approval, alongside the gazetting of the Mineral Resources Development Bill (MRDB) 2025. The strategy classifies platinum group metals, manganese, iron ore, chrome ore and coal as "high criticality" and identifies seven intervention areas — exploration, beneficiation at source, R&D coordination by Mintek, regional integration (SADC), financial instruments, energy security, and international partnerships positioning South Africa for CRMA-equivalent partnerships with the US and EU. It is the first formal South African industrial-policy framework for critical-mineral beneficiation and the first ZA action in the IPTM register.

On 14 May 2025, President Emomali Rahmon signed Law No. 2173 "On Capital and Promotion of Investment Activity," replacing Tajikistan's 2016 Law "On Investments." The law introduces a 15-year stability and grandfathering guarantee shielding investors against adverse changes in tax, customs, and foreign-exchange legislation after capital commitment, codifies fair-and-equitable-treatment and the minimum international standard of treatment for foreign capital, establishes a state Investment Committee under the Government as the authorised inter-ministerial coordination body, creates a government-level Investment Council chaired by the Prime Minister for high-strategic-priority projects, and clarifies that unpublished legal acts (gazette-unpublished government orders, ministerial instructions, regional regulations) are not binding on investors. The law directly strengthens the regulatory foundation for Chinese and other foreign mining-investment vehicles operating in Tajikistan's antimony, silver, gold, and uranium sectors.

On 8 May 2025 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the 30 April 2025 Washington intergovernmental agreement establishing the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (draft law 0309, 338 of 450 MPs in favour); President Zelenskyy signed the ratification law on 12 May 2025. On 4 June 2025 the Rada then adopted in second reading and as a whole the implementing amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine (draft law 13256, 309 MPs in favour), which credit half of royalties from new licences for the extraction of minerals of national importance (per Annex A of Cabinet Resolution 845) and half of state share revenues under new production-sharing agreements to a State Budget special fund earmarked for transfer to the joint Fund. The Fund is jointly managed 50/50 by the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and a Ukrainian state entity, gives the US first-look preferential access to new lithium, titanium, REE, graphite, uranium and oil-and-gas projects, and is the structural anchor of the 2025 US critical-minerals pivot away from China.

On 21 April 2025, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Resolution No. PP-145 "On the Privatization of Large Enterprises with State Participation on International Markets," establishing the 2025–2028 roadmap for selling minority equity stakes (10–25%) in 12 major state-owned enterprises via IPO/SPO on international and domestic exchanges, and full/near-full stakes in 29 further enterprises through competitive public tenders. The resolution introduced a three-tier asset-segmentation framework — large SOEs (IPO/SPO with international advisor mandates), medium SOEs (domestic stock-exchange sale), and small assets/real estate (e-platform sale) — and mandated engagement of international investment banks and a State Privatization Commission to oversee implementation. It was issued the same day as the sister Presidential Decree UP-70 "On the Privatization Program for 2025," which approved a 2025 annual program targeting 30 trillion UZS (~USD 2.4 bn) in state-asset disposals across 115 companies, 659 real-estate properties, and 6,100 hectares of land.

At the first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit in Samarkand (4 April 2025), the European Commission and Kazakhstan endorsed the EU-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership Roadmap 2025-2026, operationalising the 7 November 2022 MoU on Sustainable Raw Materials, Batteries, and Renewable Hydrogen with concrete two-year workstreams: geological exploration cooperation, joint R&I programmes (Horizon Europe linkages), skills and training cooperation, and promotion of ESG standards aligned with the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA, Reg. (EU) 2024/1252). The Roadmap positions Kazakhstan as the EU's primary Central-Asian CRMA Strategic Partner under Art. 37, unlocking a potential multi-billion-EUR Global Gateway financing pipeline and structurally rebalancing KZ critical-mineral export flows away from China/Russia dependencies.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14241 on 20 March 2025 (Federal Register publication 25 March 2025) invoking Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III sections 301, 302, and 303 — and selected Title VII authorities — for domestic critical-mineral production, and delegated those authorities to the Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The order operationalises the "national energy emergency" declared by EO 14156 (Jan 2025) to waive certain DPA §303 congressional-notification thresholds, designates "mineral production" as an Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program priority, expands the EO definition of "critical minerals" to include uranium, copper, potash, gold (and any further item designated by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council), and directs the Departments of the Interior, Energy, Treasury, and EXIM Bank to mobilise federal lands, permitting, and financing to expand US upstream and midstream capacity. EO 14241 is the cross-cutting domestic-mineral umbrella authority of the second Trump administration, paired with FY2025 supplemental appropriations (USD 2bn National Defense Stockpile, USD 5bn Industrial Base Fund) and complemented by the 24 April 2025 follow-on EO on offshore minerals and the 8 April 2025 coal amendment.

On 2 October 2025, Navoiyuran State Enterprise (45%), French nuclear-fuel-cycle company Orano SA (45%), and Japanese trading house ITOCHU Corporation (10%) completed the restructuring of their Nurlikum Mining joint venture, unlocking industrial development of the South Djengeldi uranium deposit in Uzbekistan's Kyzylkum Desert (Navoi region). The initial shareholder framework was signed in Paris on 10 March 2025. The project plans to produce approximately 500 tU/year over a ten-year mine life using in-situ leaching (ISL) technology, with production start targeted for Q4 2025, creating a Western-and-Japan-supply-chain-aligned uranium stream distinct from the Rosatom/ Kazatomprom-dominated channel.

Naalakkersuisut (Government of Greenland), via the Mineral Resources Authority under Minister Naaja H. Nathanielsen, published the Mineral Resources Strategy 2025-2029 in January 2025. The strategy succeeds the 2020-2024 strategy and sets the operational priorities, licensing pipeline and investor-engagement framework for Greenland's mineral sector across the 2025-2029 window. Headline tracks: sustainability (social/environmental/ economic), targeted international marketing and export-import-bank cooperation to mobilise project finance, formal critical-minerals partnerships with the EU and the US (and Nordic regional cooperation), a certification system for small-scale licensees, and expanded geoscientific data availability. The 2021 Inatsisartut Act prohibiting uranium-bearing exploration and exploitation above 100 ppm is preserved.

Mongolia's State Great Hural adopted a comprehensive package of amendments to the 2009 Nuclear Energy Law on 21 November 2024 (approved by 68.1% of votes), restructuring the country's uranium-sector governance across three principal axes. The amendments introduce a dynamic three-tier uranium royalty framework — 5% basic (AMNAT) + 5% special + 0–9% price-linked incremental royalty, yielding approximately 14–19% aggregate — that replaces a flat-rate structure with a price-elastic mechanism designed to capture uranium supercycle upside for the Mongolian state. The law also prohibits export of radioactive minerals in raw ore form (mandatory domestic processing to at least yellowcake/U₃O₈ before export), prohibits import, transit, and disposal of foreign spent nuclear fuel in Mongolia, and provides the parliamentary legal underpinning for the ~USD 1.6 billion Orano (France)– Mongolia state investment agreement on the Zuuvch-Ovoo in-situ-leach uranium deposit (Dornogovi province), signed October 2024, targeting first production in 2028 with eventual ramp-up to ~2,500 t/yr uranium output.

On 31 October 2024, the President of Uzbekistan signed Law No. LRU-987 "On Subsoil" (Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan "O nedrakh"), a wholesale recodification of Uzbekistan's mining and subsoil regime that entered into force on 2 February 2025. The new statute expands from 51 articles in the prior version to 172 articles, comprehensively overhauling licensing, royalty, and foreign-investor terms for hard minerals (including rare earths, copper, uranium, gold, lithium) and hydrocarbons. Drafting was developed in collaboration with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), signalling strategic intent to attract Western mining capital and align UZ subsoil regime with international good practice ahead of the Almalyk/Navoi IPO track and downstream critical-minerals programmes.

On 8 October 2024 Botswana's National Assembly assented to the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act No. 14 of 2024, the most significant rewrite of the country's mining statute (Cap. 66:01, 1999) in over two decades. The Act commenced on 1 October 2025 via Statutory Instrument 120 of 2025 and introduces five structurally significant provisions: a mandatory 24% citizen/local-investor equity participation in new mining concessions (if the state elects not to take the stake itself), a broadened "controlling interest" definition capturing indirect offshore transactions, enhanced ministerial licence-transfer approval requirements, strengthened environmental rehabilitation obligations, and an in-country beneficiation push. The measure closes the offshore-transaction loophole that previously allowed indirect change-of-control via Mauritius/BVI/Singapore SPVs to bypass ministerial approval, and operationalises Botswana's resource-nationalism turn alongside the companion February 2025 De Beers / Debswana commercial renegotiation.

Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), Bolivia's state lithium SOE, signed a contract in September 2024 with Uranium One Group — a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom state nuclear corporation — for the design, construction, and initial operation of an industrial direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) carbonation plant at Salar de Uyuni, with initial capacity of 14,000 t/yr lithium carbonate (expandable to 25,000–45,000 t/yr), representing a total investment exceeding USD 970 million and a 51%/49% profit-split in Bolivia's favour. The contract was approved by Bolivia's Comisión de Economía Plural in February 2025 amid corruption allegations, then suspended by parliamentary motion on 14 February 2025; a Bolivian court issued a further precautionary suspension order on 27 May 2025 on human-rights, environmental, and Mother Earth rights grounds, while the Arce government continued to insist on legislative ratification through at least 29 May 2025.

Zambia's Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development, under Minister Hon. Paul C. Kabuswe, launched the National Critical Minerals Strategy 2024-2028 on 27 August 2024 following Cabinet approval, alongside the National Three Million Tonnes Copper Production Strategy by 2031. The strategy designates copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium, manganese, graphite, tin, uranium and rare earth elements as Zambia's strategic critical minerals and is built on four pillars: geological knowledge and resource management; value addition and local processing; government participation through a special-purpose vehicle taking up to 30% equity in new strategic projects; and regulatory and institutional reform. It is the first standalone Zambian industrial-policy framework for critical-minerals beneficiation and the first ZM action in the IPTM register.

Décret n°2024-0396/PT-RM of 9 July 2024 fixes the conditions and modalities for applying Loi n°2023-040 of 29 August 2023 (the new Code Minier of the Republic of Mali). The decree, adopted in Council of Ministers on 3 July 2024 and signed by the transition presidency, operationalises the 2023 statute that replaces the 2019 mining code (Loi n°2019-022). The new framework raises maximum cumulative state-plus-Malian-private participation in mining ventures to roughly 30–35% (10% free-carry to the state, plus an additional 20% paid participation right and 5% reserved to local private investors), reshapes the fiscal regime (royalties, taxes, exemptions) for new permits and conventions, and pairs with companion local-content Loi n°2023-041 of the same date. The 2024 implementing decree is the operative trigger date for downstream investor disputes (Barrick Loulo-Gounkoto suspension, B2Gold Fekola contract renegotiations, Allied Gold Sadiola, Ganfeng Goulamina lithium ramp).

The CTRI transitional government of Gabon signed Décret n° 0276/PR/MM on 2 July 2024, establishing a dedicated legal regime for six "sovereign substances" (gold, silver, uranium, diamonds, gemstones, and rare earths) and granting the state an automatic 35% equity participation — free of all charges and non-dilutable — in any large-scale mine exploiting those materials. The decree also reserves the state an option to acquire a further 25% paid interest at market value, gives it pre-emption rights on title transfers, mandates in-country processing of extracted substances, and reserves small-scale mining titles exclusively for Gabonese nationals. Existing operators had one year from publication (until approximately 15 July 2025) to restructure their capital in compliance; the state vehicle channelling the free-carry stake is Équatoriale des Mines.

On 20–21 June 2024 Niger's Ministry of Mines, acting under the CNSP military-transition government, formally notified the Director General of Imouraren SA (the Orano subsidiary holding the Imouraren uranium permit) that the perimeter of the "IMOURAREN Permit" returned to the public domain of Niger and was freed of all derived rights, in application of articles 59 and 61 of Ordinance no. 93-16 of 2 March 1993 (Niger Mining Law). The decision followed a 7 June 2024 ministerial "note d'information" giving Orano until 19 June to engage development works under the earlier 19 March 2024 mise en demeure, and the Ministry's finding that Orano's 26 April 2024 exploitation plan "did not meet our expectations". Imouraren is one of the world's largest known uranium deposits at ~200,000 t U (Orano-disclosed reserves, originally permitted to AREVA in January 2009 with mine-build paused after the 2011 Fukushima uranium-price collapse). Orano had held 63.4% of Imouraren SA against 36.6% by Niger state-owned Sopamin. Orano notified the public on 20 June 2024 that it took note of the decision, and on 4 December 2024 initiated ICSID arbitration against the Niger state contesting the revocation. The action is the first leg of the 2024–2025 Niger-Orano break (followed by the December 2024 announcement of loss of operational control over Somaïr / Cominak / Imouraren and the June 2025 Somaïr nationalisation announcement).

Mongolia's State Great Khural adopted Resolution No. 62 on 5 June 2024, mandating the government to implement sixteen specific reforms following a parliamentary audit of the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM)'s performance in issuing special permits, collecting royalties, and enforcing taxes over the 2018-2023 period. The audit identified approximately MNT 1.1 trillion in uncollected mineral-extraction royalties and systemic weaknesses in licence management, illegal-mining enforcement, and strategic-deposit benefit distribution. The resolution directs the government to review and amend the Minerals Law, Strategic Deposits Law, and Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement frameworks by spring 2025, reform royalty calculation methodologies, and ensure strategic mineral revenues flow equitably to Mongolian citizens. Resolution 62 is the foundational parliamentary mandate driving Mongolia's 2024-25 minerals-regime reform cycle, providing the upstream political basis for subsequently enacted instruments including the Critical Minerals Support Law (January 2025), the Erdenes Critical Minerals SOE renaming (February 2025), and the Mining Product Exchange royalty-pricing shift (October 2025).

Mongolia's State Great Khural adopted the Sovereign Wealth Fund Law and accompanying Minerals Law amendments on 19 April 2024 (effective 10 May 2024). The package caps any private holder plus affiliates at ≤34% of issued shares of a company holding a strategic-deposit licence, and requires transfer of a state share (up to 34%) for designated strategic deposits. Up to 16 deposits are potentially affected. A February 2025 cabinet decision rebranded the SOE "Mongolrostsvetmet" as "Erdenes Critical Minerals" with an expanded rare-earth mandate, consolidating critical-minerals exploration and processing under Erdenes Mongol LLC.

On 21 February 2024, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed Presidential Decree DP-37 approving the 2024 State Program for the Implementation of the "Uzbekistan-2030" Strategy under the slogan "Year of Support for Youth and Business". The decree converts the parent Uzbekistan-2030 doctrine (DP-158 of 11 September 2023) into binding annual execution targets covering SOE privatisation and IPO programmes (Navoi MMC, Almalyk MMC, Uzbekistan National Investment Fund), industrial localisation, sectoral investment lines, "green economy" and water-management benchmarks, and youth-business support measures. DP-37 functions as the master annual operationalisation instrument for Uzbekistan's 2024 industrial and investment policy stack, anchoring the downstream subsoil recodification (LRU-987, Oct 2024) and critical-minerals national programme (March 2025).

President Paul Biya signed Loi n°2023/014 on 19 December 2023, replacing the 2016 mining code (Loi n°2016/017) and significantly enlarging state control over Cameroon's mineral sector. The law vests SONAMINES (Société Nationale des Mines) with an exclusive statutory monopoly over the purchase and commercialisation of gold and diamonds nationwide, mandates a 10% non-dilutable free-carry equity stake for the state in all mining enterprises, and introduces a production-sharing mechanism (1–5% of finished product for precious substances; 2–15% of raw ore for others) layered on top of revised ad valorem royalties (5% for precious metals, 3% for base metals, 10% for radioactive substances). The code provides the legal framework for SONAMINES-led reindustrialisation of large iron-ore and bauxite projects, including Mbalam-Nabeba and Minim-Martap.

In October 2023 Jordan's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) formally presented a National Mining Sector Strategy 2023-2033, accompanied by an Implementation Roadmap; the Council of Ministers Cabinet-approved and publicly launched the package in April 2024. The strategy sets headline targets of tripling mining-sector GDP from approximately JD 700 million to JD 2.1 billion and doubling mining exports from JD 1.2 billion to JD 3.5 billion by 2033. Policy instruments include a streamlined exploration-to-exploitation licensing regime under the Natural Resources Law (Law No. 12 of 1968 as amended), transparent royalty and community-benefit-sharing provisions, and catalytic foreign and domestic investment in phosphate (via state-majority Jordan Phosphate Mines Company — JPMC, a top-5 global exporter), potash (Arab Potash Company — APC, Dead Sea brine extraction), Wadi Araba copper prospects, REE deposits (MEMR exploration surveys), Central Jordan Uranium Project, and oil-shale resources, positioning Jordan as an upstream critical-minerals and fertilizer-feedstock supplier for India, China, Brazil, EU, and US offtake markets.