Home / Companies / Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. / Outlook

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. — policy outlook

What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: utility energy. Company profile →

21upcoming at elevated+Forward outlook55 in pipeline121 in force (sev ≥ 3)7 tracked materials0 customer sectors

1 · What they make

The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. is the regional integrated utility for Japan's Kansai region (Osaka/Kyoto/Kobe), generating, transmitting and distributing electricity across its service territory.

Rest of the descriptionShow

Its defining asset is a nuclear-heavy generation fleet: seven operating reactors across three stations, all in Fukui Prefecture — Mihama Unit 3, Takahama Units 1–4, and Ohi Units 3–4 — restored to full operation with the fiscal-2023 restart of Takahama 1 and 2, alongside a thermal fleet. Unusually for a utility, it also holds an equity position in its own fuel supply: Kansai has been a partner of Kazatomprom since 2006 through the APPAK LLP uranium-mining joint venture in Kazakhstan's Turkistan region (Kazatomprom 65%, Sumitomo 25%, Kansai 10%), and in December 2025 signed an agreement with Kazatomprom for the supply of Kazakh U3O8. It is separately building out grid-scale battery storage — it holds 40% of the 99MW/396MWh Tanagawa Energy Storage Plant in Misaki, Osaka Prefecture (JEXI 50%, Kinden 10%, with Sumitomo Corporation also invested; commercial operation targeted for February 2028) — and has taken a 49% stake in Iberdrola's Windanker offshore wind project in the German Baltic Sea.

Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.

2 · Where it operates — production footprint

1production country in its dossier · approx. output shares

This is where Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.

🇯🇵 Japan≈100%

Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation
Ohi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation
Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation

3 · Composition — the materials that matter

7tracked critical materials

Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.

dysprosiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply95

Neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium — *structural component*, via a minority stake rather than owned manufacturing. Kansai holds 49% of the 315MW Windanker project, which trade coverage reports will use 21 Siemens Gamesa SG 14-236 DD turbines.

neodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply86

praseodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply85

lithiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply72

Lithium — *bulk input* to the Tanagawa battery plant, in which Kansai holds 40% equity. Listed alone, deliberately: the project's **cathode chemistry has not been disclosed**, and Japanese grid-scale BESS increasingly use lithium iron phosphate.

copperbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply68

Copper, aluminium — *bulk inputs* (industry-standard inference, not KEPCO-confirmed). Conventional conductor and winding materials for generator stators, station electrical systems, transformers and regional distribution infrastructure.

uraniumbuys🇷🇺 RU controls supply67

Uranium — *bulk input, no substitute*. This is the anchor exposure and the best-evidenced one.

aluminiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply49

Examined and excluded

The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:

“Dropped this pass — nickel, cobalt, manganese. A previous pass listed the Tanagawa storage plant as "lithium-ion NMC" and added manganese as an NMC-cathode co-metal. No located source states the cathode chemistry of that project. Because LFP — which contains none of these three — is a live and increasingly common choice for Japanese grid storage, NMC is not a safe default, so all three are removed rather than carried on an assumption. Reinstate if Kansai or its EPC partners disclose an NMC cathode.”
“Silicon stays dropped: no confirmed Kansai-owned solar PV generation asset was found.”

Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.

4 · Threats & opportunities — in the pipeline

55proposed measures matching its inputs or sector · top 5 ranked by imminence × relevance · 21 at elevated+ likelihood

The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.

#1🇧🇷 Brazil PNMCE — Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PL 2780/2024)highBeneficiation / form change

1 · If this passes

BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymium lithium copper · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending

First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.

Brazil supplies 4.1% of world lithium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.

Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: lithium supply outside BR is 🇦🇺 AU 34%, 🇨🇳 CN 22%, 🇨🇱 CL 20% (shares renormalised after removing BR); neodymium supply outside BR is 🇨🇳 CN 72%, 🇺🇸 US 14%, 🇦🇺 AU 7.7% (shares renormalised after removing BR).

Further materials are covered in section 6 below.

#2🇲🇼 Malawi — Presidential Executive Order banning export of all raw/unprocessed minerals (effective 21 Oct 2025)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymium copper aluminium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending

President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.

neodymium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.

Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 72% · 🇺🇸 US 14% · 🇦🇺 AU 7.7% · 🇲🇲 MM 5.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.

Tradable names in those ex-MW countries, deployable-now first:

🇺🇸 Energy Fuels Inc.deployable nowProducing today — “only primary vanadium producer”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 Lynas Rare Earthsdeployable nowProducing today — “largest producer of separated rare earth materials outside China”. Capacity partly committed — “Its separate US Department of War-backed heavy-REE separation project (Lynas USA, Seadrift, Texas — ~US$258m in DoW fun…”

domestic subsidy

copper — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.

Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇱 CL 26% · 🇨🇩 CD 16% · 🇵🇪 PE 13% · 🇨🇳 CN 8.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.

Tradable names in those ex-MW countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

Further materials are covered in section 6 below.

#3🇨🇩 DRC — Interministerial Arrêté Banning Export of Unprocessed Copper and Cobalt Concentrates (29 June 2026, replaces 4 August 2023 framework)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending

On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.

DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.

Tradable names in those ex-CD countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#4🇨🇳 China — MOFCOM/GACC suspension of ordinary industrial & smelter-byproduct sulfuric acid exports (in force from 1 May 2026)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending

Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.

Tradable names in those ex-CN countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#5🇰🇿 Kazakhstan Subsoil Code 2026 amendments — domestic-content rise to 70% (incl. uranium), geological-data digitisation, e-auctions, strategic-investor priority righthighUnclassified · inferred

1 · If this passes

KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymium copper uranium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 98d pending

Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

Uranium — *bulk input, no substitute*. This is the anchor exposure and the best-evidenced one.

3 · Your options

The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.

Further materials are covered in section 6 below.

50 more in the pipelineShow

🇺🇸 US-China Bilateral Rare Earth Minerals Deal FrameworkhighSupply restriction

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with P…

🇨🇩 DRC Strategic Mineral Reclassification Decree — 6 new minerals (lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REEs) elevated to strategic tier, royalty 3.5%→10%highUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches lithium, uranium, neodymium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…

🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — Parliament-passed June 23, 2026; mining: Mineral Research Fund (10% gross mineral revenue), Income Tax Act & VAT Framework Agreement exemptionshighUnclassified · inferred

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches copper, neodymium · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…

🇿🇲 Zambia SI No. 43 of 2026 — Customs and Excise (Suspension) (Copper Concentrates) (No. 2) Regulations, 2026highBeneficiation / form change

stage passed-vote → high · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Minister of Finance, acting under s.

🇬🇭 Ghana Minerals and Mining Act overhaul (Act 703 replacement) + new National Mining PolicyelevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches aluminium, lithium · flagged 17 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…

🇬🇳 Guinea — Nimba Mining Company (NMC SA) Signs First Base Mining Convention (Tinguilinta Bauxite Concession, Boké)highUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches aluminium · flagged 10 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

On 6 August 2026, at a ceremony at the Petit Palais of the Presidency chaired by Djiba Diakité (Minister Chief of Staff, chair of the Simandou 2040 Strategic Committee), Guinea's wholly state-owned N…

🇲🇳 Mongolia Minerals Law Comprehensive Amendment 2026 — ~40% of 2006 law revised; exploration-licence term cut, statutory critical-minerals definition, downstream-beneficiation licensingmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches copper, neodymium, lithium · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…

🇬🇳 Guinea Bauxite Export Volume Controls — Mines Minister Sylla Quota Regime (2026)moderateSupply restriction

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches aluminium · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Guinea = world's #2 bauxite producer (183 Mt exported in 2025, ~45% of China's bauxite imports); Mines Minister Bouna Sylla confirmed in March 2026 that export volume curbs will be applied by early A…

🇲🇬 Madagascar — Council of Ministers lifts 16-year moratorium on new mining-permit issuance (except gold), effective ~29 Jan 2026highSupport / opportunity

stage passed-vote → high · touches neodymium, aluminium · flagged 13 Aug 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…

🇨🇳 Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt — US$210M acquisition of Atlantic Lithium (control of the Ewoyaa lithium project, Ghana) via Australian scheme of arrangementhighInvestment control

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Art. 22 Commission Implementing Decision — Strategic Raw Material Stock BenchmarkshighCompliance obligation

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium, neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · an obligation on you — audit and file; it prohibits importing from nowhere, so no supplier change is implied and we list none

Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…

🇳🇬 Nigeria RMRDC 30% Value Addition Bill — mandatory 30% local processing of ALL raw materials before exporthighBeneficiation / form change

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…

🇪🇺 EU European Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Centre — establishing instrumentelevatedSupport / opportunity

stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated · touches lithium, neodymium, copper · flagged 30 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…

🇪🇺 STAGE UPDATE — EU CBAM COM(2025)989 Downstream Extension: Council adopts general approach June 12, 2026elevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches aluminium · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Council's general approach expands the Commission's proposed downstream scope further (more products than Commission proposed); mandates annual Commission review for future scope additions; adds anti…

🇺🇸 US BOEM Proposed Rule — Administrative Revisions to OCS Hard Minerals Regulations (FR Doc. 2026-03690)elevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…

🇵🇪 Peru Ley General de Minería Amendment — Mining Concession Regime ReformelevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches copper · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…

🇨🇮 Côte d'Ivoire — Revision of the 2014 Code Minier (Loi n° 2014-138)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, aluminium · flagged 9 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…

🇲🇦 Morocco Mining Code Amendment — National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals + strategic-minerals designation listmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, neodymium · flagged 4 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.

🇧🇴 Bolivia nueva Ley de Minería — comprehensive replacement of the 2014 Ley 535 de Minería y MetalurgiamoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches lithium, copper · flagged 17 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.

🇳🇦 Namibia new Minerals Bill (Minerals Prospecting and Mining Act overhaul)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches uranium, lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…

African Union / AfDB — continental harmonisation of mining legislation toward a ban on unprocessed critical-mineral ore exports (Abidjan Ministerial Forum outcome)lowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches copper, lithium, aluminium, neodymium · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…

🇹🇿 Tanzania Critical & Strategic Minerals Strategy + statutory critical/strategic minerals LIST (Ministry of Minerals, Mavunde) — beneficiation-mandate licensing instrumentmoderateBeneficiation / form change

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches neodymium, lithium · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…

🇨🇿 Czech Republic — €360M Government Grant for Cinovec Lithium Project (European Metals Holdings / CEZ JV)highSupport / opportunity

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 19 Sept 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…

🇨🇱 Chile — outgoing Boric government's fast-tracked batch of 5 additional CEOL lithium salt flats (Ascotán, Quillagua Sur, Hilaricos, Piedra Parada, Agua Amarga) submitted to the Contraloría for toma de razónhighSupport / opportunity

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…

🇬🇭 Ghana Minerals and Mining Act 703 Amendment — Cabinet-Approved Proposal (Royalty 9-12%, Lease Cuts, DA Abolition)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches aluminium · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Gold mining royalties rise from 3-5% to 9-12% sliding-scale (price-indexed); mining lease maximum cut 30→15 years with renewals limited to 2×10-year additional terms; Development Agreements and Inves…

🇬🇳 Guinea Ministry of Mines — Bauxite Export Volume Cap (~150 Mt/yr, 2026)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches aluminium · flagged 19 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

~25% reduction in Guinea's annual bauxite shipments to China (150 Mt target vs.

🇺🇸 USTR Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical MineralsmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, neodymium, copper · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…

🇪🇺 EU CBAM Scope Expansion to ~180 Downstream Steel/Aluminum Products (COM(2025) 989 final)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches aluminium · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Extends the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism from the existing Regulation (EU) 2023/956 sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) to approximately 180 downstream produc…

🇬🇳 Guinea — Ministry of Mines plan to reduce bauxite export volumes to support prices (differential quota/allocation tied to downstream-investment commitments)lowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

On 18 March 2026 Guinea's Minister of Mines Bouna Sylla told Reuters that Guinea — the world's top bauxite exporter (~40% of global seaborne supply, 2025 exports ~183 Mt, +25% y/y) — would reduce exp…

🇬🇳 Guinea bauxite export curbs / production-cap regime — Ministry of Mines & Geology sector-wide export-control measure (announced, no decree yet)lowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 14 Jul 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Guinea — the world's largest bauxite exporter (~single-largest feed to China's alumina/aluminium chain) — is preparing a sector-wide measure to CAP/reduce bauxite exports to stabilise falling prices…

🇪🇺 EU Permanent-Magnet Scrap & Waste Export RestrictionlowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Strategic Projects — Second Designation RoundmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches lithium, neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Second wave of CRMA Art.

🇮🇳 India SASCI Mining Sector Reforms Component FY2026-27 — ₹5,000 crore incentive scheme to accelerate mine auction-to-production pipelinelowSupport / opportunity

stage announced → low · touches aluminium, lithium, copper, neodymium · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…

CEMAC Common Mining Code — 6-member regional harmonisation (April 2026)moderateCompliance obligation

stage draft-published → moderate · touches uranium · flagged 20 Jun 2026 · an obligation on you — audit and file; it prohibits importing from nowhere, so no supplier change is implied and we list none

If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…

🇬🇳 Guinea — Nimba Mining Company (NMC, 100% state-owned) / Glencore bauxite pre-financing and marketing agreementlowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 22 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

On 7 September 2026 Guinea's state-owned Nimba Mining Company and Glencore signed a five-year pre-financing agreement, announced by the government and Glencore on 10 September 2026, worth over USD 30…

🇮🇳 India–Myanmar rare-earths cooperation — elevated to formal bilateral agenda at Modi–Min Aung Hlaing summitlowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches neodymium · flagged 6 Sept 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…

🇬🇳 Guinea Bauxite Exchange (GBX) — Mines Minister Bouna Sylla announced July 2025 national bauxite price index targeting FOB pricing transparency and closing gap between declared export values and market prices; planned launch end-2025; Prospect Intel confirmed Guinea-Conakry launched GBX to reclaim pricing control; no enacted arrêté/décret confirmed in primary gazette sourceslowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 25 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Supersedes 2022 bauxite reference price arrêté; establishes real-time FOB benchmark for all Guinea bauxite exports (~182 Mt/yr, world's largest supplier); estimated >$1bn/yr additional government rev…

🇨🇩 DRC Mines Minister Circular — 5% Worker Equity Enforcement (Articles 71 bis + 144 bis), January 30 2026lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…

🇬🇳 Guinea Alumina Refinery Ultimatum — SMB and CBG 10-Day Deadline to Submit Construction Timeline (June 2026)lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Guinea's CNRD junta gives Societe Minière de Boke (SMB, China-linked, ~50% of Guinea's bauxite output) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG, joint venture: Halco Mining/Alcoa/Rio Tinto/Dadco) 10…

🇮🇩 Indonesia PP 19/2025 Mining Royalty Rate Hike — Implementation Postponed Indefinitely (May 2026)lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…

🇬🇳 Guinea Bauxite Export Volume Controls 2026lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 13 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

GN ≈ 60% global seaborne bauxite; a ~150 Mt/yr cap (vs 183 Mt 2025) tightens the alumina→aluminium chain — direct hit to EU aluminium-vertical names

🇶🇦 Qatar Mining Company (QMSD) recommits US$800M to resume Jebel Ohier copper-gold project, SudanlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 4 Oct 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…

🇨🇳 Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt — USD 210m acquisition of Atlantic Lithium Ltd (Ewoyaa Lithium Project, Ghana)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches lithium · flagged 9 Sept 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.

🇨🇦 Canada — Attorney General Federal Court enforcement application vs. Gator Capital Ltd re: Investment Canada Act s.40 (first-ever ICA divestiture enforcement litigation)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches lithium · flagged 6 Sept 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 15-20% stake acquisition in First Quantum Minerals' Zambian copper-nickel assetslowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF/Ma'aden JV) — 10–20% stake in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 10-20% stake acquisition in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…

🇵🇬 Papua New Guinea Mining Bill 2025 — parliamentary enactment (replacement of Mining Act 1992)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…

🇸🇱 Sierra Leone No Raw Minerals Export Commitment (VP Jalloh, Mining Week May 2026)lowBeneficiation / form change

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…

🇧🇷 Brazil BNDES "Mais Inovação" loan to Wave Aluminium Brasil SA (New Wave) — BRL 221m demonstration plant financing for bauxite-residue processing (Barcarena, Pará)lowSupport / opportunity

stage announced → low · touches aluminium · flagged 10 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

On 16 November 2025 Brazil's national development bank BNDES signed a BRL 221 million (~USD 41.

4b · Already in force

121in-force restrictions (severity ≥ 3) on its tracked materials

8 of 121 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.

Australia — Treasurer's FATA s.69(2) orders direct six China-linked investors to divest 1.68 billion Northern Minerals shares (Orders (No. 1) 2026)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.

US-China Economic and Trade Arrangement (Busan Summit) — one-year mutual suspension of reciprocal tariff escalation, China rare-earth/critical-minerals export controls, and US affiliates rule; soybean and agricultural purchase commitments🇺🇸 Tariff · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

118 more in-force restrictionsShow

US Section 232 Copper Tariff (Proclamation 10962): 50% on semi-finished + derivative copper🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21): accelerated repeal of IRA clean-energy credits and FEOC restrictions on §45Y/§48E/§45X🇺🇸 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 5

China imposes export licensing on seven heavy and medium rare earths🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Bolivia YLB–Hong Kong CBC USD 1.0bn lithium-carbonate services contract (Salar de Uyuni, 35kt/yr DLE)🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.

Mali Décret 2024-0396/PT-RM implementing 2023 Code Minier (Loi 2023-040)🇲🇱 Industrial policy · lithium, uranium, aluminiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Panama Supreme Court declares Law 406/2023 (Minera Panamá / Cobre Panamá concession) unconstitutional🇵🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 5 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) Order, 2023🇿🇼 Export control · lithium, coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mexico nationalizes lithium: Ley Minera reform bars private concessions, creates state agency Litio para México (LitioMx)🇲🇽 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires 80% of Tenke Fungurume, world's second-largest cobalt mine🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), Act No. 28 of 2002🇿🇦 Industrial policy · uraniumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774) — parent industrial-mobilization and domestic-capacity statute🇺🇸 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Canada expands counter-tariffs on US goods to CA$27.6bn, matching US Section 338/232 tariffs dollar-for-dollar🇨🇦 Tariff · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Niger Council of Ministers awards large-scale uranium mining permits at In Azaoua (to state-owned TSUMCO, ex-SOMAÏR perimeter) and Madaouela I (re-attributed to MAMICO, Niger state stake raised to 40%)🇳🇪 Industrial policy · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS DPAS Directive Allocation Order — 100% domestic-sale mandate for black mass and tungsten waste/scrap🇺🇸 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 27 [2026] — 20 more Japanese entities incl. National Institute for Defense Studies added to Control List🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 23 (2026) — 10 US Entities Added to Export Control Management List, Including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

UK bans import, acquisition and cross-trade of Russian-origin uranium (SI 2026/543)🇬🇧 Sanction · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mozambique mining-sector reform bill (INAMI public consultation): 15% state stake, raw-mineral export ban, 25-year concessions, 10% local-development levy🇲🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

UK Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism — Finance Act 2026 primary statutory framework (live 1 Jan 2027)🇬🇧 Tariff · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe Ministry of Mines suspends all raw-mineral and lithium-concentrate exports indefinitely🇿🇼 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Turkey 2026 Import Regime — Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı No. 10790 (cross-sectoral surveillance + additional duties up to 48% on non-EU)🇹🇷 Tariff · copper, aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Kazakhstan amends Subsoil Code to grant Kazatomprom statutory priority over uranium blocks and reorganises subsoil-use governance🇰🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, copper, uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Arrêté 00964/2025 — Immediate suspension of all artisanal copper-cobalt processing and marketing entities🇨🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Bolivia DS 5503 — Economic/Financial/Energy/Social Emergency Declaration and Comprehensive Stabilization Package🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Geology and Minerals Law amendment (Law No. 147/2025/QH15): rare earths designated 'special strategic' minerals, raw exports prohibited🇻🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 17/2025 — RKAB annual cycle and MinerbaOne quota system🇮🇩 Regulatory · copper, aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia Net Zero Plan 2050 and Six Sector Emissions Reduction Plans🇦🇺 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ukraine sanctions Rosatom's international network over Zaporizhzhia/Chornobyl NPP seizure (Presidential Decree No. 595/2025)🇺🇦 Sanction · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US-EU Joint Framework on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade (15% all-inclusive tariff ceiling on EU goods)🇺🇸 Tariff · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Decree 193/2025/ND-CP: Comprehensive Implementing Decree for the Law on Geology and Minerals🇻🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, copper, uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Niger nationalises Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR) uranium joint venture, transferring all Orano-held shares and assets to the State🇳🇪 Industrial policy · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires Ecuador's largest gold deposit via Lumina Gold takeover and signs $1.7B exploitation contract🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia PP 19/2025 — Tiered Minerba Royalty Regulation🇮🇩 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Steel and Metals Action Plan — COM(2025) 122 final🇪🇺 Industrial policy · copper, aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Council Regulation 2025/395 — 16th sanctions package against Russia (primary aluminium import ban, 74-vessel shadow-fleet expansion, 13 banks SWIFT cut, oil-storage and Russian-airport transaction bans)🇪🇺 Sanction · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

India Cabinet approves National Critical Mineral Mission with ₹34,300 cr seven-year outlay covering 30 minerals🇮🇳 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithium, coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Law on Geology and Minerals (Law No. 54/2024/QH15)🇻🇳 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mongolia — Nuclear Energy Law Amendments: Dynamic Uranium Royalty, Ore Export Ban, and Zuuvch-Ovoo Framework🇲🇳 Industrial policy · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Russia Resolution No. 1544 — temporary ban on enriched uranium exports to the United States🇷🇺 Export control · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU imposes definitive countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles🇪🇺 Tariff · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Niger revokes Orano's Imouraren uranium-mine operating permit (returns to public domain under Mining Code arts. 59 & 61)🇳🇪 Industrial policy · uraniumsev 4

Australia — Treasurer's FATA s.69(2) orders direct five China-linked investors to divest 613.6 million Northern Minerals shares (Orders 2024)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 6/2024: MEMR smelter-completion framework for copper, iron, lead and zinc concentrate exports🇮🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia bans copper concentrate and anode sludge exports under Permendag 10/2024🇮🇩 Export control · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Section 301 tariff hikes on Chinese EVs, batteries, semis, solar, steel🇺🇸 Tariff · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US bans Russian-origin enriched uranium imports (Public Law 118-50)🇺🇸 Sanction · uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council Order No. 785 — Regulation on the Administration of Rare Earths🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Treasury (OFAC) Bans Import of Russian-Origin Aluminum, Copper and Nickel; Bars Exchange/Derivative Servicing🇺🇸 Sanction · copper, aluminiumsev 4

Panama Ley 407 — Indefinite moratorium on metallic mining concessions nationwide🇵🇦 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China imposes export licensing on graphite products🇨🇳 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Sweden Act (2023:560) on the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments — Lag om granskning av utländska direktinvesteringar🇸🇪 FDI screening · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU CBAM Definitive Phase Entry Into Force🇪🇺 Tariff · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 213 of 2022 — Base Minerals Export Control (Lithium Bearing Ores and Unbeneficiated Lithium) Order, 2022🇿🇼 Export control · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia bans raw bauxite ore exports under Permendag 18/2022 (hilirisasi extension)🇮🇩 Export control · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Canada ISED orders three Chinese mining companies to divest critical mineral investments (Nov 2022)🇨🇦 FDI screening · lithiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia Bans Export of Aluminium Ores, Alumina and Aluminium Hydroxide to Russia🇦🇺 Export control · aluminiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Council Regulation 2022/328 — dual-use, oil-refining and aviation export ban on Russia🇪🇺 Export control · uraniumsev 4

DRC Loi n° 18/001 — Revised Mining Code: strategic-mineral royalties, state carry doubled, stability curtailed🇨🇩 Regulatory · lithium, coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017 (Act No. 5 of 2017, Cap. 449)🇹🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, uraniumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Determination — Proposed 25% Tariff on All Brazilian Goods🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa: Industrial Development Strategy 2026 — Permit-Conditioned Beneficiation Mandate for Critical Minerals🇿🇦 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Forced Labor Findings and Proposed Action — 60 Economies🇺🇸 Tariff · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council Order No. 839 — Regulations for the Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU-US Trade: Political Agreement on Implementing Regulations for Joint Statement Tariff Commitments🇪🇺 Tariff · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Guinea / GAC / EGA: Amicable Settlement Agreement — Bauxite Concession Dispute Resolved🇬🇳 Industrial policy · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US OFAC April 30 2026 — designation of former DRC President Joseph Kabila under EO 13413/13671 for material support to M23 and Congo River Alliance (AFC)🇺🇸 Sanction · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Egypt PM Decree No. 1440/2026 — Executive Regulations of Mineral Resources Law 198/2014🇪🇬 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China Customs Tariff Commission — Zero-Tariff Treatment for All 53 African Diplomatic Partners (May 2026–April 2028)🇨🇳 Tariff · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithium, copper, uranium, aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MIIT publishes draft administrative-penalty discretion standards under the Rare Earth Management Regulation🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Ministry of Minerals revokes 40 idle mineral exploration licences (188,163 ha; MBT reallocation)🇹🇿 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, uraniumsev 3

Indonesia Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026 — Nickel Ore Multi-Element HPM Benchmark Price Reform🇮🇩 Industrial policy · copper, aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Japan-France Roadmap on Cooperation in Critical Minerals (Takaichi-Macron Tokyo Summit)🇯🇵 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mexico SCJN rules lithium nationalisation constitutional (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 78/2022)🇲🇽 Regulatory · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ghana Minerals Commission revokes 300+ small-scale mining licences and launches sector-wide local content reform package🇬🇭 Regulatory · lithium, aluminiumsev 3

Zambia: Government/ZEMA conclude Sino-Metals Leach Zambia spillage investigation, opening remediation and compensation process🇿🇲 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia — Federal Court imposes AUD 14 million FIRB civil penalty against Indian Ocean International Shipping (Northern Minerals divestment non-compliance)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, neodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM/GACC Announcement No. 91 of 2025 — 2026 Dual-Use Catalogue (Export/Import Licence Administration)🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ecuador Decreto Ejecutivo 273 — Reforma al Reglamento General a la Ley de Minería (sliding 3-8% royalty, 100% self-power mandate, tightened exploration timelines)🇪🇨 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Canada implements Buy Canadian Procurement Policy Framework🇨🇦 Industrial policy · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US DOI / USGS Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals — 60-mineral statutory designation under the Energy Act of 2020🇺🇸 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithium, copper, uraniumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Malawi Presidential Executive Order — Prohibition on Export of Raw Unprocessed Minerals (October 2025)🇲🇼 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, copper, uranium, aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Myanmar (Kachin): KIO Rare Earth Mining Management Regulation — Permit, Tax, and Environmental Governance Framework (October 2025)🇲🇲 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MIIT/NDRC/MNR Interim Measures for Total Quantity Control of Rare Earth Mining, Smelting and Separation🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US BIS designates 407 HTSUS codes as Section 232 steel/aluminum derivative products (first inclusions cycle)🇺🇸 Tariff · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM + MOST Announcement No. 28 (2025) — Revision of Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited/Restricted from Export (Battery Cathode, Lithium, Gallium Processing)🇨🇳 Export control · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Guinea: Ministerial Order Revoking 129 Expired Mining Exploration Permits (May 2025)🇬🇳 Regulatory · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Türkiye Opens Anti-Dumping Investigation into Chinese Aluminium Frames for Photovoltaic Panels (Tebliğ 2025/10)🇹🇷 Tariff · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 — provincial law centralising Balochistan mineral control under federal SIFC, establishing Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA)🇵🇰 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Lao PDR PM Order No. 06/PM — Permanent Alluvial Gold Ban and Metallic Mineral Project Moratorium🇱🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa adds base-metal tariff headings (iron, steel, copper, aluminium, lead, zinc, tin) to ITAC export-permit list🇿🇦 Export control · copper, aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Forced Labour Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 — first binding EU-wide prohibition on products made with forced labour🇪🇺 Regulatory · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 — Mining Act critical/strategic minerals classification + USD 5m mining-licence capital floor🇹🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Council adds seven Iranian entities to Russia-military-support sanctions list (Implementing Regulation 2024/2697)🇪🇺 Sanction · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Bolivia YLB–Uranium One Group USD 970M DLE lithium-carbonate plant contract (Salar de Uyuni, court-suspended May 2025)🇧🇴 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Rwanda enacts Law n° 056/2024 establishing tax on minerals, restructuring royalty and export-tax rates to incentivise value-addition over raw-mineral exports🇷🇼 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Central African Republic — Mining Code Law No. 24-008: GEMINCA and SONADERM state-enterprise mandates, EITI/KP/ICGLR compliance gate, ASM formalisation🇨🇫 Regulatory · uraniumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Japan bans exports of additional industrial goods to Russia (HS 27/28/39/73/81/82/84/85/89/90 lines) and imports of Russian-origin non-industrial diamonds🇯🇵 Export control · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ghana Minerals Commission issues local-beneficiation requirement: export ban on unprocessed bauxite, lithium, iron ore, and manganese🇬🇭 Export control · lithium, aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

UK bans acquisition and import of Russian-origin metals (Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, SI 2023/1364)🇬🇧 Export control · copper, aluminiumsev 3

Zijin Mining / COMINIERE — Manono Northeast Lithium JV: DRC Exploration and Mining Licence🇨🇳 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Jordan National Mining Sector Strategy 2023-2033 — 10-year MEMR framework targeting JD 2.1bn sector GDP and expanded phosphate, potash, REE, uranium, and copper investment🇯🇴 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, copper, uraniumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Nigeria 7-Point Agenda for Solid Minerals & ETCM Roadmap🇳🇬 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Philippines Maharlika Investment Fund Act (RA 11954) — first national sovereign wealth fund with PHP 500bn target capital🇵🇭 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Poland: Geological and Mining Law Amendment — Strategic Deposit Framework (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 2029)🇵🇱 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Greenland Parliament Act on Mineral Activities (Mining Act) No. 27 of 13 June 2023🇬🇱 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Namibia Cabinet 8th Meeting — Prohibition on Export of Unprocessed Critical Minerals🇳🇦 Export control · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 57 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1)🇿🇼 Export control · lithium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US State Department designates Russian government, technology and Rosatom-linked entities on invasion anniversary🇺🇸 Sanction · uraniumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

OFAC Burma: Myanmar Mining Enterprise No. 1 and No. 2 Designated as SDNs🇺🇸 Sanction · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zambia Mines and Minerals Development (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2022 — Copper Mineral Royalty Sliding Scale🇿🇲 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa imposes 6-month export ban on ferrous/non-ferrous scrap metal, new export and import permits (Notices R.2801-R.2804)🇿🇦 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Guinea joint-ministerial arrêté — mandatory bauxite reference price mechanism🇬🇳 Regulatory · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Canada: SEMA Russia Regulations amendment (SOR/2022-102) — luxury goods and weapons-production goods export ban🇨🇦 Export control · aluminiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US NRC Suspends General License Authority to Export Radioactive Material and Deuterium to Russia🇺🇸 Export control · uraniumsev 3

Uganda Mining and Minerals Act 2022🇺🇬 Industrial policy · dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Sinomine acquires Bikita lithium mine (Zimbabwe) for USD 180 million, commits USD 300 million expansion🇨🇳 Industrial policy · lithiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS Entity List: Four Burma-Based Entities Supporting SAC Military Coup🇺🇸 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

5 · Impact — upstream (material inputs)

7scored materials

For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).

dysprosium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 1 upcoming · 44 in force95

neodymium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 18 upcoming · 44 in force86

praseodymium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 1 upcoming · 42 in force85

The other 4 materialsShow

lithium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 21 upcoming · 35 in force72

copper🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 22 upcoming · 40 in force68

uranium🇷🇺 RU controls · buys · 4 upcoming · 22 in force67

aluminium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 20 upcoming · 30 in force49

5b · Impact — downstream (its customers)

Its sector (utility energy) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.

6 · Solution / strategy — the moves available

77 bought materials with a tradable substitute bench

For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.

dysprosium19 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 35 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇯🇵 Sumitomo Corporationdeployable nowProducing today — “operating a rare-earth recovery plant”. Capacity partly committed — “Sumitomo Corp's own Mineral Resources Group materials page names its non-ferrous portfolio as copper, nickel, aluminium…”

+15 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

neodymium16 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 44 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇨🇦 Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp.deployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date.

+12 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

praseodymium15 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 39 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇨🇦 Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp.deployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date.

+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

lithium30 tradable ex-🇿🇼ZW producers · 99 tracked total

🇺🇸 Albemarle Corporationdeployable nowProducing today — “largest Western lithium producer”. Capacity partly committed — “2bn government offtake floor for AU-produced critical minerals; Greenbushes spodumene + Kemerton LiOH structurally firs…”

🇯🇵 DOWA Holdings Co., Ltd.deployable nowProducing today — “largest zinc smelter”.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇫🇷 Eramet SAdeployable nowProducing today — “leading producer of high-grade manganese ore, ~25% of global supply”. Capacity partly committed — “| | 2025-12-03 | [EU ResourceEU Action Plan COM(2025) 945](/actions/2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945)…”

+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

copper60 tradable ex-🇺🇸US producers · 226 tracked total

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

🇬🇧 Anglo American plcdeployable nowProducing today — “commercial production since 2022”.

🇬🇧 Antofagasta plcdeployable nowProducing today — “operating mines”.

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

uranium10 tradable ex-🇺🇸US producers · 29 tracked total

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Ur-Energy Inc.deployable nowProducing today — “in operation since 2013”.

🇨🇦 Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp.deployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date.

🇦🇺 Bannerman Energy Ltd.deployable laterNot yet producing — “Final Investment Decision”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date. Capacity partly committed — “The agreement also grants CNOL a life-of-mine offtake entitlement over **60% of Etango production**.”

+6 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

aluminium13 tradable ex-🇨🇦CA producers · 71 tracked total

🇨🇳 Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chinalco)deployable nowProducing today — “largest producer”.

🇯🇵 Kobe Steel, Ltd. (Kobelco)deployable nowProducing today — “only fully integrated producer of titanium mill products, running the process from”.

🇬🇷 Metlen Energy & Metals (ex-Mytilineos)deployable nowProducing today — “currently operating”. Capacity partly committed — “The project holds EU Critical Raw Materials Act "Strategic Project" status and EIB financing (€90M, Jan 2026), and Metl…”

🇳🇴 Norsk Hydro ASAdeployable nowProducing today — “major Western aluminium producer”. Capacity partly committed — “Round-2 designation would unlock EU-aligned offtake-counterparty financing and Article-16 priority financing access via…”

+9 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

How these claims are derived (method)Show

Likelihood bands are derived deterministically from the legislative stage — announced → low; draft-published → moderate; in-consultation → moderate; consultation-closed → elevated; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote → high; awaiting-signature → high. We never publish a point probability: no honest per-jurisdiction bill-passage base rate exists.
Upcoming measures come from our forward intake queue, matched to this company's scored materials and sector. Each carries the date we first flagged it and a public source.
Transmission classes are derived from what each instrument does, on explicit signals in its own text (with the taxonomy in lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.
The top-5 ranking is mechanical, not editorial: score = classWeight × (likelihood-band rank + 1) × (1 + Σ touched-material weights), where a material this company produces weighs 2 and one it buys weighs 1, and classWeight reflects severity of effect: supply restriction 4 / 3 / 2 (issuer's production share of a touched material ≥5% / measurable / unmeasured), beneficiation 3 / 2.5 / 1.5 on the same gates, import cost and unclassified 2, investment control 1.5, compliance and support 1. A reporting obligation can therefore never outrank a live supply restriction on a material this company depends on merely by name-checking many materials. Sector-only matches carry the base relevance. Ties break to the higher band, then the most recently flagged.
Issuer production shares come from the USGS-based production-share table (lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.
Each chain card is assembled, never authored: step 1 quotes the measure's own expected-impact text (any date shown, including a compliance deadline, comes verbatim from that text or its source — we never synthesize one); step 2 quotes this company's own dossier bullet for the touched material verbatim, and says so plainly when the exposure is only sector-derived; step 3 is derived from the transmission class — for supply restrictions the tradable names shown are alternatives-map entries filtered to the ex-issuer production countries, where a tariff chip means a live register tariff entry by JP explicitly targets that material and supplier country (rate shown only when recorded), a subsidy/liberalising chip means a support measure by the supplier's own government on that material, and the EU/domestic chip is derived from the EU membership list. Every chip links to its register entry; no chip means no register signal, not "no risk".
In-force restrictions are register entries (stage in-force, effective severity ≥ 3) tagging its materials — every row links to the entry and its primary source.
Upstream scores are the footprint-adjusted, buyer-relative material scores from the company risk engine.
Customer sectors come from a hand-authored supply-chain adjacency graph (analyst judgement, weighted 0–1), the same graph the register's downstream-impact views propagate through. Where the company's sector label has no node of its own, the nearest equivalent node is used and labelled as such. The demand-support / demand-risk tag is a mechanical read of each measure's type and polarity, not a per-company judgement.
Alternatives are the alternatives-map slice (derived 2026-10-05): ex-controller-bloc producers tracked in the corpus, with tradability inherited from the verified listing layer.
Alternative viability is gated, not decorative (lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.

How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.

Home / Companies / Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. / Outlook

[5]Company ↑ Market

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. — policy outlook

What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: utility energy. Company profile →

21upcoming at elevated+Forward outlook55 in pipeline121 in force (sev ≥ 3)7 tracked materials0 customer sectors

1 · What they make

Rest of the descriptionShow

Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.

2 · Where it operates — production footprint

1production country in its dossier · approx. output shares

🇯🇵 Japan≈100%

Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation
Ohi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation
Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui) — nuclear generation

3 · Composition — the materials that matter

7tracked critical materials

dysprosiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply95

neodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply86

praseodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply85

lithiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply72

copperbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply68

uraniumbuys🇷🇺 RU controls supply67

Uranium — *bulk input, no substitute*. This is the anchor exposure and the best-evidenced one.

aluminiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply49

Examined and excluded

The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:

“Dropped this pass — nickel, cobalt, manganese. A previous pass listed the Tanagawa storage plant as "lithium-ion NMC" and added manganese as an NMC-cathode co-metal. No located source states the cathode chemistry of that project. Because LFP — which contains none of these three — is a live and increasingly common choice for Japanese grid storage, NMC is not a safe default, so all three are removed rather than carried on an assumption. Reinstate if Kansai or its EPC partners disclose an NMC cathode.”
“Silicon stays dropped: no confirmed Kansai-owned solar PV generation asset was found.”