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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: chemicals. Company profile →
Two distinct chemical lines run off one sulfuric-acid backbone. The pigment line digests ilmenite concentrate in sulfuric acid to make titanium dioxide — the sulfate route, the older of the two industrial TiO₂ processes and the one that suits Ukraine's domestic ilmenite. The fertilizer line converts phosphate rock and purchased ammonia into nitrogen-phosphorus and complex three-component (NPK) grades, plus ammonium sulfate.
Iron sulfate coagulants for water treatment and cement additives are by-product streams off the same chemistry.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Sumykhimprom produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Titanium — *bulk input*. Ilmenite (FeTiO₃) concentrate is the sole feedstock of the TiO₂ pigment line; there is no non-titanium route to a titanium pigment.
Phosphate — *bulk input*. Phosphorites are the mass feedstock of the NP/NPK grades; Interfax-Ukraine reported in April 2024 that the restarting plant was "at the stage of purchasing phosphorites and potash ores".
Potash — *bulk input*, but only for the three-component grades. Potash ore purchases were reported alongside phosphorites in April 2024.
Sulfur — *bulk input*. Elemental sulfur feeds the sulfuric-acid plant, and sulfuric acid is simultaneously the digestion medium for ilmenite and the acid half of the phosphate fertilizer route.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches phosphatesulfur · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 73d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Phosphorites are the mass feedstock of the NP/NPK grades; Interfax-Ukraine reported in April 2024 that the restarting plant was "at the stage of purchasing phosphorites and potash ores".
Sulfur — *bulk input*. Elemental sulfur feeds the sulfuric-acid plant, and sulfuric acid is simultaneously the digestion medium for ilmenite and the acid half of the phosphate fertilizer route.
China supplies 44% of world phosphate mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇲🇦 MA 28% · 🇺🇸 US 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 11% · 🇯🇴 JO 9.2% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
China supplies 23% of world sulfur mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇺🇸 US 17% · 🇷🇺 RU 15% · 🇸🇦 SA 15% · 🇦🇪 AE 12% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
SN · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches titaniumphosphate · flagged 13 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before end-2025; PM Sonko's May 2026 dismissal may have delayed/revised the bill
source ↗Titanium — *bulk input*. Ilmenite (FeTiO₃) concentrate is the sole feedstock of the TiO₂ pigment line; there is no non-titanium route to a titanium pigment.
Phosphate — *bulk input*. Phosphorites are the mass feedstock of the NP/NPK grades; Interfax-Ukraine reported in April 2024 that the restarting plant was "at the stage of purchasing phosphorites and potash ores".
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches titanium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 102d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Titanium — *bulk input*. Ilmenite (FeTiO₃) concentrate is the sole feedstock of the TiO₂ pigment line; there is no non-titanium route to a titanium pigment.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches titaniumphosphate · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Titanium — *bulk input*. Ilmenite (FeTiO₃) concentrate is the sole feedstock of the TiO₂ pigment line; there is no non-titanium route to a titanium pigment.
Phosphate — *bulk input*. Phosphorites are the mass feedstock of the NP/NPK grades; Interfax-Ukraine reported in April 2024 that the restarting plant was "at the stage of purchasing phosphorites and potash ores".
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
MA · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 4 Sept 2026, 32d pending
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025. Three structural changes: (1) a National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals empowered to designate an official list of "strategic and critical minerals" — Morocco's first formal legal mechanism to do so, which would sit upstream of and interact directly with the phosphate chokepoint (Morocco holds ~70% of world phosphate-rock reserves via OCP); (2) the digital mining cadastre (governance/transparency layer — this component has ALREADY gone live, launched 2026-04-07, and is queued separately to filing. md as an enacted action); (3) sharply increased penalties for illegal mining/prospecting (unauthorised prospecting: MAD 100k-1m; illegal extraction/transport/sale: up to MAD 2m). Morocco is chokepoint-tier and thinly covered (only 4 prior MA actions: 2022 Investment Charter, an AfDB agriculture loan, the 2026 Loi de Finances, and a Feb-2026 mining-tender notice — none creates a minerals-designation regime).
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*. Phosphorites are the mass feedstock of the NP/NPK grades; Interfax-Ukraine reported in April 2024 that the restarting plant was "at the stage of purchasing phosphorites and potash ores".
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
Introduced 28-Apr-2026 by Sen.
2 of 18 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in manufacturing, petrochemicals. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.