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On June 21, 2026, OFAC issued Iran-related General License X (GL X), authorizing transactions otherwise prohibited under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 587), the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 589), and WMD-proliferation sanctions authorities — including new purchases and loadings of Iranian-origin crude oil, petrochemical, and petroleum products, a materially broader carve-out than the cargo-already-loaded window granted by the preceding General License U. Just 16 days later, on July 7, 2026, OFAC issued General License X1, revoking and superseding GL X: as of that date new purchases or loadings of Iranian-origin crude oil, petrochemical, or petroleum products were no longer authorized. GL X1 itself subsequently expired. OFAC formally published both web licenses in the Federal Register on September 30, 2026 — a retrospective publication of licenses already issued and, by then, already revoked and expired.

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced on 18 May 2026 that Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL), a flagship publicly traded entity of India's Adani Group (NSE: ADANIENT), agreed to pay $275,000,000 to settle apparent civil liability for violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 CFR Part 560) arising from AEL's purchases of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) shipments through a Dubai-based commodity trader between November 2023 and June 2025, where red flags should have placed AEL on notice that the LPG originated from Iran. Approximately $192 million in payments for the Iranian-origin LPG shipments were processed through US financial institutions, providing the US nexus for OFAC jurisdiction. OFAC determined the apparent violations were EGREGIOUS and not voluntarily self-disclosed; AEL did not admit fault but committed to implementing enhanced compliance measures. The settlement is the largest OFAC enforcement action against an Indian corporate entity on record and was announced concurrently with parallel DOJ and SEC resolutions forming part of a broader US legal-relief package for the Adani Group.

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

President Trump issued five Presidential Determinations on 20 April 2026 under Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. § 4533), invoking the authority granted by Executive Order 14156 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency, signed 20 January 2025). The five determinations cover: (1) domestic petroleum production, refining, and logistics; (2) large-scale energy and energy-related infrastructure development, manufacturing, and deployment; (3) natural gas transmission, processing, storage, and LNG capacity; (4) coal supply chains and baseload power generation; (5) grid infrastructure, equipment, and supply chain. Each determination authorises the relevant Cabinet Secretary (primarily Energy) to use DPA §303 powers — direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase commitments, and equity investments — to expand domestic capacity in the named category.

At its 86th ordinary meeting on 10 April 2026 the DRC Council of Ministers adopted two interlocking decrees: Décret 1 creates the Réserve Stratégique de Substances Minérales Stratégiques (Strategic Reserve of Strategic Mineral Substances), a sui generis public-purpose stockpiling instrument covering cobalt, coltan (tantalum-niobium), and germanium; Décret 2 amends ARECOMS' founding decree, expanding its statutory mandate from export-quota regulator to strategic-reserve operator, authorized to constitute physical stocks through compulsory allocation of quota volumes, voluntary producer acquisition, and royalty-in-kind receipts, and to intervene in international markets via timed releases or withholding to stabilise prices. The instrument materially extends Kinshasa's market- intervention reach beyond the cobalt-only quota framework adopted in February 2025, adding coltan and germanium to ARECOMS' jurisdictional perimeter and giving the DRC a price- stabilisation tool comparable to the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve and China's State Reserve Bureau base-metals stockpile.

On March 20, 2026, OFAC issued Iran-related General License U (GL U), temporarily authorizing the sale, delivery, offloading and — notably, for the first time in decades — importation into the United States of Iranian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, but only for cargo already loaded onto vessels as of 12:01 a.m. EDT that day. The window ran through April 19, 2026, after which the authorization lapsed. The license excluded any transaction touching Cuba, North Korea, or Russian-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, and did not waive any other, non-Iran sanctions program. OFAC formally published GL U (and the separate, entity-specific GL V wind-down license for Hengli Petrochemical) in the Federal Register on June 10, 2026 — a retrospective publication of licenses already issued and, by then, already expired.

On 12 March 2026 Senegal's Primature held a press conference releasing mid-term findings of the National Commission for the Re-evaluation and Renegotiation of Petroleum, Gas, and Mining Contracts, created in August 2024 under Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko's reform programme. The Commission identified a 1,075.9 billion FCFA shortfall in the mining sector — concentrated in unpaid taxes/royalties and unauthorised tax exemptions at ICS (Industries Chimiques du Sénégal) — and announced the termination of four offshore oil-exploration blocks (Djifer Offshore, Kayar Offshore, Saint-Louis Offshore, Rufisque Offshore). Renegotiation of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project, operated by BP with Kosmos Energy and Woodside as partners on the Senegal-Mauritania maritime border, is under active examination; the Primature projects 900 bn FCFA in incremental fiscal revenue 2026-2040 from the contract revision programme. This is Senegal's first major instance of retroactive resource-contract review under the Sonko-Faye government and establishes the legal-political baseline for subsequent contract renegotiations across the 27 mining contracts and remaining hydrocarbon licences under Commission review.

On 13 February 2026 President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed Executive Order No. 9 of 2026 directing all Production Sharing Contract operators and contractors to remit Royalty Oil, Tax Oil, Profit Oil, and Profit Gas directly to the Federation Account, bypassing prior NNPC Limited intermediated collection. The order simultaneously eliminates NNPC Limited's 30% management fee on profit oil/gas, suspends the 30% Frontier Exploration Fund deduction, and redirects Gas Flare Penalty proceeds to the Federation Account — materially walking back the fiscal architecture established under Petroleum Industry Act 2021 §§ 9 and 53. An Implementation Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance was established to operationalise the order and resolve disputes.

On January 23, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight vessel-owning/management firms — based in the UAE, India, Oman, the Seychelles, and the Marshall Islands — and identified nine of their tankers as blocked property, for transporting hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian crude oil, LPG, naphtha and high-sulfur fuel oil to buyers across East Asia, South Asia and East Africa. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum/petrochemical sector) as part of the maximum-pressure campaign under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, and OFAC concurrently issued General License T authorizing limited safety, environmental and cargo-offloading transactions involving the newly blocked vessels.

On 16 January 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 21 individuals and entities and identified one vessel for transferring oil products, procuring weapons and dual-use equipment, and providing financial services to Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis). Designated parties — oil-trading and exchange companies, a shipping/logistics facilitator, and front-company operatives — are based in Yemen, Oman, and the UAE, and are accused of running an oil-sales and financial- facilitation network that Treasury says generates the Houthis over $2 billion in annual illicit revenue. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on a multi-year cadence of prior OFAC designations against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and weapons-procurement suppliers.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 18 individuals and entities that make up the "rahbar" shadow-banking networks of sanctioned Iranian banks Bank Melli and Shahr Bank, including Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE Ltd, UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE and HMS Trading FZE, Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company and Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, and UK-based Nanshan Ltd. Separately, OFAC designated senior Iranian security officials, including SCNS Secretary Ali Larijani, for their role in the regime's violent crackdown on peaceful protesters that began in December 2025. The financial designations were made under E.O. 13902 (Iran's financial/petroleum/petrochemical sectors) and the human-rights designations under E.O. 13553 and E.O. 13876, in furtherance of NSPM-2; Treasury noted it sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft under the same maximum-pressure campaign in 2025.

The Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2025/2618 on 18 December 2025, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, to add 41 vessels to Annex XLII of the Russia sanctions regime. Of these, 36 vessels are designated for transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products while engaging in irregular and high-risk shipping practices characteristic of the "shadow fleet," 5 vessels are designated for transporting stolen Ukrainian grain and cultural property, and 1 vessel (GT HONOR) is designated for facilitating violation or circumvention of EU sanctions. Listed vessels are banned from access to EU member-state ports and locks and from a broad range of maritime-transport-related services, effective 19 December 2025. The measure is an incremental listing update between the 19th (Regulation 2025/2033, October 2025) and 20th (Regulation 2026/506, April 2026) numbered sanctions packages, rather than a new package itself.

On December 18, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 vessel-management/shipping firms — plus Egyptian businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr and two of his UAE-registered companies (Red Sea Ship Management LLC and High Seas Petroleum LLC) — under Executive Order 13902 for operating in Iran's petroleum sector. The vessels, flagged across Palau, Panama, Cook Islands, Barbados, Jamaica and unknown registries, are said to have transported "hundreds of millions of dollars'" worth of Iranian crude oil, fuel oil, bitumen, naphtha and condensate to buyers in Asia. Treasury frames the action as part of a campaign that has sanctioned more than 180 vessels since President Trump resumed office in January 2025, implementing NSPM-2 maximum-pressure policy.

On 15 December 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2588 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2594, giving effect to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (Ukraine territorial-integrity asset-freeze regime) by adding 9 new designations: 5 individuals who own or control companies enabling Russian oil shipments and controlling a significant share of Russia's "shadow fleet," and 4 shipping companies headquartered in Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam that manage shadow-fleet tankers and engage in irregular, high-risk shipping practices. Listed persons and entities are subject to an EU asset freeze (and, for the individuals, a travel ban); EU persons and companies are prohibited from making funds or economic resources available to them.

On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.

Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 870/2025 on 29 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 26 Russian legal entities involved in crude petroleum and natural gas extraction, petroleum-product refining, and related energy-sector activity. The decree imposes asset freezes and bars commercial transactions and investment dealings with the designated entities. It entered into force on 2 December 2025, the date of official publication.

On October 31, 2025, Bulgaria's National Assembly voted 135-4 (42 abstentions) to adopt a decision introducing a temporary measure restricting the export and intra-EU supply of petroleum products — chiefly diesel and aviation fuel — to all destinations, including fellow EU member states. The measure took effect around November 1, 2025 upon publication. Gasoline was excluded because domestic production exceeds internal demand. The ban is a direct domestic-supply-security response to US OFAC's October 22, 2025 SDN designation of Lukoil (see responds_to), whose Burgas refinery supplies roughly 80% of Bulgaria's fuel market; lawmakers cited the risk that sanctions exposure could disrupt Lukoil's export activity and drain the volumes needed to cover domestic demand. Exemptions cover refuelling of ships and aircraft and deliveries to NATO and EU member-state armed forces under the common defence policy.

On 29 October 2025 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 662, completing Switzerland's alignment with the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025) and tightening the parallel Belarus regime. The amendment took effect 30 October 2025 and adds: an export ban covering additional structural-metal, general-purpose-machinery and machine-tool goods; an import ban on further petroleum-oil products and waste/scrap categories; and expanded controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments spanning financial services, investment banking, crude-petroleum trade and motor-vehicle/trailer goods. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (WBF) had already taken over the measures within its own competence on 12 August 2025; this decision closes the remainder. In parallel, the Federal Council's asset-freeze annexes were extended to 14 individuals and 41 companies/organizations.

On October 22, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company ("Rosneft") and Lukoil OAO ("Lukoil") — together with dozens of named Russia-based subsidiaries — to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 14024 for "operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy." It is the first US designation of Russia's two largest integrated oil majors since the 2022 invasion-era sanctions architecture began. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, the blocking extends automatically to all entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft or Lukoil — capturing a sprawling global subsidiary network including Lukoil retail/refining assets in Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Finland, the West Qurna-2 upstream stake in Iraq, and Lukoil Americas. Rosneft and Lukoil together account for roughly half of Russian crude exports (~5 mb/d combined production) and Lukoil holds a ~9% European retail-fuel market share. OFAC simultaneously issued General License 124 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium / Tengizchevroil / Karachaganak Kazakhstan-pipeline carve-out, no expiry), General License 125 (Lukoil retail service stations outside Russia, wind-down to November 21, 2025), General License 126 (general wind-down to November 21, 2025) and General License 127 (debt/equity divestment and derivatives wind-down to November 21, 2025). GL 131 (issued November 14, 2025) opened a divestment window for Lukoil International GmbH; subsequent GL 134/134A/134B extended cargo-offload authorisations through April–May 2026. The action was coordinated same-day with UK OFSI Rosneft/Lukoil designations and the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package adopted October 23, 2025 — the first major US-led Russia-energy escalation under the second Trump administration.

On 9 October 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals, entities and vessels for facilitating Iranian crude oil, petroleum-product and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exports, in a coordinated action with the State Department. The network included 33 vessels transporting Iranian crude and LPG, shipping entities registered in Panama, the Marshall Islands, Ukraine and Liberia, an Iranian petrochemical producer, four Turkish petrochemical trading entities, five Chinese entities importing/refining/storing Iranian petroleum (including a China-based petrochemical-terminal operator, Jiangyin Foreversun Chemical Logistics Co., Ltd.), three Singapore-based logistics entities, and 27 entities based in Hong Kong, the UAE and India engaged in trading and shipping. The action was taken pursuant to the National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and blocks all US property/interests of the designated parties, exposing non-US counterparties to secondary-sanctions risk.

Russia's government imposed a temporary ban on exports of diesel fuel, marine (bunker) fuel and other gas oils (EAEU HS codes 2710 19 421 0 - 2710 19 429 0), including volumes purchased on exchange trading, effective 1 October 2025. The measure was framed as a domestic fuel-market stabilisation tool and initially exempted direct refinery producers from the ban. Russia is one of the world's largest diesel/gasoil exporters, so a full-coverage export halt on these grades has global gasoil-market significance, not just a regional effect. The ban has since been extended and tightened four times through mid-2026 (see amendments).

Japan lowered its price cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, effective for contracts concluded on or after 12 September 2025, aligning with the EU's July 2025 cut under its 18th sanctions package. The measure bars Japanese entities from importing, or providing shipping, insurance, financing or other services for, Russian crude priced above the new cap. In the same package Japan added 47 Russian entities and 9 individuals, 6 Crimea/Donbas-linked persons and entities, and 3 third-country entities to its asset-freeze list (transactions now require Ministry of Finance approval), and imposed export prohibitions on 2 Russian entities and 9 entities in third countries. Japan's own Russian crude imports are minimal (~0.1% of total crude imports, Jan-Jul 2025), so the measure is primarily a coalition-alignment and shipping/insurance-chokepoint action rather than a material change to Japan's own energy sourcing.

On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 32 individuals and entities and identified four vessels in what Treasury described as its broadest sanctions action to date against Iran-aligned Ansarallah (Houthi) support networks. The designated network — companies, owners, and operatives located in Yemen, China, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands — is accused of running oil and commodity smuggling through Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, laundering the proceeds, and using them to finance a global weapons procurement supply chain of front companies and shipping facilitators. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (as amended) and builds on nine prior 2024-2025 OFAC actions against Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, and suppliers.

On 2 September 2025 Mexico's Finance Ministry (SHCP) launched a capitalisation and refinancing strategy for state oil company Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), opening a USD 12 billion bond repurchase offer (of which USD 9.9 billion targeted 2026-2029 maturities). Between 15-16 September, SHCP placed a new basket of euro- and dollar-denominated bonds totalling USD 13.8 billion equivalent (EUR 5 billion across 4/8/12-year tranches at 3.500%, 4.500% and 5.125% coupons; USD 8 billion across 5/7/10-year tranches at 4.750%, 5.375% and 5.625% coupons), taking the combined operation to roughly USD 21.8 billion. SHCP stated the goal was to strengthen Pemex's capitalisation levels, reduce its financial debt balance, manage supplier obligations, fund investment projects, and improve its debt-maturity profile. The operation is part of the government's 2025-2035 Pemex strategic (rescue) plan and preceded credit-rating upgrades from Fitch (B+ to BB) and Moody's (B3 to B1, stable outlook).

On 15 August 2025 — the day of the Putin-Trump summit in Alaska — Russia's president signed Decree No. 559, amending Decree No. 723 of 7 October 2022, which had transferred the Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project's operating entity to a new Russian operator (Sakhalinmorneftegaz-Shelf, a Rosneft subsidiary) and frozen ExxonMobil's roughly 30% operator stake. The new decree sets conditions under which a foreign consortium party may reclaim its stake in Sakhalin-1 LLC: taking demonstrable action toward lifting Western sanctions that harm the project, signing supply contracts for foreign-made equipment and parts, and transferring previously accumulated funds to the project's accounts. Japan's SODECO and India's ONGC Videsh retained their stakes through the 2022 restructuring; ExxonMobil's stake remains unclaimed, with a Kremlin-set disposal deadline of 1 January 2026.

India's Union Cabinet approved ₹30,000 crore (~USD 3.43 billion) in compensation to the three public-sector oil marketing companies — Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL), Bharat Petroleum Corporation (BPCL), and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (HPCL) — for under-recoveries on domestic LPG sales during 2024-25. International LPG prices stayed elevated through the period, but the government did not pass the increase through to consumer cylinder prices, leaving the OMCs with losses on every cylinder sold. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas will distribute the funds across the three companies in twelve tranches to support crude/LPG procurement, debt servicing, and capex, and to keep LPG supply uninterrupted.

The Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2025 (Act No. 40 of 2025), receiving Royal Assent on 5 August 2025, reverses the April 2018 Ardern-government offshore petroleum exploration ban by removing the prohibition on new offshore exploration permits beyond onshore Taranaki, re-opening New Zealand's Taranaki, East Coast, and Deepwater basins to international oil and gas investors. The Act simultaneously amends the purpose of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 from "sustainably manage" to "promote" prospecting, exploration, and mining of Crown-owned minerals — a fundamental posture shift from conservation to production. Additional provisions restructure the decommissioning-liability regime by granting the Minister of Resources discretion to re-assign liability to former permit holders, extend the confidentiality period for speculative-prospecting data by six years, and introduce a new Tier 3 permit category for small-scale non-commercial gold mining.

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 22 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two individuals and five entities under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating revenue generation and material support to the Houthis (Ansarallah) through petroleum importation and money laundering. The network — Muhammad Al-Sunaydar's Arkan Mars petroleum companies (Yemen/UAE) and Yahya Mohammed Al Wazir's Al-Saida Stone for Trading and Agencies and Amran Cement Factory — coordinated roughly $12 million of Iranian petroleum imports through the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port with an Iranian IRGC-linked petrochemical trading entity, and laundered approximately €6 million through bulk-coal front-company transactions. The action builds on a cadence of OFAC designations against Houthi revenue and weapons-procurement networks running since mid-2024.

Law No. 7554 (Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun), adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 19 July 2025 and published in Resmî Gazete No. 32965 on 24 July 2025, amends Mining Law No. 3213 to introduce the first statutory definition of "stratejik ve kritik madenler" (strategic and critical minerals) in Turkish law. The law creates a Board override mechanism chaired by a Vice-Presidential delegate that can compel permit issuance for strategic/critical mineral projects when lower authorities have refused, designates MAPEG as the licensing authority within one month of a favourable Board decision, and mandates EIA Positive Decisions for all in-scope projects (eliminating the prior "EIA Not Required" option). Transitional provisions preserve old-regime rules for existing licence-holders until 1 January 2026.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated 22 entities based in Hong Kong (18), the UAE, and Türkiye under Executive Order 13224 for facilitating sales of Iranian oil that benefit the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The front-company network moves refinery payments for Iranian oil through offshore accounts to fund IRGC-QF activity; the action is the second round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign, following a June 6, 2025 action against Iranian exchange-house money-laundering networks. All property and interests of the designated entities within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a network of UAE- and UK-based companies controlled by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said that has smuggled Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi crude since at least 2020, plus five additional shadow-fleet vessel owners based in Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The action, taken pursuant to E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum sector) and E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism), also identifies several tankers as blocked property and marks the eighth round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's Iran maximum-pressure campaign. Concurrently, the State Department designated six additional entities and four vessels under E.O. 13846.

On 22 June 2025, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet ordered an immediate and complete halt of all fuel and gas imports from Thailand, effective from midnight that night (00:00, 23 June 2025). The order came amid a rapidly escalating Cambodia-Thailand border dispute following the killing of a Cambodian soldier in a disputed border area the previous month, and followed Cambodia's closure of two land border checkpoints with Thailand the same day. Thailand exported an estimated 2.3 billion litres of fuel to Cambodia in 2024 — about 20% of Thailand's total fuel exports, worth roughly THB 48 billion (USD 1.5 billion) — making Cambodia one of the largest overseas markets for Thai state energy company PTT. Hun Manet stated Cambodian fuel importers have adequate capacity to source supply from alternative countries, and separately ordered strict legal penalties, including licence revocation, against any company found smuggling Thai-origin fuel into Cambodia.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated four individuals, twelve entities, and two vessels in what Treasury called its single largest action to date against Iran-backed Ansarallah (the Houthis), pursuant to Executive Order 13224 as amended. The designated network — Sana'a- and Hudaydah-based oil-trading front companies (including Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives, Star Plus Yemen, Tamco Establishment, Royal Plus Shipping, and Abbot Trading) and their Houthi operator-owners — facilitates black-market oil and oil-derivative sales that fund Houthi militant operations, while shipping firms Best Way Tanker Corp, Ocean Voyage LLC, and Atlantis M. Shipping Co were designated for discharging over 120,000 combined metric tons of gasoline and LPG at the Houthi-controlled Ras Isa port via the vessels Valente and Atlantis MZ after the April 2025 expiration of Counter Terrorism General License 25A. The action builds on OFAC's June 2024–April 2025 cadence of designations against Houthi leaders, weapons-procurement operatives, and suppliers.

Pakistan's Ministry of Industries and Production, through the Engineering Development Board, launched the National Electric Vehicle (NEV) Policy 2025-2030 on 19 June 2025. The policy targets 30% of all new vehicles sold in Pakistan to be electric by 2030 and allocates an initial subsidy of PKR 9 billion for FY2025-26 to facilitate 116,053 electric two-wheelers and 3,171 electric three-wheelers (with 25% of the subsidy reserved for women applicants), alongside a build-out of 40 EV charging stations on motorways at 105 km average spacing. The policy is Pakistan's first horizontal EV industrial-policy framework, projected by government to save 2.07 billion litres of fuel annually and roughly USD 1 billion in foreign-exchange outflows on petroleum imports.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi promulgated Law No. 87 of 2025 on 10 June 2025, published the same day in Official Gazette Issue No. 23 mukarrar "A" and effective from 11 June 2025. The law amends Law No. 198 of 2014 (the Mineral Resources Law) by reconstituting the Egyptian General Authority for Mineral Resources as the Authority for Mineral Wealth and Mining Industries (MRMIA), endowed with an independent economic structure as a public economic authority. Headline parameters cut the minimum government shareholding requirement in mining JVs from 25% to 10%, reduce the mining-site lease cost by 60%, and expressly repeal Presidential Decree No. 45 of 1986 dissolving the Egyptian General Authority for Geological Survey and Mining Projects (its functions absorbed into the new Authority). MRMIA is granted broad competencies to develop sector strategies, regulate exploration and exploitation, localise mining industries, and enter into investment partnerships and local-manufacturing joint ventures.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.

Mozambique's Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MIREME) published a comprehensive revision of the 2014 Petroleum Law (Lei n.º 21/2014) in June 2025, tabled before the Assembleia da República for debate on 7 May 2026. The revision mandates a minimum 25% domestic-market quota for all oil, gas, and LNG produced under concessions (exclusively for national consumption), requires 100% of condensate output to be allocated domestically, and introduces idle-block penalty charges for concessionaires that fail to develop assigned blocks within prescribed periods. It also elevates the Instituto Nacional de Petróleo (INP) to full Regulatory Authority status with inspection and sanctioning powers, and establishes a mandatory minimum state Participating Interest with a free-carry obligation through to commercial production.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed the Upstream Petroleum Operations (Cost Efficiency Incentives) Order, 2025 on 29 May 2025, introducing a performance-based tax-credit framework for upstream oil and gas operators who beat NUPRC-set Unit Operating Cost benchmarks. Eligible lessees, licensees, and PSC contractors receive tax credits capped at 20% of their annual petroleum tax liability per licence area, applied against Petroleum Profits Tax, Hydrocarbon Tax, or Companies Income Tax. The Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) conducts annual terrain-specific (onshore, shallow-water, deep-offshore) Unit Operating Cost benchmarking, and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) co-administers with claw-back provisions for non-compliance; the regime runs through 31 May 2035.

South Africa's Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources (DMPR) released the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy on 20 May 2025 following Cabinet approval, alongside the gazetting of the Mineral Resources Development Bill (MRDB) 2025. The strategy classifies platinum group metals, manganese, iron ore, chrome ore and coal as "high criticality" and identifies seven intervention areas — exploration, beneficiation at source, R&D coordination by Mintek, regional integration (SADC), financial instruments, energy security, and international partnerships positioning South Africa for CRMA-equivalent partnerships with the US and EU. It is the first formal South African industrial-policy framework for critical-mineral beneficiation and the first ZA action in the IPTM register.

South African Cabinet on 20 May 2025 approved the publication of the Draft Mineral Resources Development Bill (MRDB) 2025, gazetted by Minister of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Gwede Mantashe to amend the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA). The Bill streamlines mining-rights administration by aligning with NEMA and the National Water Act, introduces a new licensing regime for artisanal and small-scale mining, and acts as the legislative implementing instrument for the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy approved at the same Cabinet sitting. Public-comment window ran through 13 August 2025; the Bill has not yet been enacted.

On 8 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated China-based "teapot" refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. and its Singapore-based broker subsidiary Xing AO Energy PTE. LTD., three firms tied to a Dongying Port (Shandong) terminal that has received Iranian crude from shadow-fleet tankers, and six Hong Kong-, UK-, and Marshall Islands-owned shadow-fleet vessels (STAR TWINKLE 6, LAMD, SKADI, BIG MAG, IMPALAS, THANE) plus their owning shipping companies and two vessel captains. It is OFAC's third action against an Iranian-oil teapot refinery and its first targeting Shandong port terminal operators, taken under E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum/ petrochemical sector) and E.O. 13846 (NIOC support) as part of the administration's NSPM-2 maximum-pressure campaign.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

Thailand's Cabinet approved in principle on 22 April 2025 the urgent revision of the Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999), directing the Ministry of Commerce to overhaul the foundational 25-year-old statute governing foreign participation in Thai economic activities, explicitly shifting the guiding principle from "protection" of domestic entrepreneurs to "enhancing competitiveness." In January 2026, the Department of Business Development operationalised the reform by announcing a 10-sector List-3 delisting package — including telecommunications services not owning network infrastructure, software development, financial-services categories (treasury centres, derivatives agency, collateralised lending, credit guarantee), petroleum drilling services, management services for affiliated companies, and domestic agricultural commodity trading — that would allow wholly-foreign-owned subsidiaries without a Foreign Business Licence (FBL). Simultaneously, the revision introduces a shift from a legal-shareholding test to an actual-control / beneficial-ownership test in nominee-shareholder enforcement, tightening the anti-front-company architecture while liberalising legitimate foreign-investment routes. Full statutory enactment via parliamentary process is expected mid-to-late 2026.

Pakistan launched the National Minerals Harmonisation Framework 2025 and the Mines & Minerals Act 2025 at the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum (Islamabad, 8–9 April 2025), consolidating six regulatory frameworks, eight legislative instruments, and 36 rule sets into a unified federal-provincial licensing system. The framework — convened by the SIFC and Deputy PM Ishaq Dar — establishes a two-tier licensing structure (large-scale: PKR 500M+; small-scale: PKR 25M–500M), mandatory appellate tribunal, and a "Mines and Minerals Force" to counter illegal mining in Sindh and Balochistan. Fiscal-incentive reforms aim to raise investor IRR from 14.5% to approximately 18%, underpinned by Reko Diq as the flagship precedent for future large-scale foreign-capital mineral projects.

Papua New Guinea's National Parliament passed the National Petroleum Authority Act 2025 on 12 March 2025 (vote 84–0), establishing the National Petroleum Authority (NPA) as a new statutory regulator replacing the Department of Petroleum and Energy. The companion Oil and Gas (Amendment) Act 2025 was passed the same week, realigning the Oil and Gas Act 1998 licensing framework with NPA oversight. Both Acts commenced on 9 April 2025 via Notice in the National Gazette. A new 0.5% gross-revenue levy on crude oil, natural gas, LNG, condensates, and LPG applies to all Petroleum Production Licence holders, directly affecting ExxonMobil's PNG LNG (8.3 Mtpa), TotalEnergies' Papua LNG (4 Mtpa, FID expected 2026–27), and Santos' legacy Oil Search holdings.