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AMK Arnold Müller GmbH & Co. KG — policy outlook

What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: magnets motors. Ownership re-checked 2026-09-28 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →

16upcoming at elevated+Forward outlook36 in pipeline96 in force (sev ≥ 3)7 tracked materials2 customer sectors

1 · What they make

AMK Arnold Müller GmbH & Co. KG originated in Kirchheim unter Teck, Germany in 1963. Its Drives & Automation division was acquired by the Arburg industrial family and rebranded as AMKmotion GmbH + Co KG in 2021; the automotive division (air-suspension compressors) was separately acquired by the Chinese Zhongding Group and now trades as AMK Automotive.

Rest of the descriptionShow

This dossier tracks the AMKmotion entity — the industrial drives arm. AMKmotion designs and manufactures AC servo motors (AMKASYN, ihXT series), integrated servo inverters (iX, iC, iDT families), and motion controllers for factory automation, packaging, printing, and machine-building OEMs. Power range spans roughly 0.15 kW to 75 kVA per axis.

Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.

2 · Where it operates — production footprint

2production countries in its dossier · approx. output shares

This is where AMK Arnold Müller GmbH & Co. KG produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.

🇩🇪 Germany≈85%

🇧🇬 BG≈15%

3 · Composition — the materials that matter

7tracked critical materials

Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.

dysprosiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply95

Dysprosium & terbium — High-performance servo motors that must maintain coercivity at elevated operating temperatures require a Dy or Tb additive (typically 1–5 wt%). Both are heavy rare earth elements with even higher China concentration than Nd/Pr; subject to Chinese export licensing controls imposed in 2023 and expanded in 2025.

terbiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply93

neodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply86

Neodymium & praseodymium — The AMKASYN and ihXT servo motors use NdFeB permanent-magnet rotors. Commercial NdFeB alloy is predominantly a Nd-Pr blend; both elements are mined and separated almost entirely in China (~85–90% of global separation capacity), creating acute single-country concentration risk.

praseodymiumbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply85

siliconbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply77

Silicon — Servo inverter power stages use silicon IGBTs (and, in newer designs, SiC MOSFETs). Silicon itself is commoditised, but high-purity polysilicon and SiC boules are concentrated in a small number of suppliers.

copperbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply68

Copper — Stator windings are copper; winding weight scales with motor power. AMKmotion's mid- to high-power motors (1–75 kVA) carry meaningful copper content.

nickelbuys🇨🇳 CN controls supply64

Nickel — Standard Ni-Cu-Ni electroplating protects NdFeB magnet slugs from corrosion; also present in signal connectors. Exposure is minor in weight but supply disruptions (Indonesian ore policy, Russian nickel sanctions) can create lead-time shocks.

Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.

4 · Threats & opportunities — in the pipeline

36proposed measures matching its inputs or sector · top 5 ranked by imminence × relevance · 16 at elevated+ likelihood

The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.

#1🇨🇩 DRC — Interministerial Arrêté Banning Export of Unprocessed Copper and Cobalt Concentrates (29 June 2026, replaces 4 August 2023 framework)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending

On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

Copper — Stator windings are copper; winding weight scales with motor power. AMKmotion's mid- to high-power motors (1–75 kVA) carry meaningful copper content.

3 · Your options

The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.

DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.

Tradable names in those ex-CD countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#2🇨🇳 China — MOFCOM/GACC suspension of ordinary industrial & smelter-byproduct sulfuric acid exports (in force from 1 May 2026)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending

Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

Copper — Stator windings are copper; winding weight scales with motor power. AMKmotion's mid- to high-power motors (1–75 kVA) carry meaningful copper content.

3 · Your options

China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.

Tradable names in those ex-CN countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

#3🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — Parliament-passed June 23, 2026; mining: Mineral Research Fund (10% gross mineral revenue), Income Tax Act & VAT Framework Agreement exemptionshighUnclassified · inferred

1 · If this passes

TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymium copper nickel · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending

TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

Copper — Stator windings are copper; winding weight scales with motor power. AMKmotion's mid- to high-power motors (1–75 kVA) carry meaningful copper content.

3 · Your options

The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.

Further materials are covered in section 6 below.

#4🇺🇸 US-China Bilateral Rare Earth Minerals Deal FrameworkhighSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

US · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches neodymium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending

Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with President Xi and me" — China to supply "full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, up front" to US; if formally enacted, would suspend or ease China's April 2025 rare earth export licensing regime (filed 2025-04-04-china-mofcom-rare-earth-export-licensing) for US-bound shipments; China's Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang confirmed "in principle" framework consensus from the June 5 Trump-Xi call; tariff framework: US 55% / China 10%; China April 2025 rare earth controls (heavy/medium REEs, including Dy/Tb NdFeB magnets, SmCo magnets) remain formally active — no MOFCOM suspension announcement found as of June 15, 2026; the deal is political but not yet implemented as a formal regulation or bilateral MOU

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

3 · Your options

United States supplies 13% of world neodymium mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.

Supply outside 🇺🇸 US: 🇨🇳 CN 83% · 🇦🇺 AU 8.9% · 🇲🇲 MM 6.7% · 🇹🇭 TH 1.4% — shares renormalised after removing US.

Tradable names in those ex-US countries, deployable-now first:

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 Lynas Rare Earthsdeployable nowProducing today — “largest producer of separated rare earth materials outside China”. Capacity partly committed — “Its separate US Department of War-backed heavy-REE separation project (Lynas USA, Seadrift, Texas — ~US$258m in DoW fun…”

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 Arafura Rare Earths Limiteddeployable laterNot yet producing — “FID taken May 2026”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date. Capacity partly committed — “Arafura holds firm offtake agreements with Hyundai, Kia, Siemens Gamesa and trader Traxys, and has secured sovereign-ba…”

domestic subsidy

#5🇲🇼 Malawi — Presidential Executive Order banning export of all raw/unprocessed minerals (effective 21 Oct 2025)highSupply restriction

1 · If this passes

MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches neodymium copper · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending

President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.

source ↗

2 · What it hits for you

Copper — Stator windings are copper; winding weight scales with motor power. AMKmotion's mid- to high-power motors (1–75 kVA) carry meaningful copper content.

3 · Your options

The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.

neodymium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.

Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 72% · 🇺🇸 US 14% · 🇦🇺 AU 7.7% · 🇲🇲 MM 5.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.

Tradable names in those ex-MW countries, deployable-now first:

🇺🇸 Energy Fuels Inc.deployable nowProducing today — “only primary vanadium producer”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

domestic subsidy

copper — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.

Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇱 CL 26% · 🇨🇩 CD 16% · 🇵🇪 PE 13% · 🇨🇳 CN 8.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.

Tradable names in those ex-MW countries, deployable-now first:

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

domestic subsidy

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

domestic subsidy

🇵🇪 Compañía de Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.deployable nowProducing today — “operating gold and polymetallic mines”.

liberalising at home

31 more in the pipelineShow

🇰🇿 Kazakhstan Subsoil Code 2026 amendments — domestic-content rise to 70% (incl. uranium), geological-data digitisation, e-auctions, strategic-investor priority righthighUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches copper, neodymium · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.

🇿🇲 Zambia SI No. 43 of 2026 — Customs and Excise (Suspension) (Copper Concentrates) (No. 2) Regulations, 2026highBeneficiation / form change

stage passed-vote → high · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Minister of Finance, acting under s.

🇧🇷 Brazil PNMCE — Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PL 2780/2024)highBeneficiation / form change

stage passed-vote → high · touches neodymium, copper · flagged 19 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0.

🇺🇸 US BOEM Proposed Rule — Administrative Revisions to OCS Hard Minerals Regulations (FR Doc. 2026-03690)elevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches nickel, copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…

🇯🇵 Japan METI/MOF Anti-Dumping Duty on Nickel-Added Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel Coil/Sheet/Strip from China and TaiwanhighImport cost

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches nickel · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · raises the cost of named origins into the issuer’s market — a cost line, not lost supply

Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Art. 22 Commission Implementing Decision — Strategic Raw Material Stock BenchmarkshighCompliance obligation

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches nickel, neodymium, silicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · an obligation on you — audit and file; it prohibits importing from nowhere, so no supplier change is implied and we list none

Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…

🇨🇩 DRC Strategic Mineral Reclassification Decree — 6 new minerals (lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REEs) elevated to strategic tier, royalty 3.5%→10%highUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-vote → high · touches neodymium · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…

🇲🇳 Mongolia Minerals Law Comprehensive Amendment 2026 — ~40% of 2006 law revised; exploration-licence term cut, statutory critical-minerals definition, downstream-beneficiation licensingmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches copper, neodymium, nickel · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…

🇲🇬 Madagascar — Council of Ministers lifts 16-year moratorium on new mining-permit issuance (except gold), effective ~29 Jan 2026highSupport / opportunity

stage passed-vote → high · touches nickel, neodymium · flagged 13 Aug 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…

🇹🇿 Tanzania Finance Bill 2026/27 — NEW raw-mineral EXPORT LEVY on quartz (HS 25.06) and feldspar (HS 2529.10.00) under the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196highBeneficiation / form change

stage awaiting-signature → high · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…

🇪🇺 EU European Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Centre — establishing instrumentelevatedSupport / opportunity

stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated · touches nickel, neodymium, copper · flagged 30 Jul 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…

🇵🇪 Peru Ley General de Minería Amendment — Mining Concession Regime ReformelevatedUnclassified · inferred

stage passed-committee → elevated · touches copper · flagged 14 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…

🇪🇺 EU Permanent-Magnet Scrap & Waste Export RestrictionlowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…

🇹🇿 Tanzania Critical & Strategic Minerals Strategy + statutory critical/strategic minerals LIST (Ministry of Minerals, Mavunde) — beneficiation-mandate licensing instrumentmoderateBeneficiation / form change

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches nickel, neodymium · flagged 29 Jun 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…

🇨🇮 Côte d'Ivoire — Revision of the 2014 Code Minier (Loi n° 2014-138)moderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches nickel · flagged 9 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…

🇲🇦 Morocco Mining Code Amendment — National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals + strategic-minerals designation listmoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches neodymium · flagged 4 Sept 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.

🇺🇸 USTR Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical MineralsmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches neodymium, nickel, copper · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…

🇧🇴 Bolivia nueva Ley de Minería — comprehensive replacement of the 2014 Ley 535 de Minería y MetalurgiamoderateUnclassified · inferred

stage draft-published → moderate · touches copper · flagged 17 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.

🇪🇺 EU CRMA Strategic Projects — Second Designation RoundmoderateSupport / opportunity

stage in-consultation → moderate · touches neodymium, silicon, nickel · flagged 15 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Second wave of CRMA Art.

African Union / AfDB — continental harmonisation of mining legislation toward a ban on unprocessed critical-mineral ore exports (Abidjan Ministerial Forum outcome)lowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches copper, neodymium · flagged 31 Jul 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…

🇮🇩 Indonesia PP 19/2025 Mining Royalty Rate Hike — Implementation Postponed Indefinitely (May 2026)lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches nickel, copper · flagged 16 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…

🇳🇨 New Caledonia (France) — "renewed nickel doctrine" + nickel-industry recovery pact under the Bougival AccordlowBeneficiation / form change

stage announced → low · touches nickel · flagged 14 Jul 2026 · changes the form/terms of the issuer’s exports, not their availability

The 12 July 2025 Bougival Accord (13-page political agreement creating a "State of New Caledonia" within France, pending a 2026 referendum + French organic law) contains an economic-rebuilding pact t…

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 15-20% stake acquisition in First Quantum Minerals' Zambian copper-nickel assetslowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper, nickel · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.

🇵🇬 Papua New Guinea Mining Bill 2025 — parliamentary enactment (replacement of Mining Act 1992)lowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper, nickel · flagged 18 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…

🇮🇳 India–Myanmar rare-earths cooperation — elevated to formal bilateral agenda at Modi–Min Aung Hlaing summitlowSupply restriction

stage announced → low · touches neodymium · flagged 6 Sept 2026 · restricts outbound flow from the issuer — the response is ex-issuer sourcing

At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…

🇮🇳 India SASCI Mining Sector Reforms Component FY2026-27 — ₹5,000 crore incentive scheme to accelerate mine auction-to-production pipelinelowSupport / opportunity

stage announced → low · touches copper, nickel, neodymium · flagged 26 Jun 2026 · support / opportunity, not a threat

Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…

🇮🇩 Indonesia NPI/Ferronickel/MHP Export Duty — ESDM Commitment, April 2026 Launch Postponed IndefinitelylowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches nickel · flagged 25 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

Indonesia = ~50% global nickel mine supply and dominant producer of NPI/ferronickel/MHP; export duty on downstream nickel products (NPI, ferronickel, nickel matte, MHP) would add a material cost laye…

🇨🇩 DRC Mines Minister Circular — 5% Worker Equity Enforcement (Articles 71 bis + 144 bis), January 30 2026lowUnclassified · inferred

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 23 Jun 2026 · mechanism unclear from the filed text — read the measure; we don’t guess

All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…

🇶🇦 Qatar Mining Company (QMSD) recommits US$800M to resume Jebel Ohier copper-gold project, SudanlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 4 Oct 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF/Ma'aden JV) — 10–20% stake in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 28 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…

🇸🇦 Manara Minerals (Saudi PIF / Ma'aden JV) — 10-20% stake acquisition in Pakistan's Reko Diq copper-gold projectlowInvestment control

stage announced → low · touches copper · flagged 27 Jun 2026 · affects deal-making (stakes, M&A, JVs), not material flow

Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…

4b · Already in force

96in-force restrictions (severity ≥ 3) on its tracked materials

5 of 96 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.

Australia — Treasurer's FATA s.69(2) orders direct six China-linked investors to divest 1.68 billion Northern Minerals shares (Orders (No. 1) 2026)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.

US-China Economic and Trade Arrangement (Busan Summit) — one-year mutual suspension of reciprocal tariff escalation, China rare-earth/critical-minerals export controls, and US affiliates rule; soybean and agricultural purchase commitments🇺🇸 Tariff · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

93 more in-force restrictionsShow

US Section 232 Copper Tariff (Proclamation 10962): 50% on semi-finished + derivative copper🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21): accelerated repeal of IRA clean-energy credits and FEOC restrictions on §45Y/§48E/§45X🇺🇸 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

China imposes export licensing on seven heavy and medium rare earths🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.

Panama Supreme Court declares Law 406/2023 (Minera Panamá / Cobre Panamá concession) unconstitutional🇵🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 5 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) Order, 2023🇿🇼 Export control · copper, nickelsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia bans raw nickel ore exports to force domestic processing🇮🇩 Export control · nickelsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires 80% of Tenke Fungurume, world's second-largest cobalt mine🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774) — parent industrial-mobilization and domestic-capacity statute🇺🇸 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, nickelsev 5

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Preliminary Anti-Dumping Ruling on Japanese Dichlorosilane (DCS) Imports🇨🇳 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS DPAS Directive Allocation Order — 100% domestic-sale mandate for black mass and tungsten waste/scrap🇺🇸 Export control · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 27 [2026] — 20 more Japanese entities incl. National Institute for Defense Studies added to Control List🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM Announcement No. 23 (2026) — 10 US Entities Added to Export Control Management List, Including MP Materials and USA Rare Earth🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Mozambique mining-sector reform bill (INAMI public consultation): 15% state stake, raw-mineral export ban, 25-year concessions, 10% local-development levy🇲🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Antidumping Determinations — Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells from India, Indonesia, and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determinations — Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells from India, Indonesia, and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia ESDM confirms 2026 nickel-ore RKAB quota cut to 260–270 million wmt🇮🇩 Industrial policy · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Turkey 2026 Import Regime — Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı No. 10790 (cross-sectoral surveillance + additional duties up to 48% on non-EU)🇹🇷 Tariff · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Kazakhstan amends Subsoil Code to grant Kazatomprom statutory priority over uranium blocks and reorganises subsoil-use governance🇰🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Arrêté 00964/2025 — Immediate suspension of all artisanal copper-cobalt processing and marketing entities🇨🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Geology and Minerals Law amendment (Law No. 147/2025/QH15): rare earths designated 'special strategic' minerals, raw exports prohibited🇻🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 17/2025 — RKAB annual cycle and MinerbaOne quota system🇮🇩 Regulatory · copper, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

India DGFT Notification 31/2025-26 — SCOMET Category 7 emerging-technologies export controls🇮🇳 Export control · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia Net Zero Plan 2050 and Six Sector Emissions Reduction Plans🇦🇺 Industrial policy · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Decree 193/2025/ND-CP: Comprehensive Implementing Decree for the Law on Geology and Minerals🇻🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia PP 28/2025 risk-based business licensing — Appendix 1F embeds OSS moratorium on intermediate-nickel smelters (matte, MHP, NPI, FeNi)🇮🇩 Industrial policy · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary countervailing duty on silicon metal from Laos, Australia, Norway, Thailand🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce final antidumping duty orders on silicon metal from Angola and Laos🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

CMOC acquires Ecuador's largest gold deposit via Lumina Gold takeover and signs $1.7B exploitation contract🇨🇳 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia PP 19/2025 — Tiered Minerba Royalty Regulation🇮🇩 Industrial policy · copper, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Steel and Metals Action Plan — COM(2025) 122 final🇪🇺 Industrial policy · copper, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

India Cabinet approves National Critical Mineral Mission with ₹34,300 cr seven-year outlay covering 30 minerals🇮🇳 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, silicon, copper, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Vietnam Law on Geology and Minerals (Law No. 54/2024/QH15)🇻🇳 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU imposes definitive countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles🇪🇺 Tariff · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Brazil Lei No. 14.948/2024 — Low-Carbon Hydrogen Legal Framework (PNH2BC, SBCH2, Rehidro)🇧🇷 Industrial policy · nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia — Treasurer's FATA s.69(2) orders direct five China-linked investors to divest 613.6 million Northern Minerals shares (Orders 2024)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia Permen ESDM 6/2024: MEMR smelter-completion framework for copper, iron, lead and zinc concentrate exports🇮🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Indonesia bans copper concentrate and anode sludge exports under Permendag 10/2024🇮🇩 Export control · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Section 301 tariff hikes on Chinese EVs, batteries, semis, solar, steel🇺🇸 Tariff · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council Order No. 785 — Regulation on the Administration of Rare Earths🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Treasury (OFAC) Bans Import of Russian-Origin Aluminum, Copper and Nickel; Bars Exchange/Derivative Servicing🇺🇸 Sanction · copper, nickelsev 4

Panama Ley 407 — Indefinite moratorium on metallic mining concessions nationwide🇵🇦 Industrial policy · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Sweden Act (2023:560) on the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments — Lag om granskning av utländska direktinvesteringar🇸🇪 FDI screening · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Korea K-Chips Act: semiconductor facility investment tax credit raised to 15/25%🇰🇷 Subsidy · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary countervailing duty determination on silicon metal from Kazakhstan🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

DRC Loi n° 18/001 — Revised Mining Code: strategic-mineral royalties, state carry doubled, stability curtailed🇨🇩 Regulatory · coppersev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017 (Act No. 5 of 2017, Cap. 449)🇹🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, nickelsev 4

stage not filed — treated as in force

US BIS temporary final rule restricting polysilicon stockpiling ahead of Proclamation 11052 Section 232 tariffs and minimum import prices🇺🇸 Regulatory · siliconsev 3

US OFAC SDN Designations: Cuban Nickel-Sector State Enterprises (CEDINIQ, CEPRONIQUEL, SERCONI, Pinares S.A.)🇺🇸 Sanction · nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce continues antidumping duty orders (Bosnia, Iceland, Malaysia) and countervailing duty order (Kazakhstan) on silicon metal after five-year sunset review🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Japan imposes provisional anti-dumping duty (3.6%-42.1%) on nickel-added cold-rolled stainless steel from China and Taiwan🇯🇵 Tariff · nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Determination — Proposed 25% Tariff on All Brazilian Goods🇺🇸 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa: Industrial Development Strategy 2026 — Permit-Conditioned Beneficiation Mandate for Critical Minerals🇿🇦 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US USTR Section 301 Forced Labor Findings and Proposed Action — 60 Economies🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China State Council Order No. 839 — Regulations for the Implementation of the Mineral Resources Law🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US OFAC April 30 2026 — designation of former DRC President Joseph Kabila under EO 13413/13671 for material support to M23 and Congo River Alliance (AFC)🇺🇸 Sanction · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Egypt PM Decree No. 1440/2026 — Executive Regulations of Mineral Resources Law 198/2014🇪🇬 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China Customs Tariff Commission — Zero-Tariff Treatment for All 53 African Diplomatic Partners (May 2026–April 2028)🇨🇳 Tariff · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MIIT publishes draft administrative-penalty discretion standards under the Rare Earth Management Regulation🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Ministry of Minerals revokes 40 idle mineral exploration licences (188,163 ha; MBT reallocation)🇹🇿 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, nickelsev 3

Indonesia Kepmen ESDM No. 144.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026 — Nickel Ore Multi-Element HPM Benchmark Price Reform🇮🇩 Industrial policy · copper, nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Japan-France Roadmap on Cooperation in Critical Minerals (Takaichi-Macron Tokyo Summit)🇯🇵 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zambia: Government/ZEMA conclude Sino-Metals Leach Zambia spillage investigation, opening remediation and compensation process🇿🇲 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Australia — Federal Court imposes AUD 14 million FIRB civil penalty against Indian Ocean International Shipping (Northern Minerals divestment non-compliance)🇦🇺 FDI screening · dysprosium, terbium, neodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MOFCOM/GACC Announcement No. 91 of 2025 — 2026 Dual-Use Catalogue (Export/Import Licence Administration)🇨🇳 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Ecuador Decreto Ejecutivo 273 — Reforma al Reglamento General a la Ley de Minería (sliding 3-8% royalty, 100% self-power mandate, tightened exploration timelines)🇪🇨 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US DOI / USGS Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals — 60-mineral statutory designation under the Energy Act of 2020🇺🇸 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, silicon, copper, nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Malawi Presidential Executive Order — Prohibition on Export of Raw Unprocessed Minerals (October 2025)🇲🇼 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Myanmar (Kachin): KIO Rare Earth Mining Management Regulation — Permit, Tax, and Environmental Governance Framework (October 2025)🇲🇲 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China MIIT/NDRC/MNR Interim Measures for Total Quantity Control of Rare Earth Mining, Smelting and Separation🇨🇳 Regulatory · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Chemicals Industry Action Plan (COM(2025) 530 final)🇪🇺 Industrial policy · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 — provincial law centralising Balochistan mineral control under federal SIFC, establishing Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority (MIFA)🇵🇰 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Lao PDR PM Order No. 06/PM — Permanent Alluvial Gold Ban and Metallic Mineral Project Moratorium🇱🇦 Regulatory · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa adds base-metal tariff headings (iron, steel, copper, aluminium, lead, zinc, tin) to ITAC export-permit list🇿🇦 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

EU Forced Labour Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 — first binding EU-wide prohibition on products made with forced labour🇪🇺 Regulatory · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Tanzania Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 — Mining Act critical/strategic minerals classification + USD 5m mining-licence capital floor🇹🇿 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Rwanda enacts Law n° 056/2024 establishing tax on minerals, restructuring royalty and export-tax rates to incentivise value-addition over raw-mineral exports🇷🇼 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

UK bans acquisition and import of Russian-origin metals (Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 4) Regulations 2023, SI 2023/1364)🇬🇧 Export control · copper, nickelsev 3

Jordan National Mining Sector Strategy 2023-2033 — 10-year MEMR framework targeting JD 2.1bn sector GDP and expanded phosphate, potash, REE, uranium, and copper investment🇯🇴 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Nigeria 7-Point Agenda for Solid Minerals & ETCM Roadmap🇳🇬 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Philippines Maharlika Investment Fund Act (RA 11954) — first national sovereign wealth fund with PHP 500bn target capital🇵🇭 Industrial policy · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Poland: Geological and Mining Law Amendment — Strategic Deposit Framework (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 2029)🇵🇱 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, copper, nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Greenland Parliament Act on Mineral Activities (Mining Act) No. 27 of 13 June 2023🇬🇱 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Namibia Cabinet 8th Meeting — Prohibition on Export of Unprocessed Critical Minerals🇳🇦 Export control · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymiumsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zimbabwe SI 57 of 2023 — Base Minerals Export Control (Unbeneficiated Base Mineral Ores) (Amendment) Order, 2023 (No. 1)🇿🇼 Export control · copper, nickelsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

OFAC Burma: Myanmar Mining Enterprise No. 1 and No. 2 Designated as SDNs🇺🇸 Sanction · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Zambia Mines and Minerals Development (Amendment) Act, No. 29 of 2022 — Copper Mineral Royalty Sliding Scale🇿🇲 Tariff · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

South Africa imposes 6-month export ban on ferrous/non-ferrous scrap metal, new export and import permits (Notices R.2801-R.2804)🇿🇦 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

Uganda Mining and Minerals Act 2022🇺🇬 Industrial policy · dysprosium, terbium, neodymium, praseodymium, coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

China — State Council Tariff Commission 2022 Tariff Adjustment Plan (税委会〔2021〕18号): ferrochrome export tariff doubled to 40%, ferrosilicon held at 25%🇨🇳 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS Entity List: Four Burma-Based Entities Supporting SAC Military Coup🇺🇸 Export control · coppersev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

BIS Entity List: Five Xinjiang Solar and Polysilicon Producers Designated for Uyghur Forced Labor🇺🇸 Export control · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

US Commerce preliminary antidumping duty determinations on silicon metal from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iceland🇺🇸 Tariff · siliconsev 3

stage not filed — treated as in force

5 · Impact — upstream (material inputs)

7scored materials

For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).

dysprosium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 1 upcoming · 44 in force95

terbium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 1 upcoming · 44 in force93

neodymium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 18 upcoming · 44 in force86

The other 4 materialsShow

praseodymium🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 1 upcoming · 42 in force85

silicon🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 3 upcoming · 18 in force77

copper🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 22 upcoming · 40 in force68

nickel🇨🇳 CN controls · buys · 17 upcoming · 25 in force64

5b · Impact — downstream (its customers)

5register measures (last 24m) targeting its customer sectors

Its customers sit in ev motors, wind turbines — read via the graph's permanent magnets node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.

China imposes export licensing on seven heavy and medium rare earths🇨🇳 hits ev motors, wind turbinesdemand risk

Mexico — Decreto modifying TIGIE and PROSEC: MFN duties of 5–35% on 185 tariff fractions for non-FTA imports (DOF 23 Apr 2026)🇲🇽 hits wind turbinesdemand risk

India Cabinet approves Rs 7,280 crore scheme to manufacture sintered Rare Earth Permanent Magnets (REPM)🇮🇳 hits wind turbinesdemand support

2 more customer-sector measuresShow

Japan-France Roadmap on Cooperation in Critical Minerals (Takaichi-Macron Tokyo Summit)🇯🇵 hits ev motorsdemand risk

China MOFCOM Announcements No. 61 + 62 — extraterritorial rare-earth export controls🇨🇳 hits ev motors, wind turbinesdemand risk

6 · Solution / strategy — the moves available

77 bought materials with a tradable substitute bench

For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.

dysprosium19 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 35 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇯🇵 Sumitomo Corporationdeployable nowProducing today — “operating a rare-earth recovery plant”. Capacity partly committed — “Sumitomo Corp's own Mineral Resources Group materials page names its non-ferrous portfolio as copper, nickel, aluminium…”

+15 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

terbium18 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 32 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇨🇦 Aclara Resourcesdeployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; no tonnes before 2028 (“first production ~2027-2028”).

+14 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

neodymium16 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 44 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇨🇦 Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp.deployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date.

+12 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

praseodymium15 tradable ex-🇨🇳CN producers · 39 tracked total

⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.

🇦🇺 Energy Transition Minerals (Kvanefjeld)deployable nowProducing today — “operating mine”.

🇨🇦 Neo Performance Materialsdeployable nowProducing today — “operating in three segments”.

🇨🇦 Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp.deployable laterNot yet producing — “pre-production”; its dossier gives no evidenced production date.

+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

silicon4 tradable ex-🇮🇳IN producers · 22 tracked total

🇲🇽 Compañía Minera Autlán, S.A.B. de C.V.deployable nowProducing today — “largest producer of manganese and”.

🇬🇧 Ferroglobedeployable nowProducing today — “largest Western (ex-China) producers of silicon metal and silicon- and manganese-based specialty al”.

🇷🇺 United Company RUSALdeployable nowProducing today — “largest refined-silicon producer”.

No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.

🇿🇦 Exxaro Resources Limitedstatus unknownIts dossier carries no deployment-status signal — status unknown; we don’t guess.

Full substitution matrix →

copper60 tradable ex-🇺🇸US producers · 226 tracked total

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

🇬🇧 Anglo American plcdeployable nowProducing today — “commercial production since 2022”.

🇬🇧 Antofagasta plcdeployable nowProducing today — “operating mines”.

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

nickel38 tradable ex-🇺🇸US producers · 137 tracked total

🇨🇦 Agnico Eagle Mines Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

🇬🇧 Anglo American plcdeployable nowProducing today — “commercial production since 2022”.

🇦🇺 BHP Group Limiteddeployable nowProducing today — “only copper smelter”.

🇸🇪 Boliden ABdeployable nowProducing today — “with mines in”.

+34 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.

Full substitution matrix →

How these claims are derived (method)Show

Likelihood bands are derived deterministically from the legislative stage — announced → low; draft-published → moderate; in-consultation → moderate; consultation-closed → elevated; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote → high; awaiting-signature → high. We never publish a point probability: no honest per-jurisdiction bill-passage base rate exists.
Upcoming measures come from our forward intake queue, matched to this company's scored materials and sector. Each carries the date we first flagged it and a public source.
Transmission classes are derived from what each instrument does, on explicit signals in its own text (with the taxonomy in lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.
The top-5 ranking is mechanical, not editorial: score = classWeight × (likelihood-band rank + 1) × (1 + Σ touched-material weights), where a material this company produces weighs 2 and one it buys weighs 1, and classWeight reflects severity of effect: supply restriction 4 / 3 / 2 (issuer's production share of a touched material ≥5% / measurable / unmeasured), beneficiation 3 / 2.5 / 1.5 on the same gates, import cost and unclassified 2, investment control 1.5, compliance and support 1. A reporting obligation can therefore never outrank a live supply restriction on a material this company depends on merely by name-checking many materials. Sector-only matches carry the base relevance. Ties break to the higher band, then the most recently flagged.
Issuer production shares come from the USGS-based production-share table (lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.
Each chain card is assembled, never authored: step 1 quotes the measure's own expected-impact text (any date shown, including a compliance deadline, comes verbatim from that text or its source — we never synthesize one); step 2 quotes this company's own dossier bullet for the touched material verbatim, and says so plainly when the exposure is only sector-derived; step 3 is derived from the transmission class — for supply restrictions the tradable names shown are alternatives-map entries filtered to the ex-issuer production countries, where a tariff chip means a live register tariff entry by DE or the EU explicitly targets that material and supplier country (rate shown only when recorded), a subsidy/liberalising chip means a support measure by the supplier's own government on that material, and the EU/domestic chip is derived from the EU membership list. Every chip links to its register entry; no chip means no register signal, not "no risk".
In-force restrictions are register entries (stage in-force, effective severity ≥ 3) tagging its materials — every row links to the entry and its primary source.
Upstream scores are the footprint-adjusted, buyer-relative material scores from the company risk engine.
Customer sectors come from a hand-authored supply-chain adjacency graph (analyst judgement, weighted 0–1), the same graph the register's downstream-impact views propagate through. Where the company's sector label has no node of its own, the nearest equivalent node is used and labelled as such. The demand-support / demand-risk tag is a mechanical read of each measure's type and polarity, not a per-company judgement.
Alternatives are the alternatives-map slice (derived 2026-10-05): ex-controller-bloc producers tracked in the corpus, with tradability inherited from the verified listing layer.
Alternative viability is gated, not decorative (lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.

How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.

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