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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: automotive. Company profile →
Isuzu Motors Limited (7202-t) is a Japanese manufacturer of commercial vehicles and diesel engines — light, medium, and heavy-duty trucks, buses, and pickups (D-Max) — sold globally through brands including Isuzu and UD Trucks. The overwhelming majority of current production and revenue is conventional diesel/gasoline powertrains; Isuzu is only beginning to electrify, with the battery-electric ELF EV light-duty truck (launched 2023) and a Class 6/7 battery-electric truck targeted for 2026-2027 in partnership with Cummins/Accelera, alongside a Toyota joint fuel-cell-truck program.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Isuzu Motors Limited produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Dysprosium / Terbium — trace additive. Heavy rare earths doped into NdFeB traction-motor magnets to preserve coercivity at operating temperature; same niche-BEV caveat as neodymium/praseodymium above. China dominates mining and separation of both with no credible alternative at scale.
Dysprosium / Terbium — trace additive. Heavy rare earths doped into NdFeB traction-motor magnets to preserve coercivity at operating temperature; same niche-BEV caveat as neodymium/praseodymium above. China dominates mining and separation of both with no credible alternative at scale.
Lithium / Graphite — structural component, but of a niche product line. The ELF EV runs on cylindrical lithium-ion cells sourced from LG Energy Solution, and Isuzu's planned Class 6/7 BEV uses Cummins/Accelera LFP battery packs. Lithium (electrolyte/cathode) and graphite (anode) are structural to those battery packs, but battery-electric trucks are currently a small fraction of Isuzu's overall unit volume ne…
Neodymium / Praseodymium — structural component (BEV traction motor magnets), niche product line. Permanent-magnet synchronous motors using NdFeB magnets are the industry-standard traction motor for the battery- electric truck segment Isuzu is entering; as with lithium, this exposure tracks the small and still-growing BEV share of Isuzu's output, not its core diesel business.
Neodymium / Praseodymium — structural component (BEV traction motor magnets), niche product line. Permanent-magnet synchronous motors using NdFeB magnets are the industry-standard traction motor for the battery- electric truck segment Isuzu is entering; as with lithium, this exposure tracks the small and still-growing BEV share of Isuzu's output, not its core diesel business.
Chromium / Manganese / Vanadium / Niobium — structural component (truck chassis and engine alloy steel). Commercial-truck frames, axles, and diesel-engine blocks/components are built from high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) and chromium steel; these four elements are standard microalloying/alloying additions in that steel, not incidental.
Chromium / Manganese / Vanadium / Niobium — structural component (truck chassis and engine alloy steel). Commercial-truck frames, axles, and diesel-engine blocks/components are built from high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) and chromium steel; these four elements are standard microalloying/alloying additions in that steel, not incidental.
Lithium / Graphite — structural component, but of a niche product line. The ELF EV runs on cylindrical lithium-ion cells sourced from LG Energy Solution, and Isuzu's planned Class 6/7 BEV uses Cummins/Accelera LFP battery packs. Lithium (electrolyte/cathode) and graphite (anode) are structural to those battery packs, but battery-electric trucks are currently a small fraction of Isuzu's overall unit volume ne…
Rhodium / Iridium — trace additive (NOx reduction catalyst). Rhodium is used alongside platinum/palladium in three-way and SCR-adjacent catalyst formulations to reduce NOx to nitrogen; like Pt/Pd, this is a gram-scale loading per vehicle, concentrated in South African PGM output.
Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
Platinum / Palladium — trace additive (diesel aftertreatment catalyst). Isuzu's diesel engines use diesel oxidation catalysts (DOC) and particulate-filter regeneration catalysts loaded with platinum and palladium to oxidize CO and hydrocarbons. This is a gram-scale washcoat loading, not a bulk structural input, but it is the single most business-critical mineral exposure Isuzu carries today because diesel af…
Chromium / Manganese / Vanadium / Niobium — structural component (truck chassis and engine alloy steel). Commercial-truck frames, axles, and diesel-engine blocks/components are built from high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) and chromium steel; these four elements are standard microalloying/alloying additions in that steel, not incidental.
Chromium / Manganese / Vanadium / Niobium — structural component (truck chassis and engine alloy steel). Commercial-truck frames, axles, and diesel-engine blocks/components are built from high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) and chromium steel; these four elements are standard microalloying/alloying additions in that steel, not incidental.
Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiummanganeselithiumcopperniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Lithium / Graphite — structural component, but of a niche product line. The ELF EV runs on cylindrical lithium-ion cells sourced from LG Energy Solution, and Isuzu's planned Class 6/7 BEV uses Cummins/Accelera LFP battery packs. Lithium (electrolyte/cathode) and graphite (anode) are structural to those battery packs, but battery-electric trucks are currently a small fraction of Isuzu's overall unit volume ne…
Neodymium / Praseodymium — structural component (BEV traction motor magnets), niche product line. Permanent-magnet synchronous motors using NdFeB magnets are the industry-standard traction motor for the battery- electric truck segment Isuzu is entering; as with lithium, this exposure tracks the small and still-growing BEV share of Isuzu's output, not its core diesel business.
Chromium / Manganese / Vanadium / Niobium — structural component (truck chassis and engine alloy steel). Commercial-truck frames, axles, and diesel-engine blocks/components are built from high-strength low-alloy (HSLA) and chromium steel; these four elements are standard microalloying/alloying additions in that steel, not incidental.
+3 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 93% of world niobium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Brazil supplies 4.1% of world lithium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Brazil supplies 4.0% of world manganese mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: niobium supply outside BR is 🇨🇦 CA 80%, 🇨🇩 CD 13%, 🇷🇺 RU 4.0% (shares renormalised after removing BR); lithium supply outside BR is 🇦🇺 AU 34%, 🇨🇳 CN 22%, 🇨🇱 CL 20% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumcopperniobiumaluminium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Lithium / Graphite — structural component, but of a niche product line. The ELF EV runs on cylindrical lithium-ion cells sourced from LG Energy Solution, and Isuzu's planned Class 6/7 BEV uses Cummins/Accelera LFP battery packs. Lithium (electrolyte/cathode) and graphite (anode) are structural to those battery packs, but battery-electric trucks are currently a small fraction of Isuzu's overall unit volume ne…
Neodymium / Praseodymium — structural component (BEV traction motor magnets), niche product line. Permanent-magnet synchronous motors using NdFeB magnets are the industry-standard traction motor for the battery- electric truck segment Isuzu is entering; as with lithium, this exposure tracks the small and still-growing BEV share of Isuzu's output, not its core diesel business.
Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
+2 more touched materials — see the composition section (3) above.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
graphite — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 81% · 🇲🇬 MG 4.6% · 🇹🇿 TZ 4.4% · 🇧🇷 BR 3.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
neodymium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 72% · 🇺🇸 US 14% · 🇦🇺 AU 7.7% · 🇲🇲 MM 5.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphiteneodymiumcopperniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Lithium / Graphite — structural component, but of a niche product line. The ELF EV runs on cylindrical lithium-ion cells sourced from LG Energy Solution, and Isuzu's planned Class 6/7 BEV uses Cummins/Accelera LFP battery packs. Lithium (electrolyte/cathode) and graphite (anode) are structural to those battery packs, but battery-electric trucks are currently a small fraction of Isuzu's overall unit volume ne…
Neodymium / Praseodymium — structural component (BEV traction motor magnets), niche product line. Permanent-magnet synchronous motors using NdFeB magnets are the industry-standard traction motor for the battery- electric truck segment Isuzu is entering; as with lithium, this exposure tracks the small and still-growing BEV share of Isuzu's output, not its core diesel business.
Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
DR Congo supplies 14% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇩 CD: 🇨🇱 CL 31% · 🇵🇪 PE 16% · 🇨🇳 CN 10% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.7% — shares renormalised after removing CD.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper / Aluminium — structural component (wiring, radiators, engine and body components). Standard large-volume inputs across both the diesel fleet (wiring harnesses, radiators, cast components) and the nascent BEV line (motor windings, busbars), scaling with total vehicle output rather than being confined to one product line. Sector-derived guesses in the prior stub not carried forward: cobalt and nickel (no confirmed Isuzu…
China supplies 7.8% of world copper mining — that share of your supply base is what this measure cuts off.
Supply outside 🇨🇳 CN: 🇨🇱 CL 29% · 🇨🇩 CD 17% · 🇵🇪 PE 15% · 🇷🇺 RU 7.1% — shares renormalised after removing CN.
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
Framework agreed "in principle" between Trump and Xi following June 5, 2026 call and subsequent negotiations; Trump stated June 11, 2026 "Our deal with China is done, subject to final approval with P…
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Gabon (CTRI transitional government, President Oligui Nguema) announced at Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi (May 2026) its intention to subscribe to Eramet SA's €500M capital increase, giving the Gab…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2.
On 6 August 2026, at a ceremony at the Petit Palais of the Presidency chaired by Djiba Diakité (Minister Chief of Staff, chair of the Simandou 2040 Strategic Committee), Guinea's wholly state-owned N…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel S…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Guinea = world's #2 bauxite producer (183 Mt exported in 2025, ~45% of China's bauxite imports); Mines Minister Bouna Sylla confirmed in March 2026 that export volume curbs will be applied by early A…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Council's general approach expands the Commission's proposed downstream scope further (more products than Commission proposed); mandates annual Commission review for future scope additions; adds anti…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit —…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
Under the RESourceEU action plan (COM(2025) 945, adopted 3 Dec 2025 and already filed as 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945), the European Commission committed to PROPOSE, by Q2 2026,…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Gold mining royalties rise from 3-5% to 9-12% sliding-scale (price-indexed); mining lease maximum cut 30→15 years with renewals limited to 2×10-year additional terms; Development Agreements and Inves…
~25% reduction in Guinea's annual bauxite shipments to China (150 Mt target vs.
Extends the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism from the existing Regulation (EU) 2023/956 sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, electricity) to approximately 180 downstream produc…
On 18 March 2026 Guinea's Minister of Mines Bouna Sylla told Reuters that Guinea — the world's top bauxite exporter (~40% of global seaborne supply, 2025 exports ~183 Mt, +25% y/y) — would reduce exp…
Guinea — the world's largest bauxite exporter (~single-largest feed to China's alumina/aluminium chain) — is preparing a sector-wide measure to CAP/reduce bauxite exports to stabilise falling prices…
Gabon = ~25% world manganese reserves, world's 2nd largest manganese ore exporter (~8 Mt/year via COMILOG/Eramet); ban on raw ore exports forces domestic processing investment (silicomanganese, EMD,…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — conc…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
On 7 September 2026 Guinea's state-owned Nimba Mining Company and Glencore signed a five-year pre-financing agreement, announced by the government and Glencore on 10 September 2026, worth over USD 30…
At Myanmar military-government head Min Aung Hlaing's early-June-2026 New Delhi visit (his first India visit since the 2021 coup), critical minerals and rare earths featured explicitly on the formal…
Supersedes 2022 bauxite reference price arrêté; establishes real-time FOB benchmark for all Guinea bauxite exports (~182 Mt/yr, world's largest supplier); estimated >$1bn/yr additional government rev…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
Guinea's CNRD junta gives Societe Minière de Boke (SMB, China-linked, ~50% of Guinea's bauxite output) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG, joint venture: Halco Mining/Alcoa/Rio Tinto/Dadco) 10…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
GN ≈ 60% global seaborne bauxite; a ~150 Mt/yr cap (vs 183 Mt 2025) tightens the alumina→aluminium chain — direct hit to EU aluminium-vertical names
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
VP declared no new large-scale mining agreement will be concluded without a binding value-addition commitment; Mines Minister referenced Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and Malawi precedents for raw-miner…
On 16 November 2025 Brazil's national development bank BNDES signed a BRL 221 million (~USD 41.
5 of 120 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (automotive) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+15 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+14 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+12 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+26 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+56 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+7 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+2 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
+9 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.